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The General Agreement on Trades in Services (GATS) is a multilateral framework of 
principles and rules for trade in services under the World Trade Organization (WTO).  This 
dissertation aims to provide regulatory structure for Article XV of the GATS.  GATS Article XV 
targets subsidies in service trades, but does not stipulate any detailed rules.  Currently, GATS 
Article XV only contains guidelines for Members in future negotiations.  Little progress has been 
made in those negotiations. 
I propose a service subsidy definition based on the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCMA), with some adjustments to adapt rules applicable to trade in 
goods to service trades.  With respect to the subsidy categorization system, I propose a hybrid 
mechanism for Members to consider.  Traffic-light categorization under the SCMA and the 
Amber/Blue/Green Box System under the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) are two existing 
categorization systems under the WTO.  The hybrid system of categorization I propose aims to 
associate the advantages of the two existing systems for trade in goods, taking into account the 
four modes by which services are supplied across borders. 
In the end, I do not propose to solve all of the problems in determining the 
appropriateness of countervailing duty procedures.  The lack of available data is a key obstacle.  
However, I do propose several collection procedures based on the VAT/RST tax systems.  The 
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problem of collecting countervailing duties on service subsidies is not without a solution.  I will 
identify the problems and suggest some models for a workable solution. 
My research also indicates that WTO Members will need to give service subsidies greater 
attention as the Doha Round moves forward.  I believe that effort can be successful and that 
WTO Members can create a more comprehensive legal system for the global market, including 
rules on service subsidies. 
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1 
I.  OVERVIEW 
This study considers Article XV of the General Agreement on Trade in Services1 (GATS) and its 
rules on subsidies in services trade.  In the Doha Round, no progress has been made on this 
issue.2  The deadlock of the Doha Round has delayed advances in this area, consistent with the 
otherwise slow development of subsidy regulation in services compared with other issues in the 
GATS.  This study will emphasize the importance of subsidies regulations in services and 
propose a legal framework for World Trade Organization (WTO) Members to consider in future 
negotiations. 
A.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
After the Uruguay Round, the completion of the GATS remained a matter of unfinished 
business.  There is no doubt that the GATS was a huge step forward in the globalization of world 
services markets.  It is also obvious, however, that there are many unsolved issues in the GATS.  
                                                 
1 General Agreement on Trade in Services art. 11, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]. 
2 Mary Footer, The General Agreement on Trade in Services: Taking Stock and Moving Forward, 29 Legal Issues of 
Economic Integration, 21-22 (2002). 
2 
The March 30, 1995 establishment of the Working Party on GATS Rules (WPGR) showed a 
clear intent to deal with many of these GATS problems.3 
The Working Party’s mandate includes issues related to safeguard measures, government 
procurement, and subsidies.  Nonetheless, the WPGR did not make any progress until July 22, 
2002.4  Moreover, of these three issues, only the topic of safeguard measures was given a 
specific deadline for completion within the GATS negotiations.5  As a result of this focus, 
safeguards have taken over the GATS discussions, leaving little room for consideration of 
subsidies issues.  Due to the delay of the negotiations concerning safeguard measures, no 
substantial progress has been made on the subsidy issue. 
Even though there is no comprehensive evidence showing subsidies in services, 
consideration of WTO Trade Policy Reviews suggests that Members do engage in granting 
subsidies in their domestic sectors, including transportation, telecommunication, tourism, 
financial services, and education.6 
Article XV of the GATS explicitly stipulates Members’ obligations regarding subsidies 
granted on trade in services: 
1. Members recognize that, in certain circumstances, subsidies may have 
distortive effects on trade in services.  Members shall enter into negotiations with 
a view to developing the necessary multilateral disciplines to avoid such trade-
distortive effects.7  The negotiations shall also address the appropriateness of 
countervailing procedures.  Such negotiations shall recognize the role of subsidies 
in relation to the development programmes of developing countries and take into 
account the needs of Members, particularly developing country Members, for 
flexibility in this area.  For the purpose of such negotiations, Members shall 
                                                 
3 GATS art. XXIV. 
4 Working Party on GATS Rules, Work Programmes, S/WPGR/7 (25 July 2002). 
5 GATS art. X(3) states that, “The provisions of paragraph 2 should cease to apply three years after the date of entry 
into force of the WTO Agreement.” 
6 Working Parties on GATS Rules, Subsidies for Services Sectors: Information Contained in WTO Trade Policy 
Review, S/WPGR/W/25/Add.2 (December 12, 2000). 
7  A future work programme shall determine how, and in what time-frame, negotiations on such multilateral 
disciplines will be conducted. 
3 
exchange information concerning all subsidies related to trade in services that 
they provide to their domestic service suppliers. 
 
2. Any Member which considers that it is adversely affected by a subsidy of 
another Member may request consultations with that Member on such matters.  
Such requests shall be accorded sympathetic consideration. 
 
This provision places upon Members obligations to: 
(1) recognize the trade-distortive effects resulting from subsidies; 
(2) enter into negotiations to develop the necessary multilateral disciplines to 
avoid such trade-distortive effects; 
(3) address the appropriateness of countervailing procedures; 
(4) recognize the role of subsidies in relation to the development programmes 
of developing countries for flexibility; 
(5) exchange information concerning all domestic subsidies related to trade in 
services; and 
(6) create a dispute resolution mechanism for dealing with service subsidies 
(this is an implied obligation, even though Article XV:2 does not 
explicitly mention any). 
As this list indicates, GATS Article XV only establishes guidance for Members to follow.  
Nevertheless, it obligates Members to conduct negotiations.8  It does not provide substantive 
rules for determining how to define “subsidies” in services, how to calculate the amount of 
subsidies, and how to determine if an aid is a subsidy.  Moreover, it provides no guidance on 
procedures for dispute resolution in subsidy related matters.9 
                                                 
8 GATS art. XV, footnote 7. 
9 GATS art. XV(2) simply accords Members to give sympathetic consideration on any request form other Members 
who allege to be inflicted by their service subsidies. 
4 
This framework (or lack thereof) raises important questions regarding the matter of 
subsidies in services trade.  Time was limited in the Uruguay Round, and many GATS details 
were not put on the table for Members to negotiate.  Thus, it is crucial that consideration be 
given to the need for future negotiation of important issues in the GATS system. 
B.  ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation can be illustrated in a chapter-by-chapter chart for a better understanding of its 
structure. 
Chapters Contents 
Chapter 1 Provide a basic overview of the dissertation.  Break down the 
analysis into three parts: introduction, information collection, 
and theory development 
Chapter 2 Briefly introduce the transition and historical background from 
the GATT era to the WTO era. Point out two essential principles 
in this international trade system:  most-favoured-nation and 
national treatment. 
Chapter 3 Focus on the General Agreement on Trade in Services, including 
its development from the past to the present, its unique 
categorization of trade in services, and its problems.  
Chapter 4 Focus on the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, including its historical transition, the elements 
necessary to determine subsidies, and the requirements to be met 
before the implementation of countervailing measures. 
Chapter 5 Focus on the subsidy-related part of the Agreement on 
Agriculture, including its exception from the general subsidy 
regulations and the purpose behind such an exception. 
Chapter 6 Confirm the importance and necessity of subsidies regulation in 
service trades.  Summarize Members’ submissions and scholarly 
publications on the definition of a service subsidy.   
Chapter 7 Propose a legal framework to regulate service subsidies, starting 
by defining “subsidy,” and moving to categorizing different 
types of subsidies. 
5 
Chapter 8 Discuss the appropriateness of countervailing measures in 
service subsidy rules.  Explain the rationales for having a 
comprehensive countervailing measure system and the 
feasibility of a specific countervailing system. 
Chapter 9 Propose a legal framework for countervailing measures in 
service trades.  Apply the Value Added Tax system as a model. 
 
1.  Introduction to Service Subsidies 
This dissertation will be divided into a total of ten chapters.  In Chapter 1, I will give readers an 
overview of the structure of this dissertation, and provide a general description of my 
contribution through the paper.  In Chapter 2, I will discuss the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and its global importance, including a discussion of the historical transition from the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades10 (GATT) to the present WTO and the institutional 
framework of the WTO.  Chapter 2 will also focus on the basic legal principles embodied in the 
WTO Agreement,11  including most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment and national treatment 
(NT) under the GATT regime. 
2.  The Relevant Agreements 
In Chapter 3, I will introduce the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).  This chapter 
will provide a thorough review of the GATS, including (1) the four modes of supplying services; 
(2) the unique way in which each Member’s schedule of concessions is drafted; and (3) how the 
                                                 
10 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, Legal 
Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 1 art. XV (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1152 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 
1994]. 
11 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, opened for signature 
April 15, 1994, Marrakesh, Morocco, 33 ILM 1140-1272 (1994) [hereinafter WTO]. 
6 
most-favoured-nation treatment and national treatment principles are applied differently in the 
rules found in the GATS than in traditional GATT practice. 
Service trades are complex and difficult to categorize.  There exists no agreed definition 
of a service in international trade.12  However, GATS represents a huge achievement in listing 
four different modes of services to be regulated.  The GATS categorization is based upon the 
“supply modes of services.”  These four modes are services trade conducted,13 
(1) from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other Member (Mode I:  
cross-border); 
(2) in the territory of one Member to the service consumer of any other Member 
(Mode II:  consumption abroad); 
(3) by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in the 
territory of any other Member (Mode III:  commercial presence); and 
(4) by a service supplier of one Member, through the presence of natural persons of a 
Member in the territory of any other Member (Mode IV:  movement of natural 
persons). 
These four modes will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.  In addition to a basic 
GATS overview, I will also review current issues regarding GATS and Members’ attitudes 
towards the agreement. 
In Chapter 4, I will provide an introduction to the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (the SCMA).  The SCMA  serves two purposes under the WTO:  to 
discipline nations in their use of subsidies, and to specify actions that can be taken to confront 
the damage caused by subsidies.  The SCM Agreement clearly defines subsidies, identifying all 
                                                 
12 Birgitte (ed.) Egelund Olsen, WTO Law- From a European Perspective, 280 (20 January 2006). 
13 GATS art. I:2. 
7 
possible forms of subsidies.14  Moreover, the Agreement categorizes subsidies into three types:  
prohibited subsidies,15 actionable subsidies,16 and non-actionable subsidies.17  Chapter 4 will 
include further elaboration of the issues raised by the structure and substance of the SCMA. 
In Chapter 5, I will provide an introduction to the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), 
concentrating on agricultural subsidies, including both export and domestic subsidies.  Since 
agricultural trade is a special and sensitive subject in the international trade system, the 
elimination of all of the restrictions on agricultural products that have been around for many 
years cannot be accomplished in a short time frame.  Managing agriculture-related matters has 
been a large and contentious issue carried over from the Uruguay Round to the Doha Round.18  
The AoA provides a relatively accommodating framework on agricultural subsidies when 
compared to the SCM Agreement.  Moreover, the AoA provides flexibility for developing 
countries and least-developed countries (LDCs). 19   This special flexibility is important in 
harmonizing the agricultural laws of Members, especially between developed and developing 
countries  This makes the application of the AoA in context of GATS subsidy matters helpful in 
motivating Members to move forward. 
                                                 
14 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF 
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 275 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 [not reproduced in I.L.M.] [hereinafter 
ASCM], art. 1. 
15 ASCM, arts. 3-4. 
16 ASCM, arts. 5-7. 
17 ASCM, arts. 8-9. 
18 Peter Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization:  Text, Cases and Materials 583-4 
(2005).  Agricultural products have long been important for most countries’ trades.  For European countries and 
United States, agricultural exports are essential interests to their local industries.  These industries have long been 
protected and heavily subsidized by countries around the world.  Since the goal for GATT/WTO is to have a world 
of free trade without other interferences, countries politically protecting and financially subsidizing local industries 
are not preferred.  Therefore, one of the most difficult tasks for GATT/WTO is to open Members’ domestic markets 
for agricultural products. 
19 AoA, art. 15. 
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3.  Theory Development 
In Chapter 6, I will demonstrate the need for multilateral rules governing subsidies in services 
trade.  In Chapter 7, suggested rules on GATS Article XV(1) will be elaborated, addressing the 
definition of a subsidy.  In Chapter 8, I will discuss the appropriateness of having countervailing 
measures in GATS.  In Chapter 9, a suggested legal mechanism to deal with countervailing 
duties will be elaborated.  In Chapter 10, I will give a summary of the dissertation, and discuss 
possible future work on this subject. 
It is useful here to provide a brief overview of the theory underlying this dissertation, as 
well as a basic review of issues that will be the focus of Chapters 6 through 9.  Prior to 
discussing the regulation of subsidies in services, we must understand why it is important to 
regulate subsidies.  Thus, Chapter 6 will begin with a demonstration of the importance of having 
subsidy regulations in the GATS.  This starting point coincides with one of the GATS Article 
XV obligations, which in turn is related to a discussion of the trade-distortive effects of 
subsidies.  Apart from discussing the nature of subsidies themselves, proof of their importance 
can be evidenced by real examples, demonstrated in existing international agreements and the 
regional regulations of Member States.20 
Also in the first part of Chapter 6, I will explain the differences between goods and 
services, as well as the differences between laws that govern goods and services trade.  We must 
ask whether goods and services are so different that we need another instrument to deal with 
subsidies in services – or whether we can use existing mechanisms originally applicable to trade 
in goods.  Trade in goods and trade in services differ in many respects, and we must ask whether 
                                                 
20 Some international agreements have established category regulating service subsidy issues.  E.g., the Australia-
New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement and the European Community Treaty.  For introduction 
on specific articles in these agreements, please refer to Chapter 6.I.B in this dissertation. 
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such differences cause unsolvable gaps when applying the subsidy definition in the SCMA to the 
services area. 
Some believe that subsidy disputes can be resolved using the current rules, and that there 
is no need to put the issue on the negotiating table right now.21  The question of whether the 
existing rules in the GATS can cover all possible problems, and eliminate the need for separate 
subsidy rules applicable to trade in services, is also addressed in Chapter 6. 
Briefly stating the theory developed in Chapter 6, I suggest that the existing rules dealing 
with trade in goods are not sufficient to regulate subsidy issues in the services sector.  Some 
scholars suggest that subsidy regulation is not necessary since existing trade rules, other than 
those dealing with subsidies,22 can cover the same scope.  I will scrutinize at length all possible 
laws which could restrain service subsidies in order to prove that those regulations are 
insufficient to deal with subsidy problems.  Therefore, I will conclude that laws related to service 
subsidies are necessary in the GATS. 
In Chapter 6, I will briefly (1) introduce Members’ discussions on service subsidy issue, 
and (2) answer why current GATS rules, the MFN treatment principle and the NT principle, are 
not sufficient to deal with service subsidy issues. 
                                                 
21 Marc Benitah, Subsidies, Services and Sustainable Development, Trade in Services and Sustainable Development, 
Issue Paper No.1, 2004, at 5, available at http://ictsd.org/downloads/2008/06/ip_services_01.pdf; 楊光華,<服務補
貼規範發展必要性之初探>, 第四屆國際經貿法學發展學術研討會論文集 , translated in Guan-hua Yang, 
Preliminary Discussion on the necessity of subsidy regulations in GATS, Chenchi Law Review, Vol. 4, 268 (2004).  
After the author’s preliminary discussion on GATS Article XV, she believes that it is not necessary to develop laws 
on service subsidies because subsidy in services is mostly in violation of national treatment principle.  Therefore, it 
is not necessary to develop subsidy rules in GATS right now.  As for other opposing reasons in details, please refer 
to Chapter 6.III.B in this dissertation. 
22 MFN and NT are two main focuses on discussing whether current laws are sufficient to deal with service subsidy.  
Please see Marc Benitah, Subsidies, Services and Sustainable Development, Trade in Services and Sustainable 
Development 7, 8 (2004); also Chapter III.B of this dissertation for more elaboration. 
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a.  Current Members’ Discussions on the Definition of Service Subsidies  In Chapter 6, after 
demonstrating the importance of regulating subsidies in the GATS, I will move on to introduce 
Members’ submissions concerning service subsidies.  A principal question raised by those 
submissions is what the definition of a service subsidy will be in future negotiations.  In this 
study, I will rely principally on two sources: WTO Members’ submissions – including internal 
documents, and scholarly writings.  Even though service subsidies are a relatively new concept, 
many WTO Members have submitted documents in the WTO meetings.23  Hence, in Chapter 6, 
the documents I will discuss include: 
(1) Submission from Chile:24  This document provides some preliminary thoughts on 
subsidies in services trade, their trade-distortive effects, the nature of subsidies, 
the resulting damages, and countervailing measures. 
(2) Submission from Argentina and Hong Kong, China:25  This document considers 
the necessary elements to improve data collection on domestic service sectors. 
(3) Submission from Argentina, Chile, and Hong Kong, China:26  This document 
provides suggestions on how to simplify the questionnaire concerning domestic 
programs for service subsidies. 
                                                 
23 Working Party on GATS Rules, Communication from Hong Kong, China and Mexico: Non-Actionable Subsidies 
in Trade in Services, JOB(07)/27 (7 March 2007); Working Party on GATS Rules, Submission from Norway: 
Response to the Questions Relevant to the Information Exchange Required Under the Subsidies Negotiating 
Mandate, S/WPGR/W/16/Add.1 (23 June 1997); Working Party on GATS Rules, Submission from New Zealand: 
Response to the Questions Relevant to the Information Exchange Required Under the Subsidies Negotiating 
Mandate, S/WPGR/W/16/Add.2 (23 July 1997); Working Party on GATS Rules, Submission from Hong Kong, 
China: Response to the Questions Relevant to the Information Exchange Required Under the Subsidies Negotiating 
Mandate, S/WPGR/W/16/Add.3 (23 July 1999), Working Party on GATS Rules, Submission from Poland: Response 
to the Questions Relevant to the Information Exchange Required Under the Subsidies Negotiating Mandate, 
S/WPGR/W/16/Add.4 (2 March 2000), S/WPGR/W/16/Add.4/Suppl.1 (20 September 2000); Working Party on 
GATS Rules, Submission from Switzerland: Response to the Questions Relevant to the Information Exchange 
Required Under the Subsidies Negotiating Mandate, S/WPGR/W/16/Add.5 (22 December 2005). 
24 Working Party on GATS Rules, Communication from Chile: The Subsidies Issues, S/WPGR/W/10 (2 April 1996). 
25  Working Party on GATS Rules, Communication from Argentina and Hong Kong, China: Development of 
Multilateral Disciplines Governing Trade Distortive Subsidies in Services, S/WPGR/W/31 (16 March 2000). 
26  Working Party on GATS Rules, Communication from Argentina and Hong Kong, China: Informal Paper, 
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(4) Submission from Poland:27  This document provides opinions on the scope of 
trade subsidies, and on the definition of subsidy. 
(5) Submission from Chile: 28   This document lists four examples of subsidies: 
exportation programs; and services related to technology, tourism, and 
infrastructure programs.  It then discusses how to define whether a subsidy  exists, 
focusing on  the form of the subsidy, the beneficiary, and the trade-distortive 
effect. 
(6) Submissions from Chinese Taipei:29  This document answers Chile’s submission 
in three parts:  (i) what is the form of a subsidy?  (ii) who are the beneficiaries?, 
and (iii) what are the trade-distortive effects? 
(7) Submissions from Mexico and Hong Kong, China: 30   This document raises 
questions about Members’ consideration of non-actionable service subsidies. 
The position of some current Members, including those on the Working Party, favors the 
application of the definition of subsidy in the SCMA as a starting point.31  However, Members 
and scholars also note that, due to the differences between goods and services, the definition in 
                                                                                                                                                             
Job(02)/84 (15 July 2002). 
27 Working Party on GATS Rules, Communication from Poland: Definition of Subsidies in GATS, JOB(02)/207 (13 
December 2002). 
28 Working Party on GATS Rules, Communication from Chile: Some thoughts about Subsidies Program in Services, 
JOB(03)/218 (2 December, 2003). 
29 Working Party on GATS Rules, Communication from the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen 
and Matsu: Definition of Subsidies in Services, JOB(04)/78 (17 June, 2004). 
30 Working Party on GATS Rules, Communication from Hong Kong, China and Mexico: Non-actionable Subsidies 
in Trade in Services, JOB(07)/27, 27 March 2007. 
31 From several WTO documents, we can see Members’ intention towards applying ASCM structure in defining 
subsidies in services, such as Working Party on GATS Rules, Communication from Singapore: An illustrative List of 
Definitional Issues that could relate to Subsidies in Services, JOB(04)/180, 1 December 2004; Working Party on 
GATS Rules, Communication from Chile: Some thoughts about Subsidies Programs in Services, JOB(03)/218, 2 
December 2003; Working Party on GATS Rules, Communication from the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, 
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu: Definition of Subsidies in Services, JOB(04)/78, 17 June, 2004.  Also, for the GATS 
Working Party’s perspective, in their notes, definition of ASCM is applied in determining whether a subsidy in 
service might exist.  Please see Working Party on GATS Rules, SUBSIDIES FOR SERVICE SECTORS: 
INFORMATION CONTAINED IN WTO TRADE POLICY REVIEWS, S/WPGR/W/25, 26 January 1998. 
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the SCMA must be revised or supplemented.32  This means that there are several alternative 
answers to whether the rules in the SCMA should be applicable to service trades.  For example, 
questions about the form of the subsidy, the subject (beneficiary) of the subsidy, the distortive 
effect across the border, and the specificity of the subsidy, all offer useful focus in determining 
differences in the appropriate subsidies regime for trade in goods and for trade in services. 
Using all relevant Members’ submissions, I will target crucial issues in defining a service 
subsidy.  Analysis of these issues will facilitate offering advice for addressing them them in 
Chapter 7. 
b.  Subsidy Definition in Services Trade under the WTO  Chapter 7 focuses on finding 
answers to the questions raised in Chapter 6.  In Chapter 7, I will break the subject into several 
issues and sub-questions for discussion.  These will include: 
(1) The definition of subsidy 
(a) Is the “financial contribution” proscribed in GATS Article I(1) applicable 
to services trade? If yes, does Article I(1) provide an exhaustive list for 
purposes of service subsidies? 
(b) Is it appropriate to use the “specificity” criterion to determine the 
existence of subsidies in services trade? 
                                                 
32 In Working Party on GATS Rules, REPORT OF THE MEETING OF 1 OCTOBER 2003: Note by the Secretariat, 
S/WPGR/M/44, 28 October 2003, Members, such as, Singapore, Australia, presented their views to use ASCM 
definition as a start.  Also in Working Party on GATS Rules, REPORT OF THE MEETING OF 24 NOVEMBER 
2004: Note by the Secretariat, S/WPGR/M/50, 17 January 2005, United States, Singapore, Hong Kong, China, 
Korea, and Australia supported the idea of applying ASCM definition as provisional definitions to collect Members’ 
relevant information regarding domestic subsidies; 林彩瑜, <有關新加坡及瑞士所提服務補貼文件之法律意見>, 
台大法律學院 WTO 研究中心, translated in Cai-yu Lin, Legal Opinions Regarding Submissions of Service 
Subsidies Presented by Singapore and Switzerland, Taiwan School of Laws: WTO Center, January 2005, at 7.  The 
author points out the question that due to the differences between goods and services, and four modes of supplies in 
GATS, the ASCM definition needs to be modified.   
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(c) Is the concept of “benefits” described in the SCMA applicable to service 
subsidies? 
(2) Possible non-actionable subsidies in services 
(a) Are the non-actionable subsidies discussed in the SCMA or the AoA 
applicable in the GATS? 
(b) Are there any possible situations where governmental financial aid should 
be exempt from subsidy disciplines? 
(3) Differential treatment 
GATS Article XV:1 stipulates that developing countries should be 
accorded “differential treatment.”  Is there a standard for the application of 
this rule in the granting of privileges? 
c.  The Starting Point for Subsidy Definition under the GATS  The first part of Chapter 7 will 
provide a definition of a service subsidy.  My thoughts on how to define and classify subsidies 
rest on the present examples from the SCMA and the AoA.  I propose to start from the subsidy 
rules we already have in this field, and then offer revisions to these rules to fit the field of 
services.  The guiding principle is that service subsidies which can constitute trade barriers 
should be prohibited, while exceptions should be allowed in certain situations that do not result 
in trade barriers. 
d.  The SCMA or AoA Classification  I will then determine whether service subsidy regulations 
should follow the “green-light” or “red-light” subsidy classification in the SCMA or the “green-
box” or “blue-box” subsidy classification in the AoA.  Each of these two different classification 
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systems has its own advantages and disadvantages.  I conclude that beginning by defining the 
scope of non-actionable/green-box subsidies is less sensitive and more efficient for all Members. 
WTO Members fall into two categories expressed in their submissions about the 
classification of service subsidies.  One group would prefer to adopt the SCMA structure, which 
sorts out three kinds of subsidies: prohibited subsidies (red-light subsidies), actionable subsidies 
(yellow-light subsidies), and non-actionable subsidies (green-light subsidies).  Even though the 
green-light category no longer exists,33 Members think it is necessary to have this category at the 
beginning of the development of subsidy regulations applicable to services.34  Representative 
countries in this group include Singapore35and Chinese Taipei.36  The other group is inclined to 
adopt the AoA structure, which differentiates between two types of subsidies: green-box 
subsidies37 and blue-box subsidies.38  This group includes Argentina and Hong Kong, China.39  
In this study, I will consider which classification method is most appropriate for service 
subsidies, as well as whether other possibilities exist. 
After deciding which classification method to apply, I must determine which service 
industries should belong to which type of subsidy.  Given the complexity and extent of subsidies, 
                                                 
33 ASCM originally contained this third category: non-actionable subsidies.  But it existed for five years, ending on 
31 December 1999, and was not extended.  The agreement applies to agricultural goods, except when the subsidies 
are exempt under the Agriculture Agreement, due to expire at the end of 2003. 
34 Working Party on GATS Rules, Communication from Hong Kong, China and Mexico: Non-actionable Subsidies 
in Trade in Services, JOB(07)/27 (27 March 2007). 
35 Working Party on GATS Rules, Communication from Singapore: An illustrative List of Definitional issues that 
could relates to Subsidies in Services, JOB (04)/180 (1 December, 2004) para. 3 (h) and (i). 
36 Working Party on GATS Rules, Communication from the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen 
and Matsu: Definition of Subsidies in Services, JOB(04)/78 (17 June, 2004). 
37 They are measures with minimal impact on trade can be used freely including government services such as 
research, disease control, infrastructure and food security.  Also they include payments made directly to farmers that 
do not stimulate production, such as certain forms of direct income support, assistance to help farmers restructure 
agriculture, and direct payments under environmental and regional assistance programmes. 
38 They include certain direct payments to farmers where the farmers are required to limit production.  Sometimes it 
is called the “blue-box” subsidies. 
39  Working Party on GATS Rules, Communication from Argentina and Hong Kong, China, Development of 
Multilateral Disciplines Governing Trade Distortion Subsidies in Services, S/WPGR/W/31 (16 March, 2000), 
para.10 (d). 
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we should start with the easy part of this subject, by defining what kinds of subsides should be 
acceptable under the final system.  WTO Members have, in fact, proposed to start the 
negotiations with the “non-actionable” subsidies in services.40  This approach has been presented 
by Mexico and Hong Kong, China.41  In their submissions, they argue that such an approach 
does not diminish the importance of the issue, but implies how much work still needs to be done 
in order to build up an effective system.  Moreover, this approach offers more incentives for 
Members to work on service subsidy issues and helps to move forward from the current deadlock 
in the negotiations. 
In the last part of Chapter 7, I will discuss the need for special and differential treatment 
for developing and least developed countries in GATS subsidy matters.  My preliminary 
inclination is to include such treatment.  Such a privilege encourages Members to participate in 
GATS subsidy regulations. 
e.  The Appropriateness of Countervailing Measures in Services Trade  In Chapter 8, I will 
address the appropriateness of countervailing measures in GATS – something Members have not 
yet considered.  Unlike with the subsidy definition, which is a substantive issue, countervailing 
measures are procedural concerns.  Therefore, this section of my dissertation will consider 
practical suggestions rather than theoretical ones. 
A countervailing measure is an “action taken by the importing country, usually in the 
form of increased duties to offset subsidies given to producers or exporters in the exporting 
                                                 
40 Working Party on GATS Rules, Communication from Hong Kong, China and Mexico:  Non-actionable Subsidies 
in Trade in Services, JOB(07)/27 (7 March 2007). 
41 Working Party on GATS Rules, Communication from Hong Kong, China and Mexico:  Non-actionable Subsidies 
in Trade in Services, JOB(07)/27 (7 March 2007). 
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country (emphasis added).”42  Therefore, countervailing duties collection can only occur for 
goods at the point of import, as is authorized by the SCMA. 
My preliminary question is whether there can be one comprehensive mechanism to 
regulate all countervailing measures in service subsidies given the many differences between 
trade in goods and trade in services.  The first step is to see whether real examples of export 
services trade situations could occur in each mode of service supply.  However, since there are 
different modes of service supply in GATS, analyzing services trade is more complex than 
analyzing trade in goods.  Especially in the Mode II service supply, it is the consumer who 
crosses the border, not the service supplier.  In order to cover all possible countervailable 
examples, I will apply prohibited subsidy situations stipulated in the SCMA Article 343  to 
services trades. 
I will differentiate the possible situations by putting them into two categories:  (1) Export 
Subsidies (Table 1) and (2) Domestic Substitution Subsidies (Table 2).  My purpose is to 
demonstrate that, sometimes, it is not always either possible or likely that services trade may 
benefit from subsidies.  If it is improbable that service subsidies in a certain mode of supply will 
occur, the question becomes whether it is really necessary to regulate all modes of supply. 
                                                 
42  World Trade Organization, Glossary term: countervailing measures, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/countervailing_measures_e.htm; ASCM footnote 36 defines 
countervailing duties “ should be understood to mean a special duty levied for the purpose of offsetting any subsidy 
bestowed directly or indirectly upon the manufacture, production or export of any merchandise, as provided for in 
paragraph 3 of Article VI of GATT 1994. 
43 Except as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture, the following subsidies, within the meaning of Article 1, 
shall be prohibited: 
(a) subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon 
export performance, including those illustrated in Annex I; 
(b) subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use of 
domestic over imported goods. 
17 
Table 1.  Export Subsidies 
SS = Service Supplier 
G = Government 
Mode 
Subsidy 
Recipient Consumers
Subsidy 
Provider Type Example 
Location of 
Injured Industries
I:  Cross-
border 
SS of 
Country A 
Country B G of 
Country A 
Export Subsidizes 
establishment of on-
line legal consultation 
providing services to 
foreigners 
Country B 
II:  
Consumption 
abroad 
SS of 
Country A 
Country B G of 
Country A 
Import(?) Subsidizes tourism 
business (such as 
hotels, resorts) to 
attract foreigners 
Country B 
III:  
Commercial 
presence 
SS of 
Country A 
Country B G of 
Country A 
Export Subsidizes offices and 
companies overseas 
(possible?) 
Country B or Other 
countries? 
IV:  Movement 
of natural 
persons 
SS of 
Country A 
Country B G of 
Country A 
Export Subsidizes natural 
persons, such as 
lawyer, engineers, 
accounts, etc. to work 
overseas 
Country B 
 (This table is created by the author.44) 
Table 1 illustrates possible examples of export service subsidies.  In the situations 
described in this table, I hypothesize that Country A provides service subsidies to its service 
suppliers.  These service suppliers, who receive the subsidies, “export” their services to 
consumers in Country B.  As a result, service suppliers in Country B might suffer injuries from 
lost sales of services.  The example in Mode I is comparably a more comprehensible example 
than the examples in other modes.  Suppose Country A’s government provides subsidies to its 
local law firms, which render legal consultation through the Internet.  In other words, Country 
A’s law firms are “exporting” their legal services to other countries, including Country B.  As a 
result, Country B’s local law firms may suffer injury as a result of Country A’s subsidies because 
Country B’s nationals may seek legal services from Country A’s on-line legal service suppliers. 
                                                 
44 The original document was presented to the Bureau of Trade in Taiwan, Republic of China, for research on service 
subsidies in May, 2007. 
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The most difficult/untraditional analysis occurs with the example in Mode II.  In Mode II, 
customers are traveling abroad to consume services.  Suppose, for example, that Country A’s 
government provides subsidies to its local tourism industry – such as giving special discounts on 
hotels located in a specific area, offering free training for local tour guides, and even building 
transportation services for advancing the regional tourist business.  Suppose also that this subsidy 
policy does attract foreigners to Country A.  This example shows us that Country A is 
“exporting” its services overseas through marketing and facilitating local tourism.  Does this 
situation qualify as an export subsidy?  Do all (or any) Mode II subsidies cause trade-distortive 
effects?45 
There are questions with the examples in Mode III as well.  A country will subsidize its 
local companies to provide services within its territory since these subsidy policies can advance 
its development and its people can benefit from governmental financial aids.  Could a country 
like Country A in Table 2 choose to encourage its own nationals to invest overseas?  The 
question is: if this does occur, should such subsidies be countervailable?  Is trade-distortive 
theory applicable under this circumstance?  As we know, export subsidies in goods trade are 
prohibited under all kinds of circumstances.  In the case of service trades, however, such a 
subsidy may in fact provide advantages to Country B that flow from the subsidies provided in 
Country A.  Would Country B be likely to challenge such a subsidy?  If they would be likely to 
do so, should the GATS mechanism provide for such a challenge?  Or should GATS offer any 
remedy if a third Country’s service industry if affected? 
The same concern appears to arise in the examples in Mode IV, where a government 
subsidizes natural persons instead of legal persons.  Is a Mode IV subsidy likely to have trade 
                                                 
45 Please see Working Party on GATS Rules, Report of the Meeting of 7 February 2005:  Note by the Secretariat, 
S/WPGR/M/51, 18 March, 2005, paras. 9-10 (Japan and Thailand expressed their doubts on such a trade-distortive 
effect issue). 
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distortive effects in Country B?  Are there any benefits received by Country B if a Mode IV 
subsidy is granted?  Should we just categorize it as a prohibited subsidy?  If so, how might it be 
appropriate (or possible) for Country B to assess countervailing duties on Country A lawyers (or 
other service providers) operating within Country B with the benefit of subsidies from Country 
A? 
Table 2.  Domestic Substitution Subsidies 
SS = Service Supplier 
G = Government 
Mode 
Subsidy 
Recipient Consumers
Subsidy 
Provider Type Example 
Location of 
Injured Industries
I:  Cross-
border 
SS of 
Country A 
Country A G of 
Country A 
Domestic 
Support  
Subsidizes domestic 
on-line education to 
nationals 
SS of Country B 
that located in 
Country B 
II:  
Consumption 
abroad 
SS of 
Country A 
Country A G of 
Country A 
? ? ? 
III:  
Commercial 
presence 
SS of 
Country A 
Country A G of 
Country A 
Domestic 
Support 
Subsidizes domestic 
offices and 
companies  
SS of Country B 
that located in 
Country A 
IV:  Movement 
of natural 
persons 
SS of 
Country A 
Country A G of 
Country A 
Domestic 
Support 
Subsidizes domestic 
natural persons, such 
as lawyers, engineers, 
accountants, etc. 
SS of Country B 
that located in 
Country A 
(This table is created by the author.46) 
 
Table 2 provides a general review of the results when a government may provide possible 
domestic subsidies to its own industries, creating benefits in local competition against foreign 
suppliers of the same services.  It illustrates a situation where Country A provides subsidies to its 
domestic service suppliers, who, in turn, provide services to local consumers in Country A.  As a 
result, service suppliers from other countries (such as Country B) may suffer losses in Country 
A’s markets. 
                                                 
46 The original document was presented to the Bureau of Trade in Taiwan, Republic of China, for research on service 
subsidies in May, 2007. 
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The example in Mode I applies to the situation where Country A provides subsidies to its 
domestic education institutions, which provide on-line education to Country A nationals.  
Suppose Country B service suppliers, which are operating in Country A, provide similar 
education through the Internet to the nationals in Country A.  The subsidy action taken by 
Country A will then enhance the market power of Country A service suppliers.  Such a result 
may cause injuries to Country B service suppliers. 
Table 2 demonstrates that it is unlikely that examples in Mode II can ever exist de facto.  
With tourism services, for example, it is improbable that the government of Country A would 
subsidize its own domestic service suppliers for traveling to Country B, which helps to promote 
Country B’s economy.47  In my preliminary observation, a Mode II actionable subsidy is unlikely 
to occur in the real world, I don’t think it is necessary to discuss it.  However, this study invites 
different points of view on this matter in the future. 
The examples in Mode III and Mode IV are similar to each other in many respects.  
Basically, the only difference is that in Mode III, Country A’s government provides support to 
offices and companies in its territory, while in Mode IV the subjects receiving support are natural 
persons/individuals, not legal persons/corporations.  Still, under these two situations, since 
Country A provides support to its domestic industries/individuals, Country B’s 
industries/individuals located in Country A will suffer injury because of the distortion in Country 
A’s domestic market. 
                                                 
47 But a common example that does occur to people is the education services when Country A provides scholarships 
so that its students can study at universities in Country B.  This gives us a moment to think about the definition of 
“subsidy” in service trades.  The subject who receives subsidies should be “service providers,” instead of 
“consumers.” Therefore, students who receive scholarships to study abroad should be deemed to be consumers, 
rather than service providers.  Thus, this common “subsidy” should not qualify as a subsidy in the Mode II example. 
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In Modes I, III, and IV, any subsidy granted to nationals of Country A by the government 
of Country A is a violation of the national treatment (NT) principle,48 because Country A accords 
different treatment to its own corporations/nationals compared with foreign service suppliers 
(Country B) located within Country A.  At first glance, this conclusion supports the arguments of 
those who suggest that no regulation of service subsidies is necessary.  This position suggests 
that we do not need to have additional subsidy regulations because existing GATS rules, 
especially the NT principle, are able sufficiently to control service subsidies.  The problem with 
this analysis is that application of the NT principle depends on each Member’s schedule of 
concessions.49  If a Member does not commit to opening a specific service sector, the NT 
principle cannot be applied to that sector.50  In this regard, I propose that having a mechanism to 
discipline service subsidies is still indispensable. 
If we assume that a mechanism to regulate service subsidies is necessary, we then need to 
think about whether it is necessary to have a regulatory system to cover all modes of supply.  
Should we focus only on those modes of supply that are most likely to create problems due to the 
difficulty of keeping track of all service trades and the low-probability of subsidies in certain 
modes of supply?  The Member submissions to date suggest that there is no agreement on how to 
deal with service subsidies in all modes of supply.  In fact, Members have not agreed upon the 
definition and scope of subsidies in service trades.  If a solution that theoretically covers all 
modes of supply is not possible, at least now, should we just forget about the form but focus on 
the substance? 
                                                 
48 The NT principle is stipulated in GATS art. XVII that, “In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any 
conditions and qualifications set out therein, each Member should accord to services and service suppliers of any 
other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than that it 
accords to its own like services and service suppliers.” 
49 GATS art. XVII. 
50 GATS art. XVI.1 provides that, “With respect to market access through the modes of supply identified in Article I, 
each Member shall accord services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favourable than that 
provided for under the terms, limitations and conditions agreed and specified in its Schedule.” 
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I propose that we should address the real problem and not get tripped up by trying to 
follow a comprehensive theoretical approach.  In Chapter 9, I aim to provide an alternative for 
Members to discuss. 
I will follow Members’ logic in trying to establish a comprehensive legal mechanism and 
prove that it will lead them to the same result, which demonstrates that a comprehensive legal 
system to regulate service subsidies is unlikely to be established in the near future.  I do not 
conclude that it is never possible to have a comprehensive system; however, with Members’ 
unwillingness and the near failure of negotiations, to have some system is definitely better than 
to have nothing. 
Once we determine to regulate service subsidies, if we are to then allow countervailing 
measures we must first answer three fundamental questions.  Only if we can answer each 
question affirmatively can we then move to a system of countervailing measures in service 
subsidies.  These three questions are: 
(1) Is it probable/likely that subsidies will occur in each service mode of supply? 
(hereinafter “the probability question”) 
(2) Is it feasible to have countervailing measures on service subsidies? (hereinafter 
“the feasibility question”)? 
(3) Is it practical to have countervailing measures on service subsidies? (hereinafter 
“the administerability question”)? 
Each question may prove more difficult than the one preceding it.  Consideration of these 
questions will begin in Chapter 8 of this study, where I will answer the first of them.  With so 
many differences between goods and services, there are serious doubts about whether having 
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countervailing measures is appropriate in service trades. 51   I will begin by discussing the 
rationale for having countervailing measures in the GATT.  These countervailing measures have 
been employed by many developed countries for years, with the United States and Europe 
leading in their use.  Understanding the rationale for and impact of countervailing measures 
under the GATT can provide some measure of how they might function within the GATS. 
(1)  The Probability Question  In Chapter 8, I will consider whether the rationale for 
countervailing measures applied to subsidies of goods is suitable for services.  Countervailing 
measures are only feasible when there are export subsidies.  It is thus necessary to determine 
whether there could be export subsidies in all four modes of service supply (the probability 
question).  Exporting services is an abstract concept, and in some instances it is difficult to 
determine if there is an export subsidy taking place.  Based on Table 1, examples show that 
Mode II is unlikely to produce the export of services from a traditional perspective.  Thus, how 
can we manage to regulate the situation if the Mode II exporting subsidy does take place?  Or, 
can we develop a specific approach, apart from countervailing measures, to deal with the Mode 
II example? 
(2)  The Feasibility Question  After demonstrating the probability question, the next problem is 
to determine the conditions when a country can collect duties (the feasibility question) in Chapter 
9.  In the case of goods, three requirements must be met to impose a countervailing duty (CVD): 
an import product must be subsidized, such an import subsidy must cause injury to the domestic 
industry, and there must exist a causal relationship between the subsidy and the injury.52  Is it 
feasible to apply the same requirements to services? 
                                                 
51 GATS, article XV. 
52  ASCM art. 11.2 states that, “An application[of countervailing duty investigation]…shall include sufficient 
evidence of the existence of (a) a subsidy and, if possible, its amount, (b) injury within the meaning of Article VI of 
GATT 1994 as interpreted by this Agreement, and (c) a causal link between the subsidized imports and the alleged 
24 
Another difficulty comes in establishing the rules for proving that domestic industries 
have suffered material injury53 because of a subsidy.  What is the standard to determine whether 
an injury is material or not?  Most often, it is determined on a case-by-case basis, usually by 
domestic authorities.  However, some objective evidence is required, and the GATS should 
provide guidance for domestic authorities in determining when an injury is material. 
Compared with trade in goods, it is relatively difficult to prove that a domestic service 
industry suffers material injury and that such injuries are caused by subsidized imports.  Even 
though these are technical matters that require economic evaluation, I will try to put legal 
theories into practice and make suggestions in a realistic format. 
(3)  The Administerability Question  Also in Chapter 9, I will discuss whether it is practical to 
administer countervailing measures in service trades (the administerability question).  In the case 
of goods, the collection of countervailing duties (CVD) is possible because goods are easy to 
target when they cross a border.54  In the case of services, on the other hand, it is more difficult 
to determine the border crossing event.55  The application of a CVD to trade in services will not 
only cost Member states more to administer, but may also fail to achieve a satisfactory result.  
Moreover, countervailing measures are effective when subsidies cause injury, but the injury may 
                                                                                                                                                             
injury…. (emphasis added).” 
53 Regarding the determination of material injury, ASCM art. 15.7 provides some factors as examples: 
(i) nature of the subsidy or subsidies in question and the trade effects likely to arise therefrom; 
(ii) a significant rate of increase of subsidized imports into the domestic market indicating the 
likelihood of substantially increased importation; 
(iii) sufficient freely disposable, or an imminent, substantial increase in, capacity of the exporter 
indicating the likelihood of substantially increased subsidized exports to the importing Member's 
market, taking into account the availability of other export markets to absorb any additional 
exports; 
(iv) whether imports are entering at prices that will have a significant depressing or suppressing effect 
on domestic prices, and would likely increase demand for further imports; and 
(v) inventories of the product being investigated. 
54 Marc Benitah, Subsidies, Services and Sustainable Development, Trade in Services and Sustainable Development, 
Issue Paper No. 1, 2004, at 33. 
55 Marc Benitah, Subsidies, Services and Sustainable Development, Trade in Services and Sustainable Development, 
Issue Paper No. 1, 2004, at 33. 
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not occur within only one country.  As discussed earlier in this chapter, not all export subsidies 
have effect in the same territory.  This is true, for example, with Mode II.  Collecting duties 
within another Member’s territory will not likely be possible.  If there is no way to collect the 
countervailing duty, any discussion of this issue will be futile. 
Many countries collect a value-added tax (VAT) on the sale of both goods and services.  
These countries include France,56 Canada,57 and Japan.58  I will examine the structure of this 
system because it is used to collect taxes on trade in services as well as on trade in goods.  This 
taxation mechanism demonstrates that it is possible to target potential taxpayers for payment of 
charges assessed on the sale of services.  This is an essential requirement in considering the 
administerability question when analyzing possible CVD regimes for subsidies on services.  If it 
is possible to apply the VAT model to the collection of CVDs on services, then the answer to the 
administerability question may be affirmative.  Even if the VAT system can only be applicable to 
certain modes of supply, it provides a starting point in applying countervailing duties to services.  
Indeed, service trades regulated in the GATS can take many forms of entry into territory.  I will 
conduct a more thorough analysis of this issue in the subsequent chapters. 
f.  If It Is Inappropriate to Have Countervailing Measures, What’s Next?  GATS Article XV 
requires Members to determine “the appropriateness of countervailing procedures.” 59  
Obviously, even the Members themselves were not sure whether the concept of countervailing 
measures could be applied in the case of service trades; otherwise, the article would require the 
                                                 
56 France enacted its first value-added tax in 1995.  See George N. Carlson, Value-Added Tax: European Experience 
and Lessons for the United States, 2 (1980). 
57 Canada enacted its first valued-added tax (GST) in 1989. 
58 Japan enacted its value-added tax system (Consumption Tax) in April 1st, 1989. 
59 GATS, Art. XV. 
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construction of the framework for countervailing measures.  So the answer to the appropriateness 
question may well be negative. 
Hence, after examining the above questions, we may conclude that neither a 
comprehensive nor a specific countervailing measure system is likely to work.  The question 
then becomes whether we simply forget about the application of countervailing measures.  This 
analysis requires consideration of those situations where countervailing measures are found to be 
inappropriate.  Will Members simply go directly to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to file a 
complaint?  Could we just abandon countervailing measures in certain modes and allow 
Members to file complaints in the DSB based on the evidence that other Members illegally 
subsidize their service industries? 
g.  Specific Dispute Resolution Mechanism under the GATS  No discussion of a proposed 
specific mechanism exists so far regarding the dispute settlement issues that accompany the 
implementation of a subsidies regime for trade in services.  Nevertheless, I will discuss this 
issue.  The format of the dispute resolution process relies upon Members’ decisions on previous 
substantive issues.  Thus, there is a need to discuss setting up specific regulation for subsidies in 
services. 
C.  CONCLUSIONS 
In Chapter 10, I will review the service subsidy issues that have been covered in this dissertation.  
The lack of current accurate data available in unclassified information will make it impossible to 
fully justify some of my ideas. 
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I do propose that a workable definition of a service subsidy can be established.  Lack of 
information exchange is not an excuse for Members’ inaction in fulfilling the requirements of 
GATS Article XV.  GATS Article XV does not specify information exchange as a necessary 
condition to establish service subsidy regulations.  It simply states that, “[f]or the purpose of 
such negotiations, Members shall exchange information concerning all subsidies related to trade 
in services that they provide to their domestic service suppliers.”  My proposed definition begins 
with the SCMA definition, adding minor adjustments. 
Regarding the service subsidy categorization, both the SCMA and the AoA classification 
systems have advantages and disadvantages.  I define a third choice, which is a combination of 
SCMA and AoA structures.  This hybrid system of categorization aims to associate the 
advantages of both existing systems for trade in goods, taking into account the special 
characteristics of services trades.  With the hybrid system proposal, I believe Members can be 
more motivated in participating in service subsidy negotiations. 
In the end, I do not propose to solve all of the problems in determining the 
appropriateness of countervailing procedures.  My effort is to identify the problems.  Much more 
effort on the part of Member states is required in order to establish a comprehensive set of rules 
for service subsidies.  I do propose several collection procedures based on the VAT/RST tax 
systems.  The collection of countervailing duties in service subsidies is not without any solution.  
However, the collection of duties on service subsidies is much more complicated than with 
subsidies on goods.  It is up to the WTO Members to determine whether to allow countervailing 
measures in cases of service subsidies.  My effort in this dissertation is to identify the problems 
and suggest some models for a workable solution. 
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What my research does indicate is that Members will need to give service subsidies 
greater attention as the Doha Round moves forward.  I believe that effort can be successful and 
that WTO Members can create a more comprehensive legal system for the global market, 
including rules on service subsidies. 
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II.  THE CREATION OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
This chapter serves as a brief introduction to the historical background of the GATT and the 
transition from the GATT to the WTO.  Familiarity with this historical transition and the legal 
reasoning behind it provides insights into the subsequent development of trade theory and law.  
In addition to reviewing the evolution of the GATT to the WTO, this chapter introduces the two 
principles crucial to the creation of this international trade system:  the Most-Favoured-Nation 
(MFN) and National-Treatment (NT) principles.  These two principles are crucial to 
understanding the WTO. 
A.  EVOLUTION OF THE GATT TO THE WTO 
While the WTO has only existed since 1995, its history can be traced back to when the creation 
of the GATT in 1948.  The GATT provided rules for the international trade system, and became 
the de facto international trade organization.  As the result of several negotiation rounds (Table 3 
below), GATT evolved from 1947 to 1994, leading to the creation of the WTO, which added 
coverage of services and intellectual property rights. 
1.  GATT Overview 
a.  History/Background  The Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 resulted in the creation of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
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Development (the World Bank). 1   In 1948, the Draft Charter for an International Trade 
Organization (ITO) was completed, after a series of conferences held in 1946, 1947, and 1948.2  
At the 1947 conference in Geneva, the ITO Charter, including the GATT, was completed.3  
Three important issues were considered at that meeting:4 
(1) the world’s dedication to establishing a major international trade institute; 
(2) the commitment to negotiate for a multilateral agreement to reduce tariffs 
reciprocally; and 
(3) the drafting of the “general clauses” relating to tariff obligations. 
The GATT helped the world trading system establish some fundamental principles that 
underlie the present WTO framework.  These included the Most-Favoured-Nation5 and National 
Treatment principles,6 and concept of Schedules of Concessions.7  Hence, from 1948 until 1994, 
GATT provided the rules for much of world trade and presided over periods with some of the 
highest growth rates in international commerce.8 
The GATT was only adopted provisionally, however, and was not intended to function as 
an organization.9  The ITO never came into being because the United States Senate refused to 
                                                 
1 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE, 15 (1998); For more 
details on the GATT history, See generally WTO official website, available at www.wto.org or RAJ BHALA, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE (2007). 
2 See generally John H. Jackson, The Uruguay Round And The Launch Of The WTO: Significance & Challenges, in, 
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND U.S. 
IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION, 7 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996). 
3 Id. at 16 (“The history of the preparation of GATT is intertwined with the preparation of the ITO Charter. The 1947 
Geneva meeting was actually an elaborate conference in three major parts.  One part was devoted to continuing the 
preparation of a charter for a major international trade institution.  A second part was devoted to the negotiation of a 
multilateral agreement to reduce tariffs reciprocally. A third part concentrated on drafting the ‘general clauses’ of 
obligations relating to the tariff obligations.  These two latter parts together would constitute the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade.”). 
4 Id. 
5 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT], art. I. 
6 Id., art. III. 
7 Id., art. II. 
8  World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: Basics, The GATT years: from Havana to Marrakesh, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm. 
9 Jackson, supra note 1, at 16.  (“So the US negotiators returned to Geneva and redrafted the general GATT clauses 
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ratify the treaty.10  The GATT became effective in the United States as an Executive Agreement, 
and gradually become the focus of the international trade community. 
Eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations took place from 1947 to 1994 during the 
GATT era. They were the Geneva Round (1947), the Annecy Round (1949), the Torquay Round 
(1951), the Geneva Round (1956), the Dillon Round (1960-1961), the Kennedy Round (1964-
1967), the Tokyo Round (1973-1979), and the Uruguay Round (1968).  The following table 
provides an overview of these GATT trade rounds: 
                                                                                                                                                             
to avoid the suggestion of an organization. Thus, multilateral decisions under GATT were taken by the 
‘CONTRACTING PARTIES’ jointly, and not by any ‘organizational body.’”  In the footnote 12, he further notes that 
the redrafted document “[was] commonly called the ‘Dunkel Text’ after the GATT Director-General Arthur 
Dunkel.”). 
10 Jackson, supra note 1, at 18.  (“The US President submitted the Havanna Charter (ITO draft) to the Congress in 
mid-1948, but after several years it became clear that the Congress would not approve the Charter, and in 1951 the 
President announced that he would no longer seek approval.”). 
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Table 3.  GATT Negotiation Rounds 
 
(This table is based on the WTO official website11) 
 
By the early 1980s, the GATT could no longer meet the needs of changing circumstances 
in international economic activities.12  Several problems occurred, including but not limited to 
some major flaws:  provisional application, waiver authority, and dispute settlement 
discrepancies.13 
b.  Provisional Application and Grandfathered Rights and Exceptions14  According to the 
GATT 1947 Protocol of Provisional Application, countries were bound to apply the GATT 
“provisionally on and after 1 January 1948,” and new Contracting Parties would do so after 
joining the GATT system.  The Protocol also contained a Grandfather clause, allowing 
Contracting Parties to keep in effect prior trade restrictions that were inconsistent with GATT 
rules.15  Based on these, some Contracting Parties were permitted to maintain measures that 
                                                 
11 World Trade Organization, supra note 8. See generally Bhala, supra note 1, Chapter 1. 
12 See generally, Jackson, supra note 2. 
13 Jackson, supra note 2.  WTO LAW – FROM A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE, at 16-24 (Birgitte Egelund Olsen ed., 2006); 
Amelia Porges, The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 67-73, in, THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION: MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING 
LEGISLATION, 67-73 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996). 
Year Place/Name Subjects covered Countries
1947 Geneva Tariffs  23 
1949 Annecy Tariffs  13 
1951 Torquay Tariffs  38 
1956 Geneva Tariffs  26 
1960-1961 Geneva (Dillon Round) Tariffs    26 
1964-1967 Geneva (Kennedy Round) Tariffs and anti-dumping 
measures
   62 
1973-1979 Geneva (Tokyo Round) Tariffs, non-tariff measures, 
“framework” agreements
 102 
1986-1994 Geneva (Uruguay Round) Tariffs, non-tariff measures, 
rules, services, intellectual 
property, dispute settlement, 
textiles, agriculture, creation 
of WTO, etc
 123 
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contradicted GATT Part II principles, e.g. National Treatment Principles or quota restrictions, 
etc. 
c.  Waiver Authority and Amendments  The GATT provided Contracting Parties a right of 
waiver in several other matters as well.16  However, those articles do not stipulate any time 
limitation upon the waivers, and this enabled parties to intentionally jeopardize the agreement 
itself.17  Difficulties inherent in the GATT amendment processes made the amendment of treaties 
difficult and almost impossible, resulting in the creation of many side treaties among GATT 
Contracting Parties.18 
d.  Discrepancies in the Dispute Settlement Procedures19  Another problem with GATT rules 
adopted without an administering institution was the lack of unified dispute settlement 
procedures.  In the 1979 Tokyo Round, this subject was addressed, leading to a “Dispute 
Settlement Understanding,” which evolved into the WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure.20 
                                                                                                                                                             
14 JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING GATT SYSTEM, 45 (1990). 
15 GATT, supra note 5, protocol para. 1. (“The Government……undertakes…..to apply provisionally on and after 1 
January 1948: (a) Parts I and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and (b) Part II of that Agreement to 
the fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legislation.”) 
16 GATT, supra note 5, art VI & art XXV. 
17 Such as the waiver for the U.S.-Canada Automobile Agreement, BUSD 14S/37; waiver for the Section 22 of the 
U.S. Agricultural Adjustment Act, BISD 3S/32, 3S/141. 
18 GATT, supra note 5, art. XXX (“[A]mendments to the provisions of Part I of this Agreement or the provisions of 
Article XXIX or of this Article shall become effective upon acceptance by all the contracting parties, and other 
amendments to this Agreement shall become effective, in respect of those contracting parties which accept 
them……”(emphasis added)) See also Jackson, supra note 14, at 45-6 (1990)  (“the amending provision of the basic 
treaty structure are such that it is now rarely considered possible to amend the GATT. The delay required by the 
treaty acceptance process, the difficulty of obtaining the required number of acceptances, the shift in bargaining 
power involved under the amending procedure in the context of a large Membership, and the fact that even when an 
amendment is effective in GATT it will not apply to countries which do not accept, are all reasons why the 
amending  procedure has fallen into disuse…One result has been the development of an elaborate system of side 
treaties, which create some of their own problems.”). 
19 See generally Jackson, supra note 14, Chapter 6. See also Jackson, supra note 1, Chapter 4. 
20 Olsen ed., supra note 13, at 16-24. Porges, supra note 13, at 26. 
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Until the Tokyo Round was completed, no specific legal instruments regulated the 
process of GATT dispute settlement.  Article XXIII of the GATT 1947 provided only basic 
guidance for dealing with disputes.21  The procedure is illustrated below:22 
                                                 
21 GATT, supra note 5, art. XXIII. (“1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it 
directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of 
the Agreement is being impeded as the result of 
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this Agreement, or 
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the 
provisions of this Agreement, or 
(c) the existence of any other situation,  
the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written representations or 
proposals to the other contracting party or parties which it considers to be concerned.  Any contracting party thus 
approached shall give sympathetic consideration to the representations or proposals made to it. 
2. If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties concerned within a reasonable time, 
or if the difficulty is of the type described in paragraph 1 (c) of this Article, the matter may be referred to 
the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall promptly investigate any matter so 
referred to them and shall make appropriate recommendations to the contracting parties which they 
consider to be concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate. The CONTRACTING PARTIES 
may consult with contracting parties, with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and with 
any appropriate inter-governmental organization in cases where they consider such consultation necessary. 
If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider that the circumstances are serious enough to justify such action, 
they may authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend the application to any other contracting party 
or parties of such concessions or other obligations under this Agreement as they determine to be 
appropriate in the circumstances. If the application to any contracting party of any concession or other 
obligation is in fact suspended, that contracting party shall then be free, not later than sixty days after such 
action is taken, to give written notice to the Executive Secretary21 to the Contracting Parties of its intention 
to withdraw from this Agreement and such withdrawal shall take effect upon the sixtieth day following the 
day on which such notice is received by him.”) 
22 Michael Patrick Tkacik, Post-Uruguay GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement: Substance, Strengths, Weakness, and 
Cause for Concern, 9 Int’l Legal Persp., 169 (1997). 
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Party A alleges the nullification or impairment of benefits 
under the Agreement by Party B. 
 
Party A may make written representations or proposals to 
Party B or other parties according to the consultation 
procedures in Article XXII. 
Party B or other parties shall give sympathetic consideration.
 
If consultation fails, Party A may refer the matter to the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES for recommendations or rulings.
 
A panel may be instituted, 
usually consisting of 3 Members who are not nationals of 
Party A or Party B.  
 
 
Both Parties can submit written submissions. 
After the submissions, a series of oral hearings may be held. 
 
 
The panel will produce a final report, which contains its 
findings and recommendations.  
The report must be delivered to the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES for adoption 
(The figure is made by the author) 
Figure 1.  GATT Dispute Settlement Procedure 
The Panel report could contain three possible findings:  the measure in question could be 
found to be directly inconsistent with specific GATT provisions (a violation nullification or 
impairment); or determined to be indirectly nullifying or impairing some benefits accruing under 
GATT (a non-violation nullification or impairment); or there could simply be no nullification or 
impairment.  Typically, if a violation nullification or impairment were found to exist, the Panel 
would request that the measure in question be removed or that some other measures should be 
applied.  As a last resort, if a party still did not comply with the decision, the Council23 could 
                                                 
23 Jackson, supra note 1, at 68. (“Council” is the standing body of the GATT, which met regularly and disposed of 
most of the business of GATT. This body was not provided in the GATT text, but arouse through practice and 
decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The example for Council to authorize retaliation was only once.  It took 
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suggest retaliation by authorizing the successful Contracting Party to suspend concessions in a 
reciprocal fashion.24 
In the GATT Council, consensus on dispute settlement was required at each of three 
stages:  establishment of a panel, adoption of a panel report, and authorization of the suspension 
of concessions.  The consensus requirement was a weakness allowing a losing party to block any 
of these three decisions.25 
2.  WTO Overview 
a.  History/Background  In September 1986, the Uruguay Round was begun in Punta del Este, 
Uruguay, where countries negotiated the Ministerial Declaration for the Round. 26   In this 
Declaration, countries acknowledged the inefficiencies of the GATT and acknowledged the need 
for a more complete trading organization. 
The GATT Contracting Parties eventually accepted a negotiating agenda that covered 
virtually every outstanding trade policy issue.27  The Uruguay Round was intended to extend the 
                                                                                                                                                             
place between the Netherlands and the United States in 1953.  The dispute was concerning the dairy products from 
the Netherlands.).  See also Netherlands Measures of Suspension of Obligations to the United States, GATT, B.I.S.D. 
(1 Supp.) at 32 (1953). 
24 ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL 
SYSTEM 238, 120 (1993). 
25 Jackson, supra note 14, at 65.  See also Porges, supra note 13, at 70  (“The dispute settlement provisions of 
Article XXIII of the GATT 1947 call for the Contracting Parties to investigate complaints brought to them, and 
permit the Contracting Parties to authorize a contracting party to suspend concessions or other GATT 1947 
obligations with respect to another contracting party. Collective decisions were required for establishment of a panel 
of experts to investigate the dispute, for adoption (or not) of the panel’s report, and for authorization of suspension 
of concessions.”). 
26 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, GATT BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTIVE DOCUMENTS, Supp. 19ff. (1987). 
27  World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO:  Basics, The Uruguay Round, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm. 
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trading system into several new areas, and to reform trade in the sensitive sectors of agriculture 
and textiles.28  All the original GATT articles were included in the talks. 
b.  Before the Uruguay Round  The Uruguay Round is frequently referred to as the birth of the 
initial idea of a unified trading system.  But by the end of the Uruguay Round, there had actually 
been no discussion on the establishment of a world organization on international trade.29  Canada 
had originally proposed the creation of an international trade institute in 1990.  During that same 
year, the European Community (which later became the European Union) also suggested the 
establishment of a trade organization, calling it the “Multilateral Trade Organization, MTO.”30  
At the end of the Uruguay Round, Professor John Howard Jackson31 from the United States saw 
the opportunity to create a more complete and detailed trade system and recommended the 
establishment of an international organization. 
c.  During the Uruguay Round  At the start of the Uruguay Round in Punta del Este, 
Contracting Party ministers accepted a negotiating agenda, which included nearly every 
important trade policy issue.  Since the Uruguay agenda covered almost all topics in the GATT, 
the ministers gave themselves four years to complete it. 
                                                 
28 Id. 
29  World Trade Organization, WTO/GATT Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round (Declaration of 20 
September 1986), available at 
http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/wto.gatt.ministerial.declaration.uruguay.round.1986/landscape.pdf.  See also Jackson, 
supra note 14, at 38-41. 
30 JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ALAN O. SYKES, JR., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT, 301 (1995). TERENCE STEWART, GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A 
NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1994), 1942 (1999). 
31  University Professor; A.B., Princeton; J.D., University of Michigan; LL.D. (Hon.), Hamburg University 
(Germany); LLD (Hon.), European University Institute, Florence, Italy. 
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In December, 1988, ministers gathered in Montreal, Canada, for an assessment of 
progress.32  But these talks ended in a deadlock, with the major disagreement focusing mostly on 
agricultural trade rules. 33   The European Community’s negotiating mandate on agricultural 
products was so limited that some agricultural exporting countries walked out, and the 
negotiations were on the edge of collapse.34  The deadlock was not resolved until the next 
meeting held in Geneva. 
d.  After the Uruguay Round  To break the 1991 deadlock, GATT Director-General Arthur 
Dunkel prepared a draft, which became known as the Dunkel Text, which included the creation 
of a new international organization.  This draft was put on the agenda in Geneva in December 
1991, and became the basis for the final agreement.  Later, in 1992, the US and EU reached a 
deal known as the Blair House accord.  In this agreement, the two parties settled most of their 
differences on agricultural issues.35On April 15th, 1994, the package of agreements was opened 
for signature in Marrakesh.36  On January 1, 1995, the World Trade Organization came into 
being. 
This series of important events is delineated chronologically in the following table:37 
                                                 
32 World Trade Organization, supra note 27. 
33 Id. 
34 Porges, supra note 13, at 77. 
35 World Trade Organization, supra note 27. 
36 羅昌發, 國際貿易法, translated in CHANG-FA LO, THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAWS, 9 (2002).  The Declaration 
was signed by ministers from most of the 123 participating governments.  The full text is available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/marrakesh_decl_e.htm. 
37 World Trade Organization, supra  note 27. 
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Table 4.  Series of Events in Post-Uruguay Round 
Date Place Events 
1986/9 Punta del Este, 
Uruguay 
Launch of the Uruguay Round 
1988/12 Montreal Ministerial mid-term review 
1989/4 Geneva Ministerial mid-term review completed  
1990/12 Brussels Ministerial meeting in deadlock and it has to 
be “closing” 
1991/12 Geneva First draft of Final Act completed.  
(The Dunkel Text) 
1992/11 Washington US and EC achieved “Blair House” 
breakthrough on agriculture 
1993/7 Tokyo Quad achieve market access breakthrough at 
G7summit 
1993/12 Geneva Most negotiations end (some market access 
issues remain) 
1994/4/15 Marrakesh Agreement was open for signature 
(Marrakesh Declaration) 
1995/1/1 Geneva WTO established, and the WTO Agreements 
take effect 
B.  BASIC FRAMEWORK OF THE WTO 
Established in 1995, The World Trade Organization (WTO) is a multilateral trading system that 
inherited many of its components from the GATT. 
The WTO Agreement in general combines two functions:38 
(1) To provide a coherent legal framework for applying all of the Uruguay Round 
agreements and making the single undertaking a reality. 
(2) To deal with issues that are common to international organizations generally:  
what the organization’s scope is to be, how it is to be structured, who can 
participate, how decisions are to be made, and housekeeping issues such as the 
budget, the secretariat, legal personality, privileges and immunities, and statute of 
the organizations, and other treaty law issues. 
                                                 
38 Porges, supra note 13, 81-82. 
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An overall understanding of the WTO from different perspectives can be gained by 
considering the questions that follow. 
1.  Why Does the World Need the WTO? 
The purpose and objectives of the WTO are stated in the agreement’s preamble:  to recognize the 
importance of world cooperation in trade, and to increase the standard of living of all human 
beings.39  Compared with the preamble of the GATT 1947,40 the WTO Agreement includes 
reference to environmental protection, demonstrating that countries are concerned not only with 
trade, but also with other issues beyond trade. 
In the GATT 1947, the preamble included language focused on, “developing the full use 
of the resources of the world and expanding the production and exchange of goods (emphasis 
added).”  The changes in the WTO wording indicate that the international community is not just 
considering economic benefits but it is also concerned about its citizens’ financial and 
environmental well-being. 
These fundamental differences are not without legal significance.  Although the preamble 
of a treaty does not have any binding force per se, in US-Shrimp, the Appellate Body held that,” 
As this preambular language reflects the intentions of negotiators … we believe it must add 
                                                 
39 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 
1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement], preamble para.1. (“Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade 
and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment 
and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and 
trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the 
objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the 
means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic 
development….”).  
40 GATT, supra note 5, preamble. (“Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour 
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily 
growing volume of real income and effective demand, developing the full use of the resources of the world and 
expanding the production and exchange of goods”) 
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colour, texture and shading to our interpretation of the agreements annexed to the WTO 
Agreements.”41 
Moreover, in Article II.1, the WTO Agreement states that the WTO is to, “provide the 
common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among its Members.…. 
2.  What Is the Scope of the WTO? 
The WTO Agreement provides the umbrella for administering an additional twenty-nine 
Agreements and Understandings, four Annexes, and one Final Act.  These agreements can be 
categorized in two groups:  Multilateral Trade Agreements and Plurilateral Trade Agreements. 
Agreements in Annexes 1, 2, and 3 are multilateral trade agreements while agreements in Annex 
4 are plurilateral agreements. 
All the Members are bound by the multilateral trade agreements as a single undertaking 
according to WTO Article II(2);42 however, with respect to the obligations set out under the 
plurilateral trade agreements, they are binding only among the countries who are parties to 
them.43 
                                                 
41  Appellate Body Report, United States – Import prohibition of certain shrimp and shrimp products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R (12 October 1998), at 153. 
42 WTO Agreement, supra note 39, art. II(2) (“The agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 
1, 2 and 3 (hereinafter referred to as “Multilateral Trade Agreements”) are integral parts of this Agreement, binding 
on all Members”). 
43 WTO Agreement, supra note 39, art.II:3 (“The agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annex 4 
(hereinafter referred to as “Plurilateral Trade Agreements”) are also part of this Agreement for those Members that 
have accepted them, and are binding on those Members.  The Plurilateral Trade Agreements do not create either 
obligations or rights for Members that have not accepted them.”) 
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a.  Multilateral Trade Agreements  Annex 1 is divided into three parts:  1A, 1B, and 1C.  
Annex 1A contains several agreements, which include: 
(a) the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trades 1994, which incorporates and 
amends the GATT 1947; 
(b) the Agreement on Agriculture; 
(c) the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures; 
(d) the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing; 
(e) the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade; 
(f) the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures; 
(g) the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994; 
(h) the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the GATT 1994; 
(i) the Agreement on Preshipment Inspection; 
(j) the Agreement on Rules of Origin; 
(k) the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures; 
(l) the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures; and 
(m) the Agreement on Safeguards. 
Annex 1B is the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and 1C is the Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) Agreement.  Annex 2 is the 
Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Dispute 
Settlement Understanding, DSU).  Annex 3 is the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM). 
b.  Plurilateral Trade Agreements  All agreements listed under Annex 4 are plurilateral trade 
agreements.  They are the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft (4A), the Agreement on 
43 
Government Procurement (4B), the International Dairy Agreement (4D), and the International 
Bovine Meat Agreement (4D) 
3.  Who Can Participate in the WTO? 
The WTO offers two different categories of Membership:  original Membership and accession.44  
In the GATT era, participating countries were called Contracting Parties, while in the WTO era, 
the participants are called Members. 
a.  Original Membership  Article XI of the WTO Agreement stipulates that, 
The Contracting Parties to GATT 1947…which accept this Agreement and the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements and for which Schedules of Concessions and 
Commitments are annexed to GATT 1994 and for which Schedules of Specific 
Commitments are annexed to GATS shall become original Members of the WTO 
for the initial group of countries.45 
 
Those who, as of 1994, had already complied with the obligations set forth in this article 
and accepted the WTO Agreement package automatically became Members of the WTO.  
However, for those who were original Contracting Party, but did not immediately accept the 
WTO Agreement, Article XIV provides a Grace Period of up to 2 years after the date of the 
WTO agreement’s entry into force for retention of Member status.46 
                                                 
44 Porges, supra note 13, at 91. 
45 WTO Agreement, supra note 39, art. XI, paragraph 1. (“The contracting parties to GATT 1947 as of the date of 
entry into force of this Agreement, and the European Communities, which accept this Agreement and the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements and for which Schedules of Concessions and Commitments are annexed to 
GATT 1994 and for which Schedules of Specific Commitments are annexed to GATS shall become original 
Members of the WTO.”). 
46 WTO Agreement, supra note 39, art XIV, paragraph 1. (“This Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements 
annexed……shall remain open for acceptance for a period of two years following that date unless the Ministers 
decide otherwise.  An acceptance following the entry into force of this Agreement shall enter into force on the 30th 
day following the date of such acceptance”) 
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b.  Accession  In the GATT era, accession was governed by Article XXXIII, which required a 
two-thirds vote of approval by the existing CONTRACTING PARTIES. 47   The primary 
influencing factor in receiving enough votes for accession was the applicant’s willingness to 
negotiate tariff concessions in order to fulfill the reciprocity requirements.48  This process was 
sometimes referred to as negotiating the ticket of admission into GATT.49 
In the WTO era, the accession procedure is the same as it was in the GATT era, and is 
stipulated in Article XII of the WTO Agreement.50  However, unlike the GATT era, in order to 
accede to the WTO, a country must to accept  all multilateral agreements, and cannot choose to 
opt out of any of them. 
Another interesting change regarding Membership in the WTO system is that full 
national sovereignty is not an absolute condition for participating in the WTO.51  Article XII of 
WTO Agreement states that, “[a]ny State or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy 
in the conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters… may accede to this 
Agreement.” (emphasis added)  This Article shows that WTO is trying to integrate the world 
economic markets in spite of political issues. 
                                                 
47 GATT, supra note 5, art. XXXIII. (“A government not party to this Agreement, or a government acting on behalf 
of a separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations and of 
the other matters provided for in this Agreement, may accede to this Agreement, on its own behalf or on behalf of 
that territory, on terms to be agreed between such government and the CONTRACTING PARTIES.  Decisions of the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES under this paragraph shall be taken by a two-thirds majority.”). 
48 Jackson, supra note 1, at 47. 
49 Jackson, supra note 1, at 48. 
50 WTO Agreement, supra note 39, art. XII, (“a. Any State or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in 
the conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters provided for in this Agreement and the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements may accede to this Agreement, on terms to be agreed between it and the WTO. Such 
accession shall apply to this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed thereto. 
b. Decisions on accession shall be taken by the Ministerial Conference. The Ministerial Conference shall approve 
the agreement on the terms of accession by a two-thirds majority of the Members of the WTO. 
c. Accession to a Plurilateral Trade Agreement shall be governed by the provisions of that Agreement.”) 
51 Jackson, supra note 1, at 48. 
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To date, one hundred fifty-one countries have joined the WTO as Members and thirty-
one countries have obtained observer status.  Following this chapter are tables that list Member 
countries with their dates of Memberships (Table 6), and observer nations (Table 7).52 
4.  What Does The WTO Do? 
In the WTO Agreement, Article III stipulates five different functions of the WTO: 
a.  Implementation of Agreements  Article III says that, “[t]he WTO shall facilitate the 
implementation, administration and operation, and further the objectives, of this Agreement and 
of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, and shall also provide the framework for the 
implementation, administration and operation of the Plurilateral Trade Agreements.”53 
The WTO agreements require governments to make their trade policies transparent by 
notifying the WTO about laws in force and measures adopted.54  Various WTO councils and 
committees seek to ensure that these requirements are being followed and that WTO agreements 
are being properly implemented.55 
b.  Dispute Settlement  Several changes were made regarding the old GATT dispute settlement 
system.  In Article II of the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the 
                                                 
52 World Trade Organization, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO:  THE ORGANIZATION Members and Observers, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm. 
53 WTO Agreement, supra note 39, art. III, paragraph 1. 
54 World Trade Organization, supra note 53. 
55 Id.; Examples can also be found in the obligations of the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the 
SPS committee) and the work of the WTO Committee on Safeguards.  Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1153 (1994) [hereinafter WTO SPS Agreement], art. 12, 
paragraph 2.  (“The Committee shall encourage and facilitate ad hoc consultations or negotiations among Members 
on specific sanitary or phytosanitary issues……”; Agreement on Safeguards, Article 13 states, “……The Committee 
will have the following functions: (a) to monitor, and report annually to the Council for Trade in Goods on, the 
general implementation of this Agreement……”). 
46 
Settlement of Disputes (DSU), the WTO establishes a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to govern 
the process of dispute settlement.56  The function of the DSB includes administering these rules 
and procedures, establishing panels, adopting Panel and Appellate Body reports, maintaining 
surveillance of implementation of rulings and recommendations, and authorizing suspension of 
concessions and other obligations under the covered agreements. 57 Not all international 
organizations have such an integrated system for handling the dispute settlement process.  The 
WTO DSU inherited some fundamental principles from the GATT and revised some 
shortcomings.  The dispute settlement mechanism plays a key role because it can ensure the 
functioning and stability of an organization.  Hence, the WTO dispute settlement system is 
referred to as the “jewel in the crown.”58  In Article 3.2 of the DSU, the following sentence 
clearly emphasizes its importance:  “The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central 
element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system.” 
With a more intact dispute settlement system, the WTO shows its commitment to 
reinforce its set game rules.  The DSU not only provides a more detailed procedure for dispute 
                                                 
56  Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter 
DSU], art 2. (“1. The Dispute Settlement Body is hereby established to administer these rules and procedures and, 
except as otherwise provided in a covered agreement, the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the 
covered agreements. Accordingly, the DSB shall have the authority to establish panels, adopt panel and Appellate 
Body reports, maintain surveillance of implementation of rulings and recommendations, and authorize suspension of 
concessions and other obligations under the covered agreements.  With respect to disputes arising under a covered 
agreement which is a Plurilateral Trade Agreement, the term “Member” as used herein shall refer only to those 
Members that are parties to the relevant Plurilateral Trade Agreement.  Where the DSB administers the dispute 
settlement provisions of a Plurilateral Trade Agreement, only those Members that are parties to that Agreement may 
participate in decisions or actions taken by the DSB with respect to that dispute. 
2. The DSB shall inform the relevant WTO Councils and Committees of any developments in disputes related to 
provisions of the respective covered agreements. 
3. The DSB shall meet as often as necessary to carry out its functions within the time-frames provided in this 
Understanding. 
4. Where the rules and procedures of this Understanding provide for the DSB to take a decision, it shall do so by 
consensus.”) 
57 Porges, supra note 13, at 95. 
58 PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES AND 
MATERIALS, 94 (2005). 
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resolution, but it also sets time limitations, which could result in disciplining Members more 
effectively: 
Table 5.  Dispute Resolution Time Line59 
These approximate periods for each stage of a dispute settlement procedure are target 
figures — the agreement is flexible. In addition, Members may settle their dispute 
themselves at any stage. Totals are also approximate 
60 days Consultations, mediation, etc 
45 days Panel set up and panelists appointed 
6 months Final panel report to parties 
3 weeks Final panel report to WTO Members 
60 days Dispute Settlement Body adopts report (if no appeal) 
Total = 1 year (without appeal) 
60-90 days Appeals report 
30 days Dispute Settlement Body adopts appeals report 
Total = 1y 3m (with appeal) 
 
Two other significant changes have also been made in the dispute settlement process.  
One is found in the process for the establishment of a Panel, and the other is the creation of the 
Appellate Body.  Organizing a Panel for the resolution of a dispute in the GATT era required 
consensus voting.60  Therefore, any proposal had to be mutually agreed upon by all Contracting 
Parties.  However, in the practice of WTO, as long as a complaining Member makes a request, 
the DSB will set up a Panel to handle the issue.61  Thus, the consensus process has been changed 
to reverse consensus, and it now requires a unanimous agreement not to set up a requested Panel. 
                                                 
59  World Trade Organization, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO:  SETTLING DISPUTES A unique contribution, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm. 
60 Porges, supra note 13, at 70.  (“Collective decisions were required for establishment of a panel of experts to 
investigate the dispute, for adoption (or not) of the Panel’s report, and for authorization of suspension of concessions. 
As of 1979, the consensus rule applied to all three of these decisions, with the result that the defending government 
could block establishment of a panel, could block adoptions of a panel’s report, and could block any authorization of 
retaliation.”). 
61 DSU, supra note 56, art. 6. (“If the complaining party so requests, a panel shall be established at the latest at the 
DSB meeting following that at which the request first appears as an item on the DSB’s agenda, unless at that 
meeting the DSB decides by consensus not to establish a panel.”). 
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Article 17 of the DSU gives Members a right to file an Appellate review. 62   The 
permanent Appellate Body is composed of seven persons, each serving a four-year term, and has 
the right to uphold, modify, or reverse the decision of a Panel.63 
In the GATT era, after the Panel reached a conclusion, a unanimous decision of all 
Contracting Parties was required to adopt its conclusion and recommendations.64  This procedure 
gave the dissenting party the chance to obstruct the process of adoption of a Panel decision,65  
and thus allowed for intentional and arbitrary delay in the process of dispute settlement.  This has 
been changed.  Unlike the GATT system, the present WTO DSU system is changed into the 
reverse consensus decision, which means that a report is deemed adopted unless there is a 
consensus against adoption.66  If an appeal is taken, however, then the Panel report is not 
adopted.67  These changes have strengthened the role of dispute settlement process in the WTO. 
                                                 
62 DSU, supra note 56, art 17 para.1.  (“A standing Appellate Body shall be established by the DSB. The Appellate 
Body shall hear appeals from panel cases. It shall be composed of seven persons, three of whom shall serve on any 
one case. Persons serving on the Appellate Body shall serve in rotation. Such rotation shall be determined in the 
working procedures of the Appellate Body.”). 
63 DSU, supra note 56, art. 17. (“2. The DSB shall appoint persons to serve on the Appellate Body for a four-year 
term, and each person may be reappointed once.  However, the terms of three of the seven persons appointed 
immediately after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement shall expire at the end of two years, to be determined 
by lot. Vacancies shall be filled as they arise. A person appointed to replace a person whose term of office has not 
expired shall hold office for the remainder of the predecessor’s term. 3. The Appellate Body shall comprise persons 
of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and the subject matter of the covered 
agreements generally. They shall be unaffiliated with any government. The Appellate Body Membership shall be 
broadly representative of Membership in the WTO. All persons serving on the Appellate Body shall be available at 
all times and on short notice, and shall stay abreast of dispute settlement activities and other relevant activities of the 
WTO. They shall not participate in the consideration of any disputes that would create a direct or indirect conflict of 
interest.”) 
64 Jackson, supra note 1, at 68. (“for the Panel to make its report and deliver it to the Council…The practice then 
became firmly established that if the Council approved the report by consensus it became binding; if it did not 
approve, the report would not have a binding status. The problem was consensus.  In effect, the procedure which 
relied on consensus meant that the nation that lost in the Panel…could block the Council action by raising objections 
to the consensus…This blocking was deemed to be the most significant defect in the GATT process.”) 
65  There are several examples of the obstruction. Please see Norio Komuro, The WTO Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism: Coverage and Procedures of the WTO Understanding, 12 J. International Arbitration, no.3, p.106-8 
(1995). 
66 DSU, supra note 56, art. 16 para. 4.  (“Within 60 days after the date of circulation of a panel report to the 
Members, the report shall be adopted at a DSB meeting unless a party to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its 
decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report.  If a party has notified its decision to 
appeal, the report by the panel shall not be considered for adoption by the DSB until after completion of the appeal. 
This adoption procedure is without prejudice to the right of Members to express their views on a panel report.”)  See 
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An overview of the whole dispute settlement process is illustrated in the following 
Figure:68 
                                                                                                                                                             
also Jackson, supra note 1, at 76.  (Professor Jackson explained the term “reverse consensus.”) 
67 Id. 
68  World Trade Organization, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO:  SETTLING DISPUTES The panel process, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp2_e.htm. 
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Figure 2.  Dispute Settlement Process 
c.  Trade Policy Review  The WTO Agreement provides that, “[t]he WTO shall administer the 
Trade Policy Review Mechanism (hereinafter referred to as the “TPRM”) provided for in Annex 
3 to this Agreement.”69  The purpose of the TPRM is:70 
(1) to achieve greater transparency in, and understanding of, the trade policies and 
practices of Members; and 
(2) to contribute to improved adherence by all Members to rules, disciplines and 
commitments made under the WTO Agreements.71 
The TPRM is responsible for the periodic review of an individual Member’s domestic 
trade policy.  The four largest economies, The European Union, the United States, Japan, and 
Canada, are subject to trade policy review every two years.72  The next 16 Members are to be 
reviewed every four years. 73   Others are reviewed every six years. 74   The least-developed 
countries may qualify for an exception and be given a longer time period.75 
                                                 
69 WTO Agreement, supra note 39, art. III, paragraph 4. 
70 Trade Policy Review Mechanism, para. A(i). (“The purpose of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (“TPRM”) is 
to contribute to improved adherence by all Members to rules, disciplines and commitments made under the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements and, where applicable, the Plurilateral Trade Agreements, and hence to the smoother 
functioning of the multilateral trading system, by achieving greater transparency in, and understanding of, the trade 
policies and practices of Members.  Accordingly, the review mechanism enables the regular collective appreciation 
and evaluation of the full range of individual Members’ trade policies and practices and their impact on the 
functioning of the multilateral trading system.  It is not, however, intended to serve as a basis for the enforcement of 
specific obligations under the Agreements or for dispute settlement procedures, or to impose new policy 
commitments on Members.” 
71 Bossche, supra note 60, at 95. 
72 Trade Policy Review Mechanism, para. C(ii). (“The trade policies and practices of all Members shall be subject to 
periodic review. The impact of individual Members on the functioning of the multilateral trading system, defined in 
terms of their share of world trade in a recent representative period, will be the determining factor in deciding on the 
frequency of reviews. The first four trading entities so identified (counting the European Communities as one) shall 
be subject to review every two years. The next 16 shall be reviewed every four years. Other Members shall be 
reviewed every six years, except that a longer period may be fixed for least-developed country Members….”) 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
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d.  Co-operation with the IMF and World Bank  The fourth WTO function stipulated in 
Article III is found in the assertion that, “[w]ith a view to achieving greater coherence in global 
economic policy-making, the WTO shall cooperate, as appropriate, with the International 
Monetary Fund and with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and its 
affiliated agencies.”76  In order Tt create greater international economic integration, the WTO 
has agreements with both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank).77  The WTO provides greater international 
economic integration by working closely with them. 
C.  CURRENT STATUS OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
The major difference between the WTO and other international organizations78 is that all major 
decisions are made by the membership as a whole, either by ministers or by their ambassadors or 
delegates.79  Decisions are normally taken by consensus.80  This part will introduce some major 
institutional elements of the WTO. 
                                                 
76 WTO Agreement, supra note 39, art. III, paragraph 5. 
77 Agreement between the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization, WT/GC/W/43, Annex I, 
11/4/1996; Agreement between the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Trade 
Organization, WT/GC/W/43, Annex II, 11/4/1996. 
78 For example, in World Bank and International Monetary Fund, power is delegated to a board of directors or the 
organization’s head. 
79 World Trade Organization, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO:  THE ORGANIZATION Whose WTO is it anyway?, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org1_e.htm. 
80 WTO Agreement, supra note 39, art. IX para. 1.  (“The WTO shall continue the practice of decision-making by 
consensus followed under GATT 1947.  Except as otherwise provided, where a decision cannot be arrived at by 
consensus, the matter at issue shall be decided by voting.  At meetings of the Ministerial Conference and the General 
Council, each Member of the WTO shall have one vote.  Where the European Communities exercise their right to 
vote, they shall have a number of votes equal to the number of their Member States which are Members of the WTO. 
Decisions of the Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall be taken by a majority of the votes cast, 
unless otherwise provided in this Agreement or in the relevant Multilateral Trade Agreement.”).  See also World 
Trade Organization, supra note 80. 
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1.  The Ministerial Conference and Other Bodies 
Getting more than one hundred fifty Members to agree on something can be challenging.  
However, the consensus system also makes the result more acceptable to the Members since no 
country opposes that result. 81   The WTO remains a Member-driven, consensus-based 
organization.82 
Article IV of the WTO Agreement lays out the organization’s structure.  It can be divided 
into four different categories:  The Ministerial Conference, 83  General Councils, 84  Special 
Councils,85 and Committees.86  Currently, there are 70 WTO bodies, 34 of which are standing 
bodies.87 
a.  Highest Authority:  The Ministerial Conference  The WTO is controlled by all Member 
states, and Members normally make their decisions through a consensus-based process.  
Members make these decisions in councils and committees.88 
The Ministerial Conference has the most important role in the WTO system.  It has to 
meet at least once every two years.  Article IV(1) specifies that the Ministerial Conference “shall 
carry out the functions of the WTO and take actions necessary to this effect…[and] shall have 
the authority to take decisions on all matters under any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements.” 
                                                 
81 World Trade Organization, supra note 80. 
82 Id. 
83 WTO Agreement, supra note 39, art. IV, para. 1. 
84 Id., at para. 2. 
85 Id., at para. 5. 
86 Id., at para. 7. 
87 Minutes of Meeting, WT/GC/M/73 (11, March, 2002). 
88 WTO Agreement, supra note 83. 
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b.  Second Level:  The General Council, in Three Guises  Everyday activities between 
Ministerial Conferences are handled by three bodies: 
(a) The General Council deals with all sectors within the WTO, including goods, 
services, and agriculture.  The Council is composed of representatives of all the 
Members, and meets as appropriate, or about seven times a year.89  It can also 
discharge the responsibilities of both the DSB and the TPRB.90 
(b) The Dispute Settlement Body has its own chairman and may establish necessary 
rules of procedure as long as they are for the fulfillment of those responsibilities.91 
(c) The Trade Policy Review Body may also have its own chairman and establish 
necessary rules of procedure as long as they are for the fulfillment of those 
responsibilities.92 
c.  Third Level:  Special Councils (Councils for Each Broad Area of Trade, And More) and 
Committees  Three other councils, each handling trade in different areas, report to the General 
Council.93  They are: 
(a) the Council for Trade in Goods (Goods Council); 
(b) the Council for Trade in Services (Services Council); and 
(c) the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS 
Council) 
Each council deals with its respective areas of trade.  These Councils also oversee the 
functioning of the Goods agreement (GATT), GATS, and TRIPS, and have subsidiary bodies. 
                                                 
89 WTO Agreement, supra note 84. 
90 Id., at para. 3 and para. 4. 
91 Id., at para. 3. 
92 Id., at para. 4. 
93 WTO Agreement, supra note 85. 
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Six other bodies report to the General Council.  Because their missions and scopes are 
more limited, they are called Committees.  Their responsibilities include trade and development, 
the environment, regional trading arrangement, and administration.94 
In 1996, the Singapore Ministerial Conference decided to establish new working groups 
to handle the investment and competition policy, transparency in government procurement, and 
trade facilitation.95  Two subsidiary organs are responsible for the plurilateral agreements and 
have to inform the General Council of their activities regularly.96 
d.  Fourth Level:  Various Committees  This level is comprised of many specialized 
committees working on different issues.  As previously mentioned, several subsidiary bodies sit 
under the Councils.  The Goods Council’s subsidiary bodies, for example, comprise 11 
committees dealing with specific subjects, including agriculture, market access, subsidies, and 
anti-dumping measures.97 
DSB, has two subsidiary bodies:  Dispute settlement Panels of experts appointed to 
adjudicate unresolved disputes and the Appellate Body that deals with appeals.98  They both 
provide the Members a place for discussion and negotiation on current issues and serve as a 
connection between Members and governmental officials. 99   The Figure below provides a 
detailed structure of the WTO: 
                                                 
94 Id., at para. 7. 
95 World Trade Organization, supra note 80. 
96 WTO Agreement, supra note 39, art. IV para. 8. 
97 World Trade Organization, supra note 80. 
98 Id. 
99 Porges, supra note 13, at 90. 
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Figure 3.  WTO Structure 
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2.  Non-Discrimination Principles 
Discrimination among states in the form of protectionism was common practice in the 1930s.100  
After World War II, the principle non-discrimination norms were included in the GATT.101  The 
WTO, again, recognizes the importance of eliminating discrimination in trade among states.102 
Two types of non-discrimination principles are embodied in the GATT/WTO:  Most-
Favored-Nation (MFN) treatment and the National Treatment (NT) obligation.103  The following 
paragraphs will discuss these two principles in the GATT/WTO. 
a.  Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) Treatment  MFN treatment can be found in GATT Article I, 
GATS Article II, and TRIPS Article 4.  It is best described as the principle of not discriminating 
among one’s trading partners.104 
What Is MFN Treatment? 
The history of MFN treatment dates back to the 12th century.105  In Article I of GATT, 
the MFN principle is listed at the top of other obligations.  This principle obliges every country 
to treat commercial activities of a particular foreign country or its citizens at least as favorably as 
it treats the activities of any other country.106  It can be described in the following figure:107 
 
                                                 
100 Bossche, supra note 60, at 208. 
101 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT & THE WTO, 57 (2000). 
102 WTO Agreement, supra note 39, preamble paragraph 3. (“Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by 
entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and 
other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations…”) 
103 See generally Jackson, supra note 103, Part III.5 (Introducing  these two non-discrimination principles in details). 
104 WTO Glossary, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/glossary_e.htm. 
105 See generally THE MOST-FAVORED-NATION PROVISION, EXECUTIVE BRANCH GATT STUDY, NO.9, 93D CONG., 2D 
SESS. 1974, 1. 
106 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, 160-161 (1989). 
107 This figure is created by the author. 
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Figure 4.  MFN Treatment 
Why Do We Need MFN Treatment? 
There are good reasons to incorporate MFN treatment in GATT/WTO:108 
(1) From the trade policy perspective, MFN treatment can ensure both countries’ 
trade concessions actually work.  Without MFN treatment, one country can sign 
several more favorable treaties with other countries after making a prior most 
favorable treaty with another country.  The later ones will make the previous one 
void since the previous one is no longer the most favorable. 
(2) In the international trade system, many interests and privileges are procured 
through negotiations.  Big countries generally possess more bargaining power 
than small countries.  By applying the MFN treatment principle, there will be less 
                                                 
108 Jackson et al., supra note 30, at 437. See also Jackson, supra note 108, at 134-135. 
A 
B 
C 
D 
MFN Agreement 
Lower tariffs 
No quotas 
Whatever A granted C or D in a bilateral agreement, B would automatically be entitled 
to without entering further agreements with A.
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tension among countries, and the fairness of international trade can be 
strengthened. 
(3) MFN treatment can limit domestic administrative branches’ discretionary powers.  
The less influence/interference a domestic administration has, the more 
effectively international trade can function. 
Based on these reasons, the text of GATT/WTO provides that, 
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in 
connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international 
transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of 
levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in 
connection with importation and exportation… any advantage, favour, privilege 
or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or 
destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally 
to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other 
contracting parties.109 
 
b.  The National Treatment (NT) Principle  The NT principle means giving others the same 
treatment as is given to one’s own nationals.110  It is included in GATT Article 3, GATS Article 
17, and TRIPS Article 3.111 
What is the NT Principle? 
The purpose of MFN treatment and the NT principle is the same:  To make sure Members 
are treated non-discriminatorily.  However, the MFN principle asks each Member state to treat 
other Member states as equal states, no less or no more favorably.  Hence, the MFN principle 
deals with Members’ laws externally. 
                                                 
109 GATT, supra note 5, art. I:1. 
110 World Trade Organization, supra note 104. 
111 Id. 
60 
On the other hand, the NT principle asks Member state to treat the products imported 
from other Member states as equal to its own domestic products.  Therefore, the NT principle 
deals with Members’ laws internally. 
Why Do We Need the National Treatment Principle? 
GATT Article III requires that Members refrain from using methods other than customs 
or border measures to distort trade with other Members.  Since GATT has set up rules on 
customs112 and border measures,113 GATT Article III targets primarily internal taxes or any 
measures that might affect internal sales.  This fits the non-discrimination purpose, because with 
the NT principle Members cannot freely exercise their discretion in domestic regulations in a 
manner that would result in protectionism.114 
Following this reasoning, the GATT Panel in United States-Taxes on Petroleum and 
Certain Imported Substances held that, 
The general prohibition of quantitative restrictions under Article XI…and the 
national treatment obligation of Article III…have essentially the same rationales, 
namely to protect expectations of the contracting parties as to the competitive 
relationship between their products and those of the other contracting parties.  
Both articles are not only to protect current trade but also to create the 
predictability needed to plan future trade.115 
 
This report of the GATT Panel was adopted on 17 June 1987, and emphasizes the 
importance of the NT principle within the WTO organization.  However, the NT principle is not 
absolute.  Members still have the power to disregard this principle under certain specialized 
                                                 
112 GATT, supra note 5, art. II.1.(a) states that, “Each contracting party shall accord to the commerce of the other 
contracting parties treatment no less favourable than that provided for in the appropriate Part of the appropriate 
Schedule annexed to this Agreement.” This article restrains Members from arbitrarily raising their custom rates. 
113 GATT, supra note 5, art. XI.1 states that, “No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other 
charges……shall be instituted or maintained……on the importation of any product of the territory of any other 
contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other 
contracting party.”  This article prohibits Members from using quantitative restriction on imported products. 
114 JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, at 273-274. 
115 United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances (June, 17, 1987), GATT, BISD, 34S, at 160. 
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circumstances.  This view was made clear in the Italian Discrimination case against Imported 
Agricultural Machinery, where the Panel stated that, “it was not the intention of the General 
Agreement to limit the right of a contracting party to adopt measures which appear to be 
necessary to foster its economic development or to protect a domestic a industry, provided that 
such measures were permitted by the General Agreement.”116 
3.  Exceptions to Non-Discrimination Principles 
There are two major exceptions to the MFN and NT principles in the WTO organization:  
general exceptions in GATT Article XX, and examples listed in GATT Article XXIV. 
a.  GATT Article XX Exceptions  Despite the advantages derived from the MFN principle, 
there are exceptions allowed to this basic concept.  GATT Article XX  allows exceptions to the 
MFN principle, when the measure involved is:117 
(1) necessary to protect public morals; 
(2) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
(3) relating to the importations or exportations of gold or silver; 
(4) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to 
customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 
of Article II and Article XVII, the protection of patents, trademarks and 
copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices; 
(5) relating to the products of prison labour; 
                                                 
116 Italian Discrimination against Imported Agricultural Machinery (Oct. 23, 1958), GATT, BISD, 7S, at 65. 
117 GATT, supra note 5, art. XX. 
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(6) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or 
archaeological value; or 
(7) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are 
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption; and so on. 
Each category not only has its own criteria, but additional requirements are also stated in 
the chapeau of Article XX,118 which requires that any exception cannot be applied in an arbitrary 
or unjustifiable discrimination manner. 
b.  GATT Article XXIV Exceptions  In addition to the general exceptions, two other exceptions 
result from the authorization of “free trade areas (FTAs)” and “custom unions (CUs).”  Some 
suggested that at the time when GATT was drafted, it was expected to embody those 
“preferential systems.”119  Both FTAs and CUs are authorized under Article XXIV of the GATT.  
The historical background and philosophy behind them were the precedents of special frontier 
tariffs between adjacent countries, and the belief that world welfare could be enhanced by 
regional trade when restrictions to trade (mainly tariffs) among several countries are totally 
eliminated.120 
This “all-or-nothing” idea allows departure from the MFN principle under the GATT 
system, but there are still loopholes in the Article.  These loopholes have endangered the original 
purposes, and some countries have taken advantage of them by claiming interim agreements as 
authorized exceptions, which has resulted in more than 100 Article XXIV-type arrangements. 
                                                 
118 GATT, supra note 5, art. XX chapeau. (“Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries…”) 
119 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, 
2ND EDITION, 163-4 (1997). 
120 Id. at 165. 
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Following the Uruguay Round, an “Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994,” was enacted.  It provides more detailed 
rules regarding FTAs, CUs, and interim agreements. 
D.  THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION IN THE FUTURE 
The establishment of World Trade Organization is one of the great successes in international 
legal history.  However, the resulting progress has not always been smooth.  WTO Director-
General Pascal Lamy indicated the need for Member cooperation in negotiations by emphasizing 
three necessary elements: 
“One, political leadership…Trade agreements are struck by governments, not by 
wise men, think tanks or Director-Generals. Leaders must act to convince and 
spend political capital to make them happen.  The time for technical work is long 
past. It is the hour of politics.  Two, pragmatism and spirit of compromise. 
There has to be give and take...Smaller steps that show demonstrable progress 
might inspire the confidence and trust to weave all topics into a final 
package  And, three, there has to be a spirit of realism. Asking for the moon 
and using empty rhetoric is normal in any negotiation but we are now past that 
point.  We must now seek realistic and creative solutions.  To stand behind 
redlines waiting for others to move only breeds mistrust and stalls the 
negotiations, postponing benefits to the world economy.”121 
 
A functioning world economy requires not only a single global organization, but the full 
participation of its Members as well. 
Table 6.  WTO Member States 
Country Entry Date Country Entry Date
Albania 8 September 2000 Angola 23 November 1996
Antigua and Barbuda 1 January 1995 Argentina 1 January 1995
Armenia 5 February 2003 Australia 1 January 1995
Austria 1 January 1995 Bahrain, Kingdom of 1 January 1995
Bangladesh 1 January 1995 Barbados 1 January 1995
                                                 
121 World Trade Organization, WTO NEWS:  SPEECHES — DG PASCAL LAMY 6 September 2011, Lamy looks at 
the multilateral trading system of the future http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl205_e.htm. 
64 
Country Entry Date Country Entry Date
Belgium 1 January 1995 Belize 1 January 1995
Benin 22 February 1996 Bangladesh 1 January 1995
Barbados 1 January 1995 Belgium 1 January 1995
Belize 1 January 1995 Benin 22 February 1996
Bolivia 12 September 1995 Botswana 31 May 1995
Brazil 1 January 1995 Brunei Darussalam 1 January 1995
Bulgaria 1 December 1996 Burkina Faso 3 June 1995
Burundi 23 July 1995 Cambodia 13 October 2004
Cameroon 13 December 1995 Canada 1 January 1995
Central African Republic 31 May 1995 Chad 19 October 1996
Chile 1 January 1995 China 11 December 2001
Colombia 30 April 1995 Congo 27 March 1997
Costa Rica 1 January 1995 Côte d’Ivoire 1 January 1995
Croatia 30 November 2000 Cuba 20 April 1995
Cyprus 30 July 1995 Czech Republic 1 January 1995
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 
1 January 1997 Denmark 1 January 1995
Djibouti 31 May 1995 Dominica 1 January 1995
Dominican Republic 9 March 1995 Ecuador 21 January 1996
Egypt 30 June 1995 El Salvador 7 May 1995
Estonia 13 November 1999 European Communities 1 January 1995
Fiji 14 January 1996 Finland 1 January 1995
Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM) 
4 April 2003 France 1 January 1995
Gabon 1 January 1995 The Gambia 23 October 1996
Georgia 14 June 2000 Germany 1 January 1995
Ghana 1 January 1995 Greece 1 January 1995
Grenada 22 February 1996 Guatemala 21 July 1995
Guinea 25 October 1995 Guinea Bissau 31 May 1995
Guyana 1 January 1995 Haiti 30 January 1996
Honduras 1 January 1995 Hong Kong, China 1 January 1995
Hungary 1 January 1995 Iceland 1 January 1995
India 1 January 1995 Indonesia 1 January 1995
Ireland 1 January 1995 Israel 21 April 1995
Italy 1 January 1995 Jamaica 9 March 1995
Japan 1 January 1995 Jordan 11 April 2000
Kenya 1 January 1995 Korea, Republic of 1 January 1995
Kuwait 1 January 1995 Kyrgyz Republic 20 December 1998
Latvia 10 February 1999 Lesotho 31 May 1995
Liechtenstein 1 September 1995 Lithuania 31 May 2001
Luxembourg 1 January 1995 Macao, China 1 January 1995
Madagascar 17 November 1995 Malawi 31 May 1995
Malaysia 1 January 1995 Maldives 31 May 1995
Mali 31 May 1995 Malta 1 January 1995
Mauritania 31 May 1995 Mauritius 1 January 1995
Mexico 1 January 1995 Moldova 26 July 2001
Mongolia 29 January 1997 Morocco 1 January 1995
Mozambique 26 August 1995 Myanmar 1 January 1995
Namibia 1 January 1995 Nepal 23 April 2004
Netherlands 
For the Kingdom in Europe and 
for the Netherlands 
1 January 1995 New Zealand 1 January 1995
Nicaragua 3 September 1995 Niger 13 December 1996
Nigeria 1 January 1995 Norway 1 January 1995
Oman 9 November 2000 Pakistan 1 January 1995
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Country Entry Date Country Entry Date
Panama 6 September 1997 Papua, New Guinea 9 June 1996
Paraguay  1 January 1995 Peru 1 January 1995
Philippines  1 January 1995 Poland 1 July 1995
Portugal  1 January 1995 Qatar 13 January 1996
Romania  1 January 1995 Rwanda 22 May 1996
Saint Kitts and Nevis 21 February 1996 Saint Lucia 1 January 1995
Saint Vincent & the Grenadines 1 January 1995 Saudi Arabia 11 December 2005
Senegal 1 January 1995 Sierra Leone 23 July 1995
Singapore 1 January 1995 Slovak Republic 1 January 1995
Slovenia  30 July 1995 Solomon Islands 26 July 1996
South Africa 1 January 1995 Spain 1 January 1995
Sri Lanka  1 January 1995 Suriname 1 January 1995
Swaziland  1 January 1995 Sweden 1 January 1995
Switzerland  1 July 1995 Chinese Taipei 1 January 2002
Senegal 1 January 1995 Sierra Leone 23 July 1995
Singapore 1 January 1995 Slovak Republic 1 January 1995
Slovenia  30 July 1995 Solomon Islands 26 July 1996
South Africa 1 January 1995 Spain 1 January 1995
United Arab Emirates  10 April 1996 United Kingdom 1 January 1995
United States of America 1 January 1995 Uruguay 1 January 1995
Venezuela (Bolvarian Republic 
of) 
1 January 1995 Viet Nam 11 January 2007
Zambia  1 January 1995 Zimbabwe 5 March 1995
 
Table 7.  WTO Observers 
Afghanistan Algeria Andorra Azerbaijan 
Bahamas Belarus Bhutan Bosnia and Herzegovina
Cape Verde Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Holy See (Vatican)
Iran Iraq Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic 
Lebanese Republic
 
Libya Montenegro Russian Federation Samoa 
Sao Tomé and Principe Serbia Seychelles Sudan 
Seychelles Sudan Tajikistan Ukraine 
Uzbekistan Vanuatu Yemen
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III.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES 
(GATS) 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is the first multilateral agreement that 
covers services trade.1  The GATT 1947 did not regulate services.  Only a few of its articles 
could be considered to affect services, such as Article IV (Special Provisions relating to 
Cinematograph Films).2  The creation of GATS was thus a significant step in international trade 
law.  The international community had been reluctant to control trade in services because that 
trade did not gain as much attention as did trade in goods.3  Moreover, the question of whether 
trade in services could be regulated has generally been controversial.4 
                                                 
1 World Trade Organization, The General Agreement on Trade in Services:  An introduction, 29 March 2006, at 2, 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gsintr_e.doc.  WTO LAW – FROM A EUROPEAN 
PERSPECTIVE, 279 (Birgitte Egelund Olsen ed., 2006). 
2 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1B, 1999, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS], art. IV. (“If any 
contracting party establishes or maintains internal quantitative regulations relating to exposed cinematograph films, 
such regulations shall take the form of screen quotas which shall conform to the following requirements: 
(a) Screen quotas may require the exhibition of cinematograph films of national origin during a specified minimum 
proportion of the total screen time actually utilized, over a specified period of not less than one year, in the 
commercial exhibition of all films of whatever origin, and shall be computed on the basis of screen time per 
theatre per year or the equivalent thereof; 
(b) With the exception of screen time reserved for films of national origin under a screen quota, screen time 
including that released by administrative action from screen time reserved for films of national origin, shall not 
be allocated formally or in effect among sources of supply; 
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (b) of this Article, any contracting party may maintain screen 
quotas conforming to the requirements of subparagraph (a) of this Article which reserve a minimum proportion 
of screen time for films of a specified origin other than that of the contracting party imposing such screen 
quotas; Provided that no such minimum proportion of screen time shall be increased above the level in effect on 
April 10, 1947; 
(d) Screen quotas shall be subject to negotiation for their limitation, liberalization or elimination.”) 
3 Olsen ed., supra note 1, at 280.  (“In recent decades national economies and the international economy have 
increasingly been based on trade in services rather than trade in goods.  Trade in services accounts for about 61% of 
the GDP and more than half of the employment in developed countries.  Even though the picture is not yet the same 
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New technologies have changed regulators’ perspectives toward trade in services. 
Whereas large sectors of the service economy--from hotels to personal services--required face-
to-face contacts with customers, scientific developments have made face-to-face interpersonal 
communication no longer necessary in many service trades. 5   Most banking services, for 
example, are managed through electronic information exchange.6 
Between 1970 and 1980, many countries relaxed their restrictions on domestic services 
markets.7  Fewer restrictions provided more opportunities for service suppliers to grow and 
compete.  Meanwhile, service suppliers began to pay attention to other countries’ service 
markets. 
                                                                                                                                                             
for developing countries, the trend shows increasing economic importance of trade in services, also for developing 
countries.”) 
4 JOHN, H, JACKSON, THE WORD TRADING SYSTEM, 306 (1997).  (“However, there were a number of conceptual 
difficulties for a negotiation on the trade in services.  First and perhaps most fundamental, was the question whether 
the normal economic principles of ‘comparative advantage’ would apply to services trade, as well as to trade in 
goods.  Some economists and other writers argued that it would, and although the evidence does not seem to this 
writer overwhelmingly clear, a judgment to go ahead with international rules seemed appropriate.”) 
5 World Trade Organization, supra note 1.  (“The emergence of the Internet has helped to create a range of 
internationally tradeable product variants - from e-banking to tele-health and distance learning - that were unknown 
only two decades ago, and has removed distance-related barriers to trade that had disadvantaged suppliers and users 
in remote locations (relevant areas include professional services such as software development, consultancy and 
advisory services, etc.).”) 
6 Id. 
7 Id., (“Services have recently become the most dynamic segment of international trade. Since 1980, world services 
trade has grown faster, albeit from a relatively modest basis, than merchandise flows. Defying wide-spread 
misconceptions, developing countries have strongly participated in that growth.  Whereas in 1980 their share of 
world services exports amounted to 20%, in 2004 it was 24% on a Balance of Payment (BOP) basis.”) 
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A.  A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADES 
IN SERVICES (GATS) 
Increases in trade in services have occurred in both developed and developing countries. 8  
Several policy groups and interested enterprises have emphasized the need to discipline services 
trade.9  However, the complexity of services raised doubts in the services trade negotiations.10  
Still, the Uruguay Round text concerning trade in services is considered to be a positive 
achievement.11 
A service is not defined in the GATS, and the need for an authoritative definition and 
scope remains controversial.12  The GATS only lists different “modes” by which services are 
supplied, and divides the scope of services in this manner.  The OECD has defined services as “a 
diverse group of economic activities not directly associated with the manufacture of goods, 
mining or agriculture.  They typically involve the provision of human value-added in the form of 
labor, advice, managerial skill, entertainment, training intermediation, and the like.”13  Despite 
the absence of a single agreed upon definition of services within the WTO, the GATS created 
rules applicable to service trades, representing a new perspective on trade regulation. 
                                                 
8 The Manufacturing Myth, THE ECONOMIST, March 19, 1994, at.91.  Supra note 4, at footnote 3. (“In 1994, 
approximately 70 percent of American jobs were tied to the service sector and total U.S. exports of services reached 
$200 billion, see 1994 Annual Report U.S. Trade Representative, 29; a 1991 report to the U.S. Congress estimated 
that the trade in services accounted for 25 percent of all world trade, see Report to the Congress of Fast-Track 
Procedures, 1 March 1991, at 51.”) 
9 Supra note 4. 
10 Id., footnote 2. (He points out in GATT Uruguay Round Document MTN.GNS/W/120, of 10 July 1991, including 
a Service Sectoral Classification list of approximately 122 or more sectors.)  See also Jude Kearny, Document of the 
U.S. Department of Commerce, October 1994, Benefits to Service Industries of the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services, 2. (It reports there are about 150 service sectors and subsectors.) 
11 Supra note 4. 
12 Aly K. Abu-Akeel, Definition Of Trade In Services Under The Gats:  Legal Implications, 32 GW J. Int’l L. & 
Econ. 189, 191 (1999). 
13 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, The Service Economy, SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY 
INDUSTRY BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY POLICY FORUM SERIES, 2000, at 7, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/33/2090561.pdf. 
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The topics dealt with in the GATS can be discerned from a review of its Article headings: 
GATS Articles 
PART I   SCOPE AND DEFINITION 
Article I 
PART II  GENERAL OBLIGATIONS AND DISCIPLINES 
Article II  Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment 
Article III  Transparency 
Article III bis Disclosure of Confidential Informational 
Article IV  Increasing Participation of Developing Countries 
Article V  Economic Integration 
Article V bis  Labour Markets Integration Agreements 
Article VI  Domestic Regulation 
Article VII  Recognition 
Article VIII  Monopolies and Exclusive Service Suppliers 
Article IX  Business Practices 
Article X  Emergency Safeguard Measures 
Article XI  Payments and Transfers 
Article XII  Restrictions to Safeguard the Balance of Payment 
Article XIII  Government Procurement 
Article XIV  General Exceptions 
Article XIV bis  Security Exceptions 
Article XV  Subsidies 
PART III  SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS 
Article XVI  Market Access 
Article XVII  National Treatment 
Article XVIII Additional Commitments 
PART IV  PROGRESSIVE LIBERALIZATION 
Article XIX  Negotiation of Specific Commitments 
Article XX  Schedules of Specific Commitments 
Article XXI  Modification of Schedules 
PART V  INSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article XXII  Consultation 
Article XXIII Dispute Settlement and Enforcement 
Article XXIV Council for Trade in Services 
Article XXV  Technical Cooperation 
Article XXVI Relationship with Other International Organization 
PART VI  FINAL PROVISIONS 
Article XXVII Denial of Benefits 
Article XXVIII Definitions 
Article XXIX Annexes 
 
This structure of the GATS demonstrates three parts to its basic rules.  They are (Part I) 
the main Articles themselves (containing general rules); (Part II) disciplines and the Annexes 
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(dealing with rules for specific sectors); and (Part III) “the individual countries’ specific 
commitments to provide access to their markets, including indications of where countries are 
temporarily not applying most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment and the principle of non-
discrimination (national treatment).” 14   There are two other parts dealing with Members’ 
commitments to future negotiations with respect to liberalization (Part IV) and the institutional 
provisions (Part V). 
1. The Concept of “Modes” of Services 
Article I(2) of the GATS provides that: 
For the purposes of this Agreement, trade in services is defined as the supply of a 
service: 
(1)  from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other Member; 
(2)  in the territory of one Member to the service consumer of any other Member; 
(3)  by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in the 
territory of any other Member; 
(4)  by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of natural persons of a 
Member in the territory of any other Member. 
 
These four categories have become referred to as separate “modes” of services supply, and the 
GATS rules distinguish among the various modes. 
                                                 
14 Olsen ed., supra note 1, at 281-282. 
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a.  Mode I - Cross-Border  Mode I, known as cross-border, describes a situation in which the 
services supplied from the territory of a Member State are traded into the territory of any other 
country.  This mode may be illustrated as follows: 
 
Example A (from the perspective of importing country A) 
A user in country A receives services from abroad through its telecommunications or postal 
infrastructure. Examples of this type of supply of services include consultancy or market 
research reports, tele-medical advice, distance training, or architectural drawings.15 
 
Mode I cross-border trade in services is similar to trade in goods, and the only difference 
is the regulatory object.  The main distinction is that trade in services generally does not allow 
for physical observation during the process of import/export.  Hence, trade in services brings 
with it difficulties that include problems in collecting taxes.16  There simply is no physical entry 
at the border as there is with trade in goods. 
b.  Mode II - Consumption Abroad  Mode II describes the circumstances in which services 
from the territory of one Member State are supplied to the service consumer of any other 
                                                 
15 World Trade Organization, supra note 1, at 4. 
16 羅羅羅 國國國國國, , translated in CHANG-FA LO, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, 509 (1999). 
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Member State within the service provider’s home state.  This particular mode is illustrated as 
follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Example B (from the perspective of importing country A) 
Nationals of A move abroad as tourists, students, or patients to consume the respective 
services.17 
                                                 
17 World Trade Organization, supra note 1, at 4. 
Country A 
Customers 
Country B 
Services provided by 
suppliers in Country B Nationals of Country A travel to Country B, and enjoy the 
services provided therein.  
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c.  Mode III - Commercial Presence  Mode III supply of services occurs when services are 
supplied by a supplier from one Member, through commercial presence in the territory of any 
other Member. This mode may be illustrated as follows: 
 
 
 
Example C (from the perspective of importing country A) 
The service is provided within A by a locally-established affiliate, subsidiary, or representative 
office of a foreign-owned – and controlled – company (e.g., bank, hotel group, construction 
company, etc.)18 
 
Mode III is defined in GATS Article XXVIII. Commercial presence means any type of 
business or professional establishment, including: 
(1) the constitution, acquisition or maintenance of a juridical person, or 
(2) the creation or maintenance of a branch or a representative office, within the 
territory of a Member for the purpose of supplying a service.19 
                                                 
18 Id. 
19 GATS, supra note 2, art. XXVIII para. (d). 
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Compared to trade in goods, this mode involves a very unique type of sale.  In the 
situation of goods, if the suppliers established a commercial presence in another Members’ 
territory, it would likely be defined as falling under the scope of investment, instead of the trade 
in goods.20 
Generally, trade and investment are treated as different types of cross-border economic 
activity.21  In trade, the exporter generally does not have to take the risks incurred in setting up 
operations overseas.  The downside is that the trader cannot exploit foreign materials and 
laborers, and must face possible obstacles, such as tariffs, during the importation process.  On the 
other hand, while investing in foreign countries may avoid importation obstacles, investors must 
bear other significant risks, including those associated with the investment of capital.22 
d.  Mode IV - Movement of Natural Persons  Mode IV occurs when services are supplied 
within one Member through the presence of natural persons from another Member in the territory 
of the first Member. This mode may be illustrated as follows: 
 
                                                 
20 Lo, supra note 16, at 510. 
21 Id. 
22 Id., at footnote 11. 
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Example D (from the perspective of importing country A) 
A foreign national provides a service within A as an independent supplier (e.g., consultant, 
health worker) or employee of a service supplier (e.g. consultancy firm, hospital, construction 
company)23 
 
Mode IV raises questions concerning immigration and emigration policies.  The GATS 
provides an Annex to regulate such issues.24 
2.  The Scope of the GATS 
GATS Article I(3)(b) and (c) define the scope of covered services.  In paragraph (b), the wording 
is services.  Paragraph (b) provides that the definition of services includes “any service in any 
sector, except services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority.”25  Thus, GATS rules 
apply to all services except for services supplied by governments.  Paragraph (c) then defines the 
exception-to-the-exception, providing that a governmental service includes only “any service 
which is supplied neither on a commercial basis, nor in competition with one or more service 
suppliers.”26  Consequently, should, for example, government-sponsored banks offer financial 
services to the public, they would be regulated by the GATS. 
The GATS, as a whole, is designed to regulate the supply of services.27  The four modes 
of supply take into account the basic characteristics of trade in services.  Unlike the trade in 
goods, which can be separated clearly into different stages, services trade often involves 
                                                 
23 World Trade Organization, supra note 4, at 4. 
24 GATS, supra note 2, annex on movement of natural persons supplying services under the agreement, para. 1. 
(“This Annex applies to measures affecting natural persons who are service suppliers of a Member, and natural 
persons of a Member who are employed by a service supplier of a Member, in respect of the supply of a service.”) 
25 GATS, supra note 2, art. I(3)(b). 
26 Id., art. I(3)(c). 
27 GATS, supra note 2, art. XXVIII, para (b). (The definition of service supply “includes the production, distribution, 
marketing, sale and delivery of a service.”) 
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simultaneous purchase and use, with the services being consumed at the time they are 
produced.28 
The differences between goods and services trade make a clear understanding of the 
GATS schedules particularly important.  Thus, the most evident difference in the application of 
the GATT and the GATS is in each Member’s schedule of concessions (GATT) and schedule of 
commitments (GATS). 
But, one must ask:  are goods and services so different that we need an alternative system 
to regulate trades in services?  The structure of the GATS suggests that trade regulations should 
treat services and goods quite differently.29  Because Members consider goods and services to be 
distinct in nature, they draft their commitments quite differently.30  The GATS commitments of 
Members are based on 12 service classifications.31  These sectors are: 
(1)  Business services (including professional services and computer services), 
(2)  Communication services, 
(3)  Construction and related engineering services, 
(4)  Distribution services, 
(5)  Educational services, 
(6)  Environmental services, 
                                                 
28 Olsen ed., supra note 1, at 285. (“services are intangible, perishable and non-storable.”) 
29 Jackson, supra note 4, at 307.  (“Another difficult conceptual questions about the negotiation on services is 
whether the well-established and well-known principles regarding trade in goods, could be applied by analogy to 
trade and services.  These principles, included the most-favoured-nation principle, the national treatment principle, 
and concepts of market access such as ‘schedule concessions’ reciprocally negotiated.  National Treatment in 
particular was problematical because certain kinds of services seemed to call for special principles to handle some 
particular policy risks that are posed by imports, compared to domestic services providers…  Thus, it was argued, 
that to apply a national treatment concept to services required considerable expertise about particular service sectors, 
and this could result in changes needed to the basic concepts of national treatment so as to effectively balance the 
need for trade liberalization against appropriate national government regulatory and prudential policies related to the 
particular service sectors—banking, insurance, brokerage, and so on.’”) 
30 World Trade Organization, supra note 1, at 4. 
31 WTO Special Distribution, Services sectoral classification list:  Note by the Secretariat, MTN.GNS/W/120 (10 
July 1991). 
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(7)  Financial services (including insurance and banking), 
(8)  Health-related and social services, 
(9)  Tourism and travel-related services, 
(10)  Recreational, cultural and sporting services, 
(11)  Transport services, and 
(12)  Other services not included elsewhere. 
These 12 sectors are further divided into 160 sub-sectors. 32   When Members prepare their 
commitments, they choose in what sectors the rules should apply, or how open they want a 
particular sector to be.33 
3.  GATS Article II— The Most-Favoured-Nation Principle 
The Most-Favored-Nation principle of the GATS is found in Article II:1, which provides that, 
“With respect to any measure covered by this Agreement, each Member should accord 
immediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other Member 
treatment no less favourable than that it accords to like services and service suppliers of any 
other country.”  The main difference between the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) obligation in the 
GATT and the MFN obligation in the GATS is found in the approach to subsidies.34  The GATT 
                                                 
32 World Trade Organization, supra note 1, at 5. 
33 Id. 
34 Marc Benita, Subsidies, Services and Sustainable Development, ICTSD Programme on Trade in Services and 
Sustainable Development, at 10 (2005), available at 
http://www.tradecapacitypakistan.com/pdf/ICTSD%20Paper%20Services%20GVA%20JUL%2005.pdf (“There is a 
fundamental difference between the GATS and the GATT (which deals only with goods) when linking the MFN 
obligation to subsidies.  In the GATT context, MFN only targets measures at the border (such as customs duties and 
other charges).  It does not cover measures affecting the process of production of a good within a Member’s territory.  
As a result, a subsidy does not fall under Article I of the GATT, which contains the MFN clause in goods. In the 
GATS context, however, the situation is different as the MFN obligation applies to any measure “affecting trade in 
services”.  Therefore MFN applies if a subsidy is granted in a discriminatory manner within a Member’s territory.”) 
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is targeted at the regulation of the trade of goods, and its MFN principle controls Members’ 
border measures, such as customs duties or quotas.35 
Article II(1) of the GATS applies both to de jure and to de facto discrimination.  In the 
Appellate Body opinion in the EC-Bananas III case,36 it was stated that, 
The obligation imposed by Article II is unqualified.  The ordinary meaning of this 
provision does not exclude de facto discrimination.  Moreover, if Article II was 
not applicable to de facto discrimination, it would not be difficult – and, indeed, it 
would be a good deal easier in the case of trade in services.37 
 
This concept applied by the Appellate Body to goods is equally applicable to services. 
The MFN principle applies to all service sectors in the GATS.  But there are some 
temporary exceptions allowed. 38   The reason for these exceptions is that, at the time of 
concluding the GATS, there were already preferential agreements among Members, either 
bilaterally or in small groups.39  As such, Members gave themselves the right to list MFN 
exemptions with their commitments.  Still, certain restrictions apply to the MFN exemptions.  
They can only be made once, and will normally last no more than ten years.40  A Member’s 
notification of an exemption must include: 
(1)  a description of the sector or sectors in which the exemption applies; 
                                                 
35 World Trade Organization, supra note 1, at 5. 
36 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime For The Importation, Sale And Distribution Of Bananas, 
WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 190 (9 September 1997). 
37 Id., at para. 233. 
38 PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:  TEXT, CASES, AND 
MATERIALS, 325 (2006). 
39 World Trade Organization, Understanding The WTO:  The Agreements, Services:  rules for growth and investment, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm6_e.htm.  Richard B Self, General Agreement On Trade In 
Services, in, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:  MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND 
U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION, 527 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996).  (“The adoption of the exemptions provision 
was highly controversial among the parties, and it was adopted to address two situations:  (1) where parties regulated 
under the principle of reciprocity and were not prepared, in some instances, to remove such provisions; and (2) the 
concern that the obligation would require that a more liberal regulatory regime of one country would extend a ‘free-
ride’ to the more protected regimes of other countries, thus depriving it of the potential leverage to address market 
access problems.”) 
40 GATS, supra note 2, Annex On Article II Exemptions para. 6. (“In principle, such exemptions should not exceed a 
period of 10 years.  In any event, they shall be subject to negotiation in subsequent trade liberalizing rounds.”).  See 
also Self, supra note 39, at 528. 
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(2)  a description of the measure, indicating why it is inconsistent with Article II; 
(3)  the country or countries to which the measure applies; 
(4)  the intended duration of the exemption; and 
(5)  the conditions creating the need for the exemption.”41 
4.  GATS Article XVII - National Treatment 
The National Treatment (NT) principle adopted in the GATS is also different from the one 
included in the GATT.  GATS Article XVII provides that, 
In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any conditions and 
qualifications set out therein, each Member should accord to services and service 
suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of 
services, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own like services 
and service suppliers.42 
 
Here, it is easy to see the differences between the GATT, which applies to measures 
affecting products, and the GATS.  The NT principle in the GATS not only regulates the service 
itself, but also regulates the service supplier. 
Before discussing national treatment under the GATS, there is one further concept that 
requires introduction:  market access.43  GATS Article XVI(1) provides that, “With respect to 
market access through the modes of supply identified in Article I, each Member shall accord 
services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favourable than that 
provided for under the terms, limitations and conditions agreed and specified in its Schedule.”44 
                                                 
41 Bossche, supra note 38. 
42 GATS, supra note 2, art. XVII(1). 
43 GATS, supra note 2, art. XVI. 
44 Id., at para. 1. 
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The GATS gives Members freedom to decide their individual commitments, to open 
markets in specific sectors, and to choose how open the markets for each sector will be.45  
Members list those sectors they are willing to open and decide the extent of market access in 
those sectors.  Most importantly, any limitations on national treatment must also be listed.46  An 
understanding of the following terms is useful in understanding the scheduling of commitments: 
(1) Market-access commitment:  if country A commits to allow foreign banks 
to operate in the domestic market, this is called a market-access 
commitment. 
(2) Market-access limitation:  if country A limits the licenses it will issue, this 
is called a market-access limitation. 
(3) Exception to the NT principle:  if country A only allows foreign banks one 
branch, while domestic banks are allowed numerous branches, this is an 
exception to the national treatment principle.47 
Article XVII(1) implies the absence of all discriminatory measures that may modify the 
conditions of competition to the detriment of foreign services or service suppliers.48  It operates 
the same as the MFN principle, in that Members can list limitations upon their national treatment 
commitment.  Hence, inconsistent measures and discriminatory subsidies are allowed as long as 
they are listed in a Member’s schedules. 
                                                 
45 World Trade Organization, supra note 39. 
46 GATS, supra note 2, art. XVII para. 1. (“In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any conditions and 
qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, in 
respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own 
like services and service suppliers”).  See also Bossche, supra note 38, at 365. 
47 World Trade Organization, supra note 39. 
48 Id. 
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The NT obligation applies regardless of whether or not foreign services and suppliers are 
treated in an identical way to their national counterpart.49  What matters is that they are granted 
equal opportunities to compete.50 
B.  THE GATS ANNEXES 
The complexity of services makes regulating service suppliers more difficult than regulating 
goods.  This complexity is the reason for the various annexes to the GATS.  These annexes are: 
(1) Annex on Article II Exemptions; 
(2) Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services under the 
Agreement; 
(3) Annex on Air Transport Services; 
(4) Annex on Financial Services; 
(5) Second Annex on Financial Services; 
(6) Annex on Negotiations on Maritime Transport Services; 
(7) Annex on Telecommunications; and 
(8) Annex on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications. 
The annexes may be divided into different subject-matter groups governing different 
sectors of services, including the movement of natural persons, financial services, 
telecommunication, and air transport services.51 
                                                 
49 GATS, supra note 2, art. XVII para. 2.  (“A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph 1 by according to 
services and service suppliers of any other Member, either formally identical treatment or formally different 
treatment to that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers.”) 
50 Id., at para. 3 (“Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be less favourable if it 
modifies the conditions of competition in favour of services or service suppliers of the Member compared to like 
services or service suppliers of any other Member.”).  World Trade Organization, supra note 39. 
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1.  The Movement of Natural Persons 
The Movement of Natural Persons Annex covers “measures affecting natural persons who are 
service suppliers of a Member, and natural persons who are employed by a service supplier of a 
Member, in respect of the supply of a service.”52  Most services regulations require that natural 
persons conduct and execute services.  Therefore, this Annex ensures persons the right to stay 
and move temporarily within Members’ territories.  However, it also allows Members to remain 
free to decide measures regarding citizenship, residence, and access on a permanent basis.53 
2.  Air Transportation 
The Air Transportation Annex covers “measures affecting trade in air transport services, whether 
scheduled or non-scheduled, and ancillary services.” 54   Traffic rights and directly related 
activities are excluded from the GATS, since they are regulated by other bilateral agreements.55  
Only measures affecting aircraft repair and maintenance services, the selling and marketing of air 
transport services, and computer reservation system (CRS) services have been included. 56  
Members are currently reviewing this Annex.57 
                                                                                                                                                             
51 World Trade Organization, supra note 39. 
52 GATS, supra note 2, annex on movement of natural persons supplying services under the agreement, para. 1. 
53 Id., at para. 2.  See also Id., at para. 4.  (“The Agreement shall not prevent a Member from applying measures to 
regulate the entry of natural persons into, or their temporary stay in, its territory, including those measures necessary 
to protect the integrity of, and to ensure the orderly movement of natural persons across, its borders, provided that 
such measures are not applied in such a manner as to nullify or impair the benefits accruing to any Member under 
the terms of a specific commitment.”) 
54 GATS, supra note 2, annex on air transportation service, para. 1. 
55 Id., at para. 2. (“The Agreement, including its dispute settlement procedures, shall not apply to measures affecting: 
(a) traffic rights, however granted; or 
(b) services directly related to the exercise of traffic rights, 
except as provided in paragraph 3 of this Annex.”) 
56 Id., at para. 3.  (“The Agreement shall apply to measures affecting: 
(a) aircraft repair and maintenance services; 
(b) the selling and marketing of air transport services; 
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3.  Financial Services58 
The Financial Services Annex applies “to measures affecting the supply of financial services.”59  
Financial stability is key to a country’s entire economy.  This Annex gives Members a good deal 
of discretion to apply measures (such as those for the protection of investors, depositors, and 
insurance policy holders) and to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system.60  
However, this Annex excludes the services provided when a government is exercising its 
authority over a public entity,61 such as government services or central bank services.62 
                                                                                                                                                             
(c) computer reservation system (CRS) services.”) 
57 Id., at para. 5. (“The Council for Trade in Services shall review periodically, and at least every five years, 
developments in the air transport sector and the operation of this Annex with a view to considering the possible 
further application of the Agreement in this sector.”).  World Trade Organization, supra note 39. 
58 Olsen ed., supra note 1, at 313 (There are two Annexes relating to financial services, Annex On Financial Services 
and Second Annex On Financial Services.  However, the second one is less important since “it merely mandates the 
ongoing negotiations after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, and contains no substantive rules on 
Members’ obligations within the financial service sectors.”). 
59 GATS, supra note 2, annex on financial services, para 1(a). 
60 Id., at para. 2. (“Domestic Regulation:  (a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of the Agreement, a Member 
shall not be prevented from taking measures for prudential reasons, including for the protection of investors, 
depositors, policy holders or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service supplier, or to ensure 
the integrity and stability of the financial system.  Where such measures do not conform with the provisions of the 
Agreement, they shall not be used as a means of avoiding the Member’s commitments or obligations under the 
Agreement.  (b) Nothing in the Agreement shall be construed to require a Member to disclose information relating to 
the affairs and accounts of individual customers or any confidential or proprietary information in the possession of 
public entities.”).  World Trade Organization, supra note 39. 
61 Id., at para. 5(c). (“Public entity” means:  (i) a government, a central bank or a monetary authority, of a Member, 
or an entity owned or controlled by a Member, that is principally engaged in carrying out governmental functions or 
activities for governmental purposes, not including an entity principally engaged in supplying financial services on 
commercial terms; or (ii) a private entity, performing functions normally performed by a central bank or monetary 
authority, when exercising those functions.”) 
62 Id., at para.1.  (“Scope and Definition of this Annex, 
(a) This Annex applies to measures affecting the supply of financial services.  Reference to the supply of a financial 
service in this Annex shall mean the supply of a service as defined in paragraph 2 of Article I of the Agreement. 
(b) For the purposes of subparagraph 3(b) of Article I of the Agreement, “services supplied in the exercise of 
governmental authority” means the following: 
(i) activities conducted by a central bank or monetary authority or by any other public entity in pursuit of 
monetary or exchange rate policies; 
(ii) activities forming part of a statutory system of social security or public retirement plans; and 
(iii) other activities conducted by a public entity for the account or with the guarantee or using the financial 
resources of the Government. 
(c) For the purposes of subparagraph 3(b) of Article I of the Agreement, if a Member allows any of the activities 
referred to in subparagraphs (b)(ii) or (b)(iii) of this paragraph to be conducted by its financial service suppliers 
in competition with a public entity or a financial service supplier, “services” shall include such activities. 
(d) Subparagraph 3(c) of Article I of the Agreement shall not apply to services covered by this Annex.”).  World 
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4.  Telecommunications63 
The Telecommunications Annex applies to “all measures of a Member that affect access to and 
use of public telecommunications transport networks and services.”64  The telecommunications 
sector has a dual role: 
(1) it is a distinct sector of economic activity; and 
(2) it is an underlying means of supplying other economic activities (e.g., electronic 
money transfers).65 
The main purpose of this Annex is to ensure that foreign telecommunication service 
suppliers are accorded the same public access as are domestic suppliers.66 
                                                                                                                                                             
Trade Organization, supra note 39. 
63  Olsen ed., supra note 1, at 316.  (There are also two Annexes relating Telecommunication, Annex On 
Telecommunications and Annex On Negotiations On Basic Telecommunications.  The later one is less important 
because it’s only temporary. “The function of this Annex was to postpone the need to specify exceptions to MFN 
(Article II) treatment for basic communications until the completion of negotiations that followed the entry into 
force of the GATS.”) 
64 GATS, supra note 2, annex on telecommunications, para. 2(a). 
65 Id., at para. 1. (“Recognizing the specificities of the telecommunications services sector and, in particular, its dual 
role as a distinct sector of economic activity and as the underlying transport means for other economic activities, the 
Members have agreed to the following Annex with the objective of elaborating upon the provisions of the 
Agreement with respect to measures affecting access to and use of public telecommunications transport networks 
and services.  Accordingly, this Annex provides notes and supplementary provisions to the Agreement.”).  See also 
World Trade Organization, supra note 39. 
66 Id., para 5. (“Access to and use of Public Telecommunications Transport Networks and Services 
(a) Each Member shall ensure that any service supplier of any other Member is accorded access to and use of 
public telecommunications transport networks and services on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and 
conditions, for the supply of a service included in its Schedule.  This obligation shall be applied, inter alia, 
through paragraphs (b) through (f). 
(b) Each Member shall ensure that service suppliers of any other Member have access to and use of any public 
telecommunications transport network or service offered within or across the border of that Member, including 
private leased circuits, and to this end shall ensure, subject to paragraphs (e) and (f), that such suppliers are 
permitted: 
(i) to purchase or lease and attach terminal or other equipment which interfaces with the network and which is 
necessary to supply a supplier’s services; 
(ii) to interconnect private leased or owned circuits with public telecommunications transport networks and 
services or with circuits leased or owned by another service supplier; and 
(iii) to use operating protocols of the service supplier’s choice in the supply of any service, other than as 
necessary to ensure the availability of telecommunications transport networks and services to the public 
generally. 
(c) Each Member shall ensure that service suppliers of any other Member may use public telecommunications 
transport networks and services for the movement of information within and across borders, including for intra-
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C.  THE GATS’S SCHEDULE OF COMMITMENTS 
As noted above, the obligations of any WTO Member under the GATS are dictated by the 
provisions of the Agreement and its Annexes, as well as by the specific commitments contained 
in the national Schedule of Commitments.67  The Schedule of Commitments is a relatively 
                                                                                                                                                             
corporate communications of such service suppliers, and for access to information contained in data bases or 
otherwise stored in machine-readable form in the territory of any Member.  Any new or amended measures of a 
Member significantly affecting such use shall be notified and shall be subject to consultation, in accordance 
with relevant provisions of the Agreement. 
(d) Notwithstanding the preceding paragraph, a Member may take such measures as are necessary to ensure the 
security and confidentiality of messages, subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
trade in services. 
(e) Each Member shall ensure that no condition is imposed on access to and use of public telecommunications 
transport networks and services other than as necessary: 
(i) to safeguard the public service responsibilities of suppliers of public telecommunications transport 
networks and services, in particular their ability to make their networks or services available to the public 
generally; 
(ii) to protect the technical integrity of public telecommunications transport networks or services; or 
(iii) to ensure that service suppliers of any other Member do not supply services unless permitted pursuant to 
commitments in the Member’s Schedule. 
(f) Provided that they satisfy the criteria set out in paragraph (e), conditions for access to and use of public 
telecommunications transport networks and services may include: 
(i) restrictions on resale or shared use of such services; 
(ii) a requirement to use specified technical interfaces, including interface protocols, for inter-connection with 
such networks and services; 
(iii) requirements, where necessary, for the inter-operability of such services and to encourage the achievement 
of the goals set out in paragraph 7(a); 
(iv) type approval of terminal or other equipment which interfaces with the network and technical requirements 
relating to the attachment of such equipment to such networks; 
(v) restrictions on inter-connection of private leased or owned circuits with such networks or services or with 
circuits leased or owned by another service supplier; or 
(vi) notification, registration and licensing. 
(g) Notwithstanding the preceding paragraphs of this section, a developing country Member may, consistent with 
its level of development, place reasonable conditions on access to and use of public telecommunications 
transport networks and services necessary to strengthen its domestic telecommunications infrastructure and 
service capacity and to increase its participation in international trade in telecommunications services.  Such 
conditions shall be specified in the Member’s Schedule.”) 
67 Jackson, supra note 4, at 308.  (“The treatment for scheduled service concessions is also covered by text that 
limits six ‘prohibited’ actions (unless exceptions are listed in a Schedule), defined as: 
• limits on the number of service provides 
• limits on the total value of service transactions or assets imported 
• limits on the number of service operations or quantity of service imports 
• limits on the number of natural persons that may be employed in a particular service sector 
• measures that restrict or require specific types of legal entity or joint venture for supplying the service 
• limits on the participation of foreign capital in shareholding or investment.”) 
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complex document, more difficult to read than a tariff schedule under the GATT.  A Schedule of 
Commitments contains at least eight entries per sector:68 
1-4.  the commitments regarding market access and national treatment with regard to 
each of the four modes of supply; 
5.  the 1st Column, which specifies the sector or sub-sector concerned; 
6.  the 2nd Column, which sets out any limitations on market access that fall within the 
six types of restrictions mentioned in Article XVI:2; 
7.  the 3rd Column, which contains any limitations that the Member may want to place, in 
accordance with Article XVII, on national treatment; and 
8.  the 4th Column, which provides the opportunity to undertake additional commitments 
as envisaged in Article XVIII. 
Any of the entries under market access or national treatment may vary within a spectrum, the 
opposing ends of which are full commitment without limitation (“none”) and full discretion to 
apply any measure falling under the relevant Article (“unbound”). 
The schedule is divided into two parts. While Part I lists “horizontal commitments” (i.e. 
entries that apply across all sectors that have been scheduled), Part II sets out commitments on a 
sector-by-sector basis. 
In the example below, the horizontal commitments under Mode III, national treatment, 
reserve the right to deny foreign land ownership.  Under Mode IV, Arcadia (the hypothetical 
Member) would be able to prevent any foreigner from entering its territory to supply services, 
except for the specified groups of persons. Within the retailing sector, whose definitional scope 
is further clarified by reference to the United Nations provisional Central Product Classification 
(CPC), commitments vary widely across modes. Most liberal are those for Mode II (consumption 
                                                 
68 World Trade Organization, supra note 1, at 11-12. 
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abroad) where Arcadia is bound not to take any measure under either Article XVI or XVII that 
would prevent or discourage its residents from shopping abroad. 
Table 8.  Sample Schedule of Commitments:  Arcadia69 
Modes of supply:  (1) Cross-border supply; (2) Consumption supply; (3) Commercial presence; (4) 
Presence of natural persons 
Sector or sub-sector 
 
Limitations on market access Limitations on national 
treatment 
Additional 
commitments
I.  HORIZONTAL COMMITMENTS 
ALL SECTORS INCLUDED 
IN THIS SCHEDULE 
(4) Unbound, other than for 
(a) temporary presence, as intra-
corporate transferees, of essential 
senior executives and specialists and
(b) presence for up to 90 days of 
representatives of a service provider 
to negotiate sales of services. 
(3) Authorization is 
required for acquisition of 
land by foreigners. 
 
II.  SECTOR-SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS 
4.DISTRIBUTION 
SERVICES 
 
C. Retailing services 
 (CPC 631, 632) 
(1) Unbound (except for mail order: 
none). 
(2) None. 
(3) Foreign equity participation 
limited to 51 per cent. 
(4) Unbound, except as indicated in 
horizontal section. 
(1) Unbound (except for 
mail order:  none). 
(2) None. 
(3) Investment grants are 
available only to companies 
controlled by Arcadian 
nationals. 
(4) Unbound. 
 
D.  THE HISTORY OF PAST NEGOTIATIONS 
Compared with other agreements, the GATS has a relatively slow phase in process.  Due to the 
unique characteristics of services trade, GATS has several special clauses and regulations built 
into its design.  Future negotiation rounds will play an important role in the development of the 
GATS.70 
                                                 
69 Id. 
70 Jackson, supra note 4, at 307. (“The Uruguay Round succeeded in developing the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services – GATS as a sort of a framework agreement for the entire landscape of services trade.  The Agreement went 
relatively far in embracing the traditional GATT concepts (MFN, national treatment, schedules of concessions), but 
clearly had to adapt those concepts for the new terrain encountered.  Furthermore, this services agreement leaves a 
great deal open, in some cases calling for specific ongoing negotiations, in other cases simply leaving it to the future 
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1.  The Post 1993 Uruguay Round Situation 
In the 1970s, the United States first proposed to incorporate services into the GATT framework.  
In 1982, the U.S. made specific proposals at a Ministerial meeting.71  However, many countries 
were uncertain about the idea of having an international agreement on trade in services.  One of 
the major problems was the difference between developed countries and developing countries 
regarding the incentives for regulating services.72  Developing countries paid less attention to 
rules on services; instead, the rules on goods were their concern.  From the developed countries’ 
perspectives, the shift of focus from goods to services represented a recognition of the lower 
production costs for goods in developing countries.73 
Eventually, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) was completed because 
of the pressure coming from the developed countries.74  However, the GATS allows a high 
degree of flexibility, both within the framework of its rules and also in terms of market access 
commitments.75 
2.  The 1995 Working Party on GATS Rules 
The GATS is not yet an end-product, but a first step in global liberalization of trade in services.76  
As the Uruguay Round ended, the GATS provided only a basic framework.  Hence, based on 
                                                                                                                                                             
to see what negotiators will be able to do.”) 
71 Self, supra note 39, at 529. 
72 Olsen ed., supra note 1, at 280-281. 
73 Id., at 281. 
74 Id. 
75 World Trade Organization, supra note 39. 
76 Olsen ed., supra note 1, at 279. 
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GATS Article XXIV, the Council for Trade in Services established the Working Party on GATS 
Rules (WPGA) on March 30, 1995. 
Article XXIV(1) provides that, “The Council for Trade in Services … may establish such 
subsidiary bodies as it considers appropriate for the effective discharge of its functions.”  After 
its establishment, the Working Party became responsible for GATS negotiation topics, such as 
emergency safeguard measures, government procurement, and subsidy issues.77 
3.  The 2001 Guidelines and Procedures for the Negotiations on Trade in Services 
On March 29, 2001, the Council for Trade in Services approved the “Guidelines and Procedures 
for the Negotiations on Trade in Services.”78  The objectives and principles of the Guidelines 
provide for: 
(1) progressive liberalization to be retained as the main concept;79 
(2) appropriate flexibility for developing countries, with special priority to be given 
to least-developed countries;80 
(3) reference to the needs of small and medium-sized suppliers;81 and 
(4) respect for “the existing structure and principles of the GATS.”82 
In terms of scope, of the Guidelines provide for: 
                                                 
77 World Trade Organization, SERVICES:  COUNCIL, The Services Council, its Committees and other subsidiary 
bodies, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/s_coun_e.htm. 
78 Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Guidelines and Procedures for the Negotiations on Trade in 
Services, adopted by the Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services on 28 March 2001, S/L/93 (29 March 
2001). 
79 Id., at para. 1. 
80 Supra note 79, at para. 2. 
81 Id., at para. 3. 
82 Id., at para. 4. 
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(1) no exclusion of sectors or modes from the scope of the negotiations, with special 
attention to be given to developing countries;83 
(2) MFN exemptions to be included in the negotiation discussion;84 and 
(3) required rule-making agendas concerning disciplines on domestic regulation 
(Article VI:4), emergency safeguards (Article X), government procurement 
(Article XIII) and subsidies (Article XV).85 
In terms of modalities and procedures, the Guidelines provide for: 
(1) schedules current at the outset to be the starting point;86 
(2) request-offer negotiations to be the main approach to adjustment going forward;87 
(3) common criteria for negotiating credit for autonomous liberalization, to be 
developed by the Services Council in Modalities for the Treatment of 
Autonomous Liberalization;88 
(4) an ongoing assessment of trade in services;89 and 
(5) a mandate to the Services Council to evaluate the results of the negotiations prior 
to their completion in the light of Article IV.90 
4.  The Doha Round Mandates with Respect to GATS 
In the Doha Ministerial Declaration,91 coverage of services was limited to the 2001 Guidelines 
and Procedures for the Negotiations adopted by the Council for Trade in Services.92   The 
                                                 
83 Id., at para. 5. 
84 Id., at para. 6. 
85 Id., at para. 7. 
86 Id., at para. 10. 
87 Id., at para. 11. 
88 Id., at para. 13. 
89 Id., at para. 14. 
90 Id., at para. 18. 
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declaration set out dates for the circulation of initial requests, stating that “Participants shall 
submit initial requests for specific commitments by 30 June 2002 and initial offers by 31 March 
2003.”93 
5.  The Cancun Meeting and the “July 2004 Package” 
At the Cancun Meeting of the Doha Round, in early September 2003, there was failure regarding 
progress on the GATS.  The concluding statement94 simply reinstated the Doha Round mandates 
by stating that, “[n]otwithstanding this setback, we reaffirm all our Doha Declarations and 
Decisions and recommit ourselves to working to implement them fully and faithfully.” 95  
Reflecting the lack of political impetus, the request-and-offer process in services virtually came 
to a halt in the wake of Cancun.96 
In mid 2004, the so called “July 2004 package (Decision Adopted by the General Council 
on August 1 2004)”97 was introduced to give momentum to the negotiations.  The Package set up 
a date of May 2005 for submitting revised offers on services.98  Upon agreement by the Council 
for Trade in Services, the Package also listed recommendations that: 
(1) Members that had not yet submitted initial offers do so as soon as possible;99 
                                                                                                                                                             
91 Ministerial Declaration, DOHA WTO Ministerial 2001:  adopted on 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (20 
November 2001). 
92 Id., at para. 15. 
93 Id. 
94 Ministerial Conference Fifth Session Cancún, 10 - 14 September 2003, Ministerial Declaration, Adopted on 14 
September 2003, WT/MIN(03)/20 (23 September 2003). 
95 Id., at para. 6. 
96  World Trade Organization, Services:  Negotiations, Key stages in the negotiations, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/key_stages_e.htm. 
97 Doha Work Programme, Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, WT/L/579 (2 August, 2004). 
98 Id, para. 1(e). 
99 Id,, at Annex C, para. (a). 
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(2) Members ensure high quality of offers, in particular in sectors and modes of 
export interest to developing countries, with special attention being given to least-
developed countries (LDCs);100 
(3) Members intensify efforts to conclude the rule-making negotiations under Articles 
VI.4, X, XIII and XV in accordance with their mandates and deadlines;101 and 
(4) Members provide “targeted” technical assistance to developing countries with a 
view to enabling them to participate effectively.102 
6.  The Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration 
The Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 2005  reaffirmed the principles set out 
in Annex C to the July 2004 package, including 
the objectives and principles stipulated in the GATS, the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration, the Guidelines and Procedures for the Negotiations on Trade in 
Services adopted by the Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services on 
28 March 2001 and the Modalities for the Special Treatment for Least-Developed 
Country Members in the Negotiations on Trade in Services adopted on 3 
September 2003, as well as Annex C of the Decision adopted by the General 
Council on 1 August 2004.103 
 
The Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration also requested that Members intensify 
negotiations in accordance with Annex C and improve their quality, with particular attention to 
export interests of developing countries. 104   Additionally, the Declaration recognized “the 
                                                 
100 Id., at para. (c). 
101 Id., at para. (e). 
102Id., at para. (f). 
103 Ministerial Conference Sixth Session Hong Kong, 13 - 18 December 2005, Ministerial Declaration:  adopted on 
18 December 2005, WT/MIN(05)/DEC (22 December 2005), at para. 25. 
104  Id., at para. 27; World Trade Organization, Services:  Negotiations, Key stages in the negotiations, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/key_stages_e.htm. 
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particular economic situation of LDCs, including the difficulties they face, and acknowledge[d] 
that they are not expected to undertake new commitments.”105 
Annex C contained a more detailed negotiating objective than had any previous 
document.106  It established a framework for: 
(1) offering new or improved commitments under each mode of supply; 
(2) treating Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) exemptions; and 
(3) scheduling and classification of commitments.107 
It also requested that Members intensify their efforts to conclude the rule-making 
negotiations.108  However, the Doha Development Agenda negotiations were suspended from 
mid-July 2006 until January 2007, without any new timelines agreed by negotiations.109 
On May 26, 2008, the Chair of the services negotiations issued a report listing the 
elements required for the completion of the services negotiations.110  In the report, the Chair 
addressed issues such as participants’ level of ambition, their willingness to bind existing and 
improved levels of market access, and their approaches to national treatment.111   The report also 
mentioned that the Members had reached conclusions on certain issues, stating that: 
(1) Members reaffirm their commitment as made in the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declaration to conclude negotiations on GATS Rules pursuant to Articles X, XIII, 
and XV, in accordance with their respective mandates and timelines. 
                                                 
105 Id., at para. 26. 
106 World Trade Organization, supra note 105. 
107 Id. 
108 Doha Work Programme, supra note 98, at Annex C, para. (e). 
109  World Trade Organization, Services: Negotiations, Current negotiations, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/s_negs_e.htm. 
110  Council for Trade in Services Special Session, Elements Required For The Completion Of The Services 
Negotiations:  Report by the Chairman, TN/S/33 (26 May 2008). 
111 World Trade Organization, supra note 105. 
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(2) Members take note of the … submission of specific and concrete proposals, to 
facilitate consideration and engagement in all three areas. 
(3) Members recognize the importance attached by some delegations to the objectives 
and principles contained in these proposals.112 
These documents demonstrate that Article XV service subsidy issues remain a concern in 
achieving the completion of GATS issues during the Doha Round.  Negotiations on service 
subsidies are behind the schedule of progress made on emergency safeguard measures and 
government procurement. 113   Nonetheless, the Members have formally recognized the 
importance of Article XV, and the indispensable need to establish a legal framework for service 
subsidies. 
 
                                                 
112 Council for Trade in Services Special Session, supra note 111, at para. 6. 
113 Working Parties on GATS Rules, Work Programmes, S/WPGR/7 (25 July 2002).  (This document points out three 
parts of service regulations:  emergency safeguard measure, subsidies, and government procurement. Unlike 
emergency safeguard measure and government procurement, it basically does not provide any concrete guidance for 
service subsidy regulations.  For detailed information, please see Chapter 6 of this dissertation.) 
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IV.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND 
COUNTERVAILING MEASURES (ASCM) 
A.  GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) was concluded as one of the 
Uruguay Round agreements.  The object and purpose of the ASCM is to discipline the use of 
subsidies, which may have trade-distortive effects,1 and to give Members the right to take action 
when their industries are harmed by subsidies.  To do this, the Agreement categorizes subsidies 
into three types: prohibited subsidies,2 actionable subsidies,3 and non-actionable subsidies.4  The 
category in which a specific subsidy falls determines the nature and extent of the relief 
mechanism that can be applied to counteract it. 
1.  Historical Background 
A subsidy is a means of governmental support to domestic industries.  Due to their impact on 
economic competition among nations, the GATT system regulates and restrains their application. 
                                                 
1 Panel Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for aircraft, WT/DS46/R, para. 7.26 (April 14, 1999). Panel 
Report, Canada-Measures affecting the export of civilian aircraft, WT/DS70/R, para. 9.119 (April 14, 1999). 
2 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 1999, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14. [hereinafter the 
SCM Agreement], art. 3 and 4. 
3 The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 5, 6, and 7. 
4 Id., art. 8 and 9. 
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a.  The Tokyo Round Subsidy Codes  The Tokyo Round Agreements included the Agreement 
on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement 
(Subsidies Code). 5   This Subsidies Code provided regulations concerning procedural 
notification; consultation and dispute settlement; remedial measures and countermeasures; and 
criteria for determining material injury.  The Code:6 
(1) for the first time, prohibited export subsidies on non-primary products as well as 
primary mineral products;7 
(2) contained the description of export subsidies, listed the test for determining 
whether an export subsidy exists, and included an illustrative list of subsidy 
practices; 
(3) recognized the harmful trade effects of domestic subsidies8 and permitted relief 
(including countermeasures) where such subsidies injure domestic producers and 
nullify or impair benefits of concessions under the GATT (including tariff 
bindings), or cause serious prejudice to other Contracting Parties; 
(4) stated the commitment by signatories to “take into account” conditions of world 
trade and production (e.g. prices, capacity, etc.) in fashioning their subsidy 
practices; 
(5) improved discipline on the use of export subsidies for agriculture; 
                                                 
5 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX:  GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE, 1147-1150 
(1995). 
6 COMMITTEE OF WAYS AND MEANS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, OVERVIEWS AND COMPILATION OF U.S. 
TRADE STATUTES, 85 (2001). 
7 M. Jean Anderson and Gregory Husisian, The Subsidies Agreement, in, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:  
MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION, 300 (Terence 
P. Stewart ed., 1996). 
8 Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, reprinted in GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents (BISD) (26th Supp. 1980) at 56, art. 8.3. 
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(6) included provisions governing the use and phase-out of export subsidies by 
developing countries; 
(7) revised the dispute settlement process; 
(8) provided greater transparency regarding subsidy practices including provisions for 
GATT notification of practices of other countries; 
(9) included an injury and causation test designed to afford relief where subsidized 
imports (whether an export or domestic subsidy is involved) impact domestic 
producers either through volume or through effect on prices;9 and 
(10) provided greater transparency in the administration of CVD laws and regulations. 
The Tokyo Subsidies Code demonstrated remarkable progress in disciplining subsidies at 
the international level.  However, it did not result in all of the benefits expected by Contracting 
Parties.  Its failure led to the birth of the Uruguay Round Subsidies Agreement.10 
b.  The Uruguay Round Subsidy Agreement  The current Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (ASCM) was concluded as part of the Uruguay Round Agreements.  It 
contains the following provisions: 
PART I:  GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Article 1 Definition of a Subsidy 
Article 2 Specificity 
PART II:  PROHIBITED SUBSIDIES 
Article 3 Prohibition 
Article 4 Remedies 
Article 5 Adverse effects 
PART III:  ACTIONABLE SUBSIDIES 
Article 6 Serious Prejudice 
Article 7 Remedies 
                                                 
9 Id., art. 2.1.  See also 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a)(2), 1677(7).  (United States at that time was asked to add an “injury 
test” to its domestic CVD laws.) 
10 Supra note 7. 
 98 
PART IV:  NON ACTIONABLE SUBSIDIES 
Article 8 Identification of Non-Actionable Subsidies 
Article 9 Consultations and Authorized Remedies 
PART V:  COUNTERVAILING MEASURES 
Article 10 Application of Article VI of GATT 1994 
Article 11 Initiation and Subsequent Investigation 
Article 12 Evidences 
Article 13 Consultations 
Article 14 Calculation of the Amount of a Subsidy in Terms of the Benefit to the Recipient 
Article 15 Determination of Injury 
Article 16 Definition of Domestic Industry 
Article 17 Provisional Measures 
Article 18 Undertakings 
Article 19 Imposition and Collection of Countervailing Duties 
Article 20 Retroactivity 
Article 21 Duration and Review of Countervailing Duties and Undertakings 
Article 22 Public Notice and Explanation of Determinations 
Article 23 Judicial Review 
Article 24 Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and Subsidiary Bodies 
PART VI:  INSTITUTIONS 
Article 25 Notifications 
PART VII:  NOTIFICATION AND SURVEILLANCE 
Article 26 Surveillance 
PART VIII:  DEVELOPING COUNTRY MEMBERS 
Article 27 Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Country Members 
PART IX:  TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
Article 28 Existing Programmes 
Article 29 Transformation into a Market Economy 
PART X:  DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
Article 30  
PART XI:  FINAL PROVISIONS 
Article 31 Provisional Application 
Article 32 Other Final Provisions 
 
ASCM Annexes 
Annex I  Illustrative List of Export Subsidies 
Annex II Guidelines on Consumption of Inputs in the Production Process 
Annex III Guidelines in the Determination of Substitution Drawback Systems as Export 
Subsidies 
Annex IV Calculation of the Total Ad Valorem Subsidization (Paragraph 1(A) of Article 6) 
Annex V Procedures For Developing Information Concerning Serious Prejudice 
Annex VI Procedures for On-the-Spot Investigations Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Article 12 
Annex VII Developing Country Members Referred to in Paragraph 2(A) of Article 27 
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2.  Elements of a Subsidy 
The SCM Agreement, for the first time, provides a complete definition of a subsidy.11  Article 
1.1 provides that a subsidy exists “if (a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or 
any public body within the territory of a Member…; or (a)(2) there is any form of income or 
price support; and (b) a benefit is thereby conferred.”  The definition thus makes clear the three 
elements required to prove the existence of a subsidy: a financial contribution, conferred by a 
government, which confers a benefit. 
a.  A Financial Contribution  In order for a measure to be a subsidy, it must constitute a 
financial contribution or take the form of an income or price support in the sense of Article XVI 
of GATT 1994. 12   Article 1.1(a)(1) provides an exhaustive list of the types of financial 
contributions by governments that can constitute subsidies.  They occur when:13 
(a) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and 
equity infusion), or a potential direct transfer of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan 
guarantees); 
(b) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal 
incentives such as tax credits); 
                                                 
11 The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 1 and 2. 
12 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1A, 1999, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT], art. XVI.1.  (“If any 
contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy, including any form of income or price support, which operates 
directly or indirectly to increase exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any product into, its territory, it 
shall notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES in writing of the extent and nature of the subsidization, of the estimated 
effect of the subsidization on the quantity of the affected product or products imported into or exported from its 
territory and of the circumstances making the subsidization necessary.  In any case in which it is determined that 
serious prejudice to the interests of any other contracting party is caused or threatened by any such subsidization, the 
contracting party granting the subsidy shall, upon request, discuss with the other contracting party or parties 
concerned, or with the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the possibility of limiting the subsidization.”). 
13 The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 1.1(a)(1).  PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:  TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS, 555-556 (2005). 
 100 
(c) a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, or 
purchases goods; 
(d) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a 
private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to 
(iii) above which would normally be vested in the government and the practice, in 
no real sense, differs from practices normally followed by governments. 
b.  Provided by a Government or Any Public Body  If a financial contribution is provided by 
private entities, such as corporations and companies, it will not be considered to be a subsidy.  It 
may, however, constitute dumping.  Dumping usually is a company’s strategic method to cut 
product prices.14  In the case of a subsidy, it is a governmental authority that makes the decision 
to provide a financial contribution. 
The test employed to determine whether there is a governmental activity is a but for 
test.15  This means that whether a support granted to a private body constitutes a subsidy depends 
on whether the payment would not have been granted but for governmental action.16 
c.  Conferring a Benefit  No definition of a benefit is provided in Article for purposes of 
determining the existence of a subsidy.  In the Dispute Settlement Body’s determination in the 
Canada-Aircraft case, the panel and the Appellate Body each made several comments on how to 
define a benefit.17  The panel ruled that if financial contributions are “provided on terms [that] 
                                                 
14 Bossche, supra note 13, at 516.  (“In fact, since prices of products are ordinarily set by private companies, 
‘dumping’ in and of itself is not regulated by WTO law.”) 
15 WTO LAW – FROM A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE, 430 (Birgitte Egelund Olsen ed., 2006). 
16 Id. (it refers to the panel finding in Panel Report, Canada – Measures affecting the importation of milk and the 
exportation of dairy products:  Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by New Zealand and the United States, 
WT/DS103/RW, WT/DS113/RW, para. 6.39 (July 11, 2001).) 
17 Appellate Report, Canada – Measures affecting the export of civilian aircraft:  recourse by Brazil to article 21.5 
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are more advantageous than those that would have been available to the recipient on the 
market,”18 it should be considered as a benefit. 
The Appellate Body further elaborated on the definition of benefit by adding the 
condition that “the financial contribution makes the recipient better off than it would otherwise 
have been, absent that contribution.”  It went on to state that “the marketplace provides an 
appropriate basis for comparison … because … a financial contribution can be identified by 
determining whether the recipient has received a financial contribution on terms more favorable 
than those available to the recipient in the market.”19 
Article 14 of the SCM Agreement provides that any method of calculating benefits is to 
be consistent with the following guidelines:20 
(1) “government provision of equity capital shall not be considered as conferring a 
benefit, unless the investment decision can be regarded as inconsistent with the 
usual investment practice of private investors.”21 
(2) “government loans shall not be considered as conferring a benefit, unless there is 
a difference between the amount that the firm receiving the loan pays on the 
government loan and the amount the firm would pay on a comparable commercial 
loan which the firm could actually obtain on the market.”22 
                                                                                                                                                             
of the DSU, AB-2000-4, WT/DS70/AB/R (July 21, 2000).  Panel Report, Canada – Measures affecting the export of 
civilian aircraft, WT/DS70/R (April 14, 1999). 
18 Panel Report, id., at para. 9.112. 
19 Appellate Report, supra note 17, at para. 157. 
20 RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:  INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE, 1053 (2007).  (“This list 
does not expressly states it is non-exclusive, but that is a reasonable reading of Article 14.  Moreover, the relevant 
Statement of Administrative Action refers to the Article 14 list as a set of ‘guidelines’, and the U.S. CVD statute uses 
the word ‘including’ before presenting the list.  Hence there may well be other financial contributions that confer a 
‘benefit’ that do not fit neatly within the four examples.”).  See also 19 U.S.C § 1677(5). (U.S. Countervailing duty 
laws tracks these same four examples) 
21 The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 14(a). 
22 The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 14(b). 
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(3) “government loan guarantees shall not be considered as conferring a benefit, 
unless there is a difference between the amount that the firm receiving the 
guarantee pays on a loan guaranteed by the government and the amount that the 
firm would pay on a comparable commercial loan absent the government 
guarantee.”23 
(4) “the provision of goods or services or purchase of goods by a government shall 
not be considered as conferring a benefit unless the provision is made for less than 
adequate remuneration, or the purchase is made for more than adequate 
remuneration.”24 
d.  The Specificity Test  The specificity test is an important and unique element found in the 
SCM Agreement.25  A subsidy available for all industries in an economy is not prohibited since it 
does not distort trade, but rather promotes general development within that economy. 26  
Therefore, the SCM Agreement makes it clear that only those subsidies given specifically to a 
certain group in an economy shall be prohibited.  This is the specificity test stipulated in Article 
2.  Article 2.1 identifies several principles for determining when a subsidy is appropriately 
specific to be actionable.  These principles have been described as resulting in the following 
types of specificity: 
                                                 
23 Id., art. 14(c). 
24 Id., art. 14(d). (“…The adequacy of remuneration shall be determined in relation to prevailing market conditions 
for the good or service in question in the country of provision or purchase (including price, quality, availability, 
marketability, transportation and other conditions of purchase or sale).”). 
25 See 19 U.S.C § 1677(5)(A).  (The specificity guidelines in the SCM Agreement are modeled on the specificity test 
that formed part of US Countervailing Duties practices.)  See also TERRENCE P. STEWART ED., THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION:  MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING 
LEGISLATION, 331-332 (1996). 
26 Bossche, supra note 13, at 559. 
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(1) “enterprise specificity: a situation where a government targets a particular 
company or companies for subsidization; 
(2) industry specificity: a situation where a government targets a particular sector or 
sectors for subsidization; 
(3) regional specificity: a situation where a government targets products in specified 
parts of its territory for subsidization; and 
(4) prohibited specificity: a situation where a government targets export goods or 
goods using domestic inputs for subsidization.”27 
If a subsidy falls within any of the categories above, it is deemed specific.  Subsidies 
established by objective criteria will not be considered to be specific.  For this purpose, objective 
criteria are “criteria or conditions which are neutral, which do not favour certain enterprises over 
others, and which are economic in nature and horizontal in application, such as number of 
employees or size of enterprise.”28 
                                                 
27 Id., at 559-560.  The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 2.1. (“In order to determine whether a subsidy, as defined 
in paragraph 1 of Article 1, is specific to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries (referred to in 
this Agreement as “certain enterprises”) within the jurisdiction of the granting authority, the following principles 
shall apply: 
(a) Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the granting authority operates, explicitly 
limits access to a subsidy to certain enterprises, such subsidy shall be specific. 
(b) Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the granting authority operates, 
establishes objective criteria or conditions governing the eligibility for, and the amount of, a subsidy, 
specificity shall not exist, provided that the eligibility is automatic and that such criteria and conditions are 
strictly adhered to.  The criteria or conditions must be clearly spelled out in law, regulation, or other official 
document, so as to be capable of verification. 
(c) If, notwithstanding any appearance of non-specificity resulting from the application of the principles laid 
down in subparagraphs (a) and (b), there are reasons to believe that the subsidy may in fact be specific, 
other factors may be considered.  Such factors are:  use of a subsidy programme by a limited number of 
certain enterprises, predominant use by certain enterprises, the granting of disproportionately large amounts 
of subsidy to certain enterprises, and the manner in which discretion has been exercised by the granting 
authority in the decision to grant a subsidy.  In applying this subparagraph, account shall be taken of the 
extent of diversification of economic activities within the jurisdiction of the granting authority, as well as of 
the length of time during which the subsidy programme has been in operation.”) 
28 The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 2.1(b), footnote 2. 
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It is important to note that the SCM Agreement applies to both de jure and de facto 
specific subsidies.29  Article 2.1(c) lists factors that may identify de facto subsidies.  They 
include: 
(1) the use of a subsidy programme by a limited number of certain enterprises; 
(2) the predominant use of the subsidy by certain enterprises; 
(3) the granting of disproportionately large amounts of subsidy to certain enterprises;, 
and 
(4) the manner in which discretion has been exercised by the granting authority in the 
decision to grant a subsidy.30 
The determination of specificity plays a crucial role in determining the relevant category 
of a subsidy.31  Unless a subsidy is specific, it will not be actionable under the SCM Agreement’s 
terms. 
3.  The Traffic-Light System 
The SCM Agreement provides a unique way of categorizing subsidies into three different 
categories: prohibited subsidies, actionable subsidies, and non-actionable subsidies.32  This has 
been dubbed the “traffic-light” system, with the three categories referred to as red light, yellow 
light, and green light. 
                                                 
29 Id., art 2.1 (c).  (“If, notwithstanding any appearance of non-specificity resulting from the application of the 
principles laid down in subparagraphs (a) and (b), there are reasons to believe that the subsidy may in fact be 
specific, other factors may be considered.  Such factors are:  use of a subsidy programme by a limited number of 
certain enterprises, predominant use by certain enterprises, the granting of disproportionately large amounts of 
subsidy to certain enterprises, and the manner in which discretion has been exercised by the granting authority in the 
decision to grant a subsidy.  In applying this subparagraph, account shall be taken of the extent of diversification of 
economic activities within the jurisdiction of the granting authority, as well as of the length of time during which the 
subsidy programme has been in operation.”). 
30 Id. 
31 Bhala, supra note 20, at 1054. 
32 Id., at 1067. 
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Only two of the categories of subsides, prohibited and actionable, remain governed by the 
SCM Agreement.  The non-actionable subsidy category existed for 5 years and ended on 31 
December 1999.33 
It should be noted that the SCM Agreement applies to both agricultural goods and 
industrial products.34  Subsidies are exempt only under the peace clause of the Agriculture 
Agreement.35  However, such a peace clause expired at the end of 2003.36  Thus, the SCM 
Agreement now provides the governing rules for agricultural as well as industrial products. 
a.  Prohibited Subsidies  Article 3 gives an explanation of prohibited subsidies.  All prohibited 
subsidies are per se illegal, presumed to be specific, and presumed to cause an adverse effect.37 
This category includes two types of subsidies: 
(1) Export subsidies:  “subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely or as 
one of several other conditions, upon export performance, including those 
illustrated in Annex I”;38 
(2) Domestic substitution subsidies:  “subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one 
of several other conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported goods.”39 
                                                 
33 The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 31.  (“The provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 6 and the provisions of 
Article 8 and Article 9 shall apply for a period of five years, beginning with the date of entry into force of the WTO 
Agreement.  Not later than 180 days before the end of this period, the Committee shall review the operation of those 
provisions, with a view to determining whether to extend their application, either as presently drafted or in a 
modified form, for a further period.”) 
34 World Trade Organization, Understanding The WTO:  The Agreements, Anti-dumping, subsidies, safeguards:  
contingencies, etc, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm#subsidies. 
35 Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1A, 1999, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410. [hereinafter AoA ], art. 13(a).  (“domestic support measures that conform fully 
to the provisions of Annex 2 to this Agreement shall be: 
(i) non-actionable subsidies for purposes of countervailing duties; 
(ii) exempt from actions based on Article XVI of GATT 1994 and Part III of the Subsidies Agreement; and 
(iii) exempt from actions based on non-violation nullification or impairment of the benefits of tariff concessions 
accruing to another Member under Article II of GATT 1994, in the sense of paragraph 1(b) of Article XXIII 
of GATT 1994.”) 
36 World Trade Organization, supra note 34. 
37 Bhala, supra note 32. 
38 The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 3.1(a). 
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Export Subsidies 
Annex I of the SCM Agreement gives a non-exhaustive list of the form export subsidies 
could take.40  The list includes: 
(1) the provision by governments of direct subsidies to a firm or an industry 
contingent upon export performance; 
(2) currency retention schemes or any similar practices which involve a bonus on 
exports; 
(3) internal transport and freight charges on export shipments, provided or mandated 
by governments, on terms more favourable than for domestic shipments; and 
(4) the provision by governments or their agencies, either directly or indirectly 
through government-mandated schemes, of imported or domestic products or 
services for use in the production of exported goods, on terms or conditions more 
favourable than for provision of like or directly competitive products or services 
for use in the production of goods for domestic consumption, if (in the case of 
products) such terms or conditions are more favourable than those commercially 
available on world markets to their exporters.41 
Domestic Subsidies 
A domestic subsidy is also called the import substitution subsidy or local content 
subsidy.42  It occurs when a Member subsidizes the choice of domestic products over import 
products. 
                                                                                                                                                             
39 Id., art. 3.1(b). 
40 Bossche, supra note 13, at 562. 
41 The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, Annex I. 
42 Bossche, supra note 13, at 564. 
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To compare export and domestic subsidies, one important concept must be understood.  
Article 3.1 (a) clearly prohibits subsidies contingent upon export performance, whether that 
subsidy is contingent de jure or de facto.43  In other words, even if the subsidy does not result 
from legal regulation, as long as it in fact takes place during export performance, it qualifies as 
an export subsidy under Article 3.1(a).44 
While the same issue arises when dealing with domestic subsidies, Article 3.1(b) is silent 
on whether domestic subsidies not directly provided by legal regulation are prohibited upon 
import substitution.  This issue has been clarified by the Appellate Body in Canada-Autos,45 
where it found only de jure subsidies to be subject to remedy upon the use of domestic over 
imported goods.46 
b.  Actionable Subsidies  Part III of the SCM Agreement deals with the actionable subsidy 
situation.  Actionable subsidies, though not prohibited, are subject to challenge, either through 
multilateral dispute settlement or countervailing duty action.  Article 5 lists the types of adverse 
effects that make a subsidy actionable:47 
(1) injury to the domestic industry of another Member; 
(2) nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or indirectly to other 
Members under GATT 1994, in particular the benefits of concessions bound 
under Article II of GATT 1994; and 
(3) serious prejudice to the interests of another Member. 
                                                 
43 The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 3.1(a). (“subsidies contingent upon, in law or in fact, whether solely or as 
one of several other conditions, upon export performance……”) 
44 Bossche, supra note 13, at 562-563. 
45  Appellate Body Report, Canada-Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WT/DS139/AB/R, 
WT/DS142/AB/R (May 31, 2000). 
46 Id., para. 142.  (“we believe that a finding that Article 3.1(b) extends only to contingency ‘in law’ upon the use of 
domestic over imported goods would make circumvention of obligations by Members too easy.”). 
47 The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 5. 
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Subsidies Causing Injury to a Domestic Industry of Another Member 
Article 16.1 of the SCM Agreement defines domestic industry to refer to “the domestic 
producers as a whole of the like products or to those of them whose collective output of the 
products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products.”48  
Article 16 provides further gloss on this definition by providing that, 
(1) when producers are related to the exporters or importers or are themselves 
importers of the allegedly subsidized product or a like product from other 
countries, these producers will not be included for purposes of defining “domestic 
industry,”49 and 
(2) in exceptional circumstances, the territory of a Member may be divided into two 
or more competitive markets and the producers within each market may be 
regarded as a separate industry.50 
The Article 16 definition requires both that the injuries are to be suffered by the domestic 
market, and that the domestic market be that of a like product.  Footnote 46 to Article 15 defines 
like product as “a product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects to the product under 
consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another product which, although not alike in 
                                                 
48 The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 16.1.  (“For the purposes of this Agreement, the term “domestic industry” 
shall, except as provided in paragraph 2, be interpreted as referring to the domestic producers as a whole of the like 
products or to those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total 
domestic production of those products, except that when producers are related to the exporters or importers or are 
themselves importers of the allegedly subsidized product or a like product from other countries, the term “domestic 
industry” may be interpreted as referring to the rest of the producers.”) 
49 The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 16.1. 
50 Id., art. 16.2. (“In exceptional circumstances, the territory of a Member may, for the production in question, be 
divided into two or more competitive markets and the producers within each market may be regarded as a separate 
industry if (a) the producers within such market sell all or almost all of their production of the product in question in 
that market, and (b) the demand in that market is not to any substantial degree supplied by producers of the product 
in question located elsewhere in the territory.  In such circumstances, injury may be found to exist even where a 
major portion of the total domestic industry is not injured, provided there is a concentration of subsidized imports 
into such an isolated market and provided further that the subsidized imports are causing injury to the producers of 
all or almost all of the production within such market.”). 
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all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration.”51  
The definition is similar to that found in GATT Articles I and III.52 
The injury criterion must be based on positive evidence and involve an objective 
examination of both:53 
(1) the volume of the subsidized imports and the effect of the subsidized imports on 
prices in the domestic market for like products,54 and 
(2) the consequent impact of these imports on the domestic producers of such 
products. 
Under Article 15.4, economic factors may be taken to indicate that an injury exists in a 
certain case, including:55 
(1) actual and potential decline in output, sales, market share, profits, productivity, 
return on investments, or utilization of capacity; 
(2) factors affecting domestic prices; and 
(3) actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, 
wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investments.56 
An examination of all factors is obligatory in each case.57  Nonetheless, the Article 15.4 
list is not exhaustive, and no one factor is to be decisive.58 
                                                 
51 The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, footnote 46. 
52  Panel Report, Indonesia – Certain measures affecting the automobile industry, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, 
WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, para. 14.174 (July 2, 1998).  (“Although we are required in this dispute to interpret the 
term `like product` in conformity with the specific definition provided in the in the SCM Agreement, we believe that 
useful guidance can nevertheless be derived from prior analysis of `like product` issues under other provisions of the 
WTO Agreement.”). 
53 The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 15.1. 
54 Id., footnote 46.  (“Throughout this Agreement the term “like product” (“produit similaire”) shall be interpreted to 
mean a product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects to the product under consideration, or in the absence of 
such a product, another product which, although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those 
of the product under consideration.”) 
55 Id., art. 15.4. 
56 Id. 
57 Bossche, supra note 13, at 570, footnote 219.  (“The existence of an obligation to examine all the factors of the 
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Subsidies Causing Nullification or Impairment of another Member’s Benefits 
The concept of nullification or impairment of another Member’s benefits originated in 
GATT Article XXIII.59  That provision lists situations in which Members may claim that their 
rights are nullified or impaired, including: 
(1) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this 
Agreement, or 
(2) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it 
conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or 
(3) the existence of any other situation.60 
                                                                                                                                                             
Article 15.4 list can be established by analogy to panel and Appellate Body reports interpreting similar provisions in 
the Anti-Dumping.”) 
58 Supra note 55. 
59 Id., footnote 12.  (“The term “nullification or impairment” is used in this Agreement in the same sense as it is used 
in the relevant provisions of GATT 1994, and the existence of such nullification or impairment shall be established 
in accordance with the practice of application of these provisions.”).  GATT, supra note 12, art. XXIII. (“1.  If any 
contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being 
nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of 
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this Agreement, or 
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions 
of this Agreement, or 
(c) the existence of any other situation, 
the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written representations or 
proposals to the other contracting party or parties which it considers to be concerned.  Any contracting party thus 
approached shall give sympathetic consideration to the representations or proposals made to it.  2.  If no satisfactory 
adjustment is effected between the contracting parties concerned within a reasonable time, or if the difficulty is of 
the type described in paragraph 1 (c) of this Article, the matter may be referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES.  
The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall promptly investigate any matter so referred to them and shall make 
appropriate recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider to be concerned, or give a ruling on the 
matter, as appropriate.  The CONTRACTING PARTIES may consult with contracting parties, with the Economic 
and Social Council of the United Nations and with any appropriate inter-governmental organization in cases where 
they consider such consultation necessary.  If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider that the circumstances are 
serious enough to justify such action, they may authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend the application to 
any other contracting party or parties of such concessions or other obligations under this Agreement as they 
determine to be appropriate in the circumstances.  If the application to any contracting party of any concession or 
other obligation is in fact suspended, that contracting party shall then be free, not later than sixty days after such 
action is taken, to give written notice to the Executive Secretary to the Contracting Parties of its intention to 
withdraw from this Agreement and such withdrawal shall take effect upon the sixtieth day following the day on 
which such notice is received by him.”) 
60 Id., art. XXIII(1). 
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Subsidies Causing Serious Prejudice to Another Member 
The SCM Agreement provides that in any of the following circumstances, a subsidy 
should be considered to be causing serious prejudice: 
(1) when the subsidy displaces or impedes the imports of a like product of another 
Member into the market of the subsidizing Member; 
(2) when the subsidy displaces or impedes the exports of a like product of another 
Member from a third country market; 
(3) when the subsidy causes a significant price undercutting by the subsidized 
product as compared with the price of a like product of another Member in the 
same market or significant price suppression, price depression or lost sales in the 
same market; and 
(4) when the subsidy causes an increase in the world market share of the subsidizing 
Member in a particular subsidized primary product or commodity as compared to 
the average share it had during the previous period of three years and this increase 
follows a consistent trend over a period when subsidies have been granted.61 
This list in Article 6.3 is not exhaustive, and it is possible that a Panel can find serious 
prejudice other than on these grounds.62 
The concept of serious prejudice includes a threat of serious prejudice. 63   Detailed 
information on determining such a threat is set out in the Annex V of the SCM Agreement, 
Procedure for Developing Information concerning Serious Prejudice.  Members must cooperate 
                                                 
61 The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 6.3. 
62 Bossche, supra note 13, at 573, footnote 231. 
63 The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, footnote 13.  (“The term “serious prejudice to the interests of another 
Member” is used in this Agreement in the same sense as it is used in paragraph 1 of Article XVI of GATT 1994, and 
includes threat of serious prejudice.”) 
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in the evidence-gathering process.  If they fail to comply, the panel may complete the record as 
necessary, relying on best information otherwise available.64 
c.  Non-Actionable Subsidies  Article 8.1 of the SCM Agreement places non-actionable 
subsidies in two groups: 
(1) subsidies which are not specific within the meaning of Article 2; 
(2) subsidies which are specific within the meaning of Article 2, but which meet all 
of the conditions provided for in paragraphs 2(a), 2(b) or 2(c).65 
Article 8.2 divides non-actionable subsidies into three groups. 
Research and development (R&D)66 
Subsidies to higher education or research establishments on a contract basis allow them 
to conduct fundamental research activities.  Such activity can enlarge general scientific and 
technical knowledge, and may not necessarily be linked to industrial or commercial objectives.67  
Generally, countries are still giving subsidies to encourage or reward research activities.  
Normally, a product at the research stage is far from being put on the market for sale.  Permitting 
                                                 
64 Id., Annex V, para. 6.  (“If the subsidizing and/or third-country Member fail to cooperate in the information-
gathering process, the complaining Member will present its case of serious prejudice, based on evidence available to 
it, together with facts and circumstances of the non-cooperation of the subsidizing and/or third-country Member. 
Where information is unavailable due to non-cooperation by the subsidizing and/or third-country Member, the panel 
may complete the record as necessary relying on best information otherwise available.”). 
65 Id., art. 8.1. 
66 Id., art. 8.2 (a). (“…assistance for research activities conducted by firms or by higher education or research 
establishments on a contract basis with firms if: 
the assistance covers not more than 75 per cent of the costs of industrial research or 50 per cent of the costs of 
pre-competitive development activity and provided that such assistance is limited exclusively to: 
(i) costs of personnel (researchers, technicians and other supporting staff employed exclusively in the research 
activity); 
(ii) costs of instruments, equipment, land and buildings used exclusively and permanently (except when 
disposed of on a commercial basis) for the research activity; 
(iii) costs of consultancy and equivalent services used exclusively for the research activity, including bought-in 
research, technical knowledge, patents, etc.; 
(iv) additional overhead costs incurred directly as a result of the research activity; 
(v) other running costs (such as those of materials, supplies and the like), incurred directly as a result of the 
research activity.”) 
67 羅羅羅 國國國國國, , translated in CHANG-FA LO, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, 434 (1999). 
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members to subsidize domestic industries in this category will most likely not distort trade in a 
severe way.  Thus, the SCM Agreement is lenient on this matter. 
Disadvantaged regions68 
The ASCM Agreement recognizes that it is appropriate for a country to give certain 
necessary assistance to its developing regions and to improve living standards and economic 
conditions within these areas.  Supporting these areas is not likely to cause trade distortion in the 
market.69  With certain restrictions and criteria, WTO members can subsidize the development of 
such regions within their territories. 
Environmental protection70 
Experience within the WTO has demonstrated that trade and environment are related in 
many respects.  A common example occurs whenever a trade measure becomes a tool to protect 
                                                 
68 The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 8.2 (b). (“…assistance to disadvantaged regions within the territory of a 
Member given pursuant to a general framework of regional development and non-specific (within the meaning of 
Article 2) within eligible regions provided that: 
(i) each disadvantaged region must be a clearly designated contiguous geographical area with a definable 
economic and administrative identity; 
(ii) the region is considered as disadvantaged on the basis of neutral and objective criteria, indicating that the 
region’s difficulties arise out of more than temporary circumstances; such criteria must be clearly spelled 
out in law, regulation, or other official document, so as to be capable of verification; 
(iii) the criteria shall include a measurement of economic development which shall be based on at least one of 
the following factors: 
– one of either income per capita or household income per capita, or GDP per capita, which must not be 
above 85 per cent of the average for the territory concerned; 
– unemployment rate, which must be at least 110 per cent of the average for the territory concerned; 
as measured over a three-year period; such measurement, however, may be a composite one and may include other 
factors.”). 
69 Lo, supra note 67, at 438. 
70 The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art.8.2 (c). (“…assistance to promote adaptation of existing facilities70 to new 
environmental requirements imposed by law and/or regulations which result in greater constraints and financial 
burden on firms, provided that the assistance: 
(i) is a one-time non-recurring measure; and 
(ii) is limited to 20 per cent of the cost of adaptation; and 
(iii) does not cover the cost of replacing and operating the assisted investment, which must be fully borne by 
firms; and 
(iv) is directly linked to and proportionate to a firm’s planned reduction of nuisances and pollution, and does 
not cover any manufacturing cost savings which may be achieved; and 
(v) is available to all firms which can adopt the new equipment and/or production processes.”) 
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the environment.  Under some circumstances, subsidies can be used as a method to encourage 
cooperation to take measures that are beneficial to environmental protection. 
Non-actionable subsidies are not totally without remedies. 71   The main difference, 
compared with prohibited subsidies and actionable subsidies, is found in the opportunity for 
involvement of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).  For any dispute resulting from a non-
actionable subsidy, Members must go to the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, not to the Dispute Settlement Body.72 
The Committee is to initiate an investigation and reach a conclusion.  Once the 
Committee determines that the alleged effect does exist, “it may recommend to the subsidizing 
Member to modify this programme in such a way as to remove these effects.” 73   If the 
recommendation is not followed, “the Committee shall authorize the requesting Member to take 
appropriate countermeasures commensurate with the nature and degree of the effects determined 
to exist.”74 
                                                 
71  Id., art. 9.1. (“If, in the course of implementation of a programme referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 8, 
notwithstanding the fact that the programme is consistent with the criteria laid down in that paragraph, a Member 
has reasons to believe that this programme has resulted in serious adverse effects to the domestic industry of that 
Member, such as to cause damage which would be difficult to repair, such Member may request consultations with 
the Member granting or maintaining the subsidy.”) 
72 Id., art. 9.3. (“If no mutually acceptable solution has been reached in consultations under paragraph 2 within 
60 days of the request for such consultations, the requesting Member may refer the matter to the Committee.”) 
73 Id., art. 9.4. (“Where a matter is referred to the Committee, the Committee shall immediately review the facts 
involved and the evidence of the effects referred to in paragraph 1.  If the Committee determines that such effects 
exist, it may recommend to the subsidizing Member to modify this programme in such a way as to remove these 
effects.  The Committee shall present its conclusions within 120 days from the date when the matter is referred to it 
under paragraph 3.  In the event the recommendation is not followed within six months, the Committee shall 
authorize the requesting Member to take appropriate countermeasures commensurate with the nature and degree of 
the effects determined to exist.”) 
74 Id., art. 9.4. 
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B.  COUNTERVAILING MEASURES 
Prohibited and actionable subsidies can be challenged multilaterally and can also be offset by 
applying countervailing measures.75  Therefore, if a Member’s domestic market is injured by 
subsidies, it has two choices:76 
(1) It may multilaterally challenge the subsidy concerned, following Article 4 or 7 of 
the SCM Agreement; or 
(2) It may unilaterally impose countervailing measures on the subsidized imports. 
Articles 4 and 7 of the ASCM Agreement authorize the Member alleging subsidy and 
injury to request consultations with the subsidizing Member.77  If consultation fails to result in 
resolution of the matter, the Member may then refer the matter to the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB).78 
The dispute will first be heard by a panel.79  The decision by the panel may either be 
accepted or appealed to the Appellate Body.80  The whole process is likely to take several 
months. 
                                                 
75 Bossche, supra note 13, at 574. 
76 Id. 
77 The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 4.1. (“Whenever a Member has reason to believe that a prohibited subsidy 
is being granted or maintained by another Member, such Member may request consultations with such other 
Member.”).  Id., art. 7.1. (“Except as provided in Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture, whenever a Member 
has reason to believe that any subsidy referred to in Article 1, granted or maintained by another Member, results in 
injury to its domestic industry, nullification or impairment or serious prejudice, such Member may request 
consultations with such other Member.”) 
78 Id., art. 4.4. (“If no mutually agreed solution has been reached within 30 days of the request for consultations, any 
Member party to such consultations may refer the matter to the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) for the immediate 
establishment of a panel, unless the DSB decides by consensus not to establish a panel.”)  Id., art. 7.4. 
(“consultations do not result in a mutually agreed solution within 60 days, any Member party to such consultations 
may refer the matter to the DSB for the establishment of a panel, unless the DSB decides by consensus not to 
establish a panel.  The composition of the panel and its terms of reference shall be established within 15 days from 
the date when it is established.”). 
79 See generally Chapter 2 for Dispute Settlement Process in the WTO era. 
80 The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 4.8.  (“Within 30 days of the issuance of the panel’s report to all Members, 
the report shall be adopted by the DSB unless one of the parties to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its 
decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report.”).  Id., art. 7.6. (“Within 30 days of the 
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The Agreement also gives Members the right to unilaterally impose countervailing 
measures.81  But this option is not without limitation. 
1.  Historical Background 
Subsidies have been treated as unfair trade measures largely because it is believed that products 
receiving subsidies will have an unfair advantage in the market place over like products that are 
not subsidized.  Subsidies have thus been considered to be tools to advance social interests.82  
Subsidized products may cause harm to like products in the importing Member.  Therefore, in 
1897, the United States passed laws allowing the collection of countervailing duties.83  The 
collection of countervailing duties aims to offset any adverse effects resulting from a subsidy, 
and thus rebalance trade conditions.84 
The Tokyo Subsidies Codes, completed in the 1970’s, set out multilateral standards for 
countervailing duty proceedings. 85   The GATT 1947 also authorized countervailing duties.  
These served as the basis for the later elaboration of subsidies relief mechanisms in Part V of the 
SCM Agreement.  The SCM Agreement definition of a countervailing duty is taken from GATT 
                                                                                                                                                             
issuance of the panel’s report to all Members, the report shall be adopted by the DSB unless one of the parties to the 
dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the 
report.”). 
81 Id., art. 10. 
82 Bossche, supra note 13, at 551. 
83 JOHN H JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM:  LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATION, 
255 (1989). 
84 羅昌發, 美國貿易救濟制度：國際經貿法研究（一）, translated in, CHANG-FA LO, US TRADE REMEDY 
SYSTEM:  RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAWS-VOLUME ONE, 105-7 (1994).  Anderson and Husisian, supra 
note 7, at 321. (“By definition, countervailing measures have a different purpose and a more limited application than 
WTO subsidies disciplines.WTO remedies are designed to operate at the source – i.e., by requesting the subsidizing 
government to eliminate the subsidy or its adverse effects, and can reach subsidies affecting any market.  By contrast, 
a countervailing duty is intended to neutralize a subsidy, and a Member may impose a countervailing duty only to 
offset subsidies to merchandise imported into its market. Whether the foreign country removes the subsidy is 
irrelevant, because the offsetting duty levels the playing field in the importing country.”) 
85 Anderson and Husisian, supra note 84. 
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Article 6: “a special duty levied for the purpose of offsetting any bounty or subsidy bestowed, 
directly, or indirectly, upon the manufacture, production or export of any merchandise.”86 
2.  Preconditions to Collecting Countervailing Duties 
According to Article IV of the GATT, 87  and Article 10 of the SCM Agreement, 88  WTO 
Members can only impose countervailing duties when: (1) there are subsidized imports; (2) there 
is injury to the domestic industry of the like products within the meaning of Articles 15 and 16; 
and (3) there is a causal link between the subsidized imports and the injury to the domestic 
industry.89 
a.  The Existence of a Subsidy  The SCM Agreement sets out detailed procedural requirements 
regarding countervailing measures investigation that may be undertaken on the domestic level.90  
The purpose of these procedural conditions is to ensure: 
(1) that the investigation is transparent; 
(2) that the rights of all interested parties to defend themselves is respected; and 
(3) that the investigating authority fully explains the basis of its decision.91 
                                                 
86 GATT, supra note 12, art. VI; The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, footnote 36. 
87  Id., art. VI para. 6(a). (“No contracting party shall levy any anti-dumping or countervailing duty on the 
importation of any product of the territory of another contracting party unless it determines that the effect of the 
dumping or subsidization, as the case may be, is such as to cause or threaten material injury to an established 
domestic industry, or is such as to retard materially the establishment of a domestic industry.”). 
88 The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 10.  (“Members shall take all necessary steps to ensure that the imposition 
of a countervailing duty on any product of the territory of any Member imported into the territory of another 
Member is in accordance with the provisions of Article VI of GATT 1994 and the terms of this Agreement.  
Countervailing duties may only be imposed pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance with 
the provisions of this Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture.”) 
89 Id., art. 11.2.  (“An application under paragraph 1 shall include sufficient evidence of the existence of (a) a 
subsidy and, if possible, its amount, (b) injury within the meaning of Article VI of GATT 1994 as interpreted by this 
Agreement, and (c) a causal link between the subsidized imports and the alleged injury….”).  Bossche, supra note 
13, at 575. 
90 The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 11, 12, and 13. 
 118 
The SCM Agreement also requires that the investigating report contain sufficient 
evidence of the amount of the subsidy, if possible.92 
b.  The Material Injury Determination  During the negotiation of the SCM Agreement, the 
United States, Australia, Switzerland, and the Nordic countries proposed that prohibited 
subsidies should be countervailable without proving injury or adverse effect. 93   This was 
countered, in particular, by the European Community and India.94  The latter opinion prevailed,95 
and, the SCM Agreement provides that no subsidy can be countervailable without showing 
injury.96 
The injury determination requires the existence of material injury, or a threat thereof, not 
just serious injury, as is required in the Agreement on Safeguards.97 
                                                                                                                                                             
91 Bossche, supra note 13, at 576.  Anderson and Husisian, supra note 84. 
92 The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 11.2. (“…Simple assertion, unsubstantiated by relevant evidence, cannot 
be considered sufficient to meet the requirements of this paragraph.  The application shall contain such information 
as is reasonably available to the applicant on the following: 
(i) the identity of the applicant and a description of the volume and value of the domestic production of the 
like product by the applicant.  Where a written application is made on behalf of the domestic industry, the 
application shall identify the industry on behalf of which the application is made by a list of all known 
domestic producers of the like product (or associations of domestic producers of the like product) and, to 
the extent possible, a description of the volume and value of domestic production of the like product 
accounted for by such producers; 
(ii) a complete description of the allegedly subsidized product, the names of the country or countries of origin 
or export in question, the identity of each known exporter or foreign producer and a list of known persons 
importing the product in question; 
(iii) evidence with regard to the existence, amount and nature of the subsidy in question; 
(iv) evidence that alleged injury to a domestic industry is caused by subsidized imports through the effects of 
the subsidies; this evidence includes information on the evolution of the volume of the allegedly subsidized 
imports, the effect of these imports on prices of the like product in the domestic market and the consequent 
impact of the imports on the domestic industry, as demonstrated by relevant factors and indices having a 
bearing on the state of the domestic industry, such as those listed in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 15.”) 
93 Anderson and Husisian, supra note 84, at 324. 
94 Id. 
95 TERRENCE P. STEWART, THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND:  A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992), 891, 915 (1999). 
96 The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 11.9 and 15. 
97 Id., art. 4.  (“For the purposes of this Agreement:  (a) “serious injury” shall be understood to mean a significant 
overall impairment in the position of a domestic industry; (b)”threat of serious injury” shall be understood to mean 
serious injury that is clearly imminent, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2.  A determination of the 
existence of a threat of serious injury shall be based on facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture or remote 
possibility; and (c) in determining injury or threat thereof, a “domestic industry” shall be understood to mean the 
producers as a whole of the like or directly competitive products operating within the territory of a Member, or those 
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The concept of material injury in the SCM Agreement is divided to include: 
(1) material injury to a domestic industry; 
(2) a threat of material injury to a domestic industry; and 
(3) material retardation of the establishment of a domestic industry.98 
Article 15 of the SCM Agreement provides the rules governing the injury determination.  
The determination of a threat of material injury must be supported by facts and not merely by 
allegation, conjecture, or remote possibility.99  The SCM Agreement provides a non-exhaustive 
list of factors to be considered for this purpose: 
(1) the nature of the subsidy or subsidies in question and the trade effects likely to 
arise therefrom; 
(2) a significant rate of increase of subsidized imports into the domestic market 
indicating the likelihood of substantially increased importation; 
(3) sufficient freely disposable, or an imminent, substantial increase in, capacity of 
the exporter indicating the likelihood of substantially increased subsidized exports 
to the importing Member’s market, taking into account the availability of other 
export markets to absorb any additional exports; 
(4) whether imports are entering at prices that will have a significant depressing or 
suppressing effect on domestic prices, and would likely increase demand for 
further imports; and 
                                                                                                                                                             
whose collective output of the like or directly competitive products constitutes a major proportion of the total 
domestic production of those products.”).  Bossche, supra note 13, at 569. 
98 The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, footnote 45. (“Under this Agreement the term “injury” shall, unless otherwise 
specified, be taken to mean material injury to a domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic industry or 
material retardation of the establishment of such an industry and shall be interpreted in accordance with the 
provisions of this Article.”). 
99 Id., art. 15.7. 
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(5) the inventories of the product being investigated.100 
All of these factors must be taken into consideration when determining if there is a 
material injury. 
c.  The Causal Relationship  Both the Tokyo Subsidies Code and the SCM Agreement provide 
that, “it must be determined that the subsidized imports are, through the effects of subsidies, 
causing injury within the meaning of this Agreement.”101  No countervailing duty may be applied 
without the determination of this causal relationship.  The SCM Agreement further points out 
factors to be considered in determining a causal relationship.  These factors include: the volumes 
and prices of non-subsidized imports of the product, a contraction in demand or changes in the 
patterns of consumption, the development of technology, and the export performance and 
productivity of the domestic industry. 
The SCM Agreement allows Members to assess injuries to the domestic industry 
cumulatively.102  However, the cumulative assessment can only be allowed when:103 
(1) the amount of subsidization established in relation to the imports from each 
country is more than de minimis as defined in paragraph 9 of Article 11 and the 
volume of imports from each country is not negligible, and 
(2) a cumulative assessment of the effects of the imports is appropriate in light of the 
conditions of competition between the imported products and the conditions of 
competition between the imported products and the like domestic product.104 
                                                 
100 Id. 
101 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 5, art. 6.4.  Id., art. 15.5. 
102 The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 15.3. (“Where imports of a product from more than one country are 
simultaneously subject to countervailing duty investigations, the investigating authorities may cumulatively assess 
the effects of such imports….”) 
103 Id. 
104 Id., art. 15.5.  (“It must be demonstrated that the subsidized imports are, through the effects of subsidies, causing 
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3.  Three Types of Countervailing Measures 
The SCM Agreement allows three kinds of measures to be taken after a domestic investigation 
and resulting determination of subsidy, material injury, and causal relationship.  They are (1) 
provisional countervailing measures, 105  (2) voluntary undertakings, 106  and (3) definitive 
countervailing duties.107  These three types of countervailing measures reflect determinations at 
different stages of the subsidy investigation.108 
a.  Provisional Countervailing Measures  After the domestic investigation reaches a 
preliminary determination that a subsidy is causing harm to the domestic industry, the Member 
can impose provisional countervailing measures on the product in question. 109   But the 
application of provisional countervailing measures “shall not be applied sooner than 60 days 
                                                                                                                                                             
injury within the meaning of this Agreement.  The demonstration of a causal relationship between the subsidized 
imports and the injury to the domestic industry shall be based on an examination of all relevant evidence before the 
authorities.  The authorities shall also examine any known factors other than the subsidized imports which at the 
same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be attributed to 
the subsidized imports.  Factors which may be relevant in this respect include, inter alia, the volumes and prices of 
non-subsidized imports of the product in question, contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption, 
trade restrictive practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic producers, developments in 
technology and the export performance and productivity of the domestic industry.”).  Bossche, supra note 13, at 
571-572, footnote 231. 
105 The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 17. 
106 Id., art. 18. 
107 Id., art. 19. 
108 Bossche, supra note 13, at 579, footnote 231. 
109 The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 17.1. (“Provisional measures may be applied only if: 
(a) an investigation has been initiated in accordance with the provisions of Article 11, a public notice has been 
given to that effect and interested Members and interested parties have been given adequate opportunities 
to submit information and make comments; 
(b) a preliminary affirmative determination has been made that a subsidy exists and that there is injury to a 
domestic industry caused by subsidized imports; and 
(c) the authorities concerned judge such measures necessary to prevent injury being caused during the 
investigation.”). 
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from the date of initiation of the investigation.”110  The duration of a provisional countervailing 
measure “shall be limited to as short a period as possible, not exceeding 4 months.”111 
b.  Voluntary Undertakings  During the investigation process, the investigated Members can 
voluntarily undertake to increase the price of the product in question.  This is accomplished when 
either, 
(1) the government of the exporting Member agrees to eliminate or limit the subsidy 
or take other measures concerning its effects; or 
(2) the exporter agrees to revise its prices so that the investigating authorities are 
satisfied that the injurious effect of the subsidy is eliminated.112 
Once a satisfactory price undertaking is received, investigations must be suspended or 
terminated.113  However, a price undertaking need not be accepted if the investigating authority 
of the importing Member considers their acceptance impractical.114  Such undertakings may be 
offered and accepted after the investigating authority has made a preliminary affirmative 
determination of subsidization, injury, and causation.115 
                                                 
110 Id., art. 17.3. 
111 Id., art. 17.4. 
112 Id., art. 18.1. 
113 Id., art. 18.4.  (“If an undertaking is accepted, the investigation of subsidization and injury shall nevertheless be 
completed if the exporting Member so desires or the importing Member so decides.  In such a case, if a negative 
determination of subsidization or injury is made, the undertaking shall automatically lapse, except in cases where 
such a determination is due in large part to the existence of an undertaking.  In such cases, the authorities concerned 
may require that an undertaking be maintained for a reasonable period consistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement.  In the event that an affirmative determination of subsidization and injury is made, the undertaking shall 
continue consistent with its terms and the provisions of this Agreement.”) 
114 Id., art. 18.3.  (“Undertakings offered need not be accepted if the authorities of the importing Member consider 
their acceptance impractical, for example if the number of actual or potential exporters is too great, or for other 
reasons, including reasons of general policy.  Should the case arise and where practicable, the authorities shall 
provide to the exporter the reasons which have led them to consider acceptance of an undertaking as inappropriate, 
and shall, to the extent possible, give the exporter an opportunity to make comments thereon”) 
115 Id., art. 18.2. (“Undertakings shall not be sought or accepted unless the authorities of the importing Member have 
made a preliminary affirmative determination of subsidization and injury caused by such subsidization and, in case 
of undertakings from exporters, have obtained the consent of the exporting Member.”). 
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c.  Definitive Countervailing Duties  As soon as the investigating authority makes the final 
determination that (1) a countervailable subsidy exists; and (2) the subsidy causes, or threatens to 
cause, injury to the domestic industry, it can impose definitive countervailing duties.116  The 
SCM Agreement provides that “[n]o countervailing duty shall be levied on any imported product 
in excess of the amount of the subsidy found to exist, calculated in terms of subsidization per 
unit of the subsidized and exported product.”117  Thus, the amount of a countervailing duty can 
never exceed the amount of the subsidy.  This prevents a Member from profiting from imposing 
excessive countervailing duties on imported goods. 
The MFN principle, as discussed earlier, applies to the collection of countervailing 
duties.118  This means that once Country A has determined that product Z has been subsidized by 
Countries B, C, and D, Country A cannot exclude Country B from the collection of 
countervailing duties.  The resulting countervailing duty must apply to all product Z exports 
from Countries B, C, and D. 
The application of countervailing duties may not be retroactive.  Thus, countervailing 
duties are only applied to products which enter for consumption after the decision enters into 
force. 119   The same non-retroactivity applies to provisional countervailing measures. 120  
                                                 
116 Id., art. 19.1. (“If, after reasonable efforts have been made to complete consultations, a Member makes a final 
determination of the existence and amount of the subsidy and that, through the effects of the subsidy, the subsidized 
imports are causing injury, it may impose a countervailing duty in accordance with the provisions of this Article 
unless the subsidy or subsidies are withdrawn.”). 
117 Id., art. 19.4. 
118 Id., art. 19.3. (“When a countervailing duty is imposed in respect of any product, such countervailing duty shall 
be levied…on a non-discriminatory basis on imports of such product from all sources found to be subsidized and 
causing injury, except as to imports from those sources which have renounced any subsidies in question or from 
which undertakings under the terms of this Agreement have been accepted…”). 
119 Id., art. 20.1. (“Provisional measures and countervailing duties shall only be applied to products which enter for 
consumption after the time when the decision under paragraph 1 of Article 17 and paragraph 1 of Article 19, 
respectively, enters into force, subject to the exceptions set out in this Article.”). 
120 Id. 
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Moreover, if a final determination is negative, any cash deposit of the provisional duty shall be 
refunded and any bond released in an expeditious manner.121 
A final countervailing duty is not indefinite, but has a fixed time period.122  The SCM 
Agreement provides that “[a] countervailing duty shall remain in force only as long as and to the 
extent necessary to counteract subsidization which is causing injury.”123  After the imposition of 
countervailing duties, a review can be initiated by authorities or interested parties, who must 
provide positive evidence substantiating the need for a review.124 
During the review, the authority should consider: 
(1) whether the continued imposition of the duty is necessary to offset subsidization, 
(2) whether the injury would be likely to continue or recur if the duty were removed 
or varied, or 
(3) both.125 
If the authority determines that collection of countervailing duties is no longer necessary, 
it must terminate the collection of countervailing duties.126 
In addition to the review mechanism, Article 21.3 of the SCM Agreement contains a so-
called sunset clause for countervailing duties.  Any definitive countervailing duty must be 
terminated on a date not later than five years from its imposition or the latest review.127  In the 
                                                 
121 Id., art. 20.5. 
122 Anderson and Husisian, supra note 84, at 335.  (However, we should note that under the Subsidies Code, as well 
as prior U.S. law, countervailing duty orders were potentially unlimited in duration). 
123 The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 21.1. 
124 Id., art. 21.2.  (“The authorities shall review the need for the continued imposition of the duty, where warranted, 
on their own initiative or, provided that a reasonable period of time has elapsed since the imposition of the definitive 
countervailing duty, upon request by any interested party which submits positive information substantiating the need 
for a review.  Interested parties shall have the right to request the authorities to examine whether the continued 
imposition of the duty is necessary to offset subsidization, whether the injury would be likely to continue or recur if 
the duty were removed or varied, or both.  If, as a result of the review under this paragraph, the authorities determine 
that the countervailing duty is no longer warranted, it shall be terminated immediately.”) 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id., art. 21.3. (“Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2, any definitive countervailing duty shall be 
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US-Carbon Steel case, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s finding that there is no evidentiary 
standard for self-initiation of sunset reviews under Article 21.3 of the SCM Agreement.128  The 
sunset clause applies to price undertakings as well as to countervailing duties.129 
C.  THE SCM AGREEMENT AND SERVICE SUBSIDIES 
The Traffic-light categorization in the SCM Agreement is, arguably, one of the most 
conceptually clear ways to organize subsidies.130  It thus provides guidance to Members in 
dealing with service trade subsidies.  Understanding the SCM Agreement is thus important to 
any further discussion of subsidies in services.  In Chapter 8, I will examine whether the this 
subsidy categorization method, and countervailing measures as applied under the SCM 
Agreement, are appropriate to the trade in services. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
terminated on a date not later than five years from its imposition (or from the date of the most recent review under 
paragraph 2 if that review has covered both subsidization and injury, or under this paragraph), unless the authorities 
determine, in a review initiated before that date on their own initiative or upon a duly substantiated request made by 
or on behalf of the domestic industry within a reasonable period of time prior to that date, that the expiry of the duty 
would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of subsidization and injury.  The duty may remain in force 
pending the outcome of such a review.”). 
128 Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing duties on certain corrosion-resistant carbon steel flat 
products from Germany, AB-2002-4, WT/DS213/AB/R, para. 112 (November 28, 2002)  
129 The SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 21.5. (“The provisions of this Article shall apply mutatis mutandis to 
undertakings accepted under Article 18.”). 
130 Bhala, supra note 32. 
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V.  THE AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE 
Agricultural matters have generated important issues on the global negotiation table.1  Not only 
are foods essential to a country’s security, but foods are also important to a country’s economy.  
Article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)2 allowed countries to maintain 
pre-existing agricultural subsidies.3  Professor Jackson described the situation as follows: 
                                                 
1 A.J. Rayner, et al., Agriculture in the Uruguay Round:  An Assessment, Econ. J. 1513 (1993).  (“Agriculture was to 
be center stage from the launch of the Round in July 1986 until November 1992, when bilateral negotiations 
between the United States and the EC resulted in the Washington Accord.  Indeed, over this period, the success or 
failure of the Round as a whole appeared to hinge on a settlement on agriculture.”) 
2 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1A, 1999, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT], art. XI.  (“1. No 
prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import 
or export licences or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of 
any product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product 
destined for the territory of any other contracting party. 
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not extend to the following: 
(a)… 
(b)… 
(c) Import restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries product, imported in any form, necessary to the enforcement 
of governmental measures which operate: 
(i) to restrict the quantities of the like domestic product permitted to be marketed or produced, or, if there is 
no substantial domestic production of the like product, of a domestic product for which the imported 
product can be directly substituted; or 
(ii) to remove a temporary surplus of the like domestic product, or, if there is no substantial domestic 
production of the like product, of a domestic product for which the imported product can be directly 
substituted, by making the surplus available to certain groups of domestic consumers free of charge or at 
prices below the current market level; or 
(iii) to restrict the quantities permitted to be produced of any animal product the production of which is 
directly dependent, wholly or mainly, on the imported commodity, if the domestic production of that 
commodity is relatively negligible. 
Any contracting party applying restrictions on the importation of any product pursuant to subparagraph (c) of this 
paragraph shall give public notice of the total quantity or value of the product permitted to be imported during a 
specified future period and of any change in such quantity or value.  Moreover, any restrictions applied under (i) 
above shall not be such as will reduce the total of imports relative to the total of domestic production, as compared 
with the proportion which might reasonably be expected to rule between the two in the absence of restrictions.  In 
determining this proportion, the contracting party shall pay due regard to the proportion prevailing during a previous 
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Commentators and observers about the GATT system have sometimes stated that 
agriculture was exempt from GATT.  This statement is not correct, but it  reflects 
the unfortunate reality that agriculture has been the most difficult part of 
international trade to bring under international treat rule discipline of the GATT 
….  [M]any nations in the world … have been largely unwilling to allow the 
GATT rules to constrain their policies designed to assist and protect their 
agriculture population.4 
 
The treatment of agricultural under the GATT has been the subject of much comment and 
criticism, resulting in many proposals for reformation of the rules. 5   One economist 6  has 
provided the following reasons to reform agricultural trades: 
(1) National agricultural policies are under pressure in almost every country.  Major 
changes will be easier politically if done multilaterally. 
(2) Agricultural trade, still an important though declining share of world trade, has 
operated too long with inadequate GATT rules, undermining the very credibility 
of the GATT as an institution. 
(3) Agricultural trade issues are an increasing source of friction between major 
trading partners.  This tension could spread to other products and lead to a major 
trade war.  In each of the last several years, there have been threats of a trade war 
                                                                                                                                                             
representative period and to any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting the trade in the product 
concerned.”) 
3 羅羅羅 國國國國國, , translated in CHANG-FA LO, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, 329 (1999). 
4 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, 313 (1997). 
5 WTO, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO:  THE AGREEMENTS, Agriculture:  fairer markets for farmers, notes that 
“The original GATT did apply to agricultural trade, but it contained loopholes.  For example, it allowed countries to 
use some non-tariff measures such as import quotas, and to subsidize.  Agricultural trade became highly distorted, 
especially with the use of export subsidies which would not normally have been allowed for industrial products.” 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm3_e.htm; see also id. at 313, (United States action in 
response to the loose GATT regulations regarding agricultural trades.  “For the United States this has been 
particularly worrisome, because it believes that it has a strong comparative advantage in the production of many 
agricultural goods, and that its agriculture producers were thwarted by other country limitations on imports of 
agricultural goods, often in direct defiance of GATT rules.  Thus, in the Kennedy Round in the 1960’, the United 
States and other countries such as Canada and Australia made an effort to bring agriculture in to the ‘GATT’.  That 
largely failed.”). 
6 See generally DALE E. HATHAWAY, AGRICULTURE AND THE GATT:  REWRITING THE RULES (1987). 
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between major trading nations over agricultural trade; only a series of last-minute 
settlements averted this clash.7 
During the Uruguay Round, the United States led a push for agricultural reform.8  One 
observer described the role of agricultural issues in the Uruguay Round, stating that 
agriculture was to be ”centre stage” from the launch of the Round in July 1986 
until November 1992, when bilateral negotiations between the United States and 
the EC resulted in the Washington Accord.  Indeed, over this period, the success 
or failure of the Round as a whole appeared to hinge on a settlement on 
agriculture.9 
 
The Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) was one result of the Uruguay Round.  The 
objective of the AoA is to reform trade in sectors and to make policies more market-oriented.10  
How to manage agricultural related matters has been a complex and contentious issue from the 
Uruguay Round to the Doha Round.11  Nevertheless, the establishment of the AoA is only a 
beginning, providing a path for future negotiations.12 
                                                 
7  Paul C. Rosenthal and Lynn E. Duffy, Reforming Global Trade in Agriculture, in,  THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION:  MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING 
LEGISLATION, 146 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996). 
8 Jackson, supra note 4, at 314.  (“U.S. officials were joined by a number of other agricultural producing countries  
of the world (many of them combined in the so-called Cairns group, which included countries such as Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, Argentina, etc.)  These mounted an almost do or die effort to make sure that the 
Uruguay Round would finally succeed in bringing agricultural under the trading rule system.”). 
9 Rayner et al., supra note 1. 
10 Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1A, 1999, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410. [hereinafter AoA], preamble. (“Having decided to establish a basis for 
initiating a process of reform of trade in agriculture in line with the objectives of the negotiations as set out in the 
Punta del Este Declaration.”).  WTO, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO:  THE AGREEMENTS, Agriculture:  fairer 
markets for farmers, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm3_e.htm. 
11 PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:  TEXT, CASES AND 
MATERIALS, 583 (2005) 
12 Jackson, supra note 8. 
 129 
A.  GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The Uruguay Round conclusion of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) was a significant move 
towards free international markets in agriculture.  The AoA for the first time provides clear 
coverage of agricultural products within the GATT framework,13 and provides a certain measure 
of fairness to the agricultural trading system.14  Present rules on agricultural goods in the AoA 
can be broken up into three parts:  market access,15 domestic support,16 and export subsidies.17  
The focus here is on the AoA regulation of subsidies, but it is to briefly introduce the market 
access aspects of the AoA, and its focus on domestic support and export subsidies. 
The market access provisions of the AoA are designed to replace quotas with tariffs.18  
Prior to the AoA, Members applied quotas and other non-tariff measures to restrict agricultural 
                                                 
13 AoA, supra note 10, art. 2. (“This Agreement applies to the products listed in Annex 1 to this Agreement, 
hereinafter referred to as agricultural products.”).  AoA, supra note 10,  Annex I lists.  (“1. This Agreement shall 
cover the following products: 
(i) HS Chapters 1 to 24 less fish and fish products, plus* 
(ii) HS Code 2905.43 (mannitol) 
 HS Code 2905.44 (sorbitol) 
 HS Heading 33.01 (essential oils) 
 HS Headings 35.01 to 35.05 (albuminoidal substances, modified 
starches, glues) 
 HS Code 3809.10 (finishing agents) 
 HS Code 3823.60 (sorbitol n.e.p.) 
 HS Headings 41.01 to 41.03 (hides and skins) 
 HS Heading 43.01 (raw furskins) 
 HS Headings  50.01 to 50.03 (raw silk and silk waste) 
 HS Headings 51.01 to 51.03 (wool and animal hair) 
 HS Headings 52.01 to 52.03 (raw cotton, waste and cotton carded or 
combed) 
 HS Heading 53.01 (raw flax) 
 HS Heading 53.02 (raw hemp) 
2. The foregoing shall not limit the product coverage of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures. 
*The product descriptions in round brackets are not necessarily exhaustive.”) 
14 Rosenthal and Duffy, supra note 7, at 152. 
15 AoA, supra note 10, art. 4. 
16 Id. at art. 6, 7, and Annex 2. 
17 Id. at art. 9,10, and 11. 
18 Id. at art. 4.  (“1. Market access concessions contained in Schedules relate to bindings and reductions of tariffs, 
and to other market access commitments as specified therein.  2. Members shall not maintain, resort to, or revert to 
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imports from other countries.19  With the AoA, only tariffs are allowed as a tool to restrict 
market access.20 Tariffication is thus used to convert quotas into tariffs.21  The following table 
demonstrates the targeted reduction for agricultural products from 1995 to 2004. 
Table 9.  Agreed Reductions in Agricultural Subsidies (Uruguay Round)22 
 Developed Countries 
From 1995-2000 
Developing Countries 
From 1995-2004 
Tariffs   
Average cut for all agricultural 
products  
-36% -24% 
Minimum cut per product -15% -10% 
Domestic support   
Total AMS cuts for sector -20% -13% 
Export subsidies    
Value of subsidies -36% -24% 
Subsidized quantities  -21% -14% 
 
Some exceptions to tariffication are allowed in the AoA.23  They are listed in Article 5 and 
Annex 5.  Article 5 allows Members to employ special safeguards on tariffied products if imports 
rise too rapidly or import prices fall too low.24  Annex 5 permits special treatment for products 
                                                                                                                                                             
any measures of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties, except as 
otherwise provided for in Article 5 and Annex 5.”) 
19 World Trade Organization, Understanding The WTO:  The Agreements, Agriculture:  fairer markets for farmers, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm3_e.htm. 
20Id. 
21Id. (For example, if the previous policy meant domestic prices were 75% higher than world prices, then the new 
tariff could be around 75%.  You can find more details on the “tariffication” process in AoA). 
22 Id. 
23 AoA, supra note 18. 
24 Id. at art. 5 para. 1. (“Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1(b) of Article II of GATT 1994, any Member 
may take recourse to the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5 below in connection with the importation of an 
agricultural product, in respect of which measures referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 4 of this Agreement have 
been converted into an ordinary customs duty and which is designated in its Schedule with the symbol “SSG” as 
being the subject of a concession in respect of which the provisions of this Article may be invoked, if: 
(a) the volume of imports of that product entering the customs territory of the Member granting the concession 
during any year exceeds a trigger level which relates to the existing market access opportunity as set out in 
paragraph 4; or, but not concurrently: 
(b) the price at which imports of that product may enter the customs territory of the Member granting the 
concession, as determined on the basis of the c.i.f. import price of the shipment concerned expressed in terms of 
its domestic currency, falls below a trigger price equal to the average 1986 to 1988 reference price for the 
product concerned.”).  Rosenthal and Duffy, supra note 7, at 146. 
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that meet certain conditions.25  Tariffication is a central feature of the AoA, and eliminating non-
tariff barriers is important to Members’ agricultural exports.26 
B.  SUBSIDIES UNDER THE AOA 
The sensitive nature of agricultural subsidies is reflected by the fact that rules governing 
subsidies in the SCM Agreement are not fully applicable to agricultural subsidies.27  In the 
Uruguay Round, countries became persuaded to take a first step, and the liberalization of 
agricultural trade continues in the Doha Round.  Agricultural subsidies are large and complex, 
and the Doha Round talks have expanded discussion under the Agreement. 28   Member 
cooperation is essential to reform the regulation of agricultural subsidies. 
                                                 
25 Id. at Annex 5 para. 1.  (“The provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 4 shall not apply with effect from the entry into 
force of the WTO Agreement to any primary agricultural product and its worked and/or prepared products 
(“designated products”) in respect of which the following conditions are complied with (hereinafter referred to as 
“special treatment”): 
(a) imports of the designated products comprised less than 3 per cent of corresponding domestic consumption in the 
base period 1986-1988 (“the base period”); 
(b) no export subsidies have been provided since the beginning of the base period for the designated products; 
(c) effective production-restricting measures are applied to the primary agricultural product; 
(d) such products are designated with the symbol “ST-Annex 5” in Section I-B of Part I of a Member’s Schedule 
annexed to the Marrakesh Protocol, as being subject to special treatment reflecting factors of non-trade concerns, 
such as food security and environmental protection; and 
(e) minimum access opportunities in respect of the designated products correspond, as specified in Section I-B of 
Part I of the Schedule of the Member concerned, to 4 per cent of  base period domestic consumption of the 
designated products from the beginning of the first year of the implementation period and, thereafter, are 
increased by 0.8 per cent of corresponding domestic consumption in the base period per year for the remainder 
of the implementation period.”) 
World Trade Organization, supra note 19. (“Four countries used “special treatment” provisions to restrict imports of 
particularly sensitive products during the implementation period, but subject to strictly defined conditions, including 
minimum access for overseas suppliers.  The four were:  Japan, Republic of Korea, and the Philippines for rice; and 
Israel for sheep meat, whole milk powder and certain cheeses.  Japan and Israel have now given up this right, but 
Republic of Korea and the Philippines have extended their special treatment for rice.  A new member, Chinese 
Taipei, gave special treatment to rice in its first year of membership, 2002.”) 
26  Rosenthal and Duffy, supra note 7, at 155.  (Take U.S. for example, “the USDA estimates that in 1993, 
approximately $8 billion in U.S. agricultural products went to markets that imposed some form of trade-distortive 
non-tariff barriers.”) 
27 Bossche, supra note 11, at 584. 
28 Paul Wolfowitz, Everyone Must do More for Doha to Succeed, Financial Times, 24 Oct. 2005, at 13, available at 
 132 
1.  Historical Background 
Developed countries, in particular the European Union and the United States, have long 
employed subsidies as measures to support domestic agriculture.29  For this reason, the GATT 
1947 stipulated that domestic agricultural subsidies are basically legal.30  GATT Article XVI 
provides that an agricultural export subsidy is acceptable as long as it 
shall not be applied in a manner which results in that contracting party having 
more than an equitable share of world export trade in that product, account being 
taken of the shares of the contracting parties in such trade in the product during a 
previous representative period, and any special factors which may have affected 
or may be affecting such trade in the product.31 
 
In the Uruguay Round, agricultural subsidies were one of the most controversial issues.  
Many countries called for the reform of agricultural subsidy rules in GATT, especially the 
United States.  But many countries, at that time, still employed domestic regulations to protect 
their own agricultural interests, including the United States.32  The European Community was 
reluctant to adopt any changes to its agricultural support program, and in particular to the 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.thailandwto.org/Doc/News/1946.pdf (Former World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz observes, “It is 
trade, not aid, that holds the key to creating jobs and raising incomes.  It is trade that will allow poor countries to 
generate growth; forgiving debt alone will not do that.  It is trade that has helped 400 million Chinese escape poverty 
in the last 20 years (1985-2005) and the same can happen elsewhere…Above all, there is a moral argument [for 
liberalizing trade].  How can we justify spending $280 billion on support to agricultural producers in developed 
countries—nearly the total gross domestic product of Africa and four times the total amount of overseas aid? How 
can we justify imposing barriers on the poorest 2 billion people that are twice as high as on everyone else? How can 
we accept a system in which Africa’s share of world exports has fallen from 3.5 percent to less than 2 percent in the 
past 30 years?”). 
29 Bossche, supra note 27. 
30 GATT, supra note 2, art. XVI paragraph 1. (“If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy, including 
any form of income or price support, which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports of any product from, 
or to reduce imports of any product into, its territory, it shall notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES in writing of the 
extent and nature of the subsidization, of the estimated effect of the subsidization on the quantity of the affected 
product or products imported into or exported from its territory and of the circumstances making the subsidization 
necessary.  In any case in which it is determined that serious prejudice to the interests of any other contracting party 
is caused or threatened by any such subsidization, the contracting party granting the subsidy shall, upon request, 
discuss with the other contracting party or parties concerned, or with the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the 
possibility of limiting the subsidization.”) 
31 GATT, supra note 2, art XVI.3. 
32 Rosenthal and Duffy, supra note 7, at 149, footnote 21. (“Both the United States and Canada, for example, 
provided protection for certain agricultural industries through the use of quotas.”) 
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notorious Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).33  The conflicts were mostly between the United 
States and the European Community (which later became the European Union).34  The US 
proposed that agricultural subsidies should be cut down greatly, but the EC opposed this 
suggestion.35  Even the US approach, however, would have allowed subsidies much higher than 
other Contracting States considered appropriate.36  In order to reach a conclusion, the EC and US 
agreed to concessions. 37   These concessions resulted in the AoA language which allows 
agricultural subsidies, but also sets out an agreement to reduce domestic agricultural subsidies.38 
Agricultural subsidies have been historically indispensable to many developed-countries, 
such as the EU.  At the same time, they clearly cause harm to other Member states.39  While the 
SCM Agreement lays out the fundamental principles governing subsidies in general, agricultural 
subsidy rules prevail over the rules of the SCM Agreement.40 
The AoA groups agricultural subsidies into two types: 
(1) agricultural export subsidies; and 
                                                 
33 Id. (“The CAP rests on three basic principles:  common pricing, which attempts to set a single level of price 
support for each commodity; community preference, which ensures that EU products retain a competitive advantage 
over imported products; and common financing, a mechanism requiring the EU to fund all CAP activities via a 
community-wide value-added tax and import levies” The CAP resulted into trade-distortive effects and gives EU 
competitive advantages in grains, milk and milk products, meat, and sugar.  Before the CAP had been implemented, 
“the EU was a net importer of wheat, but by 1985, it had become a net exporter, accounting for about 18 percent of 
world wheat exporters.”).  See also U.S. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE GATT NEGOTIATIONS AND U.S. 
TRADE POLICY, 84 (1987).  See also Al J. Daniel, Agricultural Reform:  The European Community, the Uruguay 
Round, and International Dispute Resolution, 46 Ark. L. Rev. 873, 876 (1994). 
34 Id. at 148. 
35 Lo, supra note 3, at 353. 
36 Rosenthal and Duffy, supra note 34. 
37 Id. at 149.  (“A bilateral dispute between the E.U. and the United States over oilseeds eventually provided the 
opportunity to formulate a compromise that would clear a path towards a final resolution.  This dispute was resolved 
in Washington, and is known as the ‘Washington Accord,’ or more informally, the ‘Blair House Agreement,’ in 
recognition of the location of the signing of the accord.”) 
38 Id. (“Under the Blair House Agreement, the E.U. and the United States agreed to require a 20 percent reduction in 
the average level of internal support across commodities, as determined by an Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) 
based on the 1986-88 period.  The two parties also committed to reduce the volume of subsidized exported by 21 
percent and to reduce the value of export subsidies by 36 percent using a base period of 1986-1990.  Finally, both 
countries agreed that certain internal support measures and export subsidies that conform to Uruguay Round 
commitments would not be countervaible under GATT subsidy rules.”) 
39 Bossche, supra note 27. 
40 AoA, supra note 10, art. 21.1. (“The provision of this GATT 1994 and of other Multilateral Trade Agreements in 
Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement shall apply subject to the provisions of this Agreement.”) 
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(2) agricultural domestic subsidies. 
Generally speaking, both export subsidies and domestic subsidies are legal, but they are subject 
to reduction.41  On the one hand, the AoA’s regulations towards subsidy measures are more 
lenient than the SCM Agreement’s, because export subsidies are allowed on agricultural 
products. 42   On the other hand, the AoA’s regulations are stricter than those in the SCM 
Agreement, because agricultural subsidies may be forbidden even though they generate no 
adverse effects.43 
2.  Agricultural Export Subsidies 
While the policy in the SCM Agreement is to eliminate all export subsidies, there is an exception 
for agricultural products.  The SCM Agreement prohibition on export subsidies applies to 
agricultural export subsidies, except as provided otherwise in the AoA.44  Thus, laws regulating 
export subsidies in the AoA are different from those in the SCM Agreement.  Export subsidies 
are absolutely forbidden in goods trade, but there is a distinction in examining agricultural 
subsidies.45  That distinction is between agricultural products that are specified in Section II of 
Part IV of a Member’s GATT Schedule of Concessions; and agricultural products that are not 
specified in that section. 
                                                 
41 Lo, supra note 3, at 353. 
42 Id. 
43 Lo, supra note 3, at 354. 
44 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1999, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14. [hereinafter the SCM Agreement], art. 3.1. (“Except 
as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture, the following subsidies, within the meaning of Article 1, shall be 
prohibited….”).  Bossche, supra note 27. 
45 Id. 
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Agricultural export subsidies defined in the AoA are not absolutely prohibited but are 
subject to a reduction commitment.46  WTO Members can subsidize agricultural exports, but 
only if they have made commitments to reduce those subsidies.47  Those without commitments 
cannot subsidize their agricultural exports at all.  The subsidies subject to reduction 
commitments are: 
(a) the provision by governments or their agencies of direct subsidies, including 
payments-in-kind, to a firm, to an industry, to producers of an agricultural product, 
to a cooperative or other association of such producers, or to a marketing board, 
contingent on export performance; 
(b) the sale or disposal for export by governments or their agencies of noncommercial 
stocks of agricultural products at a price lower than the comparable price charged 
for the like product to buyers in the domestic market; 
(c) payments on the export of an agricultural product that are financed by virtue of 
governmental action, whether or not a charge on the public account is involved, 
including payments that are financed from the proceeds of a levy imposed on the 
agricultural product concerned or on an agricultural product from which the 
exported product is derived; 
(d) the provision of subsidies to reduce the costs of marketing exports of agricultural 
products (other than widely available export promotion and advisory services) 
including handling, upgrading and other processing costs, and the costs of 
international transport and freight; 
                                                 
46 AoA, supra note 10, art. 9.1. (“The following export subsidies are subject to reduction commitments under this 
Agreement….”). 
47Id. at art. 8.  (“Each Member undertakes not to provide export subsidies otherwise than in conformity with this 
Agreement and with the commitments as specified in that Member's Schedule.”) 
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(e) internal transport and freight charges on export shipments, provided or mandated 
by governments, on terms more favourable than for domestic shipments; and 
(f) subsidies on agricultural products contingent on their incorporation in exported 
products.48 
Currently, there are 25 Members who have committed to reduce subsidies.  The following table 
lists those countries, with the numbers in brackets indicating the number of products for which 
each country has committed to reductions: 
Table 10.  Number of Export Subsidy Reduction Commitments by Member and Product Amounts49 
Australia (5) Brazil(16) Bulgaria (44) 
Canada (11) Colombia (18) Cyprus (9) 
Czech Republic (16) EU (20) Hungry (16) 
Iceland (2) Indonesia (1) Israel (6) 
Mexico (5) New Zealand (1) Norway (11) 
Panama (1) Poland (17) Romania (13) 
Slovak Republic (17) South Africa (62) Switzerland 
Liechtenstein (5) Turkey (44) United States (13) 
Uruguay (3) Venezuela (72)  
 
Developed-countries agreed to reduce export subsidies by an average of 36% by value 
(budgetary outlay) and 21% by volume (subsidised quantities).50  Budgetary outlay is defined as 
the revenue foregone.51  For the developing countries, the required cuts are 14% over 10 years 
with respect to volume, and 24% over the same period with respect to budgetary outlays.52  The 
AoA allows special and differential treatment for developing countries and least-developed 
                                                 
48 Id. at art. 9.1. 
49 Special Session, WTO Secretariat background paper Export subsidies, TN/AG/S/8 (April, 9, 2002). 
50 AoA, supra note 10, art. 15 para. 2. (“Developing country Members shall have the flexibility to implement 
reduction commitments over a period of up to 10 years.  Least-developed country Members shall not be required to 
undertake reduction commitments.”)  World Trade Organization, Agriculture:  Explanation:  Export 
competition/subsidies, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_intro04_export_e.htm.  Bossche, supra note 
27. 
51 AoA, supra note 10, art. 1(c). 
52 Id. art. 15 para. 2.  (“Developing country Members shall have the flexibility to implement reduction commitments 
over a period of up to 10 years.  Least-developed country Members shall not be required to undertake reduction 
commitments.”)  World Trade Organization, supra note 50.  Bossche, supra note 27. 
 137 
countries (LDC).  Developing countries had ten years to implement the reduction commitment 
while LDCs were not required to reduce commitments at all.53 
With the AoA regime in place, there are now only four situations in which agricultural 
export subsidies are allowed.  They involve: 
(1) export subsidies subject to product-specific reduction commitments within the 
limits specified in the schedule of the WTO Member;54 
(2) any excess of budgetary outlays for export subsidies or subsidized export volume 
over the limits specified in the schedule which is covered by the downstream 
flexibility provision;55 
                                                 
53 AoA, supra note 52. 
54 Id. art. 9.1. 
55 Id. art. 9.2.  (“(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (b), the export subsidy commitment levels for each year of 
the implementation period, as specified in a Member's Schedule, represent with respect to the export subsidies listed 
in paragraph 1 of this Article: 
(i) in the case of budgetary outlay reduction commitments, the maximum level of expenditure for such subsidies 
that may be allocated or incurred in that year in respect of the agricultural product, or group of products, 
concerned; and  
(ii) in the case of export quantity reduction commitments, the maximum quantity of an agricultural product, or 
group of products, in respect of which such export subsidies may be granted in that year. 
(b) In any of the second through fifth years of the implementation period, a Member may provide export subsidies 
listed in paragraph 1 above in a given year in excess of the corresponding annual commitment levels in respect of 
the products or groups of products specified in Part IV of the Member's Schedule, provided that: 
(i) the cumulative amounts of budgetary outlays for such subsidies, from the beginning of the implementation 
period through the year in question, does not exceed the cumulative amounts that would have resulted from 
full compliance with the relevant annual outlay commitment levels specified in the Member's Schedule by 
more than 3 per cent of the base period level of such budgetary outlays; 
(ii) the cumulative quantities exported with the benefit of such export subsidies, from the beginning of the 
implementation period through the year in question, does not exceed the cumulative quantities that would have 
resulted from full compliance with the relevant annual quantity commitment levels specified in the Member's 
Schedule by more than 1.75 per cent of the base period quantities; 
(iii) the total cumulative amounts of budgetary outlays for such export subsidies and the quantities benefiting from 
such export subsidies over the entire implementation period are no greater than the totals that would have 
resulted from full compliance with the relevant annual commitment levels specified in the Member's Schedule; 
and 
(iv) the Member's budgetary outlays for export subsidies and the quantities benefiting from such subsidies, at the 
conclusion of the implementation period, are no greater than 64 per cent and 79 per cent of the 1986-1990 base 
period levels, respectively.  For developing country Members these percentages shall be 76 and 86 per cent, 
respectively.”) 
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(3) export subsidies consistent with the special and differential treatment provision 
for developing country Members;56 and 
(4) export subsidies other than those subject to reduction commitments provided that 
they are in conformity with the anti-circumvention disciplines of Article 10 of the 
AoA.”57 
3.  Agricultural Domestic Support – Amber/Blue/Green Box System58 
The AoA requires that Members reduce their domestic supports regarding agricultural 
products.59  The method for calculating domestic supports is called an Aggregate Measurement 
of Support (AMS).  The AMS is “the annual level of support, expressed in monetary terms, 
provided for an agricultural product in favour of the producers of the basic agricultural product 
or non-product-specific support provided in favour of agricultural producers in general.”60 
The term “basic agricultural product” is defined as “the product as close as practicable to 
the point of first sale as specified in a Member's Schedule and in the related supporting 
material.”61  This calculation must exclude the types of support specified in Annex 2 of the 
AoA.62  The following table provides an example of how to calculate AMS: 
                                                 
56 Id. art. 9.4.  (“During the implementation period, developing country Members shall not be required to undertake 
commitments in respect of the export subsidies listed in subparagraphs (d) and (e) of paragraph 1 above, provided 
that these are not applied in a manner that would circumvent reduction commitments.”) 
57 World Trade Organization, supra note 50. 
58  See generally Committee on Agriculture Special Session, Domestic Support:  Background Paper by the 
Secretariat, TN/AG/S/4 (March, 20, 2002). 
59 Rosenthal and Duffy, supra note 7, at 166. 
60 AoA, supra note 10, art. 1(a). 
61 Id. art. 1(b). 
62 AoA, supra note 10, art. 1(a).  (“Aggregate Measurement of Support” and “AMS” mean the annual level of 
support, expressed in monetary terms, provided for an agricultural product in favour of the producers of the basic 
agricultural product or non-product-specific support provided in favour of agricultural producers in general, other 
than support provided under programmes that qualify as exempt from reduction under Annex 2 to this Agreement, 
which is: 
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Table 11.  Example of Calculating Current Total AMS63 
Member X (developed country), Year Y 
Wheat  Intervention price for wheat = $255 per tone 
 Fixed external reference price (world market price) = $110 per tonne 
 Domestic production of wheat = 2,000,000 tonnes 
 Value of wheat production = $510,000,000 
 Wheat AMS (AMS 1) 
 ($255–$110) x 2,000,000 tonnes = $290,000,000 
de minimis level=$25,500,000 
Barley  Deficiency payments for barley = $3,000,000 
 Value of barley production = $100,000,000 
 Barley AMS (AMS 2) = $3,000,000 
de minimis level=$5,000,000 
Oilseeds  Deficiency payments for oilseeds = $13,000,000 
 Fertilizer subsidy = $1,000,000 
 Value of oilseeds production = $250,000,000 
 Oilseeds AMS (AMS 3) = $14,000,000 
de minimis level=$12,500,000 
Support not specific to 
products 
 Generally available interest rate subsidy = $ 4,000,000  
 Value of total agricultural production = $860,000,000 
 Non-product-specific AMS (AMS 4) = $4,000,000 
de minimis level=$43,000,000 
Current total AMS (AMS 1 + AMS 3) = $304,000,000  
 
Developed countries agreed to cut their AMS support by 20% from 1986 to 1988.64  This 
gave developing countries the flexibility to implement reduction commitments over a period of 
up to 10 years while no reduction commitments were required of LDC Members.65  Members 
agree not to provide agricultural supports in excess of what they promised in their 
commitments.66 
                                                                                                                                                             
(i) with respect to support provided during the base period, specified in the relevant tables of supporting material 
incorporated by reference in Part IV of a Member’s Schedule; and 
(ii) with respect to support provided during any year of the implementation period and thereafter, calculated in 
accordance with the provisions of Annex 3 of this Agreement and taking into account the constituent data and 
methodology used in the tables of supporting material incorporated by reference in Part IV of the Member’s 
Schedule.”) 
63 World Trade Organization, Agriculture:  Explanation, Domestic support, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_intro03_domestic_e.htm. 
64 Bossche, supra note 11, at 585. 
65 AoA, supra note 10, art. 15(2). 
66 AoA, supra note 10, art. 3.2. (“Subject to the provisions of Article 6, a Member shall not provide support in favour 
of domestic producers in excess of the commitment levels specified in Section I of Part IV of its Schedule.”). 
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Generally speaking, all domestic supports are subject to the reduction.67  These trade-
distorting domestic supports are considered Amber-Box subsidies.68  However, there are two 
exceptions to this principle.  They are:  Green-Box subsidies (AoA Annex 2) and Blue-Box 
subsidies.69  These exceptions are introduced in the following paragraphs. 
a.  Amber-Box Subsidies  This category signifies the “domestic support for agriculture 
considered to distort trade and therefore subject to reduction commitments.”70  It includes direct 
payments and price supports to farmers.71 
Existing Amber-box Subsidy Categories 
Generally, amber-box subsidies are domestic supports that do not belong to either Blue or 
Green Box subsidies.72  The value of these measures must be reduced.73  Without these reduction 
commitments, Members should keep their domestic supports under the de minimis level.  The 
definition of de minimis subsidies is “minimal amounts of domestic support that are allowed 
even though they distort trade – up to 5% of the value of production for developed countries, 
10% for developing.” 74   De minimis subsidies are considered to be Amber-box subsidies.  
                                                 
67 Id. art. 6.1.  (“The domestic support reduction commitments of each Member contained in Part IV of its Schedule 
shall apply to all of its domestic support measures in favour of agricultural producers with the exception of domestic 
measures which are not subject to reduction in terms of the criteria set out in this Article and in Annex 2 to this 
Agreement.  The commitments are expressed in terms of Total Aggregate Measurement of Support and ‘Annual and 
Final Bound Commitment Levels’.”). 
68 Rosenthal and Duffy, supra note 59.  World Trade Organization, Agriculture Negotiations:  Backgrounder, 
Phase 1:  Domestic support – amber, blue and green boxes, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd07_domestic_e.htm. 
69 Bossche, supra note 11, at 586.  World Trade Organization, supra note 68. 
70 World Trade Organization, Glossary Term:  Amber-Box, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/amber_box_e.htm. 
71 RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:  INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE, 92 (2007). 
72 World Trade Organization, Agriculture Negotiations:  Background Fact Sheet, Domestic Support In Agriculture:  
The boxes, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agboxes_e.htm. 
73 AoA, supra note 67. 
74 World Trade Organization, Glossary Term, De Minimis, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/de_minimis_e.htm. 
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Because they cause only minimal distortion, Members are allowed to maintain these supports.75  
Moreover, the AoA includes different minimal levels for developed and developing countries.76 
Thirty WTO Members committed to reducing their domestic supports.  They are listed in 
the following table: 
Table 12.  Total AMS Commitments by Members, 1995-200177 
Argentina Australia Brazil 
Bulgaria Canada Colombia 
Costa Rica Cyprus Czech Republic 
EU Hungary Iceland 
Israel Japan Jordan 
Korea Mexico Morocco 
New Zealand Norway Papua New Guinea 
Poland Slovak Republic Slovenia 
South Africa Switzerland-Liechtenstein Thailand 
Tunisia United States Venezuela 
 
                                                 
75 Bhala, supra note 71, at 90.  See also World Trade Organization, supra note 70.  (“Any support that would 
normally be in the amber-box, is placed in the blue-box if the support also requires farmers to limit production.”). 
76 AoA, supra note 10, art. 6.4. (“(a) A Member shall not be required to include in the calculation of its Current Total 
AMS and shall not be required to reduce: 
(i) product-specific domestic support which would otherwise be required to be included in a Member’s 
calculation of its Current AMS where such support does not exceed 5 per cent of that Member’s total value 
of production of a basic agricultural product during the relevant year; and 
(ii) non-product-specific domestic support which would otherwise be required to be included in a Member’s 
calculation of its Current AMS where such support does not exceed 5 per cent of the value of that Member’s 
total agricultural production. 
(b) For developing country Members, the de minimis percentage under this paragraph shall be 10 per cent.”) 
77 Committee on Agriculture Special Session, supra note 58. 
 142 
Member Proposals in the Doha Round 
In 2003, a number of developed and developing countries wanted Amber-Box subsidies 
to be eliminated in 3 to 5 years for developed countries, and in a period up to nine years for 
developing countries.78  As for the de minimis levels, some proposed to have a higher level for 
developing countries and lower levels (or abolishment) for developed countries.79 
The Modality of Amber-box Subsidies80 
Discussions on the revision of Amber–box designations have focused on the possible 
abolition of Amber-box subsidies, the definition of de minimis levels, and the calculation of 
AMS.81  The proposed draft concerning Amber-box subsidies can be seen in the following table, 
using the positions submitted at the Cancún Negotiations. 
Table 13.  Agricultural Proposed Reform Regarding Amber-box Subsidies82 
Time Different opinions 
Before Cancún Negotiations US-EU draft:83 
It proposes to broadly reduce trade-distorting supports by a range of 
percentages to be negotiated.  Countries with larger distorting supports 
should make a greater effort.  Japan’s paper84 specifies that the reductions 
should be on total AMS.  De minimis payments would be disciplined under 
an overall reduction for Amber, de minimis and Blue-Box payments. 
G-20:85 
It proposes reductions on each product rather than for the whole agricultural 
sector, with additional conditions to reduce support on more heavily 
subsidized products, an initial downpayment cut, and larger reductions for 
products with more than a specified share of world exports.  
                                                 
78 World Trade Organization, supra note 72.  
79 Id. 
80 See generally Bhala, supra note 71, at 92-93. 
81 World Trade Organization, supra note 72. 
82 Id. 
83 Joint EC-US Paper, Agriculture, JOB(03)/157 (restricted) (August,13, 2003), available at 
http://wtocentre.iift.ac.in/agri/Other%20Useful%20Resources+/Job(03)-157%20-%20Joint%20EC-
US%20Paper.PDF. 
84 Japan, JOB(03)/165 (restricted)(August, 20, 2003). 
85 Ministerial Conference, Fifth Session Cancun, 10-14 September 2003, Agriculture-Framework Proposal:  Joint 
Proposal by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Venezuela, 
WT/MIN(03)/W/6 (September, 4, 2003). 
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Time Different opinions 
Norway:86 
It envisages larger reductions on products that are produced for export.  It 
also proposes negotiating reductions for the Amber- and Blue-Boxes 
combined. 
The European-East Asian group:87 
They argue that their supports have little impact on world markets and the 
reductions should be negotiated together with market access and export 
subsidies. 
In Cancún Negotiations The African Union/ACP/LDC:88 
They call for substantial reductions in both Amber- and Blue-Box supports 
“with a view to their phasing out and elimination”. 
b.  Blue-box Subsidies  Apart from those measures included in the Green-box category, other 
measures are also exempted from the reduction commitment. 89   They are called Blue-box 
subsidy.90 
                                                 
86  Norway’s submission, Norway’s View On The Framework Package On Agriculture, JOB(03)/169 (August 
21, 2003) (restricted), available at http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/ld/bro/2001/0010/ddd/pdfv/200663-
framework_package_on_agriculture.pdf. 
87 Agriculture - Position Of Bulgaria, Chinese Taipei, Iceland, Korea, Liechtenstein And Switzerland On The 
Framework Package, JOB(03)/167(August, 20, 2003) (restricted), available at 
http://wtocentre.iift.ac.in/agri/CAIRS%20Group+/Job(03)-167%20EE%20Asian%20Gr..pdf. 
88  Communication from Mauritius, Ministerial Conference Fifth Session Cancun, 10-14 September 2003, 
Consolidated African Union/ACP/LDC Position On Agriculture, WT/MIN(03)/W/17 (September, 12, 2003). 
89 Bossche, supra note 69. 
90 Id. (The Blue-box category has different interpretations among literature. “Blue-box’ subsidies include certain 
developing –country subsidies designed to encourage agricultural production, certain de minimis subsidies, and 
certain direct payments aimed at limiting agricultural production.”)  Bhala, supra note 71, at 89-90.  (Professor Raj 
Bhala discusses de minimis subsidies and Blue-box subsidies separately.  He states that, “the definition of the Blue-
Box in Article 6:5 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture covers only those subsidy programs that require a limit on 
production.  Thus, the Box essentially is a category for production ‘set asides’ (i.e., payments not to produce, or to 
limit acreage under production.)”).  World Trade Organization, Agriculture Negotiations:  Backgrounder, Domestic 
Support:  Amber, Blue And Green Boxes, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd13_boxes_e.htm.  
(The Blue-Box subsidy includes the de minimis subsidies, but does not include the special and differential treatment 
for developing countries.  The definition of the Blue-Box subsidies is “an exemption from the general rule that all 
subsidies linked to production must be reduced or kept within defined minimal (“de minimis”) levels.  It covers 
payments directly linked to acreage or animal numbers, but under schemes which also limit production by imposing 
production quotas or requiring farmers to set aside part of their land.”)  This dissertation will follow the structure of 
WTO website. 
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Existing Blue-box Subsidy Categories 
Blue-box subsidies receive an “exemption from the general rule that all subsidies linked 
to production must be reduced or kept within defined minimal (de minimis) levels.”91  This 
category is also described as the “Amber-Box with conditions.”92  The purpose of this category is 
to help Members reform their domestic agricultural sector.  Identified in Article 6 of the AoA,93  
This category includes certain types of direct payments for which there is no commitment to 
reduce domestic support if: 
(1) such payments are based on fixed area and yields; or 
(2) such payments are made on 85 per cent or less of the base level of production; or 
(3) livestock payments are made on a fixed number of head.94 
Currently, the only Members notifying the WTO that they are using or have used the Blue-box 
subsidies are the EU, Iceland, Norway, Japan, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.95 
Member Proposals in the Doha Round 
Under the AoA, if a subsidy falls within the Blue-box, there are no limits on spending 
supports.96  Some countries want to abolish or reduce the use of these subsidies.97  However, 
other countries insist on keeping this category.98  The EU supports keeping Blue-box subsidies, 
                                                 
91 Id. 
92 Id. (“What are the conditions in the Blue-box? The text furthers specifies that “conditions designed to reduce 
distortion.”)  
93 Bhala, supra note 71, at 90. 
94 AoA, supra note 10, art. 6 para.5(a). 
95 World Trade Organization, supra note 90. 
96 Id.  
97 Id.  (These Members include:  The Cairns Group (except Canada), including Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the 
Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay.) 
98 Id.  (“The proposing countries state that maintaining Blue-box subsidy is important “for achieving certain ‘non-
trade’ objectives, and argue that it should not be restricted as it distorts trade less than other types of support.”).  See 
also World Trade Organization, Glossary Term:  Non-Trade Concerns, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/-
glossary_e/non_trade_concerns_e.htm.  (Non-trade concerns are “similar to mutifunctionality.”  The preamble of the 
Agriculture Agreement specifies food security and environmental protection as examples.  Also cited by members 
are rural development and employment, and poverty alleviation.”)  The non-trade concerns have already brought 
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claiming that “it is ready to negotiate additional reductions in Amber-Box support so long as the 
concepts of the Blue and Green Boxes are maintained.”99 
The Modality of Blue-box Subsidies 
Some Members propose to have grace periods before phasing out this category; five 
years for developed countries and the nine years for developing countries.100  Therefore, the first 
draft on Blue-box states 
Current Blue Box payments would be capped and bound.  Then, they would either 
be halved over five years (cut 33% over 10 years for developing countries), or 
merged into the Amber Box (i.e. included in “current total aggregate 
measurement of support” or AMS) – developing countries would be allowed to 
delay the merger until the fifth year.101 
 
In the negotiated 2004 Framework Agreement, Members agreed to have a 5 percent cap 
on Blue-box subsidies.102  The proposal for Blue-box subsidies is illustrated in the following 
table, using the positions submitted at the Cancún Negotiations:103 
                                                                                                                                                             
members attention (Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Note On Non-Trade Concerns:  Revised, 
G/AG/NG/W/36/Rev.1 (November, 9, 2000)).  Countries such as Japan (see generally Committee on Agriculture, 
Special session, Negotiation Proposal By Japan On WTO Agricultural Negotiations, G/AG/NG/W/91, (December, 
21, 2000)), Republic of Korea (see generally Committee on Agriculture, Special session, Proposal For WTO 
Negotiations On Agriculture, G/AG/NG/W/98 (January, 9, 2001)) and Norway (see generally Committee on 
Agriculture, Special session, WTO Agriculture Negotiations:  Proposal by Norway, G/AG/NG/W/101 (January, 16, 
2001)) place a lot of emphasis on the need to tackle agriculture’s diversity as part of these non-trade concerns.  The 
EU’s proposal (see generally Committee on Agriculture, Special session, EC Comprehensive Negotiating Proposal, 
G/AG/NG/W/90 (December, 14, 2000)) says non-trade concerns should be targeted, transparent and cause minimal 
trade distortion.  One of the most important subjects discussed by members is food security.  Members, especially 
developing countries, consider food security important.  Some developing countries argue that they need to 
intervene in the agricultural trade because developed countries have no intention to cut down supports to their 
agricultural business.  In order to protect themselves, members need to have the rights to secure their domestic food 
producers.  See Committee on Agriculture Special Session, Export Subsidies-Food Security Or Food Dependency?:  
A Discussion Paper presented by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay (MERCOSUR), Chile, Bolivia and 
Costa Rica, G/AG/NG/W/38 (December, 11, 2001). 
99 World Trade Organization, supra note 90. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Bhala, supra note 71, at 91. 
103 World Trade Organization, Agriculture Negotiations:  Backgrounder‘Non-Trade’ Concerns:  Agriculture Can 
Serve Many Purposes, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd17_agri_e.htm.  (“As for the non-
trade concerns mentioned previously, they are not discussed as a separate issue; instead, they are considered to be on 
a different level, the three pillars:  export subsidies and competition, market access, and domestic support.  Japan 
asks for more flexible standards in dealing with sensitive products.“).  See generally Japan, supra note 84.  (Also, 
for non-trade concerns, Japan asks for more flexible standards in dealing with sensitive products.) 
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Table 14.  Agricultural Proposed Reform Regarding Blue-box Subsidies104 
Time Different opinions 
Before Cancún Negotiations US-EU draft:105 
It proposes to modify the definition of the Blue-box subsidies and limit this 
to 5% of the value of agricultural production by the end of the 
implementation period. 
G-20:106 
They want the Blue-box to be eliminated.  Japan107 wants it maintained but 
is willing to modify it. 
In Cancún Negotiations Norway:108 
It proposes to give governments to option of either adopting the US-EU 
revised definition and limit, or halving the present Blue-box subsidies from 
2000-02 levels. 
Israel:109 
It proposes leaving the final limit open for negotiation. 
The African Union/ACP/LDC:110 
They want the Blue-box to be eliminated along with the Amber-box 
c.  Green-box Subsidies  Green-box subsidies are described in Annex II of the AoA.111  Because 
they do not have adverse effects on trade,112 they are exempt from WTO Members’ reduction 
commitments. 113   Annex 2, paragraph 1 states that, “Domestic support … shall meet the 
fundamental requirement that they have no … trade-distorting effects or effects on production.”  
                                                 
104 World Trade Organization, supra note 90. 
105 Joint EC-US Paper, supra note 83. 
106 Ministerial Conference, Fifth Session Cancun, 10 -14 September 2003, supra note 85. 
107 Japan, supra note 84. 
108 Communication from Norway, Ministerial Conference Fifth Session Cancun, 10-14 September 2003, Agriculture 
Amendments to paragraph 1.3 of Annex A, WT/MIN(03)/W/15 (September, 12, 2003). 
109 Ministerial Conference Fifth Session Cancun, 10-14 September 2003, Communication from Israel:  Agriculture 
Modalities Framework:  Comments To Bridge The Gap, WT/MIN(03)/W/16 (September, 12, 2003). 
110 Ministerial Conference Fifth Session Cancun, 10-14 September 2003, supra note 88. 
111 AoA, supra note 10, Annex II. 
112 World Trade Organization, supra note 72. 
113 AoA, supra note 10, art. 7.  (“1. Each Member shall ensure that any domestic support measures in favour of 
agricultural producers which are not subject to reduction commitments because they qualify under the criteria set out 
in Annex 2 to this Agreement are maintained in conformity therewith. 
2. (a) Any domestic support measure in favour of agricultural producers, including any modification to such 
measure, and any measure that is subsequently introduced that cannot be shown to satisfy the criteria in Annex 2 
to this Agreement or to be exempt from reduction by reason of any other provision of this Agreement shall be 
included in the Member's calculation of its Current Total AMS. 
(b) Where no Total AMS commitment exists in Part IV of a Member's Schedule, the Member shall not 
provide support to agricultural producers in excess of the relevant de minimis level set out in paragraph 4 of 
Article 6. 
The reduction commitments are expressed in terms of a “Total Aggregate Measurement of Support” (Total AMS) 
which includes all product-specific support and non-product-specific support in one single figure.  Members with a 
Total AMS have to reduce base period support by 20 per cent over 6 years (developed country Members) or 13 per 
cent over 10 years (developing country Members).”) 
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Apart from having no trade-distorting effects, such domestic support should meet two 
requirements: 
(1) the support in question shall be provided through a publicly-funded government 
programme (including government revenue foregone) not involving transfers from 
consumers; and, 
(2) the support in question shall not have the effect of providing price support to 
producers.114 
Green-box subsidies are only allowed while they neither cause any trade distortion nor 
encourage any production. 
Existing Green-box Subsidy Categories 
Annex 2 lists several examples of Green-box subsidies,115 which include: 
(1) General services.116 
Policies in this category involve expenditures (or revenue foregone) in relation to 
programmes that provide services or benefits to agriculture or the rural community.  They shall 
not involve direct payments to producers or processors.  The AoA provides a non-exhaustive list 
explaining the examples.117 
                                                 
114 Id.  Annex 2 para. 1. 
115 AoA, supra note 10, Annex 2 paras. 2-13. 
116 Id. para. 2. 
117 Id. para. 2.  (it points that general services should include, 
“(a) research, including general research, research in connection with environmental programmes, and research 
programmes relating to particular products; 
(b) pest and disease control, including general and product-specific pest and disease control measures, such as 
early-warning systems, quarantine and eradication; 
(c) training services, including both general and specialist training facilities; 
(d) extension and advisory services, including the provision of means to facilitate the transfer of information and 
the results of research to producers and consumers; 
(e) inspection services, including general inspection services and the inspection of particular products for health, 
safety, grading or standardization purposes; 
(f) marketing and promotion services, including market information, advice and promotion relating to particular 
products but excluding expenditure for unspecified purposes that could be used by sellers to reduce their 
selling price or confer a direct economic benefit to purchasers; and 
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(2) Public stockholding for food security purposes.118 
This exemption includes expenditures (or foregone revenue) in relation to the 
accumulation and holding of stocks of products, which form an integral part of a food security 
programme identified in national legislation.  This may include government aid to private storage 
of products as part of such a programme. 
(3) Domestic food aid.119 
This includes expenditures (or foregone revenue) in relation to the provision of domestic 
food aid to sections of the population in need. 
(4) Direct payments to producers.120 
Support provided through direct payments (or foregone revenue, including payments in 
kind) to producers, for which exemption from reduction commitments is claimed shall meet 
some basic criteria. 
(5) Decoupled income support.121 
In this category, it is required that governmental supports should be not related to 
production or sales.122 
                                                                                                                                                             
(g) infrastructural services, including:  electricity reticulation, roads and other means of transport, market and 
port facilities, water supply facilities, dams and drainage schemes, and infrastructural works associated with 
environmental programmes.  In all cases the expenditure shall be directed to the provision or construction of 
capital works only, and shall exclude the subsidized provision of on-farm facilities other than for the 
reticulation of generally available public utilities.  It shall not include subsidies to inputs or operating costs, or 
preferential user charges.”) 
118 Id. para. 3.  (“For the purposes of paragraph 3 of this Annex, governmental stockholding programmes for food 
security purposes in developing countries whose operation is transparent and conducted in accordance with 
officially published objective criteria or guidelines shall be considered to be in conformity with the provisions of this 
paragraph, including programmes under which stocks of foodstuffs for food security purposes are acquired and 
released at administered prices, provided that the difference between the acquisition price and the external reference 
price is accounted for in the AMS.”)   
119 Id. para. 4.  (“For the purposes of paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Annex, the provision of foodstuffs at subsidized 
prices with the objective of meeting food requirements of urban and rural poor in developing countries on a regular 
basis at reasonable prices shall be considered to be in conformity with the provisions of this paragraph.”) 
120 Id. para. 5. 
121 Id. para. 6. 
122 Id. (Annex 2, para. 6 states, “(a) Eligibility for such payments shall be determined by clearly-defined criteria such 
as income, status as a producer or landowner, factor use or production level in a defined and fixed base period. (b) 
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(6) Government financial participation in income insurance and income safety-net 
programmes.123 
(7) Payments (made either directly or by way of government financial participation in crop 
insurance schemes) for relief from natural disasters.124 
(8) Structural adjustment assistance provided through producer retirement programmes.125 
(9) Structural adjustment assistance provided through resource retirement programmes.126 
(10) Structural adjustment assistance provided through investment aids.127 
                                                                                                                                                             
The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, the type or volume of 
production (including livestock units) undertaken by the producer in any year after the base period. (c) The amount 
of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, the prices, domestic or international, 
applying to any production undertaken in any year after the base period. (d) The amount of such payments in any 
given year shall not be related to, or based on, the factors of production employed in any year after the base period. 
(e) No production shall be required in order to receive such payments.”) 
123 Id., at para. 7. (“(a) Eligibility for such payments shall be determined by an income loss.  (b) The amount of such 
payments shall compensate for less than 70 per cent of the producer's income loss in the year the producer becomes 
eligible to receive this assistance.  (c) The amount of any such payments shall relate solely to income.  (d) Where a 
producer receives in the same year payments under this paragraph and under paragraph 8 (relief from natural 
disasters), the total of such payments shall be less than 100 per cent of the producer's total loss.”) 
124 Id., at para. 8.  (“(a) Eligibility for such payments shall arise only following a formal recognition by government 
authorities that a natural or like disaster (including disease outbreaks, pest infestations, nuclear accidents, and war on 
the territory of the Member concerned) has occurred or is occurring; and shall be determined by a production loss 
which exceeds 30 per cent of the average of production in the preceding three-year period or a three-year average 
based on the preceding five-year period, excluding the highest and the lowest entry.  (b) Payments made following a 
disaster shall be applied only in respect of losses of income, livestock (including payments in connection with the 
veterinary treatment of animals), land or other production factors due to the natural disaster in question.  (c) 
Payments shall compensate for not more than the total cost of replacing such losses and shall not require or specify 
the type or quantity of future production.  (d) Payments made during a disaster shall not exceed the level required to 
prevent or alleviate further loss as defined in criterion (b) above.  (e) Where a producer receives in the same year 
payments under this paragraph and under paragraph 7 (income insurance and income safety-net programmes), the 
total of such payments shall be less than 100 per cent of the producer's total loss.” 
125Id. at para. 9.  (“(a) Eligibility for such payments shall be determined by reference to clearly defined criteria in 
programmes designed to facilitate the retirement of persons engaged in marketable agricultural production, or their 
movement to non-agricultural activities.  (b) Payments shall be conditional upon the total and permanent retirement 
of the recipients from marketable agricultural production.”) 
126 Id. at para. 10. (“(a) Eligibility for such payments shall be determined by reference to clearly defined criteria in 
programmes designed to remove land or other resources, including livestock, from marketable agricultural 
production.  (b) Payments shall be conditional upon the retirement of land from marketable agricultural production 
for a minimum of three years, and in the case of livestock on its slaughter or definitive permanent disposal.  (c) 
Payments shall not require or specify any alternative use for such land or other resources which involves the 
production of marketable agricultural products.  (d) Payments shall not be related to either the type or quantity of 
production or to the prices, domestic or international, applying to production undertaken using the land or other 
resources remaining in production.” 
127Id. at para. 11.  (“(a) Eligibility for such payments shall be determined by reference to clearly-defined criteria in 
government programmes designed to assist the financial or physical restructuring of a producer’s operations in 
response to objectively demonstrated structural disadvantages.  Eligibility for such programmes may also be based 
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(11) Payments under environmental programmes128 
(12) Payments under regional assistance programmes.129 
Members can freely increase their investments on domestic supports.  Green-box 
subsidies basically apply to both developed and developing countries.  If a Member can 
demonstrate that it complies with the required criteria above, its Green-box subsidies are without 
limits. 
Member Proposals in the Doha Round 
More recently, some countries have proposed a review of domestic subsidies listed by 
Members in the Green-box category because they believe some of them have an influence on 
production or prices. 130   Other countries insist that the Green-box category should not be 
                                                                                                                                                             
on a clearly-defined government programme for the reprivatization of agricultural land.  (b) The amount of such 
payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, the type or volume of production (including 
livestock units) undertaken by the producer in any year after the base period other than as provided for under 
criterion (e) below.  (c) The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, the 
prices, domestic or international, applying to any production undertaken in any year after the base period.  (d) The 
payments shall be given only for the period of time necessary for the realization of the investment in respect of 
which they are provided.  (e) The payments shall not mandate or in any way designate the agricultural products to be 
produced by the recipients except to require them not to produce a particular product.  (f) The payments shall be 
limited to the amount required to compensate for the structural disadvantage.”) 
128 Id. at para. 12.  (“(a) Eligibility for such payments shall be determined as part of a clearly-defined government 
environmental or conservation programme and be dependent on the fulfilment of specific conditions under the 
government programme, including conditions related to production methods or inputs.  (b) The amount of payment 
shall be limited to the extra costs or loss of income involved in complying with the government programme.”) 
129 Id. at para. 13.  (“(a) Eligibility for such payments shall be limited to producers in disadvantaged regions.  Each 
such region must be a clearly designated contiguous geographical area with a definable economic and administrative 
identity, considered as disadvantaged on the basis of neutral and objective criteria clearly spelt out in law or 
regulation and indicating that the region's difficulties arise out of more than temporary circumstances.  (b) The 
amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, the type or volume of production 
(including livestock units) undertaken by the producer in any year after the base period other than to reduce that 
production.  (c) The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, the prices, 
domestic or international, applying to any production undertaken in any year after the base period.  (d) Payments 
shall be available only to producers in eligible regions, but generally available to all producers within such regions.  
(e) Where related to production factors, payments shall be made at a digressive rate above a threshold level of the 
factor concerned.  (f) The payments shall be limited to the extra costs or loss of income involved in undertaking 
agricultural production in the prescribed area.”) 
130 World Trade Organization, supra note 68. (“The G-20 framework proposes reductions on categories of Green 
Box subsidies (some income supports – paragraphs 5-13 of Annex 2 of the Agriculture Agreement) that the group 
considers to distort trade, along with additional, unspecified disciplines”.) World Trade Organization, supra note 72. 
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changed since it is already satisfactory.131  Some Members argue that the Green-box category 
should be expanded to cover additional types of subsides to accommodate a changing world.132 
The Modality of Green-box Subsidies 
The paper and non-paper opinions of Members regarding the Green-box category 
demonstrate 2 broad questions:133 
(1) Is the Green Box Flexible enough? 
Members are concerned about whether the current framework for Green-box subsidies is 
flexible enough to cover non-trade issues, such as environmental protection, rural development, 
animal welfare, etc.134  Some developing countries suggest adding a development box in the 
Green-box category, asking for more flexibility and ability to adjust.135 
(2) Does a Green-box Subsidy distort trade? 
Several Members, both developed and developing countries, believe that Green-box 
subsidies are causing trade-distorting effects. 136   Additionally, they want to re-examine the 
criteria for the current Green-box subsidy categories.137  The first draft on Green-box subsidies 
would amend the AoA by 
(i) adding fixed or unchanging reference periods (some Green Box provisions allow 
countries to base their calculations on base periods that can change); 
                                                 
131 World Trade Organization, supra note 68.  See also World Trade Organization, supra note 72.  (The US-EU draft 
says nothing about the Green Box.  Japan, Norway and the European-East Asian group oppose changing or limiting 
the Green Box.) 
132  World Trade Organization, supra note 68.  (“The African Union/ACP/least-developed countries call for 
developed countries’ ‘trade distorting’ Green Box measures to be limited.”).  World Trade Organization, supra note 
72. 
133 World Trade Organization, supra note 90. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. (“Those developing countries include Cuba, Dominican Rep, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Kenya, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe.”) 
136 Id.  
137 Id.  
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(ii) tightening rules on criteria for compensation that is allowed to be in the Green 
Box, and 
(iii) allowing compensation for increased costs of protecting animal welfare.”138 
d.  Developmental Measures  The AoA allows special and differential treatment for developing 
countries.139  Activities covered in developmental measures include investment subsidies which 
are generally allowed for developing countries.140  The rationale behind this special treatment is 
stated as follows: 
Developing countries depend on the production and export of agricultural 
products for their foreign exchange earnings.  In 1986, for low income developing 
countries, 19 percent of their Gross National Product and 60 percent of their labor 
force depended on agriculture.  In addition, agricultural products accounted for 
fifty to one hundred percent of total exports by some developing countries.  A 
very large number of agricultural exports originated from developing countries.141 
 
Current proposals provide for the retention of special and differential treatment for 
developing countries, with possible enhancements.142  During the G-20, some countries called 
for expanded provisions under this Article, “with possible enhancements143 for diversifying 
away from crops that are harmful for human health and for other well-targeted subsidies.”144 
                                                 
138 Id. 
139 AoA, supra note 10, art. 6 para. 2. (“In accordance with the Mid-Term Review Agreement that government 
measures of assistance, whether direct or indirect, to encourage agricultural and rural development are an integral 
part of the development programmes of developing countries, investment subsidies which are generally available to 
agriculture in developing country Members and agricultural input subsidies generally available to low-income or 
resource-poor producers in developing country Members shall be exempt from domestic support reduction 
commitments that would otherwise be applicable to such measures, as shall domestic support to producers in 
developing country Members to encourage diversification from growing illicit narcotic crops.  Domestic support 
meeting the criteria of this paragraph shall not be required to be included in a Member's calculation of its Current 
Total AMS.”). 
140 World Trade Organization, supra note 63. 
141 Kele Onyejekwe, GATT, Agriculture, and Developing Countries, 17 Hamline L. Rev. 77, 103 (1997) 
142 World Trade Organization, supra note 63.  
143 World Trade Organization, Agriculture Negotiations:  Backgrounder Decision on net food-importing developing 
countries, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd15_foodimport_e.htm.  (“For detailed 
information on these enhancements provisions, see The Pérez del Castillo and Derbez drafts reflect this, with the 
Derbez text referring to “enhanced” provisions.  General Council chairperson Carlos Pérez del Castillo included a 
draft “framework” on agriculture as Annex A of his draft Ministerial declaration, JOB(03)/150/Rev.1, 
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There is no doubt that the application of the AoA to subsidies is a complex matter.  
Nonetheless, it has provided both notable and historical achievements.  The existence of a 
different subsidies regime in the AoA, as compared to the SCM Agreement, requires that one be 
aware during future negotiations of both the progress indicated by, and the difficulties raised by, 
the existing agricultural subsidies regime. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
24 August 2003.  Further negotiations in Cancún led to a second revision in the “Derbez text”, JOB(03)/150/Rev.2, 
13 September 2003.”) 
144 World Trade Organization, supra note 90.  Bhala, supra note 71, at 96.  (In the G-20 PLAN FOR CUTS TO 
OVERALL TRADE, “it agreed developing countries should be put in separate bands and obliged to make cuts in the 
sum of their Amber-Box, Blue-Box, and De minimis support.”). 
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VI.  SUBSIDIES IN SERVICES TRADES 
On July 25, 2002, the Working Party on GATS Rules released Work Programmes outlining 
Members’ future obligations. 1   At the beginning of the document, the Work Programmes 
recognized Members’ freedom to conduct their negotiations regarding service subsidy 
regulations.  The document explicitly provides for flexibility in the negotiation process, stating: 
(1) “The work programmes do not prejudge in any way the outcome of the 
respective negotiations on emergency safeguard measures, subsidies, and 
government procurement.  Members will remain free to bring up any 
relevant issues for discussion, including the questions of feasibility and 
desirability, as well as the scope of the negotiations, under any of the three 
subjects of negotiations. 
(2) The benchmarks for submissions are indicative, with a view to encouraging 
Members to put forward submissions on the respective subjects as early as 
possible, and would be without prejudice to Members’ rights to put 
forward further suggestions and raise relevant issues by way of 
submissions at any time, under any of the three subjects of negotiations. 
                                                 
1 Working Party on GATS Rules, Work Programmes, S/WPGR/7 (July, 25, 2002). 
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(3) The undertaking of individual items of work, including the question of 
feasibility and desirability, should be without prejudice to each other 
under each subject of negotiations.”2 
Apart from recognizing flexibility in negotiations, the Work Programmes point out three 
components of service regulations:  emergency safeguard measures, subsidies, and government 
procurement.  For service subsidies, the Working Party’s mission is based on Article XV of the 
GATS and paragraph 7 of the Negotiating Guidelines 3  and the Work Programmes list the 
following objectives: 
(1) “to continue discussion on subsidies on the basis of submissions from 
Members and materials available; 
(2) to encourage Members to put forward submissions on subsidies as early as 
possible before March 31, 2003, without prejudice to Members’ right to 
put forward further suggestions and raise relevant issues; 
(3) the Chairperson to circulate a note by June 30, 2003 to report on the 
progress of work; and 
(4) to prepare for the opportunity provided by the Fifth Ministerial 
Conference to take stock of progress made in the negotiations.”4 
If we take a closer look at the document, it does not provide any concrete guidance for 
service subsidy regulations.  However, it does give a positive perspective towards future 
                                                 
2 Id. at para. 1. 
3 Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Guidelines and Procedures for the Negotiations on Trade in 
Services, adopted by the Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services on 28 March 2001, S/L/93, para. 7 (29 
March 2001).  (“Members shall aim to complete negotiations under Articles VI:4, XIII and XV prior to the 
conclusion of negotiations on specific commitments.”). 
4 Working Parties on GATS Rules, supra note 1, at para. 4. 
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negotiations on service subsidies, and acknowledges the Members’ opinion that it is necessary to 
have regulations governing service subsidies under the GATS regime. 
Moreover, if we compare the emergency safeguard measures regulation with subsidy 
regulation, the big difference is the time limit.  The Work Programmes’ wording regarding 
emergency safeguard measures states that “the Working Party will organize its work on 
emergency safeguard measures (ESM) as follows:  … (e) to finalize the negotiations under 
Article X by 15 March 2004.”5 (emphasis added). 
This text could indicate why the Members’ present negotiations mainly focus on the 
emergency safeguard measures instead of subsidies.  In the Work Programmes, the deadlines on 
the regulations are not mentioned in any paragraph on subsidies or government procurement.  
Due to the complexity of these two categories, both involving government participation, we can 
see that the Working Party does not want to rush Members to make any extensive changes.  
However, the drawback is that Members have thus far made no significant progress in these two 
areas. 
A.  THE IMPORTANCE OF SUBSIDY RESTRICTIONS IN SERVICES 
Subsidies sometimes can be an efficient method to carry out public policies and to ensure the 
greater good.6  GATS is a relatively complex agreement compared to other agreements under the 
                                                 
5 Working Parties on GATS Rules, supra note 1, at para. 3. 
6 BERNARD M. HOEKMAN AND MICEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: 
THE WTO AND BEYOND, 270 (2001). 
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WTO.  Some scholars propose that service subsidy guidelines are not necessary because existing 
GATS rules sufficiently address subsidy issues.7 
While it is true that some existing regulations indeed enforce restrictions upon service 
subsidies, current rules cannot cover certain situations, which I will discuss later in this chapter.  
According to the future market access required by GATS, Members will require service-specific 
laws.  The fact that current regulations seem sufficient cannot diminish the importance of 
establishing service subsidy parameters. 
In this chapter, I will discuss whether it is necessary to regulate service subsidies where 
even GATS Article XV has recognized distortive effects of subsidies on trade in services; I will 
also discuss whether the current GATS structure is sufficient to deal with service subsidies.  I 
conclude that it is necessary to have a specific system for subsidies in services. 
1.  Trade-Distortive Effects of Subsidies 
Article XV states that “Members recognize that…subsidies may have distortive effects on trade 
in services.  Members shall enter into negotiations with a view to developing the necessary 
multilateral disciplines to avoid such trade-distortive effects….”8 (emphasis added)  Obviously, 
the main concern regarding subsidies is that they result in trade distortion.  Therefore, it is 
important to understand what distortion is under the WTO. 
                                                 
7 See generally 楊光華, 服務補貼規範展必要性之初探, 政大法學評論 i, Guang-hua Yang, Discussion on the 
Necessity to Have Service Subsidy Regulations in WTO, Chengchi Law Review, 231-290 (2004). 
8 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1B, 1999, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS], art. XV. 
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a.  What Is Distortion?  Distortion is “[w]hen prices and production are higher or lower than 
levels that would usually exist in a competitive market.”9  As Prof. Benitah explains, 
A subsidy is seen as a practice that distorts the natural allocation of scarce 
resources by the market inside a national economy, because it gives a wrong 
signal to the recipient firm about its real production costs…  We thus have a 
welfare loss for the national economy of the subsidizing country, as well as a 
welfare loss for the world economy insofar as subsidized services prevent the use 
and thus the production of similar services produced in a more efficient way in 
other countries.10 
 
But there is one concept to which we must pay more attention - not all subsidies are bad.  
It is true that subsidies affect the allocation of resources, but sometimes these effects on 
economic activity are socially desirable, such as constructing facilities in rural areas. 11  
Therefore, economists offer no general objection to the use of subsidies.12 
Distortion does not equal discrimination.  Suppose Country A gives a subsidy to its 
domestic telecommunications industry, but does not grant subsidies to foreign-owned 
telecommunication firms.  People may quickly assume that this has a distortive effect on the 
industry because a discriminatory subsidy exists. 
Professor Benitah points out that the above conclusion is misleading because the 
discrimination should fall under the NT principle category.13  He suggests that we need to follow 
a two-stage process:14 
 
                                                 
9  World Trade Organization, Glossary Term: distortion, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/distortion_e.htm. 
10 Marc Benitah, Subsidies, Services and Sustainable Development, ICTSD Programme on Trade in Services and 
Sustainable Development, at. 10 (2005), available at 
http://www.tradecapacitypakistan.com/pdf/ICTSD%20Paper%20Services%20GVA%20JUL%2005.pdf. 
11 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, 294 (1997).  (“[I]t must be recognized that subsidies are 
exceedingly important, even crucial tool of national governments in facilitating their sovereign capacity to promote 
legitimate government policies to serve their constituents.”). 
12 Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, John M. Olin Law & 
Economics Working Paper No. 186, 6 (2003), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html. 
13 Benitah, supra note 10, at 11. 
14 Id. 
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As we can see from these two stages, the first stage only has to do with the definition of 
what a distorting subsidy is.  To determine whether this subsidy is discriminatory or not takes 
place only in the second stage. 
b.  Simple v. Sophisticated Definition of Distortion  A generally accepted understanding of 
distortion is that “any interference with the allocation of resources by the market inside a 
national economy leads to a disturbance of international economic relations by interfering with 
the principle of comparative advantage.”15  This is the simple version of the distortion definition. 
Many scholars are trying to argue that it is necessary to go beyond the simple view.  
Professor Jackson states that, 
Not just any ‘distortion’ should suffice for the international system to take action. 
In some sense, every governmental action that impinges on the economy creates a 
‘distortion’….  However, it is a legitimate choice for a national sovereign to 
accept to lower economic welfare in order to promote certain societal and 
governmental objectives (such as redistribution of income, or support for the 
handicapped).  As long as the government’s actions are taken in such a way that 
the costs are borne only by that society, it seems inappropriate for other nations in 
the world to complain.16 
 
Additionally, scholars believe that under some circumstances it is unclear whether 
distortion is a result of subsidies because 
                                                 
15 Benitah, supra note 10. 
16 Jackson, supra note 11, at 298. 
Define certain distorting measures as subsidies. 
Impose the NT principle analysis to determine 
whether these subsidies are provided in a 
discriminatory manner. 
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For a payment to have this effect, it must lead the (subsidized) firm either to 
increase the quantity of goods offered or to decrease the price it charges in 
(foreign) markets.  Because the recipient firm will produce until marginal revenue 
equals marginal cost, a payment will only have such a detrimental impact if it 
either decreases the marginal cost (curve) of the foreign producer or increase its 
marginal avenue.  Unless this occurs, the government payment may increase the 
profits of (the subsidized) firm, but no need for a countervailing duty exists.17 
 
Many scholars suggest adopting the complex definition of distortion, but such complexity 
is hard to define, enforce, and regulate.  It shifts the burden of determining the extent and cause 
of distortion on a case-by-case basis to WTO panelists and the Appellate Body, and they will 
most likely be accused of becoming legislators without the expertise required for this kind of 
judgment.18 
WTO Members are still opting for the simple definition of distortion.  The simple version 
obviously prevails at the current stage.  Take the United States as an example. The U.S. Final 
Rule relating to countervailing duties stipulates that, 
[I]f there is a financial contribution and a firm pays less for an input than it would 
otherwise pay in the absence of that financial contribution (or receives revenues 
beyond the amount it otherwise would earn), that is the end of the inquiry insofar 
as the benefit element is concerned…  The Department need not consider how a 
firm’s behavior is altered when it receives a financial contribution that lowers its 
inputs costs or increases its revenues (emphasis added).19 
 
The simple version of distortion has two criteria:  (1) specificity; and (2) the fact that it 
provides to its recipient a benefit not available on the free market.20  These criteria are important 
in Chapter 7 when we discuss the subsidy definition for services. 
                                                 
17 Diamond R., Economic Foundation of Countervailing Duty Law, Virginia Journal Of International Law, Volume 
29, 784-785 (1989). 
18 Benitah, supra note 10, at 12. 
19 Countervailing Duties: Final Rule. 63 Federal Register, 65361 (1998). 
20 Benitah, supra note 10, at 10. 
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2.  Global Awareness of Subsidies in Services 
The importance of subsidy regulations is also supported by the world’s attitude towards service 
subsidy issues.  In OECD countries, and likely in most others as well, the vast majority of 
subsidies overall are granted in non-service industries such as steel, shipbuilding, and mining.21  
Still, subsidies in the services trade are common in some 31 developed and developing countries, 
mostly focusing on four main services:  audiovisual services, air transport or maritime transport 
services, tourism, and banking.22  Audiovisual service subsidies are usually found in developed 
countries, while tourism subsidies are found in developing countries.23  As for transport services 
and banking, they can be found in both developed and developing countries.24 
It is important to consider both international agreements and regional regulations when 
determining the importance of regulating service subsidies.  If Members consider service 
subsidies to be an important issue, they should incorporate service subsidies regulations into their 
laws. 
                                                 
21 Robert Ford and Wim Suyker, Industrial Subsidies in the OECD Economics, Department of Economics and 
Statistics Working Paper No. 74, OECD, Jan. 1990. 
22 Working Party on GATS Rules, WTO Secretariat, Subsidies for Service Sectors: Information contained in WTO 
Trade Policy Reviews, S/WPGR/W/25, 2 (January, 26, 1998). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
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a.  International Agreements  Agreements signed by economic entities can guide global 
awareness.  Sometimes it is easier for countries to sign a treaty bilaterally instead of 
multilaterally.  By ratifying treaties between countries, a rule can be enforced and applicable 
between the signatories.  This also indicates that countries understand the necessity of having 
such a rule.  Therefore, I am providing the following examples to illustrate the importance of 
incorporating service subsidy regulations into the GATS. 
The WTO Secretariat offers an overview on current agreements relating to services, and 
concludes that among 24 agreements notified under GATS Article V, 13 contain disciplines on 
subsidy practices relating services.25  Moreover, among those 13 agreements, 11 are signed 
between the European Communities (now the European Union) and other European countries.26 
Other examples are the Protocol on Trade in Services to the Australia-New Zealand 
Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA) and the Revised Treaty of 
Chaguaramas establishing the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) including the Single Market 
and Economy.27 
ANZCERTA contains a provision stating that, “The Member States shall not introduce 
new, or expand existing, export subsidies, export incentives and other assistance measures 
having a direct distorting effect on trade between them in services and shall work towards the 
elimination of any such measures by 30 June 1990.”28 (emphasis added). 
                                                 
25 Working Party on GATS Rules, Overview of Subsidy Disciplines Relating to Trade in Services in Economic 
integration Agreement, S/WPGR/W/46 (November, 12, 2003) (RESTRICTED). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at paras. 10, 11. 
28 Protocol on Trade in Services to the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations -Trade Agreement.  
(Canberra, 18 August 1988), Australian Treaty Series 1988 No. 20, available at  
http://web.me.com/jane_kelsey/Trans-
Pacific_Partnership_FTA/Australia_files/ANZCERTA%20services%20protocol.pdf. 
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The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing the Caribbean Community including 
the CARICOM Single Market and Economy,29 states that, “The Member States shall harmonize 
national incentives to investments in the industrial, agricultural and services sectors.” 30 
(emphasis added). 
In addition to the aforementioned agreements, some other agreements have incorporated 
components of GATS Article XV.  The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) provides that, 
“The Member States shall review the scope of application of this Chapter with a view to 
extending the disciplines with respect to State aid to the field of services, taking into account 
international developments in the sector. The reviews shall take place at yearly intervals.”31 
(emphasis added). 
The Free Trade Agreement between the EFTA States and Mexico provides that, 
“[s]ubsidies related to trade in services shall not be covered under this Section. The Parties shall 
pay particular attention to any disciplines agreed under the negotiations mandated by Article XV 
of the GATS with a view to their incorporation into this Agreement.” 32   Moreover, the 
Agreement between New Zealand and Singapore on a Closer Economic Partnership states that, 
The Parties shall review the issue of disciplines on subsidies related to trade in 
services in the context of the reviews of this Agreement provided for in Article 
68. They shall pay particular attention to any disciplines agreed under Article XV 
of GATS with a view to their incorporation into this Agreement.33 
 
                                                 
29 This Agreement was ratified by the following WTO Members: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados Belize, Dominica, 
Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad 
and Tobago. 
30 Revised Treaty Of Chaguaramas Establishing The Caribbean Community Including The Caricom Single Market 
And Economy [hereinafter Chaguaramas], available at  http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/revised_treaty-
text.pdf, art. 69, para. 1. 
31 Id. art. 16, para. 3. 
32 Id. at art. 19, para. 5. 
33 Id. at art. 23, para. 2. 
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The next paragraph in the agreement states that “[t]he Parties shall consult on 
appropriate steps in regard to subsidies related to trade in services where any subsidies issues 
arise in bilateral services trade under this Agreement.”34 
The Singapore-Australia Free Trade Agreement provides that “[t]he Parties shall 
consult on appropriate steps in regard to subsidies related to trade in services where any 
subsidies issues arise under this Chapter.”35 
These economic integration agreements between Members have been reported to the 
WTO Secretariat under GATS Article V since May 20, 1996.  They are organized into the 
following Table:36 
Table 15.  Economic Integration Agreements Between WTO Members 
 
                                                 
34 Id. at art. 23, para. 3. 
35 Id. art. 21, para. 2. 
36 Working Party on GATS Rules, supra note 25, Annex. 
Economic Integration 
Agreement 
Date of Notification Document 
reference 
Where Relevant 
Provisions can be 
found 
EC-Slovak Republic 27 August 1996 S/C/N/23 Article 64 
EC-Hungary  27 August 1996 S/C/N/24 and 
S/C/N/Corr.1 
Article 62 
EC-Poland 27 August 1996 S/C/N/ 25 and  
S/C/N/25/Corr.1 
Article 63 
EC-Czech Republic 9 October 1996 S/C/N/26 Article 64 
EC-Romania 9 October 1996 S/C/N/27 Article 64 
EC-Norway, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein 
10 October 1996 S/C/N/28 Article 61-64, Protocol 27
EC-Bulgaria 25 April 1997 S/C/N/55 Article 64 
New Zealand- Australia 21 October 1997 S/C/N/66 Article 11 
EFTA-Mexico 22 August 2001 S/C/N/166 and 
S/C/N/166/Corr.1 
Article 19 
New Zealand-Singapore 19 September 2001 S/C/N/169 Article 23 
EC-Latvia 11 February 2002 S/C/N/187 Article 64 
EC-Estonia 11 February 2002 S/C/N/188 Article 63 
EC-Lithuania 11 February 2002 S/C/N/189  Article 64 
EC-Slovenia 11 February 2002 S/C/N/190 Article 65 
EFTA 3 December 2002 S/C/N/207 Article 16 
CARICOM 19 February 2003 S/C/N/229 Article 69 
Singapore-Australia 1 October 2003 S/C/N/233 Article 21 
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This table shows that Members have begun to recognize the importance of 
service subsidy regulations.  This recognition is not just on the international level, as 
indicated by the following discussion. 
b.  Regional Regulations  Article 87 of The Treaty on European Union (hereinafter TEU) 
provides a general outline for state aid, stating: 
Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or 
through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to 
distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain 
goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible 
with the common market.37 (emphasis added). 
 
Additionally, Article 107 of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union contains similar 
language.38 
European Union Members have entered into other treaties with provisions similar to 
Article 87. 39   Moreover, the Agreement establishing the European Economic Area (EEA), 
concluded between the European Union and Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, also has 
substantive disciplines on state aids.40 
As seen from both the international agreements and the regional agreements, the 
importance of service subsides catch the attention of many countries.  Because of the distortive 
effects resulting from subsidies, I believe there is a need to regulate subsidies in service areas. 
                                                 
37 Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, Oj. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinafter TEU], art. 87, 
available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:321E:0001:0331:EN:PDF. 
38  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:en:PDF, art. 107, para. 1. (“Save as 
otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form 
whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of 
certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.”) 
39 Working Party on GATS Rules, supra note 36. 
40 Id., at para. 8. 
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B.  CURRENT DISCUSSIONS UNDER THE WTO 
Before I go into the development of service subsidy regulation, it is important to first examine 
Members’ discussions and suggestions on GATS service subsidy rules.  This type of analysis 
allows for the identification of the core questions regarding service subsidy regulation. 
1.  Information Exchange Required By GATS 
GATS Article XV requires that Members “exchange information concerning all subsidies related 
to trade in services that they provide to their domestic service suppliers.”  After the Uruguay 
Round, however, the negotiations on subsidies did not progress smoothly.  Not only was no 
development on service subsidies made, but just 5 out of 151 members submitted their domestic 
subsidy information to the WTO.  Those 5 countries are Hong Kong,41 Switzerland,42 Poland,43 
Norway,44 and New Zealand.45 
The WTO Secretariat prepared the questionnaire based on the subsidy definition in the 
SCM Agreement because of the absence of a subsidy definition in the GATS.  Since the GATS 
entered into force in 1995, Members have had 16 years to fulfill this obligation.  But, to date, 
                                                 
41 Working Party on GATS Rules, Submission from Hong Kong, China: Response to the Questions Relevant to the 
Information Exchange Required Under the Subsidies Negotiating Mandate, S/WPGR/W/16/Add.3 (July, 23, 1999). 
42  Working Party on GATS Rules, Submission from Switzerland: Response to the Questions Relevant to the 
Information Exchange Required Under the Subsidies Negotiating Mandate, S/WPGR/W/16/Add.5 (December, 22, 
2005). 
43 Working Party on GATS Rules, Submission from Poland: Response to the Questions Relevant to the Information 
Exchange Required Under the Subsidies Negotiating Mandate, S/WPGR/W/16/Add.4 (March, 2, 2000). 
S/WPGR/W/16/Add.4/Suppl.1 (September, 20, 2000). 
44 Working Party on GATS Rules, Submission from Norway: Response to the Questions Relevant to the Information 
Exchange Required Under the Subsidies Negotiating Mandate, S/WPGR/W/16/Add.1 (June, 23, 1997). 
45 Working Party on GATS Rules, Submission from New Zealand: Response to the Questions Relevant to the 
Information Exchange Required Under the Subsidies Negotiating Mandate, S/WPGR/W/16/Add.2 (July, 23, 1997). 
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only five Members have come forward with their domestic service subsidy programs.  The 
following tables catalogue their submissions. 
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a.  Hong Kong46 
                                                 
46 Id. 
Program Object Method Amount Duration Impact 
Financial 
Services 
Regional derivative 
warrants and 
convertible bond 
All investors, local 
and overseas 
Stamp duty 
exemption 
For 1997: 
HK$2,031,504  
No time limit. Since its introduction, there have 
been 17 regional derivative warrants 
listed on the SEHK with an average 
daily turnover of $20.8 million, or 
0.2% in terms of the total turnover 
of the Exchange 
Stock lending and 
borrowing 
All stock borrowers 
and lenders (local 
and overseas) who 
are essentially 
brokerage houses and 
institutional investors
Stamp duty 
exemption 
Data not available No time limit. Since the introduction of the stamp 
duty exemption, the number of 
transaction of local stock lending 
and borrowing has grown 
substantively 
Hedging transactions 
by stock options 
market makers 
Market makers (local 
and overseas) for 
stock options. 
Stamp duty 
exemption 
1996.6.1~1997.11.
30: 
HK$284,239,484  
No time limit. Since then, the number of stock 
options has grown from 1 to 17 with 
turnover in terms of number of 
contracts traded grown by 48% over 
the same period 
Tourism The Government 
provides a loan to the 
HKTA, and is not 
targeted at any 
specific sectors or 
enterprises 
Different types of 
financial support 
Data not available 5 years credit period Data not available 
The Services Support Fund (SSF) Non-profit-making in 
nature, except for the 
projects’ long-terms 
self-sufficiency. 
In the form of 
grants or loans. 
Average funding 
support for each 
project is HK$1.83 
million 
No specific time 
limits. But based on 
past experience, the 
duration ranges from 
1-2 years 
Data not available 
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b.  Poland47 
Program Object Method Amount Duration Impact 
Resources (loans) for 
restructuring investments 
and for “hedging” 
purposes” 
(1) State owned 
enterprises; 
(2) Companies which 
stock is owned by the 
Treasury; 
(3) Companies which 
stock is owned by the 
Treasury and the 
employees 
(4) Companies which 
stock is owned by the 
Treasury  
(5) Companies which 
stocks have been 
contributed as a share 
in Sugar Partnerships 
Grant and 
investment loan 
In the year of 1997: 
transport – PLN 7.2 million 
in loans 
typography – PLN 1.9 
million in loans 
construction – PLN 1.4 
million in grants, PLN 4.0 
million in loans 
 
In the year of 1998: 
transport – PLN 3.0 million 
in grants, PLN 8.4million in 
loans 
construction – PLN 0.2 
million in grants, PLN 2.0 
million in loans 
heating supply – PLN 2.0 
million in loans 
The agreement between the 
International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development and the government 
of Poland assumed extending of 
adaptation loans for the enterprises 
and financial sector in three tranches: 
1st Tranche : USD 125 million; 
2nd Tranche : USD 100 million; 
3rd Tranche : USD 125 million 
The 1st tranche was made available in 
1994.   
The 2nd tranche was received by the 
Treasury in April 1995. 
Approximately 86 per cent of the 
EFSAL funds was consumed by the 
end of 1998. 
The Polish Side has resigned from 
applying for the 3rd tranche. 
The program does 
not directly impact 
the foreign trade 
Direct 
Grants for 
Extra 
Charges to 
Products 
and 
Grants for 
the meals sold 
in milk bars 
Above-mentioned milk 
bars apply margin not 
exceeding 25 per cent 
of the value of used 
food products 
Grant and 
investment loan 
For 1997: 
13.9 million 
For 1998: 
17 million 
For 1999: 
18.3 million 
Grants from the state budget There are no effects 
on the foreign trade 
                                                 
47 Working Party on GATS Rules, supra note 52. 
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Program Object Method Amount Duration Impact 
Services Grants for 
railway 
passenger 
domestic 
transport 
Direct grants for 
railway passenger 
transport were awarded 
for the transport:   
within urban 
agglomeration, 
regional (local), inter-
regional (long 
distance) by means of 
regular passenger 
trains, speeded-up 
trains, excluding 
passenger transport by 
means of express, 
Inter-City, Euro-City 
and Euronight (hotel) 
trains in domestic and 
international 
communication 
For 1997: 
710 million 
For 1998: 
560 million 
For 1999: 
537.7 million 
Grants for 
passenger bus 
transport 
Grants for bus 
passenger transport 
were awarded for the 
regular domestic inter-
city transport 
For 1997: 
193.4 million 
For 1998: 
164 million 
For 1999: 
148.2 million 
Grants for 
publication of 
specialized 
school and 
university 
books 
These grants are 
awarded for publishers 
of school and 
university books: 
1. For teaching 
specialized subjects in 
vocational schools; 
2. For schools of 
national minorities; 
3. For special 
schools; 
4. For university 
books. 
For 1997: 
11 million 
For 1998: 
11.6 million 
For 1999: 
10.8 million 
171 
Program Object Method Amount Duration Impact 
Assistance for 
Restructuring of the 
Banking Sector 
Banking sector Grants, loans, tax 
incentives 
For 1997: Cooperative 
banking sector: PLN 137.5 
million, including the 
assistance provided in the 
form of: 
Treasury bonds: 
69.3 million PLN; 
Loans extended by NBP: 
45.2 million PLN; 
Tax incentives:  23 million 
PLN. 
For 1998: 
No state aid granted  
For 1999: 
No assistance granted 
According to the conditions of the 
Treasury bonds issue, being the main 
component of the assistance provided 
within the scope of the above-
mentioned program, the buy-out of 
the bonds will be terminated in the 
year 2009 
The program does 
not directly impact 
the foreign trade 
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c.  Switzerland48 
Program Object Method Amount Duration Impact 
Horizontal 
Measure 
Investment promotion 
and guarantees for 
mountainous regions 
(including 
implementation 
measures) 
Regions, communities, 
private and public 
corporations 
The investment 
assistance consists of 
loans or at most direct 
transfer (contributions 
to interest payments) 
Investment aid: 
For 2004: 44,7 million CHF; no 
data available for 2006 
Guarantees: For 2004:  
2,5 million CHF; preliminary 
estimate for 2006:  
2,8 million CHF 
Implementation measures: 
For 2004: 
7 million CHF; preliminary 
estimate for 2006:  
7 million CHF 
There are no 
specific time limits 
 
Government aid for 
economically 
endangered regions 
Privat institutions: SMEs Financial assistance 
(tax concessions, debt 
guarantees, 
contribution to interest 
charges) 
For 2004:  
6,3 million CHF.  Preliminary 
estimate for 2006: 
9 million CHF 
The measure was 
planned to be 
limited.  But so far, 
the measure has 
been extended by 
the parliament 
several times 
INTERREG III SMEs, private 
organizations 
Direct transfer of funds 
(financial assistance) 
For 2004:  
5,9 million CHF.  Preliminary 
estimate for 2006: 
5,9 million CHF 
The program runs 
from 2000 to 2006.  
The subsidies are 
granted in line with 
the allotted budget 
Business 
service 
Cancer study Support of the 
experimental and 
applied cancer research 
Direct transfer of funds For 2004:  
4.95 million CHF. 
Preliminary estimate for 2006:  
5,1 million CHF. 
The financial 
assistance is granted 
for a period of four 
years. 
After that, a new 
request has to be 
submitted. 
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Swiss National fund Swiss National fund Financial compensation For 2004: 
359 million CHF.  Preliminary 
estimate for 2006:  
435 million CHF 
No specific time 
limit. 
 
Swiss Academies for 
Natural Sciences / 
Humanities / Medical 
Sciences / Technical 
Sciences 
These four academies 
are recognized by the 
federal government for 
the promotion of 
research. 
Direct transfer of funds For 2004: 
Natural Sciences:  
5,4 million CHF 
Humanities: 6,2 million CHF 
Medical Sciences:  
1,5 million CHF 
Technical Sciences:  
1,4 million CHF 
Preliminary estimate for 2006 (for 
all academies together): 23,5 
million CHF 
The financial 
assistance is granted 
for a period of four 
years. 
 
Contribution to 
research on animal 
diseases 
Research projects on 
animal diseases and 
animal welfare are 
supported. 
Financial assistance For 2004: 
0,524 million CHF  Preliminary 
estimate for 2006:  
0,534 million CHF. 
Annual credit 
Communica-
tion Services 
Audio 
Services 
Public Film 
Funding 
Promotion of the quality 
and diversity of films 
Spreading of film 
culture and the 
deepening of 
understanding of films 
Promotion of the film 
festival 
Indexing and restoration 
of films 
Cooperation of the 
different sectors of the 
branch of trade 
International 
cooperation in the area 
of trade 
Promotion of the 
formation and future 
education of film 
professionals  
Financial assistance in 
form of non refundable 
payments, interest 
grants, guarantees and 
conditional refundable 
loans 
Film funding:  
For 2004:  
22,4. million  Preliminary estimate 
for 2006:  
23.4million CHF. 
Film culture: 
For 2004: 
4,2 million CHF.  Preliminary 
estimate for 2005: 
4,7 million CHF 
Formation and further education 
of film professionals: 
For 2004:  
2,5 million CHF.  Preliminary 
estimate for 2006: 
2,3 million CHF 
Annual credit  
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Radio and 
Television 
Services 
The national radio and 
television company SRG 
receives the largest part 
of the television license 
fees. 
Mandatory fees For 2003: Approximately 1100 
million CHF of mandatory fees 
No time limits 
Tourism and 
Travel 
Related 
Services  
Swiss Tourism  Only the public 
cooperation “Swiss 
Tourism” 
Direct transfer of funds For 2004: 40,4 million CHF.  
Preliminary estimate for 2006: 46 
million CHF 
Credit approved by 
the Parliament for 
the period 2005 – 
2009.  Hereafter a 
new approval will 
be necessary.  
 
Documentation and 
advisory center of the 
Swiss Tourist 
Association 
The documentation and 
information center of the 
Swiss Tourist 
Association 
Financial assistance For 2004:  
0,1 million CHF.  Preliminary 
estimate for 2006:  
0,1 million CHF 
Annual credit 
Promotion of 
innovation and 
cooperation in the area 
of tourism 
To promote innovation 
and cooperation in 
tourism (Various private 
institutions) 
Direct transfer of funds For 2004:  8,8 million CHF.  
Preliminary estimate for 2006:  
6,9 million CHF. 
No specific time 
limits 
Recreational, 
cultural and 
sporting 
services 
Library, 
archives, 
museum 
and other 
cultural 
services 
Pro Helvetia As first recipient only 
the foundation “Pro 
Helvetia”.  As second 
recipients: private 
institutions.  
Financial assistance For 2004: 
34,7 million CHF.  Preliminary 
estimate for 2006:  
33,1 million CHF 
No specific time 
limits.  The amount 
of financial aid is 
always calculated 
for a period of four 
years; afterwards a 
new federal 
resolution is 
necessary. 
 
Support of 
cultural 
organization 
Private institutions Annual financial 
assistance. 
For 2004: 
3,8 million CHF.  Preliminary 
estimate for 2006:  
3,3 million CHF 
Limited to one year, 
hereafter a new 
request has to be 
submitted 
Bibliomedia Only the foundation 
“Bibiomedia” 
Financial assistance For 2004: 2 million CHF.  
Preliminary estimate for 2006:  
1,5 million CHF 
No specific time 
limit.  The 
parliament decides 
on the financial aid 
for a certain period 
of time. 
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Landesphon
othek 
Only the Swiss 
association: 
Landesphonothek 
Financial assistance For 2004:  
0,99 million CHF, Preliminary 
estimate for 2006: 
no data available. 
No time limit 
Memoriav Only the association: 
Memoriav 
Direct transfer of funds For 2004: 
1,3 million CHF.  Preliminary 
estimate for 2006:  
2,9 million CHF. 
No specific time 
limit.  The 
parliament decides 
on the financial aid 
for a period of four 
years 
Museum of 
Transport 
(“Verkehrsh
aus”) 
 
Only the Museum of 
Transport in Lucerne 
Financial assistance For 2004: 1,58 million CHF.  
Preliminary estimate for 2006:  
1,6 million CHF 
The parliament has 
decided to grant 
financial aid for the 
period of 2004 - 
2007.  Afterwards a 
new approval is 
necessary. 
Promotion 
of literature 
for young 
people and 
children 
Five organizations that 
promote literature for 
young people and 
children  
Annual financial 
assistance 
For 2004: 0,963 million CHF.  
Preliminary estimate for 2006: 
0,97 million CHF 
Annual credit 
Sporting 
and other 
recrea-
tional 
services 
Promotion 
of 
gymnastics 
and sports 
organization 
Private institutions: 
gymnastics and sport 
organizations 
Direct transfer of funds For 2004:  
5,5 million CHF.  Preliminary 
estimate for 2005:  
5,7 million CH 
Annual credit. 
Promotion 
of int’l sport 
events 
Private Institutions: 
Organizers of World or 
European 
Championships or 
similar international 
sport events. 
Guarantee for a limited 
coverage of a possible 
deficit 
For 2004: 0,49 million CHF.  
Preliminary estimate for 2006:  
0,5 million CHF 
Annual credit 
Construc-
tion of sport 
facilities 
Sponsorship of sport 
facilities 
Financial assistance For 2004:  
7,2 million CHF.  Preliminary 
estimate for 2006:  
0,1 million CHF 
Credit duration of 
four years 
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Extracurric-
ular youth 
work 
About 130 youth 
organizations and 
sponsorship of 
extracurricular youth 
work 
Direct transfer of funds For 2004:  
6,6 million CHF.  Preliminary 
estimate available for 2006: 
None 
Annual credit. 
Foot paths 
and hiking 
trails 
Two specialized 
organizations, the ARF 
and the SAW 
Direct transfer of funds For 2004:  
1,5 million CHF.  Preliminary 
estimate for 2006:  
2,3 million CHF 
None 
 
Transport 
Services 
Transport 
Services 
by railway 
Compensa-
tion of the 
combined 
traffic 
The Swiss Federal 
Railways (state owned 
company) and other 
transport companies 
with a concession 
Compensation For 2004:  203 million CHF.  
Preliminary estimate for 2006: 220 
million CHF 
Annual credit 
Investment 
in combined 
traffic 
Private institutions 
(entreprises) 
Financial assistance 
(loan, non refundable 
payments) 
For 2004: 49,1 million CHF.  
Preliminary estimate for 2006: 40 
million CHF 
Annual credit 
Technical 
upgrades 
and 
changeover 
of the 
operation 
Transport companies 
with a concession 
Financial assistance in 
form of a loan, non 
refundable payments or 
participation 
For 2004: 159,1 million CHF.  
Preliminary estimate for 2006: 
168,2 million CHF 
No time limit is 
intended 
Connection 
tracks 
Enterprises (owner of 
the connecting tracks) 
Direct transfer of funds 
(financial assistance) 
For 2004: 
17,1 million CHF.  Preliminary 
estimate for 2006:  
22 million CHF 
Annual credit 
Transport of 
accompa-
nied motor 
vehicles 
Transport companies 
(through the Lötschberg, 
the Furka, the Oberalp 
and the Albula) 
Financial assistance For 2004: 
3,2 million CHF  Preliminary 
estimate for 2006: 
3,4 million CHF 
Annual credit 
177 
Program Object Method Amount Duration Impact 
Compensa-
tion for the 
regional 
transport 
Swiss Federal Railways 
and transport companies 
with concession 
Compensation For 2004:  
1’196 million CHF.  Preliminary 
estimate for 2006:  
1’304 million CHF 
The federal council 
decides on the 
contribution for the 
regional transport 
four years in 
advance in line with 
the estimate of cost 
and the fiscal 
planning 
Price 
reduction 
for the 
wagonload 
traffic’s 
lines 
Transport companies Financial assistance For 2004: 66,3 million CHF.  
Preliminary estimate for 2006:  
20 million CHF 
Limited to the 
period from 2000 to 
2010 
Infrastruc-
ture 
investment 
of the Swiss 
Federal 
Railways 
The Swiss Federal 
railways (state-owned 
enterprise) 
Compensation in form 
of a loan or non 
refundable payments 
For 2004: 517,3 million CHF.  
Preliminary estimate for 2006:  
476,2 million CHF 
The service level 
agreement has to be 
renewed after four 
years. The current 
service level 
agreement is valid 
from 2003 to 2006 
d.  New Zealand49 
Program Object Method Amount Duration Impact 
Education Tertiary Education Education sector Grant Annual 7 million None Total number: 15,000 
TOP trainees 
Training Opportunity 
Program(TOP) 
Education sector Annual 186 million None 2,600 private tertiary 
students 
Industry Training Education sector Annual 57 million None 30,000 industry trainees 
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Broadcasting Producers of television and 
radio program. 
Grant. 
(Contractual 
conditions 
apply) 
The total amount of 
public broadcasting fee 
revenue collected by 
the Broadcasting 
Commission is around 
NZ$87 million. Of this 
total, about 50% is 
spent on television 
programming 
Time limits for 
each project are 
determined by the 
Broadcasting 
Commission in 
negotiation with 
the producer and 
are set down in 
contract 
The effect of 
Broadcasting Commission 
funding, where an 
overseas sale is made, is 
relatively revenue neutral: 
the seller of the program 
cannot therefore exploit 
the grant for the purposes 
of obtaining a more 
favorable export position 
Film Production Approximately 50 film 
producers and writers were 
eligible for assistance in 
1995/96 
Grant 11,220 million(until 
6.30.1996) 
No data is 
available 
No data is available 
Land Transport Land transport sector Grant Annual cost is 
estimated at 30 million 
NZ 
The contract 
between the 
transport operator 
and the Regional 
Council will be 
for a specific 
period(one year) 
No data is available 
Air Transport Air services sector. About 7 
airports, out of 24, receive 
deficit funding. 
The support 
takes the form 
of deficit 
funding by 
local 
authorities 
Total funding was 
$156,000 (until 
6.30.1996) 
No data is 
available 
No data is available 
Business Development All sectors Grant Total of 2,657 projects 
were approved to a 
total of NZ$8.6 million. 
(7.1.1996 ~ 2.28.1997) 
During the same period 
NZ$4.3 million was 
paid out in grants 
An application for 
a grant must be 
made before any 
costs have been 
incurred, and the 
applicant must 
then uplift the 
grant within 
twelve months of 
approval. An 
extension of up to 
No data is available 
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three months is 
available. 
Tourism Tourism sector. Private sector 
partners may include the 
following types of 
organizations involved in 
marketing a tourism product 
overseas: 
(1) Any company or 
commercial undertaking; 
(2) Any state-owned 
enterprise; 
(3) Any regional, local 
authority or regional 
tourism organization; 
(4) Any organization 
that is not directly funded 
by the NZ Government. 
It does not 
provide any 
direct grants 
or loans.  
20 million NZ. (until 
6.30.1997) 
Each contract 
must specify a 
time frame for 
expenditure, 
including 
installment 
payment dates 
where appropriate
No data is available 
Tradenz Joint Action Group (JAG) 
Funding 
The current focus is on the 
following sectors: consultancy 
services, publishing services, 
aviation services and audio-
visual (film and television) 
services 
Grant $400,000 (until 
6.30.1997）  
There are no 
prescribed time 
limits, although 
all funding is 
dependent on 
annual budgetary 
allocations made 
by the 
Government 
No data is available 
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e.  Norway50 
Program Object Method Amount Duration Impact 
Industrial R&D program and projects All firms are eligible, 
regardless of branch, region 
or size 
Grants N/A 
 
Starting date: 1991.  
Duration has not 
been specified 
Support is 
granted to a 
variety of 
projects and 
sectors. 
Statistical data 
showing the 
trade effects of 
the subsidy are 
not available 
Public Research and Development 
Contracts 
A public R&D contract is an 
agreement between a 
Norwegian enterprise and a 
public authority that asks for 
the development of a new 
product or process. 
Grants N/A 
 
Starting date: 1968.  
Duration has not 
been specified 
Industrial R&D Contracts  
 
R&D cooperation projects 
between private enterprises  
(a major customer and a 
subcontractor) 
Grants N/A 
 
Starting date: 1994.  
Duration has not 
been specified 
Regional Investment Grants  Enterprises located in 
assisted areas for regional 
policy. All sectors except 
primary production in 
agriculture, forestry and 
fishing. Oil extracting or 
refining activities are also 
excluded 
Grants or loans 
(few cases).  
N/A 
 
Starting date: 1966.  
Duration has not 
been specified 
Regional Grants for the Development 
of Business and Industry 
Enterprises located in 
assisted areas for regional 
policy. All sectors except 
primary production in 
agriculture, forestry and 
fishing. Oil extracting or 
refining activities are also 
excluded 
Grants or loans 
(few cases). 
N/A 
 
Starting date: 1983.  
Duration has not 
been specified 
Scheme for Restructuring in Regions 
Dependant of a Single Industry 
Available to enterprises in 
municipalities dependent on 
a single industry or on a 
single enterprise 
Grants N/A 
 
Starting date: 1987.  
Duration has not 
been specified 
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The Norwegian Corporation for 
Industrial Estates and Development 
(SIVA) 
SMEs (Maximum 250 
employees is one out of three 
criteria). Primarily 
manufacturing industry 
located in assisted areas. 
Grants Maximum subsidy is 50 
per cent of eligible cost 
Starting date: 1992.  
Duration has not 
been specified 
Trade effects of the subsidy Mainly SMEs (Maximum 
250 employees is one out of 
three criteria) in private 
sector located in assisted 
areas. 
Grants N/A Starting date: 1986.  
Duration has not 
been specified 
Funds for restructuring of the 
Community of Rana 
Enterprises located in the 
Community of Rana. 
 
Grants Starting date: 1988.  
Duration has not 
been specified 
Funds for restructuring of the 
Community of Sor-Varanger 
Available to enterprises 
located in Sor-Varanger, 
Finnmark County. 
Grants Starting date: 1991.  
Duration has not 
been specified 
Viking Business Development A/S Enterprises located in Askim 
in Østfold County and 
economically viable 
Grants Starting date: 
1.12.1991.  
Duration has not 
been specified 
Assistance to 
Small and 
Medium Sized 
Companies 
Development Grants Scheme is primarily intended 
for SME. The scheme is 
available for all sectors 
except insurance, banking 
and finance, shipping, oil and 
gas exploration, public 
administration and public 
sector commercial 
enterprises, but primarily 
Grants Conditions applying from 
01.04.1995: 
Subsidy allowed to SMEs 
(1) maximum 50 
per cent of costs 
eligible under the 
notion of “soft aid” 
(2) maximum 35 
per cent of costs 
eligible for applied 
research and 
development projects 
and  
(3) maximum 7,5 
per cent to physical 
investment  
Starting date: 1993.  
Duration has not 
been specified 
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The Public Advisory 
System 
TI and VINN provide SMEs 
with technical competence 
and knowledge. BRT give 
general assistance 
Services free/partly 
free of charge. 
The institutions only 
subsidy services directed 
towards SMEs with less 
than 100 employees and 
mainly companies with 
less than 20 employees. 
The legal maximum aid 
level to a enterprise is 
50,000 ECU over a 3-year 
period. The average level 
however is only NOK 
10,000. 
The public advisory 
system was 
reorganized in 1988. 
Duration has not 
been specified 
Export 
promotion 
The Export 
Campaign, the 
Strategy Program and 
The Program for 
Export Development 
in SME 
Conditions applying from 
01.04.1995: 
Available to SMEs 
(maximum 250 employees is 
one out of three criteria). 
Costs covered; expenditures 
when attending trade fairs, 
expenditures for market 
research/surveys, seminars, 
training, consultancy fees.  
Grants Maximum aid intensity 50 
per cent. Average intensity 
is 25 per cent. 
Starting date: 1969, 
1986 and 1989 for 
the Export 
Campaign. The 
Program for Export 
Development in 
SME and The 
Strategy Program 
respectively. 
Duration has not 
been specified 
Subsidies to the Fishery Sector Private persons, firms and 
research institutions can 
apply for subsidies. Main 
projects demands 50 per cent 
economic participation from 
private persons and firms. 
Grants N/A Starting date: 1994. 
Duration has not 
been specified 
Limited means, 
and special 
demands for 
private 
participation, 
make the trade 
effects very 
small if at all 
existing. 
Tax reimbursement scheme for 
seafarers 
Approximately 9000 
seafarers employed in some 
300 companies on board 500 
vessels 
Grant. The total amount will 
depend on the number of 
eligible applicants, but as 
an indication NOK 414 
million has been set aside 
in the budget year 1997. 
Duration has not 
been specified 
Statistical data 
showing the 
trade effects of 
the subsidy are 
not available 
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This information was voluntarily submitted by these five Members and was based on the 
Members’ own judgment on service subsidy programs.  As of 2011, no other Members had 
updated their information exchange.  The mandate to exchange information has been a big issue 
in a series of Members’ negotiation rounds.  Members are urged to complete the information 
exchange and express their concerns. 
The Chairperson of the GATS Working Party “noted the lack of significant progress in 
the information exchange,”51 and the fact that “most members are reluctant to contribute to the 
Article XV information exchange.”52  The delegate from Hong Kong, China, recalled “the 
importance of fulfilling the mandate to provide information on all subsidies related to trade in 
services, and he wondered why many Members were not able to provide such information based 
on their own definition.”53  Additionally, the delegation from Switzerland indicated that “Article 
XV contained a clear legal obligation to exchange information concerning all subsidies related to 
trade in services, and [t]his obligation existed since 1995 and its fulfillment had therefore been 
long overdue.”54 
The delay in information exchange does cause obstacles in creating a legal framework for 
service subsidies, but it should not excuse Members from achieving the Article XV mandate: to 
create disciplines on service subsidies. 
                                                 
51 Working Party on GATS Rules, Report Of The Meeting Of 1 October 2003: Note by the Secretariat, 
S/WPGR/M/44, para. 40 (October, 28, 2003). 
52 Working Party on GATS Rules, Negotiations On Subsidies: Report by the Chairperson of the Working Party on 
GATS Rules, S/WPGR/10, para. 16 (June, 30, 2003). 
53 Working Party on GATS Rules, supra note 60, at para. 46. 
54 Working Party on GATS Rules, Report Of The Meeting Of 24 November 2004: Note by the Secretariat, 
S/WPGR/M/50, para.16 (January, 17, 2005). 
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2.  Members’ Opinions in Relevant Meetings 
Members’ communications are also important to consider when discussing Article XV 
obligations. It is necessary and useful to observe Members’ points of view on how to facilitate 
more progress. 
The following table contains Members’ submissions regarding Article XV from 2000 to 
2005.55 
 
                                                 
55 This table is organized by author. 
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Table 16.  Summary of Members’ Opinions on Service Subsidies 
Document/Time Country Submissions/Suggestions 
S/WPGR/M/29,  
9 October 200056 
Poland • Supports the idea of information exchange, and urges members to conform to such obligations. 
Brazil 
 
• Suggests including a reference to the possible need for additional GATS disciplines to avoid trade-distortive 
effects and includes the appropriateness of countervailing duties. 
Canada 
 
• Supports the Chairperson’s proposal to have a more structured discussion on subsidies and agrees to convey 
strong views on these issues. 
S/WPGR/M/38, 
26 July 200257 
Secretariat  
 
• Declares that the initial demand for the information exchange never attempted to propose whether a given 
subsidy was trade-distortive or not.  It was up to Members to judge. 
• Clarifies that TPR Reports were based on any information available.  They didn’t distinguish between trade-
related or trade-distortive subsidies. 
Chile  
 
• Recalls the primary objective was to increase transparency in the area of subsidies.  Together with Argentina, 
Hong Kong, presents a simplified questionnaire (S/WPGR/W/16). 
• States that the information exchange under Article XV covers all subsidies, not only trade-distortive ones. 
• States that it is up to each Member to decide whether to reply to the simplified questionnaire. 
Republic of 
Korea 
• Supports the simplified questionnaire. 
• Says the TPR reports could be considered as information exchange in Article XV. 
Hong Kong, 
China 
• Supports the idea to have a simplified questionnaire. 
Canada 
 
• Says that the simplified questionnaire proposed did not seem to make it less difficult for Members to report 
relevant subsidies in services. A fundamental question, how to define a subsidy, remained. 
• Proposes the question on whether governmental assistance to services was trade-distortive. 
• Suggests Members keep in mind the distinction between trade-related and trade-distortive subsidies. 
United States • Says the purpose of the discussion was to look for any possible new disciplines to address trade-distortive 
effects of subsidies. 
• Asks how to distinguish trade-distortive/non trade-distortive effects of subsidies.  Thinks that it is necessary 
to differentiate these two in collecting information exchange.  Otherwise the undifferentiated information was 
not really helpful for the discussion. 
Mexico • Supports the idea of simplified questionnaire. 
Uruguay • Suggests two sources of subsidy information: (1) the information in the TPR; (2) information provided by 
Members. 
• Contemplates whether the replies to the simplified questionnaire would be given on a voluntary basis. 
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Argentina  • Explains that the purpose of a simplified questionnaire was to comply with the information exchange, not to 
decide whether or not subsidies were trade-distortive. 
S/WPGR/M/44, 
28 October 200358 
Poland • Notes their interest in further discussion on multilateral disciplines on subsidies in services, as well as in 
greater transparency. 
• Thinks that discussing the definition of subsidy was a logical starting point and it can contribute to the 
information exchange. 
• Considers that delegations could provide information on the basis of their own definition. 
• Points to two key issues for further discussion: (1) the broad definition of subsidy; (2) possible exclusions 
from such a broad definition. 
• Thinks that the broad definition of subsidies could be built on answers to 4 questions: Who was granting the 
subsidy, to whom, what was the form of the subsidy, and possibly, what were the benefits to the recipient of the 
subsidy. 
• Agrees that the definition in Article I:3(a) was sufficient, but wanted to draw attention to this issue.  A more 
important issue was concerned with Article I:3(c). Where private suppliers of medical or education services 
would operate alongside public providers, they considered that Article I:3(c) would not be sufficient in order to 
address the question of to whom the subsidy was granted. 
• Thinks that co-existence without competition between private and public services was the exception rather 
than the rule.  In their view, Article I:3(c) would not appear to be sufficient for the purpose of subsidy 
disciplines, and this issue would need to be addressed more. 
Chile • Recognizes the contribution from Poland, Argentina and Hong King, China.  It clearly suggested that a 
common basis for working on a definition was emerging.  Members should thus have the necessary elements to 
develop a consensus definition. 
• Points out the efforts to obtain information exchange had not been fruitful.  Members could work on a list of 
examples of measures.  However, such examples should be submitted on a voluntary basis.  For example, Chile 
could provide information on subsidies which affected its private sector, without identifying the Member 
providing the subsidy. 
• Recalls members to respond to the questionnaire on subsidies prepared by the Secretariat. 
• Suggests Members could, on a voluntary basis, provide information on subsidies that they themselves were 
providing or on the subsidies provided by others that affected their service suppliers. 
Hong Kong, 
China 
• Agrees that a definition of subsidies is needed, but emphasized that agreeing on such a definition should not 
be a pre-condition for proceeding with the information exchange. 
• Clarifies that they were not envisaging an explicit listing of entities and agreed with Poland that this would be 
a difficult exercise. 
• Recalls the importance of fulfilling the mandate to provide information on all subsidies related to trade in 
services. 
• Asks why many Members were not able to provide such information based on their own definition.  
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• Stresses that the purpose of information exchange was not to target the practices of certain Members, but to 
evaluate the scale and types of subsidies in existence. 
• Expresses support for Chile’s proposal and suggests Working Party should remain open to other sources on 
subsidies. 
• Stresses that the information would be provided on a voluntary basis and that it should be up to Members to 
draw from their own and preferred sources of information. 
• Does not agree that discriminatory subsidies would be outside the scope of Article XV simply because they 
would be subject to scheduling under Article XVII. The concept of discriminatory subsidies was not entirely 
clear in the context of export subsidies. 
United States • Is interested in considering whether it was possible or desirable to develop rules to govern these various 
instruments. 
• Considers Poland’s contribution a useful basis.  In particular, to whom the subsidy was granted. 
• Asks why Article I:3(c) would not be adequate in that regard and expresses interest in hearing more from 
other delegations on this issue. 
• Considers it is important to address the question of scope and definition of services subsidies because this 
would help to define the type of information to put in a list of examples. 
Argentina • Does not foresee significant difficulties in coming to an agreement on a definition for subsidy, especially for 
purpose of the exchange of information. 
Colombia • Agrees that similarities existed between the elements of a definition identified in the contributions from 
Poland, Argentina, and Hong Kong, China. 
• Thinks Secretariat should explore more with some international agreements, such as OECD, the World Bank, 
on related information. 
• Contemplates whether Secretariat could analyze the notification made by Members. 
Australia 
 
• Considers that one of the problems with using the SCMA definition was that the principle of territoriality 
could not be applied directly to a service. 
• Considers the contributions from Argentina and Hong Kong alluded to possible ramifications of subsidy 
disciplines for public services, education, health and related social services. However, due to GATS Article 
I:3(b), these activities should not be an issue.  Still, such sensitivities should be kept in mind for developing 
countries. 
• Agrees that not all subsidies were trade-distorting, therefore, the definition of measures should be limited to 
those that actually distorted trade in services. 
• Suggests that services had to be treated differently given the importance of regulatory structures and public 
services. 
Cuba 
 
• Emphasizes the need to look into other possible sources of information, such as UNCTAD and the OECD. 
Switzerland 
 
• Agrees that the work on the definition of subsidies and the exchange of information could very be well 
carried out simultaneously. 
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• Asks whether those Members that had scheduled limitations regarding subsidies could elaborate on the scope 
of such limitations. 
Brazil 
 
 
 
• Contemplates whether Members would agree, and whether the Secretariat  would think it possible, to prepare 
a note on subsidy disciplines pertaining to services contained in RTAs reported under Article V of the GATS. 
• Confirms that UNCTAD, after having finished its study, was invited not only to circulate but also to present 
the study in this Working Party. 
Indonesia  
 
• Thinks that some more work could be done so as to further clarify and crystallize agreement.  Propose that 
Members should spell out more explicitly areas of agreement would be helpful in that regard. 
Republic of 
Korea 
 
 
 
• Considers it useful to exchange views on subsidies, including those that might be trade distortive, although 
this should not prejudge any position. 
• Welcomes the suggestion by Chile and thought it was important to maintain the anonymity of the source of 
the subsidy. 
• Is open to discuss classification suggestions, including legitimate policy objectives such as environment or 
cultural protection or restructuring of domestic services industries. 
• Thinks the GATS Article I:3 already provided answers with regard to who was granting the subsidies.   
• Considers the definition found in the SCMA was sufficient, excluding any regulatory measures. However, 
they had doubts about income and price support. 
• Suggests that rather than determining beforehand what might be trade distortive, it would be preferable to 
concentrate on basic issues such as the definition of subsidies and information sharing. 
Thailand • Considers it useful to further discuss the definition of subsidies and emphasize that there was a clear mandate 
in the GATS to develop disciplines on subsidies. 
• Acknowledges that the SCMA could provide a very useful starting point for the definition of subsidy in 
services. 
Singapore 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Indicates that it was important to be clear about what Article XV did not cover.  In this regard, discriminatory 
subsidies were governed by the national treatment obligation, and they were consequently not covered by 
Article XV.  Also, subsidies granted in the context of services supplied in the exercise of governmental 
authority would fall outside the scope of Article XV.  One would also expect subsidies granted to achieve such 
legitimate objectives to be carved-out from Article XV. 
• Considers that the SCMA might not be readily applicable in a GATS context. 
• Refers to implicit subsidies, which some might associate with certain regulations or lack thereof.  Did not 
think that the SCMA covered such subsidies nor that GATS disciplines should do so. 
Mauritius 
 
• Thinks the issue needs to be approached with caution and that the work to be undertaken by the Secretariat 
should be factual rather than analytical. 
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S/WPGR/M/45 
18 December 200359 
Chile 
 
 
 
 
 
• Believes that even in the present occasion, there is no need yet to discuss subsidies relating to air transport 
and maritime transport services, but it seemed important to discuss them in the future. 
• Thanks delegations for their comments on the communication. And underscores that its delegation did not 
want to limit the list of examples to those that were most clearly distortive, such as export subsidies. 
• Raises the point concerning the subsidies available to foreign suppliers having established a commercial 
presence in the territory, pursuant to Mode 3.  Thinks this also needed to be carefully considered.  Such 
subsidies might have a trade-distortive effect when the recipients supplied services outside the territory of the 
Member granting the subsidy. 
Hong Kong, 
China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Observes that a significant number of economic integration agreements had been reported since the previous 
Secretariat Note on the subject, over half of which contained disciplines on subsidies in services sectors.  It 
would be useful if those Members that were parties to the agreements could. 
(1) explain what was the motivation or intention for including subsidy disciplines in the agreements; 
(2) elaborate on the coverage of these disciplines, as many may seemed to apply to both services and goods. 
(3) explain how they operationalize them, including how they address the issue of definition of subsidy and 
how they determine the appropriate criteria for invoking such disciplines. 
• Interested to see how the Chile’s examples would be treated under the subsidy disciplines of economic 
integration agreements referred to. 
• Thinks it might be important to discuss other types of subsidies that were, by their nature, less trade distortive 
and could, because they related to public policy objectives, be regarded as tolerable or non-actionable. 
Discussions on both types of subsidies could take place contemporaneously. 
• Considers the question of whether certain areas or forms of government support should be considered as non-
actionable under any disciplines to be developed. Believes that similar considerations would apply to the 
example listed by Chile pertaining to scientific research and technology transfers. 
• Invites other delegations to come forward with additional anonymous examples so as to highlight the types of 
subsidy programs in existence and the types of problems they might cause. 
India • Gives concerns for cases where a subsidy targeted a service embodied in a physical good, and whether this 
would be considered as a subsidy relating to a good or a service, especially in light of the examples given for 
tourism.  
United States • Thinks it might be easier if Members had put forward their own subsidy programs as examples. 
• Thinks that while the absence of a definition of subsidy did not necessarily mean other elements of Article 
XV needed to be sidestepped, a piecemeal approach might be more appropriate. 
Brazil • Thinks the communication from Chile represents a useful way to focus discussions.   
Canada  
 
 
 
• Notes that the range of examples provided by the delegation of Chile underlined the difficulties in defining 
what a subsidy in the service trade was. Tries to decide which subsidies were distorting and determines that to 
discipline them would be a significant challenge. 
• Considers whether certain subsidy programs had distortive effects.  It is important to determine the extent to 
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 which existing GATS obligations, especially national treatment, could help in addressing potential effects of 
subsidies. 
Japan 
 
 
 
• Believes that Chile’s examples were helpful and encourages other Members to provide additional real, but 
anonymous examples.   
• Points out the question that under GATS, how would Members address issues arising from subsidies to a 
specific service sector when the levels of commitments for such a sector varied across the membership. 
New Zealand 
 
 
• Considers Chile’s communication to be useful and believes that limited inferences could be drawn from the 
treatment of subsidies in the goods context. 
• Supports Hong Kong, China’s call for participation of a greater number of delegations, including in the 
information exchange and the discussion of the examples put forward by Chile. 
• Notes that the Protocol on Trade in Services of the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade 
Agreement created substantially free trade and investment conditions in services between the two countries on 
a negative list basis with very few exceptions.  Does not recall that trade distortive subsidies had been identified 
in the field of services. 
Switzerland  • Believes that the communication by Chile constituted a very good contribution to the work of the Working 
Party. 
• Highlights that it is sensible to discuss the issue of definition contemporaneously with the examination of 
substantive issues such as those suggested in the communication from Chile. 
• Hopes to solve the chicken-and-egg dilemma, which had prevented progress in the past. 
Australia • States that it is possible to consider subsidy rules for services in a manner which might parallel and be based 
on rules already applying to subsidies in goods. 
Chinese Taipei  
 
 
 
• Considers that the paper from Chile was helpful in facilitating the discussions of the Working Party. 
• Observes that subsidies granted to service providers were sometimes associated with goods and could thus be 
governed by the SCMA. 
• Thinks that all established suppliers could benefit from the subsidy in the examples of the infrastructure 
program. It might be therefore be difficult to identify trade-distortive effects. 
S/WPGR/M/50 
17 January 200560 
Chile • Wishes to provide some information on domestic support programs relating to services.  Reiterates that the 
primary objective of the delegation in this area was to increase transparency so as to comply with the mandate 
in Article XV and paragraph 7 of the Guidelines and procedures for the Negotiations on Trade in Services. 
• Wishes to mention some activities that received government support in Chile. The three programs concerned 
fulfilled public policy goals and did not distort trade.  Here are the three examples: 
a. Development Fund for Telecommunications, enshrined in Law 18.168 (General Telecommunication Law) 
b. The program of Rural Electrification for Poor Families 1994 
c. In the area of maritime transportation 
United States • Recognizes the concerns expressed by some delegations regarding the information exchange, as well as fears 
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of getting bogged down in definitional issues. 
• Notes that one way of approaching the analysis could be to explore a few services sectors and consider how 
the definition of subsidy contained in the SCMA might apply.  Those questions include, would government 
support of health care and education to be captured in this definition? What about subsidies that supported mass 
transit or those underpinning universal access to telecommunications, electric power or postal services? How 
would the specificity test in the SCMA affect the scope of services subsidies that could be captured by a 
definition? Because the SCMA had been negotiated in the context of trade in goods, it should not necessarily be 
assumed that its definition would be entirely appropriate for services. 
• States that another question to consider is whether any aspects of the SCMA definition need to be adapted to 
better correspond to the context of trade in services. 
• Agrees that it is important to keep in mind the ideas expressed in the past on the issue of the definition of 
subsidy so as to not repeat the same discussion. 
Singapore • Recalls that the SCMA definition could serve as a starting point for such discussions as it had already argued 
in the Working Party in the past.  The Secretariat had also done a useful background paper in 1996, 
S/WPGR/W/9.  It might be useful to revisit this and discuss how such concepts as the “existence of a financial 
contribution”, “government or any public body”, “any form of income or price support”, or the “conferral of a 
benefit to the supplier,” which were used in the SCMA, could apply in the services context. 
• Considers the following issues: 
(1) Would disciplines resulting from the negotiations under Article VI:4 be sufficient to address issues relating 
to regulatory measures? 
(2) Should the WPGR avoid creating overlapping disciplines relating to such measures? 
(3) While the term “benefit” was not defined in the SCMA, it had been discussed and clarified in the 
jurisprudence. For instance, the Appellate Body had clarified that a “benefit to the recipient” meant that the 
recipient must be a natural or legal person. 
• Contemplates whether it would be appropriate for the Working Party to consider such jurisprudence even if it 
did not relate to trade in services. 
• Stresses that the statistical and measurement difficulties in services trade had to be recognized as work 
proceeded in the negotiations, even if such difficulties should be no reason to ignore the mandate in Article XV. 
• Considers that other provisions in the GATS, in addition to Article VI, VIII, IX, might also address certain 
aspects of subsidies.  Believes that national treatment and Article XXIII:3 might be also relevant.  
Hong Kong, 
China 
• Contemplates whether distinctions could be made between domestic and foreign services on the basis of 
particular modes of supply.  Also wonders how the issue of public policy objectives should be treated in the 
development of disciplines.  Could certain subsidies granted in pursuance of some public policy objectives, 
possibly in certain specific sectors, be defined as tolerated or non-actionable even if they had certain trade 
distortive effects? 
• Looks forward to the upcoming contribution from the United States and agrees that it would be useful to 
examine a few services sectors.  Concurs that the SCMA definition provided a useful starting point for the 
purpose of comparison. 
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• Thinks that no delegation disputed that the information exchange had to be done.  However, the issue of how 
to carry it out remained. 
Switzerland • Recalls that Article XV contained a clear legal obligation to exchange information concerning all subsidies 
related to trade in services.  This obligation existed since 1994 and its fulfillment is, therefore, long overdue. 
• Supports the idea to set up a timeframe for negotiations, and to have the Secretariat prepare a composite note 
on issues to be considered for a definition of subsidy. 
Canada  
 
 
• Thinks that there had not been many substantive comments on the issue of definition; this could not, however, 
be seen as implying any kind of agreement on definition.  The Note should be allowed to be updated to 
incorporate any further comments. 
European 
Communities 
 
 
• Notes that the Chairperson had in the past produced a checklist of issues which touched upon the definition of 
subsidy.  A possibility might be to update that document. 
• Cautions that most of the interventions on the definition of subsidy were limited to raising questions, rather 
than providing answers. 
S/WPGR/M/51 
18 March 200561 
United States • Recognizes the obligation to exchange information concerning all subsidies relating to trade in services 
provided to domestic suppliers, and this is not tantamount to having to provide all possible information in 
advance of the negotiations. 
• Concerned that the submission of a large amount of information in an unfocused manner could create a 
significant burden without yielding useful results.  It would slow down work and be counterproductive for 
those having particular interests in these negotiations. 
• Suggests the Working Party might thus want to discuss which sectors could provide a useful starting point.  
Tourism could be considered because this was a sector if importance to a wide range of Members, although did 
not want to preclude other sectors. 
• Notes that many of the suggestions put forward seemed to be more about defining what a subsidy was not.  
Wonders whether it could be inferred from the synthesis that Members were not foreseeing any particular type 
of subsidy as problematic.  It would be good to have a better idea of the types of subsidies that Members 
thought should be disciplined, so as to get a sense of their prevalence.  This would help to determine the nature 
of the problem at hand, which in turn would help in crafting an appropriate definition. 
• Contemplates whether there were any particular types of subsidies that actually presented a significant 
problem in the services context.  Consequently, it seems more prudent to use a broad definition, at least from 
the outset. 
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Hong Kong, 
China 
• Contemplates whether the sector of tourism had particular problems with subsidies as compared to other 
sectors such as transport or construction.  Does not think that agreement of all delegations on a sector was 
needed before proceeding further; it could be left to individual Members to choose the sectors they thought 
would be useful for the purpose of information exchange. 
• Suggests that it was now time to act upon the information exchange rather than talk about it. 
Japan 
 
• Considers it was useful to narrow the scope of the information exchange by focusing on certain sectors.  
However, the delegation was not convinced by the choice of the tourism sector.  Considers that tourism was in 
certain regards quite different from other sectors, where the main focus was on how to supply services abroad. 
Thailand 
 
 
• Thinks that the suggestion to focus on relevant sectors was useful. Does not mind starting with tourism, 
although exploring subsidy schemes in infrastructural services such as telecommunications or transport could 
also be quite relevant. 
Pakistan 
 
• Welcomes efforts by the United States to suggest paths towards a constructive information exchange. 
• Supports the proposal to invite UNCTAD to present its study in services subsidies. 
Chinese Taipei 
 
 
• Asks whether the United States wished to develop a provisional definition of subsidy before proceeding with 
the information exchange or, alternatively, develop a definition on the basis of the information gathered on a 
sectoral basis. 
• Makes some comments on the Singapore communication: 
(1) The notion of price or income support should be included in a definition of subsidy in services so as to 
cover all relevant situations. 
(2) Subsidy-like effects of regulatory measures should not form part of a definition, but be covered by other 
provisions of the GATS. 
(3) On the basis of benefits, inadequate statistics, as well as the complexity associated with multiple modes of 
supply, made the measurement of benefits conferred on recipients particularly challenging. 
Republic of 
Korea 
 
• Sympathizes with concerns that too broad a definition might make the information process too burdensome; 
the SCMA definition constituted a good basis. 
• Agrees with idea to focus on tourism at first then moves to other sectors. 
Chile • Supports Hong Kong, China’s determination that Article XV contained an obligation to provide information 
on all subsidies.  While agreement on a provisional definition might be useful, this was not a prerequisite for 
exchanging information. 
• Thinks other sectors like construction or transport might be more relevant. 
• Wishes to make several comments with regard to the Singapore’s communication: 
(1) Thinks that the various elements forming a financial contribution in the SCMA would also capture the 
reality of service. 
(2) Does not think that there was a direct relationship between negotiations under Article XV and those under 
Article VI:4. 
(3) Hopes that Singapore could elaborate more on the term “benefit,” and possibly provide some concrete 
examples. 
(4) Thinks it would be appropriate to consider the “traffic-light” approach in the context of services. 
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Switzerland • Regarding the Article XV mandate, notes that it was up to each Member to decide how it wanted to fulfill that 
mandate.  Members do not have to proceed in the same manner. 
• Thinks that the subsidy definition used in the SCMA provided a good basis for work on subsidy disciplines in 
services. 
India • Asks about the choice of tourism as a focal sector and asks if the United States considers that it caused 
particular trade-related problems. 
• Notes that the suggestion to focus on subsidies directly linked to exports might be a useful starting point. 
Colombia • Believes that the mandated information exchange concerned all subsidies, not solely some of them. 
• Thinks that distortive effects were much more significant concerning the proposal to start with tourism. 
Singapore • Says that even though the Working Party had discussed this topic for the last 10 years, little progress had been 
made.  Its communication raised a number of questions that were relevant to the discussion, but did not aim to 
provide answers. 
Indonesia 
 
 
• Agrees with the United States that the scope of the information exchange might need to be narrowed by 
focusing on selected sectors, which needed to be chosen with care. 
• Thinks a suitable timeframe for developing countries is needed.  
Canada 
 
 
 
• Believes that there is no guarantee, even with a provisional definition, that Members would rush to provide 
information. 
• Suggests it would be useful if Members that had been adversely affected could come up with specific sectoral 
examples. 
Australia • Notes that these negotiations involved complex technical issues. 
• Agrees that Members needed to arrive at a provisional definition of subsidy, for which the SCMA provided a 
good starting point. 
• Supports the suggestion to start with the tourism sector, as this was a sector of interest to a wide range of 
Members. Such a sectoral discussion should be of a generic nature rather than Member-specific. 
European 
Communities 
• Reiterates that the best way to obtain information for the negotiations would be for those Members that 
considered themselves adversely affected by subsidies of others to share their experience in that regard. 
South Africa • Suggests that it was more important to have disciplines on subsidies that had a trade-distortive effect than 
trying to examine a large amount of subsidies that might not be useful for the Working Party’s purpose at this 
juncture. 
Mexico 
 
 
• Believes that the mandate on information exchange contained in Article XV was clear. It concerned all 
subsidies.  Thinks that the suggestion to develop a provisional definition might facilitate the exchange of 
information, but it should not prejudge the final outcome of disciplines to be developed. 
• Thinks it might be best to start with sectors other than tourism. 
• Believes that Article XV:2 was independent from Article XV:1 and is not a substitute for the information 
exchange foreseen concerning the intervention by the European Communities. 
China • Thinks US suggestion might be a practical way forward.  However, further consideration was needed.  
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S/WPGR/M/5762 Hong Kong, 
China 
 
 
 
• Thinks that this might link up with the parallel track of discussion in the Working Party on the question of 
definition of subsidy concerning concerns about how the information gathered would be used. 
• Hopes that the Secretariat Note could provide incentives for Members to be forthcoming and take this area of 
the negotiations forward. 
• Notes that in past discussions some Members had expressed an interest in looking at what might be 
permissible subsidies. 
Switzerland • Observes that no definition was necessary to collect and exchange information because Table 1 (in the 
Secretariat Note) highlighted that Members tend to grant subsidies in many sectors.  These constituted a good 
basis for those Members that had not yet fulfilled their obligations of information exchange. 
• Encourages Members to provide greater information and relevant information on subsidies in five sectors. 
Canada • Thinks that delegation needed to focus on government assistance to trade in services, and not simply 
government assistance to services sectors generally. 
• Demandeurs should be able to demonstrate if they had been adversely affected by subsidies to trade in 
services that might exist. 
Mexico • Wishes to highlight that the communication should not be seen as a negotiating proposal, but rather as a tool 
to stimulate a substantive discussion between delegations. 
United States • Believes that communication might be premature. It asks many important questions but the delegation did not 
have answers for many of them. 
• Asks whether the issues raised by the sponsors were exhaustive or merely illustrative. 
• Thinks that it is not clear that there was even the beginning of an agreement among Members as to the nature 
of any possible multilateral disciplines in this area or on the definition of a service subsidy. 
• Discusses whether subsidies needed to be in a green or red category; it was necessary to understand the nature 
of the disciplines from which these would be included or excluded. 
S/WPGR/M/5863 Switzerland  
 
 
• Wishes to share some views on what constitutes permissible/non-actionable subsidies. 
• Wishes to recall the delegation’s views on export subsidies.  Such measures distort competition and put in 
question market access commitments.  Wishes to continue work on both these aspects. 
China 
 
 
• Believes that some of the government activities mentioned in the Secretariat Note might not be considered as 
subsidies. 
• States that the word “subsidies” in the title of the Note should, therefore, be qualified by quotation marks 
since there is no definition on subsidies yet. 
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S/WPGR/M/5964 
 
 
 
 
 
United States 
 
 
 
 
• Asks how Members could possibly analyze whether any particular action should be a green-lighted subsidy if 
the nature of the disciplines from which they were being exempted was unknown. 
• Thinks that the communication raises interesting issues, but the discussion was premature. 
• Says that the delegation would have reservation about inviting an outside speaker to address the Working 
Party.  This might be done in seminars, but not in the current context. 
Thailand • Notes that UNCTAD had done research on subsidies in the last years and proposed to have an UNCTAD 
representative make a presentation at the next meeting. China supported this proposal. 
Mexico • Notes that the delegation had significant interest in further discussions on the topic of subsidies. 
India 
 
• Thinks it seems premature to get into substantive discussions at this stage since papers for both subsidies and 
ESM are forthcoming. 
S/WPRG/M/6065 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mauritius • Notes that they had relied on research from only two organizations.  This is insufficient as even in research 
there might be an element of bias depending on which organization has conducted the work. 
• Encourages UNCTAD to look specifically at how subsidies were used in developing countries as well as how 
special and differential treatment could be ushered in for the interest of developing countries. 
Hong Kong, 
China 
 
• Finds the work conducted by UNCTAD to be comprehensive and useful for discussions in the WPGR. 
• Proposes that the analysis has also illustrated how certain domestic policy objectives, such as for 
development, environmental protection or rescue situations, might merit the use of subsidies. 
Mexico 
 
• Finds the presentation to be comprehensive and noted the importance of highlighting the relationship between 
the trade-distorting effects of some subsidies and development objectives. 
• Asks for further details on the empirical work envisaged by UNCTAD in his area. 
United States 
 
 
 
• Notes that the individually authored papers did not represent UNCTAD’s view of the issue o that of the 
UNCTAD Secretariat.  
• Believes the issue goes beyond academic interest and would need to be discussed and defined in more precise 
terms since subsidies have been mandated for negotiations by WTO Members. 
• Notes that the papers would inform thinking on the issue and appreciates that it had been brought to the 
general attention of the WPGR. 
China 
 
 
• Finds the main findings and research methodologies to be very useful. 
• Observes that distinguishing between goods and services subsidies was particularly difficult. This is the one 
of the problems that would need to be addressed. 
European 
Community 
• Notes that, while the delegation appreciated the academic value of the work, it is not certain that it could be 
used in the discussions in the WPGR. 
• Thinks that it would be useful to focus future work on subsidies to services suppliers meeting the selective 
criteria. 
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S/WPRG/M/6266 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hong Kong, 
China 
• Notes that efforts had been made by the delegation to facilitate discussions in this area. 
• Proposes that it might be helpful if the OECD, which had also undertaken some research in the area of 
subsidies in services, could be invited to present their work. 
• Notes that the Secretariat (note?) on subsidy disciplines relating to trade in services in economic integration 
agreements could be updated. 
European 
Communities 
• Supports the proposal by Hong Kong, China to invite the OECD. 
United States • Requests further information on the study so as to see if it would be a useful and acceptable addition to the 
Working Party’s discussion. 
China • Supports the proposal to invite the OECD to present its study on subsidies to the Working Party.  
S/WPGR/M/6367 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Switzerland 
 
 
 
• Notes that OECD presentation demonstrated that it was possible to collect information on subsidies, 
especially on export subsidies. 
• Notes that the definition of subsidy contained in the SCMA could serve as a provisional working definition 
for the information exchange mandate in Article XV. 
Hong Kong, 
China 
 
 
• Agrees with Switzerland that the SCMA can serve as a possible reference for further deliberation on the 
possible definition of subsidy. 
• States that, in the delegation’s view, the current global financial crisis may give rise to even more examples of 
subsidies in services. 
China • Highlights that in reality, some subsidies may be directed at achieving other policies. 
• Highlights that the report indicated that mode 1 and 2 are perhaps the most relevant for identifying export 
subsidies.  However, believes that in mode 3, information is insufficient. Mode 3 accounts for the major 
proportion of world trade in services, and in the view of the delegation, subsidies granted under this mode 
should be reviewed in the future. 
Brazil 
 
 
• Highlights that the OECD study identified export subsidies but did not deal with their economic impact on 
services exports. 
• Notes that when the program was discussed at the OECD, a number of methodological problems had arisen 
on how to measure trade barriers in services. 
Pakistan • Notes the difficulties with defining subsidies in services, especially in terms of modes 2, 3, and 4. 
India • Stresses the importance of starting serious discussions on subsidy disciplines, commencing with the mandated 
information exchange. 
S/WPRG/M/6468 
 
Korea • Emphasizes the importance of Article XV negotiations as many governments face economic difficulties with 
increasing and unregulated use of subsidies in services. 
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Hong Kong, 
China 
• Concurs with the Chairman on moving beyond a conceptual discussion of a definition for subsidies and to 
examine some practical effects in a specific manner. 
• Believes that the provisional definition that it provided a few years ago could still be relevant and would 
welcome any efforts from other delegates. 
Mexico • Notes that it had co-sponsored proposals on this subject and encouraged Members to reinitiate discussions on 
the definition of subsidies as well as possible trade-distortive effects. 
Colombia • Notes the OECD’s further work may shed more light on the relevant criteria and elements for a provisional 
definition of subsidies in services. 
India • Supports Hong Kong, China’s intervention on the need to reinitiate discussions by focusing on trade-
distortive effects and in this connection, a provisional definition of subsidies. 
• Urges Members that had been calling for disciplines on subsidies in services, similar to those in the goods 
area, to come forward and support discussions in the Working Party. 
S/WPRG/M/6569 Switzerland • Makes a distinction between the exchange of information and the development of disciplines to avoid the 
trade-distortive effects of subsidies in services. 
• Feels regrettable that information exchange was not being fulfilled by Members. 
• Highlights that in the case of export subsidies, the nature of the distortion was inherent to the measure.  It is 
clear to Switzerland that since these subsidies are aimed at creating distortion there should be disciplines on 
their use. 
• Refers to Switzerland’s proposal submitted years ago, and points out the idea has not been rejected by any 
delegation.  Some delegations had, at that time, said that it was not a problem as they did not have export 
subsidies.  However, should this be the case, it would be easier to agree that such subsidies will never be used. 
• Suggests that by focusing on export subsidies, questions on the nature of the distortion and the definition of 
subsidies become irrelevant, since a prohibition would cover all such practices, whatever definitions are used. 
• Proposes the distortion is built-in since the very aim of the measure is to distort. 
Mexico • Believes that the definition submitted in its previous proposal with Hong Kong, China could provide a good 
basis for the exchange of information and for further technical discussion. 
• Urges other Members to comment on the proposals that were on the table, and referred specifically to the 
communication from Hong Kong, China and Mexico. 
Hong Kong, 
China 
• Feels that there has been a lack of interest in the subsidy negotiations. 
• Clarifies that the five sectors would be self-selected. The idea was to limit the information exchange exercise 
so as to encourage greater participation. 
Pakistan • Notes that while it concurred that export subsidies should be disciplined, it would be even more important to 
have an agreed definition on measures that would fall under the scope of such disciplines. 
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United States • Notes that on some issues there had either been a lack of engagement or interest. 
• Feels that there had been a lack of interest from some of the most important players in this particular 
discussion. 
• Points out that there have been proposals explaining which type of subsidy programs would not be subject to 
disciplines, but no indication had been given of the disciplines to which subsidies would be subjected. 
• Underscores that the lack of interest did not mean that subsidies did not exist but that they do not seem to be 
causing significant trade effects. 
• Reminds delegation that WTO Members are meant to address significant trade problems and not to discuss 
hypothetical problems. 
• Observes that there has been very little discussion on what distortive effects are produced by subsidies. There 
has not been any empirical evidence that subsidies in services are trade-distorting. 
• Believes that a definition of export subsidies would be relevant to identifying distortions.  
India  • Recalls that the distorting effects of subsidies on trade in services had been recognized by all Members 
• Considers Members should be moving forward rather than backward in their discussions since both the 
concept of distortion and the need to negotiate disciplines has already been settled. 
• Disagrees with the suggestion that since the private sector had not complained, a problem did not exist.  It is 
pointed out that there are similarly no complaints in respect to market access in a number of sectors but 
Members are still discussing the matter. 
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It is good to hear from many voices around the world, but it can sometimes also produce 
an overwhelming loss of focus.  Everyone knows it is difficult to build a perfect law, let alone 
have over 100 countries agree on this law.  Some Members are cautious about the notion that too 
many questions have been asked, but no action has been taken.  The EU cautioned that most of 
the interventions on the definition of subsidy were limited to raising questions, rather than 
providing answers.70  The US expressed concern that the submission of too much information in 
an unfocused manner could create a significant burden without yielding useful results.71 
A review of Members’ discussions and submissions raises both useful questions and 
suggestions.  I turn now to addressing both in the context of the system that may be possible.   
C.  THE NEED TO HAVE A SPECIFIC SYSTEM FOR SUBSIDIES IN SERVICES 
After establishing the importance of regulating service subsidies, the next question is: how are 
we going to carry out a legal mechanism to manage service subsidies?  Do we need a distinct 
rule to cover this?  Or can we simply apply the existing rules on subsidies, including those found 
in the SCM Agreement and AoA, and integrate them into the service area?  I believe the 
foremost question to be whether there is any situation where service subsidies cannot be resolved 
by applying the current GATT subsidy rules. 
                                                 
70 Working Party on GATS Rules, supra note 63, at para. 27. 
71 Working Party on GATS Rules, supra note 70, at para. 4. 
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1.  Why Not Just Apply the SCM Agreement to Regulate Subsidies In Services? 
Because of the development of societies and technologies, many laws today need to change in 
order to consider and adapt to these developments.  Take cyber laws, for instance. Cyber law has 
adopted many concepts from existing contract rules in determining when and how an online 
transaction can be formed.72 
The SCM Agreement currently is the most commonly-used legal mechanism for dealing 
with subsidies.  For this reason, people may ask why we should not just apply the SCM 
Agreement to service subsidies.  I am not proposing that the principles embodied in the SCM 
Agreement are not applicable to the service subsidies.  Instead, my point is that applying the 
SCM Agreement directly to service subsidies is not appropriate.  The following discussion will 
explain why simply applying the whole SCM Agreement to services does not work. 
a.  Differences between Goods and Services  Before the GATS, Members presented a way to 
incorporate trade in services into the existing rules on trade in goods73—to incorporate service 
regulations into GATT.  This idea was discussed when thoughts of regulating trade in services 
first appeared.  There was even a proposal to change the framework of GATT so as to cover 
                                                 
72 See generally Juliet M. Moringiello and William L. Reynolds II, Survey of the Law of Cyberspace: Electronic 
Contracting Cases 2006-2007, Business Lawyer, Vol. 63, p. 219, 2007, available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1438&context=fac_pubs&sei-
redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Fsearch%3Fgcx%3Dc%26sourceid%3Dchrome%26ie%3D
UTF-8%26q%3DRichard%2BD.%2BDiamond%23sclient%3Dpsy-
ab%26hl%3Den%26source%3Dhp%26q%3Dsurvey%2Bof%2Bthe%2Blaw%2Bof%2Bcyberspace%3A%2Bcase%
2B2006-
2007%26pbx%3D1%26oq%3Dsurvey%2Bof%2Bthe%2Blaw%2Bof%2Bcyberspace%3A%2Bcase%2B2006-
2007%26aq%3Df%26aqi%3D%26aql%3D1%26gs_sm%3De%26gs_upl%3D30324l33516l0l33764l15l14l0l0l0l0l2
24l2006l3.9.2l14l0%26bav%3Don.2%2Cor.r_gc.r_pw.%2Ccf.osb%26fp%3D4d90baad82b9465%26biw%3D1366%
26bih%3D643#search=%22Richard%20D.%20Diamond%22.  See also Saami Zain, Regulation Of E-Commerce By 
Contract: Is It Fair To Consumers?, 31 U. West. L.A. L. Rev. 163 (2000). 
73 WTO LAW – FROM A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE, 284-285 (Birgitte Egelund Olsen ed., 2006). 
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“goods and services” rather than just “goods.”74  However, this proposition was rejected.75  The 
differences between trade in goods and trade in services are so significant that it is impossible to 
regulate them together through just one single agreement, for the following reasons: 
(1) The most significant reason is that services are intangible, perishable and non-
storable.76  Also, services are simultaneously provided and consumed. 
(2) There are several modes of supply of services, which is not the case for trade in 
goods.77  For example, if a Taiwanese programmer received a subsidy from the 
Taiwan government, and then he traveled to the US to provide his services, then 
he, himself, is a provider of services. 
(3) International trade in services often requires the movement of one or more of the 
factors of production.78 
(4) National regulations for trade in services are more extensive and diverse than 
those for trade in goods.79 
(5) The atypical role of “territory” in production of services is a distinctive element. 
In subsidy examples involving trade in services, the benefit conferred by a 
                                                 
74 Id. at 285. 
75 Id. 
76 Aly K. Abu-Akeel, Definition Of Trade In Services Under The Gats: Legal Implications, 32 GW J. Int’l L. & Econ. 
189, 2 (1999).  See also Phedon Nicolaides, Economic Aspects of Services: Implications for a GATT Agreement, 23 J. 
World Trade 125, 126 (1989) (it includes the discussion on difference in goods and services.). 
77 Abu-Akeel, supra note 84. (The author suggests to see Gary P. Sampson & Richard H. Snape, Identifying the 
Issues in Trade in Services, 8 World Economy 172, 172-75 (1985) for the discussion on the classification of 
international transactions in services based on the proximity of supplier and consumer.). 
78 Id. at footnote 10.  (“The fact that trade in services would usually require movement of capital and/or labor was 
always recognized, and it accounted for GATT’s reluctance to expand into the services area, as it would involve 
investment issues, an area traditionally beyond the reach of the GATT.”) 
79 Id. at footnote 11.  (“A classification of barriers by country/sector to international trade in services can be found in 
UNCTAD & World Bank Study, supra note 2, at 20-24. It is evident from this study that most barriers are not 
designed to restrict trade in services but merely to regulate the service sectors in the national economy. They are 
nevertheless perceived as having the effect of discouraging entry into the local market by foreign services suppliers. 
See Joel P. Trachtman, Trade in Financial Services Under GATS, NAFTA, and the EC: A Regulatory Jurisdiction 
Analysis, 34 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 37, 46 (1995).”). 
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subsidy to a service firm is not necessarily confined to the territory of the 
government providing the subsidy.80 
b.  Differences between the GATT and the GATS  One difficult conceptual question about the 
negotiation on services is whether the well-established and well-known principles regarding 
trade in goods apply by analogy to trade in services.  The GATS architecture is very different 
from the GATT in ways that affect the ability of governments to grant subsidies, hence the 
refusal of GATS negotiations to simply transpose GATT subsidy rules to services.81 
These differences include the MFN treatment and NT principles, and the concept of 
market access through scheduled concessions that are reciprocally negotiated. 
The Most-Favoured-Nation Principle in the GATT and the GATSArticle II(1) of GATS 
provides that, “[w]ith respect to any measure covered by this Agreement, each Member should 
accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other Member 
treatment no less favourable than that it accords to like services and service suppliers of any 
other country.” 
The same principle is found in GATT Article I: 
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on … any 
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any 
product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for 
the territories of all other contracting parties. (emphasis added) 
 
The main difference between the MFN obligation in the GATT and the MFN obligation in the 
GATS is its applicability in subsidy issues.  The GATT regulates trade in goods, and its MFN 
                                                 
80 Benitah, supra note 10, at 14. 
81 European Service Network Policy Committee, European Services Network Preliminary Views On Subsidies In 
Services: Final Version, June 25, 1999, at 1, available at http://www.esf.be/new/wp-
content/uploads/2009/06/subsidie.pdf. 
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principle is designed to control members’ border measures, such as customs tariffs or quotas.82  
Thus, the MFN principle in the GATT does not apply to measures affecting the process of 
production of goods within a Member’s territory, such as subsidies.83  The situation in the GATS 
is different because the MFN principle in the GATS applies to any measure “affecting trade in 
services.”  Thus, the MFN obligation is applicable whenever a service subsidy is granted on a 
discriminatory basis.84 
As such, the MFN principle is applicable as long as Country A grants subsidies to service 
providers from Country B, instead of Country C.  It is possible, however, that a Member State 
may still decide not to grant a subsidy within its territory to foreign service suppliers.  In this 
situation, there is no application of the MFN principle. 
National Treatment in the GATT and the GATS 
The NT principle adopted in the GATS is also different from the one included in the 
GATT.  The NT principle of the GATT is stated as follows: 
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of 
any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than 
that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations 
and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
transportation, distribution or use.  The provisions of this paragraph shall not 
prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges which are 
based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on 
the nationality of the product.85 
 
The GATS NT principle provides that, 
In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any conditions and 
qualifications set out therein, each Member should accord to services and service 
suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of 
                                                 
82 Olsen, supra note 81, at 281. 
83 Benitah, supra note 10, at 8. 
84 Id. 
85 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1A, 1999, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT], art. III (4). 
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services, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own like services 
and service suppliers.86 (emphasis added). 
 
Thus, the NT principle in the GATS not only regulates the service itself, but also the 
service supplier.  However, such a principle can be applicable only if Members agree to be 
bound in that sector in their schedules. 
Apparently, employing the NT principle as a restriction on Members’ domestic subsidies 
is efficient since the NT principle requires that members accord the same treatment to foreign 
services and service suppliers as to domestic services and service suppliers.87  Nevertheless, 
Members may differ in the process of their domestic service liberalization, resulting in 
differences in scheduled commitments.88  Additionally, GATS Article XVII allows Members to 
put limitations on applying the NT principle.89  And most members put such limitations in their 
schedules.90  The following table, taken from Adlung and Roy,91 illustrates the limitations that 
Members have placed on the NT principle:92 
                                                 
86 GATS, supra note 8, art. XVII. 
87 Benitah, supra note 91. (The idea, of course, is that the obligation to grant a services subsidy to foreign firms 
inhibits the desire to grant the subsidy to national service firms.) 
88 Id. 
89 GATS, supra note 8, art. XVII.1. (“In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any conditions and 
qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, in 
respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own 
like services and service suppliers (emphasis added).”  The article’s wordings state that if a Member explicitly limits 
the application of NT principle, the article has no binding force on it.).  See also Chapter 3.I.F in this dissertation. 
90 Benitah, supra note 91.  See also Rudolf Adlung and Martin Roy, Turning Hills Into Mountains? Current 
Commitments Under The Gats And Prospects For Change, World Trade Organization Economic Research and 
Statistics Division, 20 (2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd200501_e.htm (The Table 3 
provides more details on how many limitations have been put in each service sectors). 
91 Adlung and Roy, supra note 101, at 18. 
92 Id. 
 206 
 
Legend: 
A – Tax Measures 
B – Subsidies and Grants 
C – Other Financial Measures 
 
D – Nationality and Residency 
Requirements  
E – Licensing, Standards, Qualifications 
Requirements and 
Registration/Authorization 
Requirements 
F – Performance Requirements (e.g., 
technology transfer, training) 
 
G – Ownership of 
Property/Land  
H–Other National 
Treatment Measures 
I  – Market Access 
Limitation 
 
Figure 5.  Total Number of National Treatment Limitations:  By Level of Development 
Adlung and Roy observe that “developing and developed countries display similar 
patterns of limitations…developing countries tend to rely somewhat more strongly on land-
related restrictions, but less so on discriminatory subsidies and nationality or residency 
requirements.”93 
Despite the Article XVII requirement, the concept of the NT principle in the GATS is 
still unclear.  The first and most obvious problem is the definition of “likeness.”94  There is a 
debate over how to determine what are “like services” and “like service suppliers.”95  Do these 
                                                 
93 Id. 
94 Panel Report, European Communities – Regime of the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27, 
para. 7.322.  (“Similarly, in our view, to the extent that entities provide like services, they are like service suppliers.” 
However, this decision was strongly criticized by scholars.) 
95 G. VERHOOSEL, NATIONAL TREATMENT AND WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT – ADJUDICATING THE BOUNDRIES OF 
REGULATORY AUTONOMY, 61(2002).  W. Zdouc, WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relation to the GATS, 2 Journal 
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terms extend to different modes for providing services?  What if a member commits in one mode 
and fully complies with it, but still causes some adverse effects to foreign services/service 
suppliers in other modes?  It is not clear whether the NT principle can answer all questions 
resulting from its application to service subsidies. 
It is true that the NT principle can be very powerful in regulating subsidies in the services 
trade compared with the MFN treatment principle, but because many questions exist about its 
application, it can also be ineffective in some subsidy circumstances. 
The NT principle in the GATS is only negotiable, not mandatory as it is in the GATT.  
For example, in financial services it is important to protect consumers with various prudential 
governmental regulations.  Thus, it was argued, that to apply the NT principle to financial 
services required considerable expertise about particular service sectors, and this could result in 
changes to the basic concepts of national treatment so as to effectively balance the need for trade 
liberalization against appropriate national government regulatory and prudential policies related 
to the particular services sectors- banking, insurance, brokerage, and so on.96 
Because of the differences between goods and services, in addition to the differences 
between the GATT and the GATS, it is obvious that simply applying the SCMA to service 
subsidies does not work.  Hence, we can confirm the necessity to regulate service subsidies in 
another category. 
                                                                                                                                                             
of International Economic Law, 332 (1999). 
96 World Trade Organization, Understanding The WTO: The Agreements, Services: rules for growth and investment, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm6_e.htm. 
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2.  Are Existing Rules Enough to Restrict Subsidies? 
Member comments on services trade subsidies have done more to raise questions than to provide 
answers.  Some scholars and Members have suggested that a possibility to avoid duplicating or 
overlapping disciplines needs to be taken into consideration.97  I have a different point of view 
regarding the issue of overlapping regulation.  We have seen that the GATS, when compared 
with the GATT, has more complexity in its nature and structure.  But wasting time on worrying 
about what overlapping or duplicate rules might do does not provide a solution to the service 
subsides problem.  It is not uncommon in legal systems to have more than one legal mechanism 
to deal with the same subject matter.  An action can violate more than one article in the same 
treaty.  Pointing out that existing rules have similar effects does not diminish the importance of 
building up the necessary regulatory framework service subsidies. 
The question we need to focus is what is the purpose of having such rules?  We need 
these rules because of the distortive nature of subsidies, and we would like to discipline them.  I 
will discuss the existing rules, which might have disciplinary effects on service subsidies, in the 
following paragraphs, and I will demonstrate that there is still a need to have a separate legal 
mechanism dealing with service subsidies. 
a.  Most-Favoured-Nation Principle  Granting a subsidy to the extent that the subsidy is limited 
formally or in effect to a service or service supplier of one foreign origin and not to another 
                                                 
97 Communication from Singapore, An illustrative list of Definitional issues that could relate to Subsidies in Services, 
JOB(04)/180 (December, 1, 2004) (the representative from Singapore stating that, “it is well known that measures 
affecting trade in services are generally embedded in domestic regulatory measures. Some Members have 
highlighted that regulatory measure could have subsidy-like effects…. In this connection, wouldn’t disciplines 
resulting from the Article VI:4 negotiations be sufficient to address issues relating to regulatory 
measures? …shouldn’t the WPGR avoid duplication or creating overlapping disciplines relating to regulatory 
measures?”) 
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would violate the MFN principle.98  Even though the MFN principle is an effective way to 
regulate a cross-sectoral subsidy, the principle is useless in certain situations.  Here is one 
example: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Most- Favoured-Nation Principle 
In this example, the service industries of both Country B and Country C have their 
commercial presences in Country A (Mode 3 example).  Country A only grants a subsidy to its 
local service industries.  It does not grant a subsidy to the companies of either Country B or 
Country C, which are located within Country A’s territory.  This scenario does constitute 
discrimination, but not a violation to the MFN principle because Country A does not accord 
favorable treatment to the firms of either Country B or Country C. 
The MFN principle is binding across all service sectors, but would not restrain most types 
of subsidies in services.  This is because discrimination in the granting of subsidies does not 
usually happen among foreign firms, but between foreign and domestic firms.99 
                                                 
98 European Service Network Policy Committee, supra note 89, at 2. 
99 Id. 
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Additionally, Members can still create exemptions from MFN treatment.  Around 380 
MFN exemptions have been listed by 70 Members, and many Members listed several 
exemptions in the same sector.100  Almost two-thirds of the exempted measures are found in 
communication services and in transport services.101  As mentioned earlier, these two categories 
receive the most subsidies in developed and developing countries.  Thus, the lack of having 
specific disciplines to regulate subsidies in services can cause damage to Members. 
b.  National Treatment Principle  The NT principle can play a strong role in disciplining 
service subsidies.  In the example illustrated above, the MFN principle does not have an effect on 
the situation, but the NT principle can actually discipline the situation.  It is because Country A 
accords favorable treatment to its own national industries. 
But, the NT principle under the GATS is optional.102  Members may differ in their pace 
towards services liberalization under the GATS, so the obligation to implement the NT principle 
varies a lot among Members.103  Therefore, limits exist in the following three ways: 
(1) The NT principle is only applicable in scheduled sectors.  It only covers 
discriminatory subsidies Members have written into their Schedules.  Several 
countries have taken across-the-board exemptions for subsidies applicable to all 
service sectors in their Schedules. 
(2) The NT principle is only applicable in scheduled modes. Members are free not to 
schedule the NT principle in any one or more of the four modes of supply.  Thus, 
                                                 
100 Aaditya Mattoo, Shaping Future Rules For Trade In Services: Lessons From The GATS, 16 (2000), available at 
http://tradeinservices.mofcom.gov.cn/upload/2008/08/18/1219023021688_99396.pdf. 
101 Id. 
102 GATS, supra note 8, art. XVII para. 1. 
103 Benitah, supra note 91. 
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Members can benefit from a certain mode of supply for a certain service by not 
accord NT principle protection in all four modes of supply. 
(3) The NT principle is applicable only to services or service suppliers located within 
a Member’s territory.104 Article XVII does not require a Member to extend 
national treatment to a service supplier located in the territory of another 
Member.105  Therefore, a subsidy may not apply to all service suppliers in the 
world.  If Country A accords favourable treatment to its local industries’ branches 
in Country B, the NT principle cannot cover such a situation. 
                                                 
104 European Service Network Policy Committee, supra note 195. 
105 Group of Negotiations on Services, Scheduling Of Initial Commitments In Trade In Services: Explanatory Note, 
MTN.GNS/W/164, at 5 (September, 3, 1993). 
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c.  Market Access  Market access stipulates that Members “shall accord services and service 
suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favourable than that provided for under the 
terms, limitations, and conditions agreed and specified in its Schedule.”106  That is to say market 
access commitments only apply to those who have made commitments in their schedules.  If a 
Member does not allow market access in a certain service sector, the disciplinary effects of the 
MFN and NT principles are de facto useless.107 
d.  Monopoly Provisions  GATS Article VIII prohibits monopolists to impair the MFN principle 
and the scheduled commitments, including NT principles.108  Article VII can prevent monopolist 
service suppliers from engaging in cross-subsidization.  But it only limits to MFN and NT 
covered areas and targets to monopolists. 
e.  Non-violation Provisions  GATS Article XXIII states that, 
If any Member considers that any benefit it could reasonably have expected to 
accrue to it under a specific commitment of another Member under Part III of this 
Agreement is being nullified or impaired as a result of the application of any 
measure which does not conflict with the provisions of this Agreement, it may 
have recourse to the DSU….(emphasis added) 
 
This dispute resolution Article allows challenge based on both NT and the MFN 
principle, and also provides Members another way to challenge Member’s granting of subsidies.  
However, the complaining Member is required to demonstrate that such a subsidy was not 
anticipated at the time when specific commitments were made.109  Because the disciplines on 
                                                 
106 GATS, supra note 8, art. XVI para. 1. 
107 Benitah, supra note 91. 
108 GATS, supra note 8, art. VIII. (“Each Member shall ensure that any monopoly suppliers of a service in its 
territory does not, in the supply of the monopoly service in the relevant market, act in a manner inconsistent with 
that Member’s obligations under Article II and specific commitments.”). 
109 Benitah, supra note 10, at 9. 
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service subsidies are still unclear right now, it is difficult to say what the future of service 
subsidies will be. 
If we accept, as we must, the importance of regulating service subsidies, and the 
necessity of having specific subsidy regulations for the services trade, then something beyond the 
existing GATT/GATS legal framework is necessary.  The next chapter considers the possibility 
of a special legal system to regulate service subsidies. 
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VII.  A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR SUBSIDY REGULATION IN GATS 
A.  DEFINING “SUBSIDY” IN THE GATS 
The definition of “subsidy” is a crucial starting point for creating a multilateral framework for 
subsidy regulation.  The WTO Secretariat has released an informal note on the definition of 
subsidy with the goal of summarizing the main substantive views expressed since the circulation 
of the original note on January 26, 2005.1 This chapter will focus on the possible elements of a 
definition, and suggest a workable solution to the current stalemate on this issue. 
1.  “Subsidy” Defined in the SCM Agreement as A Start 
In an effort to fulfill the information exchange required by GATS Article XV, many Members 
have suggested using the subsidy definition prescribed in Article 1 of the SCM Agreement as a 
starting point, because, over quite a few decades, the SCM Agreement has developed subsidy 
concepts that are more mature. 
As introduced in Chapter 4, there are three elements in the SCM Agreement that are used 
to determine whether there is a subsidy.  They are:  the existence of a financial contribution; the 
                                                 
1 Working Party on GATS Rules, Synthesis Of Views Expressed On The Definition Of Subsidy: Informal Note by the 
Secretariat, JOB(05)/4/Add.1 (March 31, 2006). 
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conferral of a benefit; and the fact that a government conferred that benefit.2  Moreover, the 
concept of specificity is essential in determining whether a subsidy exists.  In the following 
sections, I will discuss each element separately to evaluate their applicability. 
a.  Do We Really Need A Different Definition?  In trying to reach an agreement on the 
definition of service subsidy, the progress of developing Article XV has been delayed for 15 
years.  Moreover, the lack of a definition has given Members an excuse for not taking part in the 
information exchange, which is clearly required in GATS Article XV. 
Everyone seems to agree that using the subsidy definition from the SCM Agreement is a 
start.3  However, many concerns have been raised in regards to possible amendments.4  Most of 
those concerns offer questions, instead of concrete answers.  Members have expressed their 
concerns, and many of them have “mentioned that the goods model was not particularly useful 
for defining services subsidies since both areas have different characteristics.”5  I disagree with 
this position, and suggest that using the definition of subsidy currently used in goods trade is a 
good model from which to start in considering trade in services. 
Current Discussion 
Professor Benitah has expressed his concern about the application of the goods subsidy 
definition in services trade. 6   Other scholars have echoed Prof. Benitah’s concerns. 7   One 
                                                 
2 See Chapter 4.II.B for discussions. 
3 See Chapter 6.II.B, TABLE N for Members’ opinions in each session. 
4 Working Party on GATS Rules, Communication From Singapore: An illustrative List of Definitional Issues that 
could relate to Subsidies in Services, JOB(04)/180 (December, 1, 2004). 
5 Working Party on GATS Rules, Negotiations On Subsidies: Report by the Chairperson of the Working Party on 
GATS Rules, S/WPGR/10, at para. 15 (June, 30, 2003). 
6 Marc Benitah, Subsidies, Services and Sustainable Development, ICTSD Programme on Trade in Services and 
Sustainable Development, at. 14 (2005), available at 
http://www.tradecapacitypakistan.com/pdf/ICTSD%20Paper%20Services%20GVA%20JUL%2005.pdf. 
7 Thomas Chan, ICTSD Roundtable on Trade in Services and Sustainable Development: “Towards Pro-Sustainable 
Development Rules for Subsidies in Trade in Services”, Mar. 10, 2003, available at 
http://ictsd.org/downloads/2008/08/background-note_final.pdf. 
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obvious difference between goods and services is that the concept of territory8 is more difficult 
to apply in all service modes.9  In sales of goods, only one mode exists:  the cross-border sale.  
But in sales of services, Modes I and II are defined by reference to the territory of supply of 
services, while Modes III and IV are defined by the nationality of the service supplier.10  This 
creates difficulties in applying the subsidy definition from goods to services. 
Despite the doubts and questions submitted by Members and scholars, there is still some 
positive feedback.  The representative of Argentina did not foresee significant difficulties in 
coming up with an agreed definition for service subsidies.11  The representative of Korea also 
thinks the SCM Agreement definition is sufficient.12 
The representative of the United States has noted that, “[t]he synthesis also showed that, 
on the issue of definition alone, many topics could be explored further, possibly for an indefinite 
time.  Many of the suggestions put forward seemed to be more about defining what was not a 
subsidy.”13 
My Suggestions 
My proposal is very simple and straightforward.  So far, all concerns regarding the 
definition of subsidy are based on theories.  Also, there is no reference to any service subsidy, 
which causes adverse effects, mostly because Members’ information is lacking.  But is there a 
real-world example that suggests that the SCM Agreement definition for subsidy is not 
applicable in the service situation?  In other words, can any service subsidy which causes trade-
                                                 
8 See this Chapter I.C for discussions. 
9 Australia also expressed this concern in S/WPGR/M/44, 29 October 2003, para. 52. 
10 Chan, supra note 7. 
11  Working Party on GATS Rules, Report Of The Meeting Of 1 October 2003: Note by the Secretariat, 
S/WPGR/M/44, at para. 50 (October, 29, 2003) (restricted). 
12 Id. at para. 63. 
13  Working Party on GATS Rules, Report Of The Meeting Of 7 February 2005: Note by the Secretariat,  
S/WPGR/M/51(March, 18, 2005) (restricted). 
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distortive effects not be categorized as a subsidy under the SCM Agreement definition?  If not, 
why can’t we just apply the SCM Agreement subsidy definition to services? 
As I mentioned before, not all subsidies are prohibited.14  Only those subsidies that have 
trade-distorting effects should be disciplined.15  Let us look at the definition on subsidy found in 
Article 1 of the SCM Agreement.  Article 1 provides a general idea on what a subsidy is.  Then, 
following the idea that trade-distortive subsidies shall be disciplined, Article 2 of the SCM 
Agreement comes into play.  Article 2 stipulates that a subsidy must be granted specifically to an 
enterprise, industry, or group of enterprises or industries.  A situation could be described in a 
two-stage analysis. 
The investigating authority must first determine whether there is a subsidy.  In this 
determination, the authority will consider:  (1) whether these is a financial contribution; (2) 
whether such a financial contribution is made by a government/public entity; (3) whether such a 
financial contribution confers a benefit.  Once it is determined that a subsidy exists, the authority 
then moves on to determine whether that subsidy has trade-distorting effects based on the 
specificity requirement. 
For the first stage, I propose that if there is no real-world example that tells us the current 
definition is insufficient, it is reasonable to categorize it as a subsidy under the SCM Agreement 
framework. 
I use the evolution of cyber laws as an example in the next paragraph to show that 
sometimes it is not necessary to have a different legal definition to articulate a term in different 
areas of law.  Moreover, how to deal with legal issues arising from a new area can also be a 
                                                 
14 See Chapter VI of this dissertation for discussion. 
15 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1B, 1999, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS], art. XV. 
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model for a service subsidy definition.  As to the second stage regarding the specificity criterion, 
I will return to it in the later paragraphs. 
b.  Cyber Laws Development as an Example  In the current era, technology development 
moves society into a different stage.  The creation of the internet, for example, has shifted the 
world’s perspective.  While dealing with these new developments, legal reforms are always 
evolving over time.  I believe it is useful to take these developments into consideration, and enact 
theoretically similar thinking with regard to service subsidies. 
Cyber law development has drawn the attention of the world.  As the volume of 
electronic contracting increases, legislators around the world are evaluating existing contract 
laws in light of new business practices.16  Because the United States lacks any overarching vision 
of how electronic contract law should evolve, it continues to rely heavily on case law 
developments to make incremental reforms in contract law.17  Meanwhile, the EU is trying to 
harmonize the law applicable to traditional and electronic commerce through legislative 
instruments.18 
Some commentators have suggested that legal and economic institutions will have to 
change substantially in response to new technologies of trade.19  Still, contrary opinions exist.  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that, “[w]hile new commerce in the 
Internet has exposed country to many new situations, it has not fundamentally changed the 
                                                 
16 Jane Kaufman Winn and Jens Haubold, Electronic Promises: Contract Law Reforms and E-Commerce in a 
Comparative Perspective, 27(5) E.L. Rev., 1 (2002), available at  
http://www.law.washington.edu/Directory/docs/Winn/Electronic_Promises_Revised.pdf. 
17 Id. at 2. 
18 Id. 
19 Avery Wiener Katz, Is Electronic Contracting Different? Contract Law in the Information Age, available at  
http://www.columbia.edu/~ak472/papers/Electronic%20Contracting.pdf. 
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principles of contract.”20  Even though not all commentators agree on whether the application of 
traditional contract laws can apply to electronic contracting cases, it is no longer possible to 
complain about the absence of law or its unsettled nature.21 
In Asia, under general contract law, there are well-established principles and rules that 
deal with how a legally binding contract is created.  In Singapore, while the law of contracts 
continues to apply broadly to both the physical and electronic world, additional legal frameworks 
fill the gaps where the rules governing contracts in the physical world encounter new 
technologies.22 
New developments in technology have come with the concept of “functional 
equivalence.” Thus, to the extent there has been a problem addressed by law, and a new problem 
arises (or seems to arise), then the analytical process allows one to project from existing 
problems and legal solutions to developing problems or legal solutions.  This is often done by 
considering whether in the new environment something is the functional equivalent of a situation 
in the “old” environment.  We can apply the same theoretical thinking into regulating goods and 
services.  If the definition of subsidy allows functional equivalence in the goods trade and in the 
services trade, it is reasonable to adopt the goods subsidy definition at the outset.  With more 
Members’ cooperation in the future, we can adjust the service subsidy definition into a more 
functional framework. 
                                                 
20 Trieber & Straub, Inc. v. United Parcel Services, Inc., 474 F.3d 379, 385 (7th Cir. 2007), citing Register.com v. 
Verio, 356 F.3d 393, 403(2d Cir. 2004). 
21 Juliet M. Moringiello and William L. Reynolds, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF CYBERSPACE: ELECTRONIC 
CONTRACTING CASES 2006-2007, p. 1, available at  
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1438&context=fac_pubs. 
22  Goh Seow Hiong, National E-Commerce Legislation In Asia And The Pacific: The Case Of Singapore, in 
Harmonized development of legal and regulatory systems for e-commerce in Asia and the Pacific: current 
challenges and capacity-building needs, at 104, available at http://captel.ntu.edu.sg/unescap/casesingaporepaper.pdf. 
 220 
2.  Are “Financial Contributions” Listed In The SCM Agreement Exhaustive In Service 
Trades? 
As mentioned before, Article 1.1(a)(i)-(iv) and (a)(2) in the SCM Agreement lists types of 
subsidies, basically covering existing forms of subsidies.  Apparently, these financial 
contributions are considered exhaustive.23 
Starting from 1998, the Secretariat released six reports24 on the trade policy reviews 
concerning subsidies in services.  The forms of financial contributions are listed in six different 
categories.  They are:  (1) direct grants; (2) preferential credit and guarantee; (3) equity 
injections; (4) tax incentives; (5) duty-free inputs & free zones; and (6) other & unspecified 
measures.  According to current information from most Members, there is no evidence showing 
any new kind of financial contribution example.25  Therefore, we can reasonably assume that 
these forms can be applicable in service subsidies.26 
                                                 
23 PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES, AND 
MATERIALS, 555-556 (2006).  See also Panel Report, United States-Measures Treating Export Restraints as 
Subsidies, WT/DS194/R, at para. 8.65 (June, 29, 2001) (“the requirement of a financial contribution from the outset 
was intended by its proponents precisely to ensure that not all government measures that conferred benefits could be 
deemed to be subsidies.”)  Id. at para. 8.38. (“by introducing the notion of financial contribution, the drafters 
foreclosed the possibility of the treatment of any government action that resulted in a benefit as a subsidy.”). 
24 Working Party on GATS Rules, Subsidies For Services Sectors Information Contained In WTO Trade Policy 
Review: Background Note by the Secretariat, S/WPGR/W/25 (January, 26, 1998).  Working Party on GATS Rules, 
Subsidies For Services Sectors Information Contained In WTO Trade Policy Review: Background Note by the 
Secretariat, S/WPGR/W/25/Add.1 (May, 29, 2000).  Working Party on GATS Rules, Subsidies For Services Sectors 
Information Contained In WTO Trade Policy Review: Background Note by the Secretariat, S/WPGR/W/25/Add.2, 
(December, 12, 2000).  Working Party on GATS Rules, Subsidies For Services Sectors Information Contained In 
WTO Trade Policy Review: Background Note by the Secretariat, S/WPGR/W/25/Add.3 (September, 19, 2002).  
Working Party on GATS Rules, Subsidies For Services Sectors Information Contained In WTO Trade Policy Review: 
Background Note by the Secretariat, S/WPGR/W/25/Add.4 (February, 12, 2004).  Working Party on GATS Rules, 
Subsidies For Services Sectors Information Contained In WTO Trade Policy Review: Background Note by the 
Secretariat, S/WPGR/W/25/Add.5 (March, 27, 2007). 
25 See Chapter 6, supra note 3. 
26 Robert Prylinski and Dariusz Mongialo, Definition of Subsidy in the GATS, ICTSC Roundtable on Trade in 
Services and Sustainable Development “Towards Pro-Sustainable Development Rules for Subsidies in Trade in 
Services”, Mar. 10, 2003, available at http://ictsd.org/downloads/2008/08/speaking-notes_dariusz-
mongialo_final.pdf. 
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However, there are some concerns regarding the Article 1.1(a)(2) situation.  It states that 
“any form of income or price support” is considered to be a subsidy.  Scholars speculate that the 
form of subsidy may play an even more important role in service areas in the future, so 
adjustments are necessary.27  Therefore, they propose to insert a list of forms of income or price 
supports in the definition.28 
It is my view that, to come up with a list of income or price supports would definitely 
help to address changing situations.  However, how will Members come to a consensus with 
respect to the list?  This may drag the questions back to the “chicken and egg” situation because 
this would go back to the information exchange stage.  Members will start to argue whether the 
definition or domestic information should come first. 
Thus, to adopt the subsidy rules from the GATT into the GATS, and to indicate that 
GATT examples are not exhaustive in the GATS context, is a feasible method.  This method is 
sufficient for the world right now.  We can leave it to the dispute resolution process or future 
negotiations to determine what comprehensive types of financial contributions should be 
included in the future. 
3.  The Notion of Territory in Service Subsidies 
Another issue that arises in applying the subsidy definition of the SCM Agreement to services 
trade is the notion of territory.29  The SCM Agreement definition provides that “a subsidy shall 
be deemed to exist if:  there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body 
                                                 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Benitah, supra note 6, at 14. 
 222 
within the territory of a Member….” 30  (emphasis added).  In brief, subsidies in the SCM 
Agreement are territorially bound, and the concept of territory provides a link between the 
financial contribution and the subsidizing Member. 31   Consequently, subsidies granted to 
firms/persons outside of a Member’s territory may not be subject to discipline.  For some export 
subsidies in Mode III or IV, they will fall outside of the territorial scope.32  Thus, “it is certainly 
necessary – given the modal structure of the GATS – to introduce the notion of territory.”33 
Professor Benitah has made several important observations on this issue.  He focuses on 
the relationship between the territory and the benefit resulting from the financial contribution, 
and states, “the benefit conferred by a subsidy to a service firm is not necessarily confined (as it 
is for goods) to something unavailable on the free market of the territory of the government 
providing the subsidy.”34  He also provides some useful scenarios to explain this statement.35 
A more flexible notion of territory is necessary in order to define the connection between 
the financial contribution and the subsidizing Member.36  Members do not have to re-write the 
                                                 
30 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1999, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14. [hereinafter the SCM Agreement], art. 1:1.1(a)(1). 
31  Natasha F. Ward, Theoretical Challenges And Practical Difficulties For The Development Of Subsidies 
Disciplines In The General Agreement On Trade In Services, WORLD TRADE INSTITUTE, Mile 7, Sept. 30, 2007, at 
31, available at 
http://web65.uranus.ibone.ch/images/stories/MILE/MILE%20Theses/MILE%207/Natasha%20Ward_MILE%207.pd
f?PHPSESSID=7f41ef09f5e133e08848ea72ed35570c. 
32 Benitah, supra note 29. (“In the fields of goods, the familiar scenario is as follows: a good is subsidized by 
country A and then completely produced on its domestic territory.  Those units of the subsidized god not consumed 
by country A’s residents are eventually consumed by residents of countries B, C, etc. on their respective territories.  
This scenario seems not to hold true in the field of services.”). 
33 Ward, supra note 31. (Rudolf Adlung’s communication by email on July, 30, 2007). 
34 Benitah, supra note 29. 
35 Id. (“Mode 3: let us suppose that country A provides a subsidy to a firm which then establishes a subsidiary 
company in Country B.  Insofar as the subsidiary keeps a close link with its mother firm, one could say that the 
product line process takes place simultaneously on the territory of A and B.  Mode 4: India grants a subsidy to an 
Indian computer programmer who then travels to the US to provide services to US firms.  Contrary to the classical 
scenario for goods, the product is not entirely produced on the territory of India; at least one part of the production 
process of the service has to take place in a territory different from the territory from the territory of the country 
providing the subsidy.”) 
36 Ward, supra note 31.  (In the proposed definition of a subsidy, the notion of territory as found in the ASCM 
definition has been discarded.  The wholesale adoption of the ASCM definition of a subsidy would place some 
subsidies such as export subsidies for Mode 3 suppliers outside of the scope of subsidies disciplines… This notion 
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wording in the SCM Agreement, but just provide a flexible definition to cover the different 
modes of supplies.  The territoriality requirement does not necessarily mean that the financial 
contribution must be made within a Member’s territory.  As long as the financial contribution is 
given by a Member’s government, and is received by firms/persons within another Member’s 
territory, it should be subject to the subsidy discipline. 
The SCM Agreement aims at disciplining subsidies.37  Allowing the definition of subsidy 
to exclude certain modes of services supply is contrary to the purpose of the SCM Agreement.38  
Moreover, when this passage is discussed, experts focus mostly on who grants the financial 
contribution, instead of from where and to where it is granted.39  By looking into the GATS and 
the SCM Agreement together, giving the subsidy definition a more flexible interpretation to fit 
the distinct four modes of service supplies is a legitimate approach.  If this flexible interpretation 
is adopted, then the current SCM Agreement subsidy definition can be applicable to the GATS. 
4.  The Application of Specificity to Service Subsidies 
GATS Article XV mandates that “Members recognize that, in certain circumstances, subsidies 
may have distortive effects on trade in services.  Members shall enter into negotiations with a 
                                                                                                                                                             
of territory would need to be flexible enough to capture the relationship between the financial contribution and the 
subsiding Member.) 
37  World Trade Organization, Subsidies And Countervailing Measures, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/scm_e.htm. 
38 Vienna Conventions on the Laws of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 311 (May 23, 1969), art. 31, para.1 and 2. (“1. A 
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its 
preamble and annexes:  
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion 
of the treaty;  
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and 
accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.”) 
39 World Trade Organization, Subsidies And Countervailing Measures:  Overview, Agreement On Subsidies And 
Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agreement”), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/subs_e.htm. RAJ BHALA, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE, 1050 (2007). 
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view to developing the necessary multilateral disciplines to avoid such trade-distortive 
effects….”40  It is clear that disciplines on service subsidies should only focus on those that 
create trade-distortive effects, instead of all service subsidies. 
In Chapter 6, we explain the concept of trade-distortion.  Two elements needed to be 
fulfilled:  (1) specificity and (2) the conferral of benefits not available on the free market.41  
Thus, it seems logical then to ask whether the application of specificity into service subsidies is 
necessary.  Some commentators propose that trade-distortion effects should be considered in the 
definition itself, or eventually in a possible countervailing procedure; while others question 
whether it should be directly addressed in the disciplines at all.42  I propose that it is necessary to 
put the specificity test in the determination of a service subsidy.  To be more precise, I suggest 
utilizing the specificity test in the definitional stage, instead of the countervailing measure stage. 
The reason why it is more appropriate to put the specificity criterion in the definitional 
spectrum is twofold: 
(1) If we put the specificity test in the application of countervailing measures, there 
will possibly be no test at all.  It is still for members to determine whether having 
countervailing measures in service subsidies is appropriate.  Suppose in the end 
Members decide countervailing measures are not appropriate in service subsidies.  
If so, there will be no further discussion of specificity. 
(2) If the definition does not directly require the application of a specificity test in the 
disciplines, the scope of subsidies covered by it will be too broad.  Such a result 
may damage the original purpose of having the specificity test.  Some subsidies 
                                                 
40 GATS, supra note 15, art. XVI. 
41 See supra Chapter VI. 
42 Synthesis Report of the Discussion in the Meeting, ICTSD Roundtable on Trade in Services and Sustainable 
Development:  “Towards Pro-Sustainable Development Rules for Subsidies in Trade in Services”, at  para. 11, Mar. 
10, 2003, available at http://ictsd.org/downloads/2008/08/synthesis-report_consolidated.pdf. 
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that aim to overcome market failures are very trade-distortive in nature, but could 
still be necessary and justified.43 
Poland has expressed its concern about the application of specificity in service subsides.  
The delegation stated that, 
How to treat the horizontal subsidies granted in the sector which (taking 
into account the level of specific commitments of a given Member) is 
closed (or strongly limited) for the foreign suppliers? In this case a 
‘horizontal’ subsidy is not exactly available to ‘all’.  However, it still may 
improve the competitive power of the recipients – maybe not on the 
domestic market (as there is no foreign competition here), but possibly in 
export of their services.44 
 
In order to determine wither the definition of a subsidy must include a specificity test, 
first, we need to reiterate the rationale behind the GATS.  Due to some services’ unique 
characteristics, Members have agreed upon the method of progressive liberalization in dealing 
with the services trade.  The same moderate attitude is also taken towards in the AoA. 
Taking the moderate attitude, Members can feel less pressure when opening their 
domestic markets to foreign service suppliers.  Of course, there is never a perfect solution.  Less 
pressure sometimes equals more freedom, and more freedom sometimes causes delays in 
liberalizing domestic markets.  The current negotiations have been accompanied by the refusal of 
Members to reduce existing trade barriers. 
                                                 
43 Id. 
44 Communication from Poland, Definition of Subsidy in GATS, JOB(02)/207, para. 12 (December, 13, 2002).  See 
also Prylinski and Mongialo, supra note 26, at 4. (“The subsidy disciplines in the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures treat very seriously the matter of the specificity of the subsidy.  This issue is not contained 
in the definition itself, but it is clear that only specific subsidies are “actionable” (Art. 1.2 of this Agreement).  In 
fact, it is based on the assumption that the horizontal subsidies (granted upon objective criteria to all recipients, 
possibly including the foreign ones) do not affect competition… How to treat the horizontal subsidies granted in the 
sector in which (taking into account the level of specific commitments of a WTO Member concerned) market access 
for foreign suppliers is closed or very limited? In this case a “horizontal” subsidy is not exactly available to “all”.  
However, this Member may still improve the competitive power of the recipients - maybe not on the domestic 
market (as there is no foreign competition here), but possibly in export of their services.”)  
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Once rules are made, however, Members are bound to follow them.  Progressive 
liberalization should be the method applicable to the GATS.  Therefore, unless Members agree to 
open a certain service sector, it is legitimate to say that horizontal subsidies in a certain sector are 
permissible. 
As introduced before, 45  the SCM Agreement regulates both de jure and de facto 
specificity.  Article 2 states that, “[i]f, notwithstanding any appearance of non-specificity 
resulting from the application of the principles…there are reasons to believe that the subsidy may 
in fact be specific, other factors may be considered.”46  Unlike Poland’s scenario, in an open 
service sector it is much easier to determine the specificity of a subsidy.  That is to say, in an 
open service sector, if a general subsidy causes specific industries to profit, then it is specific. 
Let us take a closer look at Poland’s concern.  Poland’s situation does not fall within the 
purview of Article XV because it is in a closed service sector.  If a Member does not agree to 
open a certain service sector, granting a subsidy in that service sector is permissible under the 
GATS.  It is acceptable even if the subsidy improves the competitive power of the recipients.  
But we need to pay attention to one thing.  If the Member grants a subsidy to a service sector 
(SERVICE A), which is closed to all foreign service providers, and in the meantime allows its 
domestic SERVICE A providers to export their services,47 then the subsidy will be considered 
specific, and therefore subject to disciplines. 
Another concern regarding specificity is whether we apply a modal perspective or a 
sectoral perspective.48  Since services trades are divided into different modes and sectors in their 
                                                 
45 See supra Chapter IV. 
46 The SCM Agreement, supra note 30, art. 2. 
47 See Chapter 4.II.B.4 of this dissertation. (“any subsidy falling under the provisions of prohibited subsidies shall be 
deemed to be specific.”  In the later part of this chapter, I will propose that the prohibited subsidies in services trade 
should include export subsidies.) 
48 Chan, supra note 7, at II. (While discussing the definition of service subsidies, he points out that: “Specificity 
relates to the question of mode- whether modal specificity is needed for subsidies.  That would require distinction of 
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Schedules of Concessions, it is reasonable to take mode specific and sector specific situations 
into consideration.  As a practical matter, it may be difficult to define specificity based on modes 
or sectors, but Professor Benitah points out that the important issue is whether funds have been 
artificially channeled towards a certain group of firms.49 
B.  THE SCM AGREEMENT FRAMEWORK V. THE AOA FRAMEWORK 
After formulating the definition of a service subsidy, it is necessary to determine what kinds of 
subsidies are permissible and what kinds are not.  Not all subsidies are forbidden; hence it is 
important to categorize service subsidies. 
I have previously introduced subsidy related frameworks in the SCM Agreement50 and 
the AoA. 51   To consider whether we should follow the SCM Agreement or AoA subsidy 
framework, we should first take a look at their differences.  Members differ on which framework 
is appropriate for service subsidies.  After demonstrating the pros and cons of both frameworks, I 
propose a hybrid framework. 
1.  Differences between Two Frameworks 
The main difference between the two frameworks is that the AoA does not forbid export 
subsidies while the SCM Agreement absolutely bans any export subsidy.  However, this does not 
necessarily mean that the framework of the AoA is more lenient than that of the SCM 
                                                                                                                                                             
subsidies by mode.  The fact that NT obligation is entered by mode might also call for distinction of subsidies by 
mode.”).  Ward, supra note 31. 
49 Ward, supra note 31. 
50 See supra Chapter IV. 
51 See supra Chapter V. 
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Agreement.  Under the SCM Agreement, domestic supports are allowed as long as they are not 
disputed by other Members.  In the case of the AoA, if the supports cannot be exempted, these 
supports have to be reduced even if they cause no harm.52 
Differences between subsidy regulations in the SCM Agreement and the AoA can be 
seen below: 
Table 17.  Differences Between Subsidy Regulations in the SCM Agreement and AoA 
 Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing measures 
Agreement on Agriculture 
Export subsidies Absolute prohibition/ 
Complete elimination 
Reduction requirement  
Domestic support Domestic substitution subsidy:  
Absolute prohibition/ 
Complete elimination 
Amber-box category: 
Reduction requirement  
Green-box category: 
Free allowance  
(This table was prepared by the author) 
 
2.  Advantages and Disadvantages of Each Framework 
Professor Marc Benitah has provided a clear comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of 
each framework in the following table.53 
 
Table 18.  Advantages and Disadvantages of the Agriculture and Goods Model for Discipline Services Subsidies 
                                                 
52 羅昌發, 國際貿易法, translated in CHANG-FA LO, THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAWS, 354 (2002). 
53 Benitah, supra note 6, at 35. 
 Advantages Disadvantages 
AoA Model • Subsidy ceiling for the future and 
partially responds to the need to control 
distortion.  There is no need to demonstrate 
adverse effects of subsidies.  In other words, 
in case of a deadlock, there is still 
“something.” 
 
• No need to demonstrate adverse effects 
 
 
 
 
• Determine what adequate ceilings 
sometimes make it hard to reach a conclusion.  
It might be an obstacle for future negotiations. 
 
 
 
 
• Might allow Members to “reallocate” 
subsidies within and among expected boxes 
unless complementary reductions and 
disciplines are included in the boxes. 
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Because service subsidies are a relatively new concern in the WTO, many countries have 
not yet expressed their points of view.  But we can infer their opinions from their submissions 
and discussions.  Scholars have also expressed their opinions on which structure to apply. 
Singapore and Chinese Taipei prefer the SCMA structure, as does.  Sauvé Pierre.54  On 
the other hand, it seems that the WTO Secretariat, Argentina, Hong Kong, and China are support 
the AoA structure.  Scholars at the International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development 
(hereinafter ICTSD) support the AoA structure.55 
I will discuss these two categorization systems in detail, indicating the positions of 
Members and scholars. 
                                                 
54 Sauvé Pierre, Completing the GATS Framework: Addressing Uruguay Round Leftover, Aussenwirtschaft, Vol. 57, 
No. 3, 301-41 (2002), available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/Papers/Sauve/sauvegats.pdf. 
55  David Vivas Eugui and Alex Werth, Rediscovering Subsidies in Service Negotiations, BRIDGES 7(6), 
July/August 2003, at 15, available at http://ictsd.org/downloads/2009/03/bridges07-6.pdf. 
• No need to collect specific data for 
specific sectors if an Aggregate 
Measurement of Support is adopted 
 
• Easier for members to “sit down” and 
negotiate Article XV 
 
• Compared with “sector-specific” method, 
it is more difficult to discipline. 
 
 
• Hard to end or continue negotiations.  
Based on the current AoA negotiations 
experience, such method is sometimes 
insufficient and unsatisfactory. 
The SCM 
Agreement  
Model  
(Goods) 
• “Sector-specific”, and easy to follow. 
• Targets to “in law” export subsidies. 
• Consistent with existing WTO legal 
framework based on similarities and 
differences between goods and services. 
• Easy to continue further negotiations. 
• Sometimes difficult to collect CVD.  
• Hard to prove adverse effects 
• Compensatory remedy could be in 
effective in various models.  
 
• Difficult to start negotiations.  However, 
strict rules can allow a more effective 
disciplining effect.  
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3.  Other Proposed Approaches /Frameworks 
Apart from the original AoA or the SCM Agreement approaches, scholars have also proposed 
several alternatives to regulate services trades.  These alternatives create new approaches to the 
GATS, but each leaves questions unanswered.  The alternatives are outlined below,56 
a.  Sector-Specific Disciplines  UNCTAD proposed a sector-specific approach to govern 
subsidies in services, noting the different types of services trades in 1993:57 
UNCTAD had proposed that the sectoral focus should be on areas where 
subsidies have a major impact on trade in sectors of export interest to 
developing countries, such as in construction and engineering services.58  
The proposal includes an examination of issues related to the different 
modes of delivery especially as they relate to possible benefits by 
corporations to allow them to compete more efficiently in trade in 
services.59 
 
The advantages and disadvantages of the UNCTAD approach are as following:60 
Advantages • Allows progress in addressing trade distortive subsidies in precisely those specific 
sectors which cause problems.  Such use could curb the use of subsidies and undermine 
negotiated market access. 
• Allows the fashioning of disciplines which can more comfortably accommodate the 
peculiar nature of some services industries and the affected services. 
• Offers the opportunity to avoid or remedy the effects of trade distortive subsidies in third 
country markets which are almost undisciplined by the current rules. 
Disadvantages • Includes the fact that conceptual details would need to be ironed out for each sector.  It 
does not resolve the conceptual problems arising from the GATS, such as the definition, 
the notion of specificity, etc. 
• Creates an unevenness of disciplines between sectors whereby some subsidy practices 
may be subject to more stringent disciplines in some sectors than others due to the 
operation of political economy factors in negotiations.  
 
                                                 
56 Ward, supra note 31, at 55-58. 
57 UNCTAD, The Impact of Subsidies on Trade in Services, Geneva: UNCTAD, 1993, UNCTAD/SDD/SER/3, at 13. 
58  Chakravarthis Raghavan, Services Subsidies Need Sector-Specific Approaches, Jul 14, 1994, 
http://www.sunsonline.org/trade/areas/services/07140094.htm. 
59 Ward, supra note 31, at 55. 
60 Id. 
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Questions beyond simple advantages and disadvantages have been raised about this 
approach.61  Some cannot be answered until the approach is more clearly explained. 
b.  Partial Disciplines Approach  Rajeev Ahuja62 proposed a partial disciplines method in the 
Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER).63  His aim is not to 
discipline all trade-distortive subsidies, but to discipline only the most distorting ones.64  He lists 
points to consider in applying the proposed discipline: 
(1) “All firm specific subsidies in basic infrastructure sectors especially in financial 
and telecommunications sectors could be targeted initially; 
(2) Some discipline on subsidy practices in sectors in which higher commitments have 
been made such as tourism (financial and telecommunication also happens to be 
sectors in which higher commitments have been made); 
(3) Subsidy measures specifically targeted at firms engaged in earning foreign 
exchange through services export; 
                                                 
61 Id. at 56.  (“Would it be tighter disciplines for the sectors which would have sectoral disciplines? And if so, what 
would be the policy rationales for more stringent disciplines for services?...Whether the disciplines for the targeted 
sectors would be conditional or unconditional…To what extent should developing countries be subject to the 
disciplines?”)  
62 Economist in the Health, Nutrition, and Population unit of the World Bank, India office.  Formerly, he was a 
senior fellow with the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER), New Delhi.  
Email: rahuja@worldbank.org. 
63 Rajeev Ahuja, Towards Developing Subsidy Disciplines under GATS, Indian Council for Research in International 
Economic Relations, Working Paper No. 174, November 2005, available at http://www.icrier.org/pdf/WP174.pdf. 
64 Id. at 35. (He stated the idea of having this approach is “…not to tackle all trade distorting public support program 
in services sectors but to advance discussions on only those programs that are perceived to be most trade 
distortionary.  The literature dealing with developing subsidy disciplines in GATS deals with the whole gamut of 
issues that are to be dealt with in developing full-blown subsidy framework in case of services.  The need for such a 
framework is not denied.  But many members favour taking a piecemeal approach, making a modest beginning, 
rather than developing full framework.  While subsidy disciplines in services will no doubt enable member countries 
to achieve greater progress under GATS by making greater commitments, the present need for having subsidy 
disciplines is necessitated by the undermining of market access commitments when a member country subsidise 
service supplied in the third country market.  The need for subsidies disciplines is also heightened by the relatively 
low ability of developing country members to subsidise services especially in areas in which they have a 
comparative advantage.  Lack of information on the subsidies that are being given by different member countries to 
different services sector is acting as a major stumbling block in achieving even this limited objective.  However, the 
discussion on the framework can continue alongside such modest beginning.  For taking a small step, the definition 
of subsidies in GATT is considered to be a good starting point by the member countries.”) 
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(4) Consumption support that is tied to a service supplier could be disciplined; 
(5) Certain kinds of subsidies that take the form of export guarantees and export 
credit/loans extended to any service sector would most certainly be trade 
distortionary and should be restricted; likewise benefits accorded to outbound 
foreign direct investment could be disciplined; 
(6) Transport sector receives significant level of support from government but its trade 
distortionary potential remains to be established; 
(7) Social sectors such as health and education that have attracted minimal 
commitments and in which there is a strong public policy rationale can be ignored 
initially.”65 
With respect to the limited discipline approach, there are also advantages and 
disadvantages:66 
Advantages • Allows progress in addressing trade-distortive subsidies in precisely those specific sectors 
which cause problems.  Such use could curb the use of subsidies in undermine negotiated 
market access. 
• Allows the fashioning of disciplines which can more comfortably accommodate the 
peculiar nature of some services industries and the affected services. 
• Offers the opportunity to avoid or remedy the effects of trade distortive subsidies in third 
country markets which are almost undisciplined by the current rules. 
Disadvantages • There should be flexibility in firm specific subsidies in basic infrastructure for developing 
countries.  Also, in the case of market failures and government intervention, social goals 
which are intended to cure problems should be allowed.   
• Includes the discipline of discriminatory consumption subsidies, which is a new element 
in regulating subsidies.  This suggestion would create conditions which are attached to 
subsidies granted to consumers.  
 
While this method provides the same advantages as the sector-specific approach does, it 
also includes some disadvantages, such as stringent disciplines.  Members’ unwillingness in 
negotiating on service subsidies resulted from the complexity of service subsidies and the fear of 
too many limitations.  Narrowing the current negotiating framework, focusing either on sectors 
                                                 
65 Ahuja, supra note 63, at 37. 
66 Ward, supra note 31, at 57. 
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or on the most distortive effects, can seem attractive to Members in the beginning.  In the longer 
run, Members would discover the outcome of possible stringent disciplines.  This potential 
concern should be taken into consideration while developing the GATS subsidy framework. 
c.  The European Union Approach  The European Union has its own approach in terms of 
dealing with distortion in its internal market.  This approach is called the Competition Policy 
Approach.67  Under the EU approach, 
the core issue is whether [a] subsidy, referred to as state aid in the EC treaty, 
distorted competition, and not just whether it distorted trade.  As a general 
principle subsidy is banned in EC because it distorts competition by giving some 
enterprises an advantage over others.  The controls in the EC treaty focus only on 
financial assistance to firms, and only “in cases where some subset of firms is 
treated differently from the way firms are treated in the country as a whole.”68 
 
Suppose an EU Member State provides a state aid. 69   It would be considered 
incompatible with the common market, but it does not necessarily mean that such aid is 
prohibited.  The European Commission can examine whether the said aid qualifies for an 
exemption.70  However, the EU approach also poses some problems.  Two main problems are, 
                                                 
67 Ward, supra note 31, at 58. 
68 Ahuja, supra note 63, at 17-18. 
69 Id. at 18. (He further explains the definition of state aid. “EC rules on state aid are applicable to goods and 
services alike.  The definition of state aid is similar to that of subsidies in case of ASCM.  For any measure to be 
regarded as state aid, it must qualify the following four conditions:  
(i) lead to transfer of resources from state (including national, regional or local authorities, public banks and 
foundations, etc.)  
(ii) would constitute an economic advantage that the undertaking would not have received in the normal course of 
business  
(iii)  is selective and thus affect the balance between certain firms and their competitors.  
(iv) must have a potential effect on competition and trade between member states.  
Note that it is selectivity that differentiates State aid from so called general measures (e.g. most nation-wide fiscal 
measures).  Potential effect of small levels of state aid (de minimis level) is considered limited and therefore kept 
outside the scope of the definition of state aid.”) 
70 Id. 
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(a) An EU-modeled regime would severely curtail the flexibility that Members 
currently enjoy and would therefore be politically unacceptable.71 
(b) There is no corresponding entity within the WTO to the European Commission, 
which could meaningfully determine whether the subsidy qualifies to be one of 
the exceptions.  Moreover, such a framework could create more stringent 
multilateral disciplines for subsidies in services than those that apply to goods and 
agriculture.  No legitimate reasons could justify such a tighter regulation.72 
A plurilalteral approach has been suggested by Rudolf Adlung.73  His key focus is on 
“whether it would be possible to motivate a critical mass of governments that have a joint-fiscal 
and economic policy-interest in protecting themselves from subsidy-related temptations.”74  This 
approach does not create many incentives for Members.75  Thus, I will discuss only the two 
existing subsidy-regulating frameworks in this Chapter, and present a new Proposal for the 
regulation of service subsidies. 
C.  IS IT APPROPRIATE TO APPLY THE SCM AGREEMENT TRAFFIC-LIGHT 
FRAMEWORK TO SERVICE SUBSIDIES? 
Before pointing out the advantages and disadvantages of the two existing system, it is important 
to understand two types of norms in the creation of laws.  The first type of norm prohibits a 
certain behavior, while the second type prohibits a certain behavior only if it produces an 
                                                 
71 Ward, supra note 67. 
72 Ward, supra note 67. 
73 Senior economist, Trade in Services Division, WTO Secretariat.  E-mail:  rudolf.adlung@wto.org. 
74 Rudolf Adlung, Negotiations on Safeguards and Subsidies in Services: A Never-Ending Story?”, Journal of 
International Economic Law, Vol. 10  Issue 2, 235-265 (2007).  Ward, supra note 67. 
75 Ward, supra note 67. 
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undesirable effect.76  As for the second type, legal tests are necessary to demonstrate that the 
undesirable effects indeed took place.77  Both the SCM Agreement and the AoA involve the 
application of each of these two types of norms. 
As I introduced above, when people refer to the traffic-light system in the SCM 
Agreement, it means three kinds of subsidies (only two now remain).  There are prohibited 
subsidies (red-light subsidies), actionable subsidies (yellow-light subsidies), and non-actionable 
subsidies (green-light subsides).78  Non-actionable subsidies no longer exist. 
1.  The SCM Agreement Rationale for a Traffic-Light Framework 
As mentioned above, the SCM Agreement is a huge step forward in dealing with subsidies 
internationally.  The traffic-light concept was based on the premise that some subsidies were 
trade distorting per se while others were benign or even noble, and that subsidies ranged from 
prohibited red at one end of the spectrum to non-actionable green at the other.79 
The SCM Agreement combines the two types of norms introduced earlier.  Prohibited 
subsidies are considered the most trade-distorting subsidies.  Export subsidies and domestic 
substitute subsidies are two main targets to be regulated.  In regards to these two types of 
subsidies, the specific behaviour is simply prohibited(the first type of norm).  Therefore, once a 
Member is found to engage in such behaviour, that behaviour must be avoided. 
On the other hand, actionable subsidies fit regulation by the second type of legal norm.  
This kind of subsidy is not directly prohibited, but is used to prohibit the effect resulting from the 
                                                 
76 Marc Benitah, The Law of Subsidies under the GATT/WTO System, Kluwer Law International, 11 (2001) 
77 Id. 
78 For detailed information on these categories, please refer to Chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
79  European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, EC Submission in DDA Negotiations: Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Brussels, 19 November 2002, Ref. 492/02-Rev.3, at 2, available at  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/july/tradoc_112234.pdf. 
 236 
act.  Therefore, the system must provide a process for determination of any adverse effects 
produced by this type of subsidy.80  This second type shifts the burden of proof to the defendant 
country to rebut the accusation of serious prejudice.81 
2.  Current Discussions 
We can start with Members’ submissions to see relevant discussions.  These will include the 
communications from Mexico, Chile, Singapore, and Chinese Taipei. 
In Singapore’s submission, there are several questions concerning how to adapt the SCM 
Agreement structure (traffic-light category) to the GATS Article XV disciplines.82 
Chinese Taipei also uses the SCM Agreement structure in its submission to classify 
subsidies.83  Those subsidies are tested using three questions:  (1) What is the form of the 
subsidy?  (2) Who is the beneficiary of the program?  (3) What are the effects of the program and 
are these effects distortive? 
Some scholars do not mention explicitly what structure they prefer, but they do utilize the 
SCM Agreement structure in their discussion.84  Pieere Sauvé discusses the possibility of using 
the SCM Agreement structure as a model.  He believes that the current SCM Agreement 
definition of “green-light” subsidy may provide a workable basis for services trade.85   He 
                                                 
80 The SCM Agreement, supra note 30, art. 5 and 6. 
81 Benitah, supra note 76, at 32 
82 Working Party on GATS Rules, supra note 4. 
83  Working Party on GATS Rules, The Separate Customs Territory Of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen And Mastu: 
Definition Of Subsidies In Services, JOB(04)/78 (June, 17, 2004). 
84 David Vivas Eugui, Negotiations in WTO on the Rules of the General Agreement on Trade in Services: the case of 
Venezuela, in UNCTAD Commercial Diplomacy Programme, UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/6, 7 February 2001, at 20-28., 
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/poditctncd6.en.pdf.  Pierre, supra note 54, at 327. 
85  Id. at 328. (“In the SCM Agreement, “green-light” subsidies encompass four types of activities: generally 
available subsidies (i.e., subsidies not specific within the meaning of the SCM Agreement), research and pre-
competitive development activities (R&D), regional development aid, and certain environmental subsidies (i.e., 
assistance for the adaptation of existing plants to new environmental requirement) It is interesting to note that each 
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suggests that the green-light subsidy can be maintained and might need to include more sectors.86  
However, he also raises many questions about applying the SCM Agreement structure, including 
whether it is realistic to analogize some regulations from goods to services.87  David Vivas Eugui 
also applies the SCM Agreement classification in his discussion of the subsidy classification 
system.88 
3.  Sub-conclusion 
The SCM Agreement structure represents the most comprehensive discipline for subsidies.  It 
categorizes subsidies into groups, and requires Members to eliminate export subsidies and 
domestic substitute subsidies. 
In my view, it would be perfect for Members to agree on this structure; however, it seems 
impossible.  First, the complexity of the GATS is well-recognized.  It is difficult to provide 
satisfactory answers to all Members concerns.  If Members refuse to accept this proposal, but 
                                                                                                                                                             
of these activities can constitute service sectors in their own rights.  If WTO members collectively deemed it 
appropriate in the Uruguay Round to protect such practices in the context of trade in goods, should the same 
reasoning not extend to services trade and investment?”) 
86 Id. at 329. (“In addition to the above listed activities, it might be necessary to examine the possible ramifications 
for social services (education, health, and related social services) In principle, subsidies to these types of activities 
should not be at issue because they typically involve services rendered in the exercise of governmental authority, 
which are carved out under Art. I:3(b) of the GATS.  However, some of these sectors represent commercially 
readable services, already listed in some countries’ schedules.  There is little doubt that this issue raises particular 
sensitivities in many jurisdictions that will likely require specific and careful attention in developing any acceptable 
subsidy disciplines.  The creation of an SCM-like “green box” (or non-actionable) approach to subsidies which are 
granted for the pursuit of recognized social or non-economic objectives (e.g. environmental protection, provision of 
services in remote or disadvantaged areas) could be considered in this regard.”)   
87 Id. at 329-330.  (“export subsidies” in each mode.  For mode 1, he thinks “it’s roughly comparable to trade in 
goods, and the theoretically the same prohibition could well be applicable.” For mode 2, “the scenario is reversed 
because the consumer travels to the supplier’s territory to consume a service.  How then might an export subsidy be 
applicable?” For mode 3, “it is unlikely that a domestic government would provide a subsidy to a firm that is 
considering relocating or establishing a commercial presence in another jurisdiction.”  For mode 4, he questions that 
“is it realistic for governments to provide a subsidy for persons leaving the country?”)  
88 Eugui, supra note 83, at 25.  (He made several comments on drawing up a classification system for subsidies.  
And he provides suggestions for developing countries if they want to include a list of non-actionable subsidies.) 
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reject it by raising more questions, the difficulty of regulating services subsidies will only 
increase. 
Second, the red light category obliges Members to eliminate all related subsidies.  Such a 
requirement creates governmental burdens on Members to gather information, and then remove 
those subsidies at once.  Under the progressive liberalization method of the GATS, Members 
would be reluctant to commit to market access.  Without such commitments, the GATS goal of 
progressive liberalization cannot be achieved. 
D.  IS IT APPROPRIATE TO APPLY THE AOA FRAMEWORK TO SERVICE 
SUBSIDIES? 
The AoA contains a different structure than the SCM Agreement.  It only applies to agricultural 
products.  As for non-agricultural products, the rules of the SCM Agreement apply.  The AoA 
provides simple distinctions by allocating agricultural products subsidies into the Green/Blue 
Box and all others to the Amber-Box. 
1.  The Rationale for the AOA System 
It has been mentioned previously that agricultural subsidies have traditionally been a common 
practice among developed and developing countries.  They have been a major agenda issue in 
both the Uruguay Round and the Doha Round.  The sensitivity of agricultural subsidies is 
unquestionable. 
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Because agricultural export subsidies and domestic subsidies are indispensable 
instruments to a country, and many countries’ trade interests and economic development are 
severely affected by these subsidies,89 several provisions relating to agricultural export subsidies 
or domestic subsidies still contain many effect-based norms (the second type).  That is to say, it 
would be rare to find a situation where a practice is completely prohibited.90  This greater 
flexibility undoubtedly stems from recognition on the part of negotiators of the widespread use 
of governmental supports.91 
2.  Current Discussions 
Argentina and Hong Kong, China are pro-AOA countries.  In a report made by the GATS 
Secretariat, it seems that they also favor the AoA approach for two reasons:92 
First, in contrast to the SCM Agreement, emphasis was placed on a commitment 
to reduce subsidy levels, in addition to establishing rules on the legal acceptability 
of various subsidy practices via the green box/blue box approach.  Arguably, 
where the overall reduction commitments apply, they obviate the need to identify 
carefully the nature and impact of each and every subsidizing intervention -- an 
arduous task in the face of inadequate information.  Secondly, restraints on the 
use of remedies against subsidies formed part of the package involving subsidy 
reduction commitments.  It may be that subsidy disciplines structured in this 
manner fit well into a framework that envisages progressive liberalization, which 
is a defining feature of the AoA.  The question here is whether there might be a 
place for comparable step-by-step arrangements in the case of services.93 
 
Members have also expressed the opinions that a gradual method should be used to 
reduce subsidies.  Hong Kong, China and Argentina have stated that, 
                                                 
89 Bossche, supra note 23, at 84. 
90 Benitah, supra note 6, at 18. 
91  Paul C. Rosenthal and Lynn E. Duffy, Reforming Global Trade in Agriculture, in,  THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION: MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING 
LEGISLATION, 171 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996). 
92 Working Party on GATS Rules, Subsidies And Trade In Service: Note by the Secretariat, S/WPGR/W/9, at 7 
(March, 6, 1996). 
93 Id. 
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[i]t can be argued that the way to deal with subsidies is not through an 
(aggressive) approach, such as countervailing measures but rather on a gradual 
basis, possibly by a similar approach to that in agriculture and TRIMS:  ie. a 
programme under which Members agree:  to cap the current levels of subsidies; 
and to reduce their subsidies (in a range of sectors to be agreed multilaterally).  
Discussion of the experiences of New Zealand and Australia on the prohibition of 
new and expanded export subsidies and the elimination of existing export 
subsidies might in instructive-as might discussion of the experience of the EU in 
containing and reducing state aid that distorts international competition.94 
 
Some scholars also think applying the AoA structure is more appropriate for the gradual 
liberalization in the GATS.  Additionally, this structure gives developing countries more 
advantages.95  Prof. Benitah states that the philosophy of the AoA (standstill/reduction model) 
seems more appropriate and would provide a practical solution for a highly technical issue.96 
In one ICTSD publication, scholars suggested a series of actions for adopting the AoA 
structure into the GATS: 
(1) agreement on a definition for subsidies in services; 
(2) mandatory notification of all services subsidies; 
(3) stand-still commitment (i.e. freezing of existing subsidies levels); 
(4) reduction of commitments of existing non-exempt subsidies to be implemented in a 
sequential manner; and 
(5) eventual phase out of all non-exempt support97 
                                                 
94  Working Party on GATS Rules, Communication From Argentina And Hong Kong, China: Development of 
Multilateral Disciplines Governing Trade Distortive Subsidies in Services, S/WPGR/W/31, at 5 (March, 16, 2000). 
95 Jean-Francois Bellis, LACK OF CLEAR REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF SAFEGUARDS, GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 
AND SUBSIDIES, IN THE WTO AND GLOBAL CONVERGENCE IN TELECOMMUNICATION AND AUDIO-VISUAL SERVICES, 
300-301 (2004). 
96 Benitah, supra note 6, at 1. 
97 Eugui and Werth, supra note 55, at 16. 
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3.  Sub-conclusion 
It seems that scholars are more inclined to adopt the AoA structure than the SCM Agreement 
structure because the AoA fits the progressive liberalization principle under the GATS.  It puts 
less pressure on Members and makes them more willing to conduct negotiations.  However, there 
is one thing we need to pay attention to:  the current status of the AoA. 
The AoA has always been a central issue during WTO negotiation rounds.  In September 
2003, the Cancun Negotiation Round met its deadlock on agricultural issues.98  Later, in March 
2004, the negotiation was re-opened.99  In 2005, Members made a new negotiation package at 
the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference.100  However, Members met another deadlock in 2006, 
while discussing market access on agricultural products, domestic supports, and NAMA.101  
WTO Chief of the Ministerial Conference, Pascal Lamy, announced the stop of all negotiations 
on July 24, 2006.102 
The Doha Negotiation Round was resumed on February 7, 2007. 103   Even though 
Members have reached a consensus on some issues, the negotiation remains stalled.104 
It is worth noting that the AoA structure allows Members to sit down and talk at the 
beginning.  But, the subsequent reduction of their commitments depends greatly upon Members’ 
cooperation and enthusiasm.  Adopting the AoA structure in the services trade will mean that 
                                                 
98  Chung-Hua Institute for Economic Research, New Negotiaiton Rounds – Agriculture, 
http://taiwan.wtocenter.org.tw/issue/issuenego_AG.asp?id=30. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101  Id.  See also Anup Shah, WTO Doha “Development” Trade Round Collapse, July 28, 2006, 
http://www.globalissues.org/article/663/wto-doha-development-trade-round-collapse-2006.  Lori Wallach and 
Deborah James, Why the WTO Doha Round Talks Have Collapsed and a Path Forward, August 14, 2006, 
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0814-33.htm. 
102 Chung-Hua Institute for Economic Research, supra note 97. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
 242 
future deadlock is possible.  So we need to ask ourselves whether we are ready to assume the 
potential consequence of its application. 
E.  IS IT APPROPRIATE TO APPLY A “HYBRID” APPROACH TO SERVICE 
SUBSIDIES? 
Both the SCM Agreement and the AoA structures have advantages and disadvantages in dealing 
with service subsidies.  In order for Members to reach a consensus, I propose a third alternative 
for consideration. 
1.  The Rationale for a Hybrid System for GATS 
The idea of an approach other than those in the SCM Agreement and the AoA has been 
suggested by others.  The Chairmen of the Working Party on GATS Rules suggested this 
approach when he said, 
…work on subsidies is affected by the “chicken and the egg” syndrome and very 
limited progress has been made on technical issues….  I would also like to 
encourage Members to submit new proposals – formal or informal – taking into 
account the specificities of the GATS.  I do not underestimate the role of the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures in stimulating our 
deliberations, but I think that an approach more closely related to the GATS 
framework is needed in order to advance work on the core issues.105 
 
Switzerland proposed a Draft Annex on Export Subsidies in 2004, and it targeted the 
disciplines on export service subsidies. 106   The structure to regulate service subsidies that 
                                                 
105 WTO Working Party on GATS Rules, Negotiations on Subsidies: Report by the Chairperson of the Working 
Party on GATS Rules, WTO S/WPGR/20, at para. 19 (June, 30, 2003). 
106 林彩瑜，《「有關新加坡及瑞士所提服務補貼文件之法律意見」》，台大法律學院WTO研究中心, translated in, Tsai-Yu 
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Switzerland discussed is close to the AoA structure because it adopted stand-still 
commitments107 and progressive phase-outs.108  But it developed a connection with Members’ 
commitment lists regarding service sectors. 109   Under the Swiss proposal, stand-still 
commitments and progressive phase-out would only apply to the service sectors that Members 
have agreed to open.110  This example shows that a new way of disciplining service subsidies, in 
order to accommodate its complexity, is no stranger to Members. 
2.  Future Development 
In this section, I propose a combination of the SCM Agreement and AoA structures. 
a.  Traffic-light Classification  It is widely agreed that the classification of subsidies in the 
SCM Agreement is very clear and reasonable.  Hence, applying the three-category traffic-light 
approach to the GATS by dividing subsidies into (1) semi-prohibited subsidies (semi-red light 
subsidies), (2) semi-actionable subsidies (semi-yellow light subsidies), and (3) non-actionable 
subsidies (green light subsidies) should be clear as well. 
I propose semi-prohibited subsidy classifications for services trade, instead of the 
prohibited subsidy as described in the SCM Agreement, in order to combine the SCM and AoA 
approaches.  As mentioned in the previous chapters, subsidies are mostly implemented to 
achieve social purposes, and to consider what is essential to public interests.  Therefore, my 
                                                                                                                                                             
Lin, Legal Opinions On Singapore’s And Switzerland’s Submissions Regarding Service Subsidies, National Taiwan 
University-WTO Research Center, at 10 (Jan. 2005). 
107 Id. (citing Switzerland, Draft Annex on Export Subsidies (2004/12), art. 4(2)). 
108 Id. (citing Switzerland, Draft Annex on Export Subsidies (2004/12), art. 4(1)). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. (citing Switzerland, Draft Annex on Export Subsidies (2004/12), art. 3). 
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proposed classification recognizes recognize the importance of having a non-actionable category 
in service subsidies. 
b.  Stand-still Commitments and Progressive Phase-out in the Semi-Red light Subsidy  
Members are reluctant to discuss subsidies not only because of their complexity, but also 
because of their sensitive nature.  There is no doubt that WTO Members are pressured internally 
to implement subsidies on service sectors domestically.  In order to fulfill their obligations for 
information exchange, Members will need to invest a lot of resources.  However, the information 
exchange is only the first step, and Members have shown reluctance to take that first step.  This 
leaves the establishment of further disciplines also without a concrete path. 
First, it is important to create incentives and increase Member enthusiasm for dealing 
with service subsidies on a global level.  Of course, the topic is listed in the agenda, so Members 
are obliged to address it.  Nevertheless, I propose combining the ceiling restrictions from the 
AoA with the SCM Agreement prohibited subsidy categorization.111  This means that, in this 
category, Members are not allowed to implement these subsidies.  But Members do not have to 
eliminate all such existing subsidies at once.  Instead, they can progressively reduce subsidies in 
this category.  This is why I call this category a semi-red light subsidy. 
The SCM Agreement prohibits both export subsidies 112  and domestic substitution 
subsidies.113  The reason to highlight these two types of subsidies is because they result in the 
most trade-distortive effects, and should, therefore, be eliminated.  There is no reason why we 
cannot apply the same theory to services trade.  I therefore propose in service subsidies that these 
two subsidies should be prohibited as well. 
                                                 
111 The SCM Agreement, supra note 30, art. 3. 
112 Id. art. 3.1(a). 
113 Id. art. 3.1(b). 
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As discussed earlier, the Members’ biggest concern is whether there will be realistic 
examples regarding export and domestic subsidies in all four modes.  Due to the limit of 
statistical evidence, no comprehensive report can demonstrate the existence of all such subsidies 
in the services sector.  In addition, compared to goods trade, market access to each service sector 
is different.  While this may not present a factual issue right now, this does not mean there will 
not be an issue in the future. 
A good approach to services subsidies regulation should be both comprehensive and 
effective.  It should evolve with time and sometimes ahead of time.  It will require both the 
necessary rules and a dispute settlement process.  If Members agree upon this at the beginning, 
then having disciplines on export and domestic service subsidies at the present stage should be 
reasonable. 
The system will also require stand-still commitments and a phase-out process.  Members 
should specify in their commitments what export and domestic service subsidies are in effect.  
And Members should set up schedules to gradually reduce existing subsidies according to those 
schedules. 
A system that (1) provides the necessary rules, (2) includes a dispute settlement 
mechanism, (3) requires stand-still commitments, and (3) establishes a phase-out process, should 
encourage Member participation in developing subsidy regulations.  Basing such a system on an 
SCM/AoA hybrid approach should allow more detailed rules on service subsidies by adopting 
that aspect of the SCM Agreement framework. 
c.  Categories and Time Duration for Green-light Subsidies  So Member and scholar 
discussions lead to the conclusion that there can be several types of subsidies listed in the green 
 246 
light category.114  Most importantly, these service subsidies shall not be specific, and shall be 
either de jure or de facto.  I propose that those subsidies that are specific, but meet the following 
conditions, should also be included as green-light subsidies: 
(1) Subsidies designed to achieve a public policy.115  This may include, but is not 
limited to, assistance not involving direct payments to producers or processors, 
such as research, pest and disease control, extension and advisory, marketing, and 
infrastructural services, water, energy, transport, and education;116 
(2) Subsidies to disadvantaged regions, not limited to specific enterprises or 
industries within a region, that are given as part of a general framework of 
regional development, where the region can be shown to be disadvantaged in 
terms of economic development (e.g. income per capital or household income per 
capita, or GDP);117 
(3) Disaster relief subsidies.118 
(4) Research & Development subsidies:  Assistance for research activities conducted 
by firms or by higher education or research establishments on a contract basis 
with firms, up to a maximum of 75% of the costs of industrial research or 50% of 
the costs of pre-competitive development activity, subject to a number of 
conditions on the scope of the assistance;119 
                                                 
114 Working Party on GATS Rules, Communication From Hong Kong, China And Mexico: Non-Actionable Subsidies 
In Trade In Services, JOB(07)/27 (March, 7, 2007). 
115 Synthesis Report of the Discussions in the Meeting, supra note 42, at 4, para. 13. 
116 Working Party on GATS Rules, supra note 113, at para. 4(a). 
117 Id. at para. 3(b). 
118 Id. at para. 4(d). 
119 Id. 
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(5) Environmental protection subsidies:  assistance to adapt existing facilities to new 
environmental requirements, provided that the help is given on a one-time basis, 
is limited to 20% of total costs, and is generally available to all eligible firms.120 
The first category is necessary to achieve a certain public policy.  It is without doubt that 
subsidies are the most efficient tool used by governments to accomplish a variety of economic, 
social or environmental objectives.121  However, sometimes both beneficiaries and institutions 
are easily addicted to subsidies, and without these subsidies, a wave of bankruptcies can 
happen.122  In order to prevent this from taking place, but also insure a country’s development, a 
necessity test is required to determine the need for such a subsidy.  In general, the focus should 
be on national policy objectives, and Members’ rights to regulate outlined in the GATS should 
not be compromised.123 
Following this rationale, a standard of necessity should be established.  The necessity test 
contained in the GATT Article XX general exception can be a useful reference for future 
disciplines.124  Some scholars have already suggested examining whether the subsidy used is 
needed to achieve the policy goal, and whether it is not more trade-restrictive than necessary.125 
As to the second and third category, disadvantaged regions and disaster relief are 
borrowed from the goods disciplines.  Without government support, service providers are hardly 
willing to invest in these areas.  To provide an optimal standard of living for people located in 
these areas, it is important to have this exception.  This same emphasis on the importance of 
subsidies is applicable in the disaster relief area. 
                                                 
120 Id. at para. 3(c). 
121 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Subsidies To Services Sectors: A Neo-Protectionist 
Distortion Or A Useful Development Tool?, UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/MISC/2003/7, 20 April 2005, at 3, para. 1.1, 
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditctncdmisc20037_en.pdf. 
122 Id. at 10, para. 2.1. 
123 Synthesis Report of the Discussions in the Meeting, supra note 42, at 4, para. 13. 
124 See generally Lo, supra note 52, at 277-280. 
125 Synthesis Report of the Discussions in the Meeting, supra note 122. 
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R&D is an important and controversial part of the SCM Agreement, but still, as the role 
of knowledge in the modern economy cannot be overemphasized,126  R&D has a unique, crucial, 
and universal impact on each country’s productivity and competitiveness.127  R&D activities, in 
particular, are the main sources of innovation and productivity, and  ultimately play a crucial role 
in economic development at large.128  It is important to have this category listed in the non-
actionable subsidies.  Moreover, the negative effect and perverse distortions commonly 
associated with subsidies are likely to be minimal, if any, in the case of R&D.129 
The last category is the protection of the environment.  Some major subsidies to services 
have caused the pollution of the environment.  Subsidies to energy services are commonly used 
in developing and developed countries, and the main environmental problems resulting from 
energy production include global warming, land and sea pollution caused by acid rain, dust and 
soot, incomplete combustion, and health problems.130  Subsidies to transport services can also 
increase environmental problems.  Exhaust emitted from vehicles is a major cause of pollution.  
Hence, subsidies granting assistance to facilities that are more environment-friendly should be 
taken into consideration. 
d.  Semi-Actionable Service Subsidies  Those service subsidies that are not semi-prohibited or 
non-actionable should fall under the category of actionable subsidies.  These subsidies should not 
be prohibited unless there is evidence of adverse effects.  The reason behind this category is that, 
considering subsidies as a kind of economic pollution.  The modern economy could not function 
                                                 
126 See generally GROSSMAN, G. AND E.  HELPMAN, INNOVATION AND GROWTH IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (1991) 
(Investment in the R&D is the centerpiece of “new growth theory”). 
127 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 120, at 14. 
128 Id., at. 14, footnote 8. 
129 Id. at. 15. 
130 Id. at 20-21. 
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if every kind of polluting economic activity was fully prohibited.131  Thus, they need to provide a 
balanced mechanism.  GATT/WTO negotiators realized that a complete prohibition on any kind 
of subsidy was not economically, socially, or politically feasible.132   Partial protections for 
parties who suffer from adverse conditions are definitely more feasible. 
In this category, a Member should be required to prove that a certain service subsidy, 
performed by another Member, indeed causes adverse effects.  The criteria listed in the SCM 
Agreement can offer guidance.133  As for the definition of serious prejudice, some examples can 
be taken into account.134  These requirements are essential to semi-actionable subsidies.  As I 
proposed earlier, the progressive phasing-out process is the main idea in the services trades.  
Therefore, we can utilize this concept and apply it to the actionable subsidies in the SCM 
Agreement. 
Service subsidies that fall into this category are only actionable when they cause adverse 
effects to other Members.  Members can refer to those criteria in the SCM Agreement.  
However, if a subsidy is found to adversely affects another Member, it should be subject to a 
reduction commitment determined by the Dispute Settlement Body.  As for how much the 
reduction should be, this can be determined either by the Working Party or the DSB based on the 
best available information.  This serves the idea of having progressive development in the 
services trades, and also can be the motive for Members to deal with the service subsidy issue.  
                                                 
131 Id. at 35. 
132 Id. 
133 The SCM Agreement, supra note 30, art. 5. (“(1) injury to the domestic industry of another Member; (2) 
nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or indirectly to other Members under GATT 1994 in 
particular the benefits of concessions bound under Article II of GATT 1994; (3) serious prejudice to the interests of 
another Member.”) 
134 Id. art. 6. (“(1) subsidies to cover operating losses sustained by an industry; (2) subsidies to cover operating 
losses sustained by an enterprise, other than one-time measures which are non-recurrent and cannot be repeated for 
that enterprise and which are given merely to provide time for the development of long-term solutions and to avoid 
acute social problems; (3) direct forgiveness of debt, i.e. forgiveness of government-held debt, and grants to cover 
debt repayment.”) 
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Members have to know what is taking place within their jurisdictions.  If they don’t, they might 
face the possibility of losing their privileges.  Moreover, this can provide Members with 
additional motivation to adhere to the information exchange mandates on their own, instead of 
relying on the Working Party. 
e.  The Inclusion of a Peace Clause  Since the hybrid approach adopts the phasing-out method, 
I propose that there is a need for the inclusion of a peace clause, or due restraint.  Article 13 of 
the AoA is an example of such a peace clause.  Such a clause would provide that “agricultural 
subsidies committed under the agreement cannot be challenged under other WTO agreements, in 
particular the Subsidies Agreement and GATT.”135  This provision contains the privileges for the 
AoA categories.  It prohibits Members from challenging Green-box subsidies or applying 
countervailing duties under the AoA.136  Amber/Blue-box categories can face the possibility of 
CVD but with the exercise of due restraint.137  Export subsidies are also protected from CVD 
                                                 
135 World Trade Organization, Glossary Term:  peace clause, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/peace_clause_e.htm. 
136 Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1A, 1999, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410. [hereinafter AoA], art. 13 (a). (“domestic support measures that conform fully 
to the provisions of Annex 2 to this Agreement shall be: 
(i) non-actionable subsidies for purposes of countervailing duties; 
(ii) exempt from actions based on Article XVI of GATT 1994 and Part III of the Subsidies Agreement; and 
(iii) exempt from actions based on non-violation nullification or impairment of the benefits of tariff concessions 
accruing to another Member under Article II of GATT 1994, in the sense of paragraph 1(b) of  Article XXIII of 
GATT 1994.”) 
137 Id. art. 13(b).  (““domestic support measures that conform fully to the provisions of Article 6 of this Agreement 
including direct payments that conform to the requirements of paragraph 5 thereof, as reflected in each Member’s 
Schedule, as well as domestic support within de minimis levels and in conformity with paragraph 2 of Article 6, shall 
be: 
(i) exempt from the imposition of countervailing duties unless a determination of injury or threat thereof is made 
in accordance with Article VI of GATT 1994 and Part V of the Subsidies Agreement, and due restraint shall be 
shown in initiating any countervailing duty investigations; 
(ii) exempt from actions based on paragraph 1 of Article XVI of GATT 1994 or Articles 5 and 6 of the Subsidies 
Agreement, provided that such measures do not grant support to a specific commodity in excess of that decided 
during the 1992 marketing year; and 
(iii) exempt from actions based on non-violation nullification or impairment of the benefits of tariff concessions 
accruing to another Member under Article II of GATT 1994, in the sense of paragraph 1(b) of Article XXIII of 
GATT 1994, provided that such measures do not grant support to a specific commodity in excess of that 
decided during the 1992 marketing year;”) 
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with some conditions and with the admonition of due restraint.138   The AoA peace clause 
remained in effect for a period of nine years, expiring at the end of 2003.139 
In the hybrid system, green-light subsidies should be subject to the same privilege as the 
Green-box subsidies.  Semi-prohibited/semi-actionable subsidies should be exempt from the 
application of CVD due to the lack of empirical evidence currently available regarding certain 
CVD matters.140  But the peace clause is not without time limit.  Members should set a time 
frame for such a privilege to expire. 
                                                 
138 Id. art. 13(c).  (“export subsidies that conform fully to the provisions of Part V of this Agreement, as reflected in 
each Member’s Schedule, shall be: 
(i) subject to countervailing duties only upon a determination of injury or threat thereof based on volume, effect 
on prices, or consequent impact in accordance with Article VI of GATT 1994 and Part V of the Subsidies 
Agreement, and due restraint shall be shown in initiating any countervailing duty investigations; and 
(ii) exempt from actions based on Article XVI of GATT 1994 or Articles 3, 5 and 6 of the Subsidies Agreement.”) 
139  World Trade Organization, Agriculture:  Explanation, Other issues, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_intro05_other_e.htm#peace_clause. 
140 See Chapter 9 for detailed explanations. 
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F.  SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
The idea to incorporate special and differential treatment in the GATS was taken from the 
introduction to Article 27 in the SCM Agreement.141  As discussed previously, there is no 
evidence that suggests that goods trade is so different from service trade as to require an entirely 
new subsidy control mechanism.  It is possible to apply the existing special and differential 
(S&D) treatments in service trades.  Moreover, doing so can only give developing countries 
incentives to sit down and talk about the subsidy regulation issues. 
                                                 
141 The SCM Agreement, supra note 30, art. 27.  (“27.1  Members recognize that subsidies may play an important 
role in economic development programmes of developing country Members.) 
27.2 The prohibition of paragraph 1(a) of Article 3 shall not apply to: 
(a) developing country Members referred to in Annex VII. 
(b) other developing country Members for a period of eight years from the date of entry into force of the WTO 
Agreement, subject to compliance with the provisions in paragraph  4. 
27.3 The prohibition of paragraph 1(b) of Article 3 shall not apply to developing country Members for a period of 
five years, and shall not apply to least developed country Members for a period of eight years, from the date of entry 
into force of the WTO Agreement. 
27.4 Any developing country Member referred to in paragraph 2(b) shall phase out its export subsidies within the 
eight-year period, preferably in a progressive manner.  However, a developing country Member shall not increase 
the level of its export subsidies,141 and shall eliminate them within a period shorter than that provided for in this 
paragraph when the use of such export subsidies is inconsistent  with its development needs.  If a developing 
country Member deems it necessary to apply such subsidies beyond the 8-year period, it shall not later than one year 
before the expiry of this period enter into consultation with the Committee, which will determine whether an 
extension of this period is justified, after examining all the relevant economic, financial and development needs of 
the developing country Member in question.  If the Committee determines that the extension is justified, the 
developing country Member concerned shall hold annual consultations with the Committee to determine the 
necessity of  maintaining the subsidies.  If no such determination is made by the Committee, the developing country 
Member shall phase out the remaining export subsidies within two years from the end of the last authorized period. 
27.5 A developing country Member which has reached export competitiveness in any given product shall phase out 
its export subsidies for such product(s) over a period of two years.  However, for a developing country Member 
which is referred to in Annex VII and which has reached export  competitiveness in one or more products, export 
subsidies on such products shall be gradually phased out over a period of eight years.   
27.6 Export competitiveness in a product exists if a developing country Member’s exports of that product have 
reached a share of at least 3.25 per cent in world trade of that product for two consecutive calendar years.  Export 
competitiveness shall exist either (a) on the basis of notification by the developing country Member having reached 
export competitiveness, or (b) on the basis of a computation undertaken by the Secretariat at the request of any 
Member.  For the purpose of this paragraph, a product is defined as a section heading of the Harmonized System 
Nomenclature.  The Committee shall review the operation of this provision five years from the date of the entry into 
force of the WTO Agreement. 
27.7 The provisions of Article 4 shall not apply to a developing country Member in the case of export  subsidies 
which are in conformity with the provisions of paragraphs 2 through 5.  The relevant provisions in such a case shall 
be those of Article 7. 
27.8 There shall be no presumption in terms of paragraph 1 of Article 6 that a subsidy granted by a developing 
country Member results in serious prejudice, as defined in this Agreement.  Such serious prejudice, where applicable 
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In addition to providing incentives, it is also important for developing countries to know 
that services trade liberalization is not only for the benefit of developed countries.  It is important 
for developing nations as well.  Major developing countries are increasingly involved in service 
markets, such as information technology, back office operations, and call centers.142  The unified 
regulation of service trades can also protect the interests of developing countries and least-
developed countries. 
The following are some suggested S&D treatments that are possible for consideration: 
                                                                                                                                                             
under the terms of paragraph 9, shall be demonstrated by positive evidence, in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraphs 3 through 8 of Article 6. 
27.9 Regarding actionable subsidies granted or maintained by a developing country Member other than those 
referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 6, action may not be authorized or taken under Article 7 unless nullification or 
impairment of tariff concessions or other obligations under GATT 1994 is found to exist as a result of such a subsidy, 
in such a way as to displace or impede imports of a like product of another Member into the market of the 
subsidizing developing country Member or unless injury to a domestic industry in the market of an importing 
Member occurs. 
27.10 Any countervailing duty investigation of a product originating in a developing country Member shall be 
terminated as soon as the authorities concerned determine that: 
(a) the overall level of subsidies granted upon the product in question does not exceed 2 per cent of its value 
calculated on a per unit basis; or 
(b) the volume of the subsidized imports represents less than 4 per cent of the total imports of the like product in 
the importing Member, unless imports from developing country Members whose individual shares of total imports 
represent less than 4 per cent collectively account for more than 9 per cent of the total imports of the like product in 
the importing Member. 
27.11 For those developing country Members within the scope of paragraph 2(b) which have eliminated  export 
subsidies prior to the expiry of the period of eight years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, 
and for those developing country Members referred to in Annex VII, the number in  paragraph 10(a) shall be 
3 per cent rather than 2 per cent.  This provision shall apply from the date that the elimination of export subsidies is 
notified to the Committee, and for so long as export subsidies are not granted by the notifying developing country 
Member.  This provision shall expire eight years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. 
27.12 The provisions of paragraphs 10 and 11 shall govern any determination of de minimis under paragraph 3 
of Article 15. 
27.13 The provisions of Part III shall not apply to direct forgiveness of debts, subsidies to cover social costs, in 
whatever form, including relinquishment of government revenue and other transfer of liabilities when such subsidies 
are granted within and directly linked to a privatization programme of a developing country Member, provided that 
both such programme and the subsidies involved are granted for a limited period and notified to the Committee and 
that the programme results in eventual privatization of the enterprise concerned. 
27.14 The Committee shall, upon request by an interested Member, undertake a review of a specific export 
subsidy practice of a developing country Member to examine whether the practice is in conformity with its 
development needs. 
27.15 The Committee shall, upon request by an interested developing country Member, undertake a review of a 
specific countervailing measure to examine whether it is consistent with the provisions of paragraphs 10 and 11 as 
applicable to the developing country Member in question.”) 
142 Bhala, supra note 39, at 101. 
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(1) Permission for subsidies in Mode I when research and development activities are 
concerned and permission for the developing countries to maintain free trade 
zones in services;143 
(2) Exemption from countervailing measures for the least developed countries, and 
for developing countries with some restrictions, such as a low gross domestic 
product (GDP) country, when the subsidies granted are too low, or the volume of 
subsidies are too low;144 
(3) Allowing developing countries to maintain export subsidies on services for longer 
periods, subject to their gradual removal;145 
(4) If services are aimed to develop domestic services, those services should be 
exempt from subsidy regulations with due moderation. 
The details of the above S&D treatment, such as the appropriate periods of time, the 
amounts of subsidies granted and the calculation of subsidies, are issues for future development.  
It is, however, unquestionable that having an S&D provision in service trades is necessary. 
G.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this chapter, I recommend that Members adopt the current definition of subsidy in goods trade 
to services trade.  The original text in the SCM Agreement should be preserved.  Hence, the 
definition of service subsidy should be: 
“(1) For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if: 
 
                                                 
143 Eugui, supra note 83, at 27. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
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(i) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body 
within the territory of a Member146 (referred to in this Agreement as 
“government”), i.e. where, but not limited to: 
(ii) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans,  
and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. 
loan guarantees); 
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g. 
fiscal incentives such as tax credits); 
(iii) a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, 
or purchases goods; 
(iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or 
directs a private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions 
illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested in the 
government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices 
normally followed by governments; 
 or 
(i) there is any form of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of 
GATT 1994; 
  and 
(b) a benefit is thereby conferred. 
 
(2) A subsidy as defined in paragraph 1 shall be subject to the provisions of 
this agreement only if such a subsidy is specific in accordance with the 
provisions of specificity. 
 
As for the specificity criteria, the concept embodied in the SCM Agreement can also be 
applicable: 
(1) In order to determine whether a subsidy is specific to an enterprise or industry or 
group of enterprises or industries (referred to in this Agreement as “certain 
enterprises”) within the jurisdiction of the granting authority, the following 
principles shall apply: 
(a) Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the 
granting authority operates, explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain 
enterprises, such subsidy shall be specific. 
(b) Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the 
granting authority operates, establishes objective criteria or conditions 
governing the eligibility for, and the amount of, a subsidy, specificity shall 
not exist, provided that the eligibility is automatic and that such criteria 
and conditions are strictly adhered to.  The criteria or conditions must be 
clearly spelled out in law, regulation, or other official document, so as to 
be capable of verification. 
                                                 
146 A more flexible interpretation is required to assess the relationship between the financial contribution and the 
subsidizing Member. 
 256 
(c) If, notwithstanding any appearance of non-specificity resulting from the 
application of the principles laid down in subparagraphs (a) and (b), there 
are reasons to believe that the subsidy may in fact be specific, other factors 
may be considered.  Such factors are:  use of a subsidy programme by a 
limited number of certain enterprises, predominant use by certain 
enterprises, the granting of disproportionately large amounts of subsidy to 
certain enterprises, and the manner in which discretion has been exercised 
by the granting authority in the decision to grant a subsidy.  In applying 
this subparagraph, account shall be taken of the extent of diversification of 
economic activities within the jurisdiction of the granting authority, as 
well as of the length of time during which the subsidy programme has 
been in operation. 
(2) A subsidy which is limited to certain enterprises located within a designated 
geographical region within the jurisdiction of the granting authority shall be 
specific.  It is understood that the setting or change of generally applicable tax 
rates by all levels of government entitled to do so shall not be deemed to be a 
specific subsidy for the purposes of this Agreement. 
(3) A subsidy which is limited to a certain mode of service supply or a certain sector 
of service trades inscribed in the Schedule of this Agreement, such subsidy shall 
be specific. 
(2) Any subsidy falling under the provisions of prohibited subsidies shall be 
deemed to be specific. 
(3) Any determination of specificity under the provisions of this Article shall 
be clearly substantiated on the basis of positive evidence.” 
 
The above two provisions are responsible for defining what a subsidy is.  In regards to 
the classification system, I propose to adopt a hybrid system, combining the SCM Agreement 
and AoA models. 
Table 19.  Proposed Hybrid Classification System for GATS 
Semi-prohibited 
Subsidy 
Following SCM Agreement Article 3, two subsidies should be identified:  (1) export 
subsidy; (2) domestic substitute subsidy.  
Members should specify in their commitments what export and domestic service subsidies 
are in effect.  And Members should set up time to gradually cut down the subsidies 
according to schedules. 
Semi-Actionable 
Subsidy 
This subsidy can be actionable only if it causes: 
(1) injury to the domestic industry of another Member; 
(2) nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or indirectly to other 
Members under GATT 1994 in particular the benefits of concessions bound under 
Article II of GATT 1994; 
(3) serious prejudice to the interests of another Member. 
After confirming the adverse effects caused by this subsidy, it shall be subject to 
reduction.  The amount of reduction is determined by the DSB or the Working Party, 
whoever obtains the best available information at hand.  
Non-actionable 
Subsidy 
(1) Assistance in services necessary to achieve certain public policy.  This may 
include, but is not limited to, assistance not involving direct payments to producers or 
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processors, such as research, pest and disease control, extension and advisory, 
marketing and infrastructural services, water, energy, transport, and education; 
(2) Disadvantaged regions not limited to specific enterprises or industries within a 
region, which is given as part of a general framework of regional development, and 
the region can be shown to be disadvantaged in terms of economic development (e.g. 
income per capital or household income per capita, or GDP) than the Member 
country as a whole; 
(3) Disaster Relief. 
(4) Research & Development:  Assistance for research activities conducted by 
firms or by higher education or research establishments on a contract basis with 
firms, up to a maximum of 75% of the costs of industrial research or 50% of the costs 
of pre-competitive development activity, subject to a number of conditions on the 
scope of the assistance; 
(5) Environmental protection:  assistance to adapt existing facilities to new 
environmental requirements, provided that the help is given on a one-time basis, is 
limited to 20% of total costs, and is generally available to all eligible firms 
 
Lastly, the incorporation of a peace clause and S&D treatment are necessary in the GATS 
subsidy disciplines.  These privileges are: 
(1) Non-actionable subsidies that conform fully to the provisions shall be: 
(i) non-actionable subsidies for purposes of countervailing duties;147 
(ii) exempt from actions based on Article XVI of GATT 1994 and Part III of 
the Subsidies Agreement; and 
(iii) exempt from actions based on non-violation nullification or impairment of 
the benefits of tariff concessions accruing to another Member under 
Article II of GATT 1994, in the sense of paragraph 1(b) of  Article XXIII 
of GATT 1994 
(2) Semi-prohibited and semi-actionable subsidies that conform fully to the 
provisions shall be exempt from the imposition of countervailing duties. 
(3) Permission for subsidies in Mode I when research and development activities are 
concerned and permission for the developing countries to maintain free trade 
zones in services; 
                                                 
147 “Countervailing duties” where referred to in this Article are those covered by Article VI of GATT 1994 and 
Part V of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
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(4) Exemption from the possible countervailing measures for the least developed 
countries, and for developing countries with some restrictions, such as a low gross 
domestic product (GDP) country, subsidies granted are too low, or the volume of 
subsidies are too low; 
(5) Allowing developing countries to maintain export subsidies on services for longer 
periods, subject to their gradual removal; 
(6) If services are aimed to develop domestic services, those services should be 
exempt from subsidy regulations with due moderation. 
The structure and wording of above provisions are only preliminary.  The purpose here 
has been to suggest the basic structure and approach. 
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VIII.  COUNTERVAILING MEASURES IN SERVICE TRADES 
To ascertain the appropriateness of countervailing measures in the services trade is one of the 
mandates listed in GATS Article XV.  With the hybrid regulation model I proposed in Chapter 7, 
the services trade regulation regime is not yet in a position to incorporate countervailing 
measures.  This does not suggest, however, that it is not an appropriate aspect of services trade 
regulation.  The GATS mandates that Members discuss countervailing measures, making this an 
appropriate area for further recommendations. 
A.  DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GOODS AND SERVICES IN THE APPLICATION OF 
COUNTERVAILING MEASURES 
In order to discuss the appropriateness of countervailing measures under the GATS, it is 
important to understand the purpose of such measures under the GATT.  Why did Members 
decide to allow such relief measures in goods trade?  Why should there be any entitlement to 
such relief?  Are the concerns any different in applying countervailing measures in the trade in 
services than in the trade in goods? 
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1.  The Purpose of Countervailing Measures 
The definition of a countervailing measure is an “action taken by the importing country, usually 
in the form of increased duties to offset subsidies given to producers or exporters in the exporting 
country.”1  Since these measures are usually in the form of duties, we frequently mention them as 
countervailing duties (CVD). 
For at least 100 years, international trade policy-makers have found that certain subsidies 
were inappropriate and responded with two mechanisms:  (1) permitting national governments to 
offset the effect of subsidies on imported goods by using countervailing duties; and (2) providing 
international rules concerning the use of subsidies in international trade.2  The United States 
passed a law addressing CVDs in 1897.3  Until now, the United States has been the most 
extensive user of CVDs; few other governments have done so and in rare cases.4  Therefore, in 
the SCM Agreement, the provisions on CVD proceedings largely track prior U.S. procedures.5 
Applying a CVD is no different from imposing a tariff.6  More precisely, a CVD is 
simply a duty on top of the MFN tariff.7  Prof. Jackson has discussed the policy underpinnings of 
CVDs and subsidies rules as follows:8 
                                                 
1  World Trade Organization, Glossary term:  countervailing measures, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/countervailing_measures_e.htm. 
2 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT & THE WTO, 94 (2000). 
3 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, 225 (1989).  See generally COMMITTEE OF WAYS AND MEANS 
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:  OVERVIEW AND COMPILATION OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES, 83-86 (2001). 
4 Jackson, supra note 2, at 87. 
5  M. Jean Anderson and Gregory Husisian, The Subsidies Agreement, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:  
MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION, 329 (Terence 
P. Stewart ed., 1996). 
6 RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:  INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE, 1062 (2007). 
7 Id.  See also Bhala, supra note 6, at 1054-1061.  (It provides detail economic analysis on subsidy effects on the 
Supply and Demand Curves.) 
8 Jackson, supra note 3. 
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(1) Economists demonstrate persuasively that subsidies can have a considerable 
distorting effect, and many subsidies in international trade clearly reduce overall 
world welfare.9 
(2) Because the uses of subsidies can seriously damage world welfare, there is a 
reason for the international trade system to intervene – to inhibit subsidies.10 
(3) Some still consider a system of international rules to be a second best solution 
regarding subsidies.  They are skeptical about the efficiency of international rules 
to achieve a certain discipline.11 
These reasons allow governments to utilize CVDs in order to discourage the use of 
subsidies.12  Do CVD laws really discourage the use of subsidies?  United States CVD laws have 
indeed had some impact.13  Not only are the CVD laws supported by policy reasons, but they are 
also supported by legal rationales.14  CVDs can rectify the unfairness caused by subsidies.15 
There are, however, criticisms of CVD laws.  Those criticisms are summarized by 
Jackson as follows: 
                                                 
9 Jackson, supra note 2, at 90.  (“Some might argue that CVD laws exalt property rights and interests of the minority 
over the majority. Domestic producers, the output of which a CVD protects, gain.  But their gain is the loss to the 
public, which pays higher prices.”)  
10 Id.  See also Jackson, supra note 2, at 92-3 and JACKSON, LOUIS, AND MATSUSHITA, IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO 
ROUND, NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM, CHAPTER 11 (1984).  (These two 
books contain more arguments in support of CVD laws.) 
11 Id. at 97. 
12  Id. at 91. (“This approach can be countenanced even though the motives of governments in applying 
countervailing duties are really not to maximize world welfare, but are instead to maximize the welfare of the 
producers who constitute important political constituencies within the country.”) 
13 Although it is a cursory study, Prof. Jackson has had personal discussions with foreign government officials who 
are planning to change their government subsidy programs due to pressure from exposure to US countervailing duty 
actions. 
14 Bhala, supra note 6, at 1066. 
15 Id.  (He also points out an opinion made by Prof. Robert W. Mcgee that “fairness can be defined as non-coercive 
exchange.  So long as an export-import deal is voluntary, with no official tariff, quota, or remedy, then it is fair.”  
CVD is an artificial interference with property rights, hence it may not suffice for fairness.) 
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(1) Only large countries are able to use CVDs to discourage the use of subsidies by 
other countries.  Small countries are generally unable to create such an impact.16 
(2) The appropriateness of CVDs is weakened by the economic analyses presented in 
the Sykes17 and Trebilcock18 papers, which show that CVDs have the welfare-
limiting effects of any tariff.19 
One thing to bear in mind is that CVDs only target export subsidies.  That is to say, in the 
case of export subsidies, only importing countries can initiate CVD proceedings towards 
exporting countries.  Why are export subsidies so heinous that the WTO still allows the use of 
CVDs while such measures remain controversial?  One prominent rationale against CVDs is that 
from the importing country’s perspective, “the consumers of subsidized goods and services will 
enjoy the lower prices that result from subsidies, even if taxpayers at large and unsubsidized 
producers suffer.”20  If an export subsidy is implemented on a certain good or service, consumers 
in the importing country will benefit from such a subsidy.  However, the same economist states 
that, 
To be sure, it is possible to devise scenarios in which subsidies granted by foreign 
governments to their exporting firms can be harmful to an importing nation.  One 
possibility is that the subsidy may drive out all competitors of the subsidized 
firms under circumstances where it is difficult for competitors to re-enter the 
market later, leaving the subsidized firms with monopoly power that results in 
higher (rather than lower) prices.21 
                                                 
16 Jackson, supra note 2, at 91. 
17 See generally Alan O. Sykes, Second-Best Countervailing Duty Policy:  A Critique of the Entitlement Approach, 
21 L. & Pol. Int’l Bus., 699 (1990).  
18 See generally Michael J. Trebilcock, Is the Game Worth the Candle?  Comments on A Search for Economic and 
Financial Principles in the Administration of U.S. Countervailing Duty Law, 21 L. & Pol. Int’l Bus. 
19 Jackson, supra note 2, at 97.  See also Bhala, supra note 6, at 876-7 (It provides more discussions on the neo-
classical assumptions underline the CVDs.) 
20 Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, John M. Olin Law & 
Economics Working Paper No. 186, 10 (2003), available at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/186.aos_.subsidies.pdf. 
21 Id. at 11. See also Janusz Ordover, Alan Sykes & Robert Willig, Unfair International Trade Practices, 15 N.Y.U.J. 
Int’l L. & Politics 323 (1983).  See also James Brander & Barbara Spencer, Export Subsidies and International 
Market Share Rivalry, 18 J. INT’L ECON. 83 (1985); Avinash Dixit and Alan Kyle, The Use of Protection and 
Subsidies for Entry Promotion and Deterrence, 75 Am. Econ. Rev. 139 (1982), Jonathan Eaton and Gene Grossman, 
263 
 
It seems that the question of the appropriateness of CVD laws is sometimes relatively 
subjective.  As Prof. Jackson states, 
Nevertheless, if one believes that the world would be better off if there were a 
general reduction of the use by governments of subsidies relating to products that 
grow in international trades, one could argue that the US policies, motivated for 
entirely different reasons, may fortuitously or coincidentally be having a salutary 
effect on the world economy.22 
 
But it is important to consider one thing:  In the case of services trade, is having a system 
of international rules still a second best solution regarding subsidies?  Perhaps to have a single 
mechanism to deal with subsidies is appropriate in services trades.  I suggest (below?) that if the 
appropriateness of CVD laws in service subsidies is denied, Members still have the second 
choice. 
2.  Current Discussions 
Regarding the question of whether it is appropriate to have countervailing measures, i.e., 
countervailing duties in services trade, there is not much information available to date.  
However, some scholars seems are strongly opposed to such measures. 
The majority opinion is that it is not possible to have a CVD mechanism in the services 
trade.  Professor Benitah does not recommend the adoption of a CVD regime due to its 
impracticability in the services trade.23  His reasons are listed as follows: 
1. CVDs can be a protectionist tool:  filing a CVD complaint could reduce foreign 
exporters’ competitors in several ways even if the case ends with a finding of a 
                                                                                                                                                             
Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly, 101 Q. J. Econ. 386 (1986).  (They provide more information 
on the economics models on the effect of export subsidies.) 
22 JOHN H. JACKSON, JEAN-VICTOR LOUIS, AND MITSUO MATSUSHITA, IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND:  LEGAL 
ASPECTS OF CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RULES, 255 (1982). 
23 Benitah, supra note 23, at. 36. 
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negative injury determination.  This would create uncertainty for foreign exporters 
and reduce their interests in investment.24 
(2) Redundancy with the future GATS safeguard measure:  Although no consensus 
yet, it is possible to argue that the simultaneous establishment of a CVD and the 
emergency safeguard measure (ESM) would lead to redundancy although there is 
presently no consensus.25 
(3) CVDs are only used by a few developed countries:  Since the establishment of 
CVDs, they have only been utilized by the U.S. and the EU.  The usefulness of 
CVDs is minor for developing countries.  Hence, it can be argued that it is not in 
the interest of developing countries to see the emergence of such a regime.26 
A report by the European Services Network clearly opposes establishing an equivalent to 
countervailing duties in services, citing difficulties in measurement and enforcement.27  The 
report states:  “The immense difficulties in measuring, classifying and regulating the supply of 
services should argue against any attempt to introduce a notion of countervail.  In trade of goods, 
the notion is very difficult to apply fairly; in services trade it would be almost impossible.”28 
Some still believe that the same actions that are taken in goods trade can be taken in 
services trade, but limitations arise from the very nature of services and from the methodological 
                                                 
24 Id. at 33. 
25 Id. at 34.  (“Article X of GATS mandates WTO Members to undertake multilateral negotiations on an emergency 
safeguard measure (ESM) for services…Many developing countries have proposed that governments be allowed to 
impose temporary restrictions on the supply or consumption of services if their domestic firms are threatened by 
surging services imports. But industrialized countries have been extremely unreceptive to the idea of an ESM in the 
service sector. The US in particular argues that the ESM advocates have failed to make a case for these safeguards 
and that any such rules could scare off investment by foreign service providers since they create legal 
uncertainty…the injury test would likely play a decisive role in bother of these regimes (ESM and subsidy) while 
the issue of ‘unfair’ subsidies would play a secondary role.”) 
26 Id. 
27 European Service Network Policy Committee, European Services Network Preliminary Views On Subsidies In 
Services:  Final Version, Jun. 25, 1999, at 4, available at http://www.esf.be/new/wp-
content/uploads/2009/06/subsidie.pdf. 
28 Id. 
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limitations in the investigative procedure. 29   David Vivas Eugui 30  sets out the factors that 
determine the possibility of applying CVDs in services as follows,31 
(1) Determining the injury:  he proposes that the same criteria as those put forward in 
the draft safeguards in services could be used. 
(2) Calculating the effect of the subsidy on the supply of services:  he believes that 
calculations in services are more complex than those in goods.  The technical 
problems and economic measurement problems need to be solved by those 
interested countries. 
(3) Calculation of countervailing measures:  He believes it would be possible to work 
with abstract units for the supply of services.  However, this kind of solution is 
arbitrary and would be very difficult to apply. 
(4) Imposition of border measures:  He believes it would be impossible to apply the 
same mechanisms as in goods.  The use of taxes on consumption or on the supply 
of the service, which follow the commercial transaction rather than the good or 
service, is recommended. 
3.  Sub-conclusion 
As mentioned earlier, once a Member determines that its domestic service industries suffered 
material injury from another Member’s subsidy there are two ways to deal with subsidy 
                                                 
29 David Vivas Eugui, Negotiations in WTO on the Rules of the General Agreement on Trade in Services:  the case of 
Venezuela, in UNCTAD Commercial Diplomacy Programme, UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/6, 7 February 2001, at 26-27, 
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/poditctncd6.en.pdf. 
30 He is currently a consultant with UNCTAD; LLB Universidad Catolica Andres Bello, Carcas, Venezuela; LLM 
Common Law Studies, Georgetown University, Washington D.C., USA 
31 Eugui, supra note 29, at 26-27. 
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situations.32  One way to remedy these material injuries is to bring a complaint to the WTO 
dispute settlement forum, seeking removal of the challenged subsidy.  The second way is to file a 
complaint in a national forum of the country importing the subsidized products, seeking the 
imposition of countervailing duties.33 
B.  THE PROBABILITY THAT EXPORT SUBSIDIES WILL EXIST IN ALL FOUR 
MODES OF SERVICE SUPPLY 
An initial question of concern to Members is whether there is a real export subsidy taking place 
in all four modes.  In Chapter I, I provided a table of examples of the four modes of service 
supply under the GATS.  In this Chapter, I seek to find a real situation to represent subsidies in 
each of the four modes of supply. 
1.  Mode I Examples 
As presented in Chapter III, the difference between Mode I, in which the services supplied from 
the territory of a Member State are traded into the territory of any other country, and Mode III, 
when services are supplied by a supplier from one Member, through commercial presence in the 
territory of any other Member, is whether there is a commercial presence in the export-targeted 
country.  If there is no commercial presence, the service belongs to Mode I.  If there is any form 
of commercial presence, the service falls under the Mode III category.  Now, Mode I and Mode 
III are often seen as taking place together.  It is reasonable to infer that, from a business 
                                                 
32 See Chapter IV of this dissertation. 
33 Benitah, supra note 23, at 33. 
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operator’s perspective, having a commercial presence in a foreign country will attract more 
business and more customers.  This is more commonly seen in financial and medical services, 
such as Citigroup, HSBC, UPMC, etc. 
To analogize the situation from the goods trade to the service trade in Mode I, examples 
could cover any benefit granted to service suppliers of a Member that increases its competitive 
edge, giving them an advantage in the market, such as preferential interest rates, tax rebates, 
duty-free equipment, and reduced- or rate-free telecommunications to supply the service.34 
There are many examples showing that countries are willing to support efforts of local 
companies to expand overseas.  Countries, mostly developed, have established institutions, often 
seen as banking facilities, to help their local industries export goods and services.  Most 
importantly, this example can take place in both Mode I and Mode III. 
The Export-Import Bank of the United States (hereinafter Ex-Im Bank) is one example.  
This bank is the official export credit agency of the United States.35  The charter of the Ex-Im 
Bank stipulates that, 
The objects and purposes of the Bank shall be to aid in financing and to facilitate 
exports of goods and services, imports, and the exchange of commodities and 
services between the United States or any of its territories or insular possessions 
and any foreign country… The Bank’s objective in authorizing loans, guarantees, 
insurance, and credits shall be to contribute to maintaining or increasing 
employment of United States workers.36 
 
The mission of this agency is to “enable U.S. companies — large and small — to turn 
export opportunities into real sales that help to maintain and create U.S. jobs and contribute to a 
                                                 
34 Luis Abugattas Majluf, Towards Disciplines on Subsidies on Agreements to Liberalize Trade in Services, Report 
Prepared for the CRNM/IDB Project, Aug. 2002, at 11, available at 
http://www.crnm.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=166&Itemid=82. 
35 Export-Import Bank of the United States, Mission http://www.exim.gov/about/mission.cfm. 
36 Export-Import Bank of the United States, Charter Section 2a, http://www.exim.gov/about/charter/section2a.cfm. 
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stronger national economy.”37  By providing working capital guarantees (pre-export financing), 
export credit insurance, loan guarantees, and direct loans (buyer financing), Ex-Im Bank has 
supported more than $400 billion worth of U.S. exports over 70 years.”38 
As part of its direct lending program, the Bank has a tied aid war chest it uses to counter 
specific projects that are receiving foreign-subsidized export financing.39  Tied aid credits and 
mixed credits are two of the primary methods whereby governments provide their exporters with 
official assistance to promote exports.40  Tied aid credits include loans and grants that reduce 
financing costs below market rates for exporters and are tied to the procurement of goods and 
services from the donor country.41 
The United States is not the only country that offers this kind of support to its local 
industries.  The United Kingdom’s export credit agency, the British Chamber of Commerce 
(hereinafter BCC), also offers export services, such as export training and help with export 
documentation.  Additionally, the BCC provides a series of supportive processes for local 
industries to export.42  One of the support programs aids the review of export communications.  
The review is designed to prevent language and cultural barriers from coming between British 
exporters and overseas business.43  The subsidy provided for these reviews are, 
The cost of each review is £500 + £87.50 VAT.  Eligible companies can receive 
from UKTI a subsidy of £350 towards the cost of the first review and a subsidy of 
£250 towards each of the second and third reviews.  VAT is charged on the full 
cost of each review.44 
                                                 
37 Export-Import Bank of the United States, supra note 35. 
38 Export-Import Bank of the United States, supra note 35. 
39 James K. Jackson, Export-Import Bank:  Background and Legislative Issues, CRS Report for Congress, at 3, 
Update November 14, 2001, available at http://crapo.senate.gov/issues/banking/2007-01-19-ex-imbank.pdf. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42  British Chambers of Commerce, Export Communications Review, 
http://www.britishchambers.org.uk/zones/export/export-communications-review. 
43 Id. 
44  British Chambers of Commerce, Subsidy, http://www.britishchambers.org.uk/zones/export/export-
communications-review/subsidy.html. 
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Australia has a similar support program and similar system of financial assistance, which 
helps local companies break into export markets.  For example, Australia utilizes the Export 
Market Development Grants (hereinafter EMDG) scheme, which is a key Australian 
Government financial assistance program for aspiring and current exporters.45  The EMDG is 
administered by Austrade.  The scheme supports a wide range of industry sectors and products, 
including inbound tourism and the export of intellectual property.46  Examples of the support 
provided by the EMDG are as follows,47 
(1) encouraging small and medium sized Australian businesses to develop export 
markets; 
(2) reimbursing up to 50 percent of expenses incurred on eligible export promotion 
activities, above a $10,000 threshold; 
(3) providing up to eight grants to each eligible applicant. 
Rwanda permits investors to operate in export processing zones, and these investors are 
exempt from duties or taxes.48  These enterprises are required to export at least 80% of their 
production or to supply the required percentage to export services. 49   These are examples 
showing that governments are indeed, under some circumstances, willing to support the 
expansion of local companies with or without any commercial presence in another country. 
                                                 
45 Australian Government Austrade, Export Market Development Grants (EMDG), 
http://www.austrade.gov.au/Export-Market-Development-Grants-EMDG/default.aspx. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48  Natasha F. Ward, Theoretical Challenges And Practical Difficulties For The Development Of Subsidies 
Disciplines In The General Agreement On Trade In Services, WORLD TRADE INSTITUTE, MILE 7, Sep. 30, 2007, at 33, 
available at 
http://web65.uranus.ibone.ch/images/stories/MILE/MILE%20Theses/MILE%207/Natasha%20Ward_MILE%207.pd
f?PHPSESSID=7f41ef09f5e133e08848ea72ed35570c.  (She cited this example from the GATS Working Party 
Report, Subsidies for Service Sectors-Information Contained in Trade Policy Reviews:  Background Note by the 
Secretariat, S/WPGR/W/25/Add.5, 7 (March 2007).) 
49 Id. 
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Some people may wonder about a government’s purposes in establishing such banks.  
Does this mean that governments are encouraging their local companies to export overseas?  Or 
does this simply demonstrate that local companies are so eager to expand their businesses that 
governments cannot stop them, so they instead choose to help ensure their benefits? 
In my opinion, the original purpose for establishing such banks may not be the main 
concern to discuss.  The focus should be on the present effect of having this banking system.  By 
setting up this support program, governments are encouraging domestic industries to export 
overseas.  The establishment of these programs subsidizes and creates incentives for local 
companies to go offshore.  Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that these support programs can be 
examples of subsidies in the Mode I supply of services. 
2.  Mode II Examples 
In Chapter I, I suggested the possibility that the traditional perspective of exporting is different 
between goods and services in the Mode II situation, in which services from the territory of one 
Member State are supplied in that state to the service consumer of any other Member State.  
Analogizing goods trade to services trade in Mode II, allows the conclusion that an export 
subsidy would be “any measure which grants benefits to domestic suppliers of a Member 
generating as a result of such measure ‘runaway business’ from another Member.”50  Most 
CARICOM countries provide incentives to the tourism sector through the Hotel Aids Ordinance 
and other programs.51 
                                                 
50 Majluf, supra note 34.  
51 Id. at 9. 
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According to some CARICOM countries’ regulations, it is obvious that these countries 
are promoting their tourism businesses.  The following are some examples:52 
(1) Anguilla:  enacts an Ordinance to provide for the establishment of a statutory 
authority known as the Anguilla Tourist Board for the encouragement, promotion 
and development of tourist traffic to Anguilla, for adequate and efficient tourist 
services for Anguilla, and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.53 
(2) Bahamas:  enacts an Act to encourage the construction of hotels in the colony by 
providing for the refund of customs duties and emergency taxes and certain other 
concessions, and for the exemption of such hotels from certain taxation, and also 
to relieve existing hotels from certain taxation.54 
(3) Dominica:  enacts an Ordinance to promoting the hotel industry in Dominica by 
granting certain relief with respect to customs duties, income tax, and real 
property tax to persons who expend moneys upon the construction or equipment 
of hotels in Dominica and for purposes incidental thereto and connected 
therewith.55 
(4) Mexico:  enacts a law comprised of five parts sub-divided into chapters and 
articles in Spanish.  Provides for the development of tourism, in terms of the 
planning of tourism including priority development zones, the decentralization of 
                                                 
52 Onecaribbean.org, www.onecaribbean.org.  (It is the official tourism business website of the Caribbean countries, 
and contains detail information on each Caribbean countries’ domestic regulations on tourism information.)  See 
also Caribbean Tourism Legislation Database, www.onecaribbean.org/content/files/legislationdatabase.doc. (It 
contains individual country’s domestic regulations.) 
53 Id. (The Anguilla Tourist Board Ordinance, 1993.  (No. 16 of 1993)) 
54 Id. (The Hotels Encouragement Act, 1954, with subsequent amendments.  Chapter 304) 
55 Id. (Hotel Aids Ordinance, 1958.  Ch. 321) 
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functions, the promotion and publicity of tourism, the National Tourism Fund, and 
operational aspects of the sector.56 
(5) St. Vincent & The Grenadines:  enacts an Act to provide incentives for the 
renovation, refurbishment and expansion of existing hotels, for the construction of 
new hotels, and for matters incidental thereto and connected therewith.57 
(6) Turks & Caicos Islands:  enacts an Ordinance to encourage the establishment, 
conduct, and expansion of development enterprises on the islands by the granting 
of relief from customs duties and taxes to persons engaging in such enterprises 
incidental to and connected with any of the foregoing purposes.58 
Fiji also has subsidies provided in the Hotels Aid Act.59  The article provides that, 
Subject to the other provisions of this section, where a hotel owner: 
(a) has been granted provisional approval; and 
 
(b) has completed the project and the amenities thereto have been provided in 
accordance with the provisional approval, 
 
he shall be granted a subsidy up to a maximum rate of 7 per cent of the total capital 
expenditure incurred in the project and in the provision of such amenities as may be 
approved by the Minister in the provisional approval, but less the cost of any land 
acquired for the project.60  (emphasis added). 
 
                                                 
56 Id. (Ley Federal de Turismo, 1992 (Federal Tourism Law)) 
57 Id. (The Hotel Aid Act, 1988.  (No.16 of 1988)) 
58 Id. (Encouragement of Development Ordinance, 1972.  (No. 2 of 1972))  
59 Laws of Fiji, Chapter 215, Hotels Aid, Ordinance No. 35 of 1964, Legal Notice No. 112 of 1970, Acts Nos. 35 of 
1975, 17 of 1981, available at http://www.paclii.org/fj/legis/consol_act_OK/haa105/.  (Hotel Aid Act is established 
to induce investment and re-investment in the hotel/resort segment of the tourism sector, the Hotel Aid Act is 
administered by the Product & Development Unit. The Hotel Aid Act consists of investment incentives divided into 
2 major parts. Part 1 of the Hotel Aid Act features standard allowances and subsidies whilst Part 2 features the Short 
Life Investment Package.)  See also http://www.tourism.gov.fj (it contains further information). 
60 Article 5(1), Laws of Fiji, Chapter 215, Hotels Aid, Ordinance No. 35 of 1964, Legal Notice No. 112 of 1970, Acts 
Nos. 35 of 1975, 17 of 1981. 
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Many countries, such as France, Malaysia, India, Singapore, the United States, and the 
United Kingdom, provide incentives to promote tourism.61  France provides grants to improve 
the accessibility of geographical regions such as Reunion.62  Singapore supports cheap flights 
and provides training grants to help its tourism business.63 
These examples support the claim that countries do provide incentives for tourism 
through domestic aid programs.  At a preliminary glance, these are real examples of Mode II 
subsidies.  However, I believe there are more factors to be considered. 
I propose to use the goods trade as a model to start defining certain aspects of the service 
trades, including the definition of subsidy and the categorization of subsidy.  We should be 
reminded that the definition of export subsidy is “subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, whether 
solely or as one of several other conditions, upon export performance, including those illustrated 
in Annex I.”64 (emphasis added)  As previously introduced, export performance is a criterion for 
determining whether there is an export subsidy.  Therefore, keeping this criterion in mind, we 
should look into these domestic regulations again. 
Based on the definition of export performance listed in the definition, the regulatory 
system to be adopted should provide an important condition, instead of merely identifying 
incentives.  This important condition is that a subsidy can only be granted if the consumers are 
foreigners, not nationals.  Suppose the law only grants subsidy to hotels, saying that if guests are 
not locals, these guests can receive a cheaper price for staying.  The government will help cover 
the price difference.  In this case, I suggest it is an export service subsidy in Mode II. 
                                                 
61 Rajeev Ahuja, Towards Developing Subsidy Disciplines under GATS, Indian Council for Research on International 
Economic Relations, Working Paper No.174, November 2005, at 29, available at 
http://www.icrier.org/pdf/WP174.pdf. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1999, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter the SCM Agreement], art. 3.1(a). 
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One possible situation is, in fact, the export performance.  Suppose the law grants a 
subsidy to hotels but does not require guests to be foreigners.  While, on its face, this law does 
not target foreigners, if that is the group that benefits in fact, the targeted consumers are still 
foreigners.  In this situation, I propose it is still an export service subsidy in Mode II. 
With this element, previous examples of domestic tourism aids can possibly be 
considered export subsidies.  Based on the limited information currently available, I do not 
believe that making a rush determination is appropriate.65  Hence, it should be left to Members to 
develop further findings on these relevant laws. 
Another commonly seen example is found in government support of events that attract a 
global audience, such as the World International Exposition (World Expo),66 the Olympics,67 the 
FIFA World Cup,68 etc.  While holding such an event, governments will grant support to the 
local industries, such as hotels, transportation, and other services.  This definitely gives the 
tourism industry parallel benefits.  But one crucial element is whether such world events are 
supported by governments.69  If the recipients of the benefit are governments themselves, then 
those benefits will not be considered Mode II examples. 
                                                 
65 Ward, supra note 48, at 33.  (She states that, “By contrast, for some services, the granting of a subsidy is tied to 
anticipated export earnings, for example, almost all subsidies for the delivery of tourism services through Mode 2 
may be considered de facto subsidies.”) 
66 Official Site of the Bureau International des Expositions, http://www.bie-paris.org.  (The history of having World 
Expo can be traced back to 1851, in London, United Kingdom.  As for the 2010 World Expo, it is held in Shanghai, 
China. The benefits that incurred from holding the World Expo.). Yang Lina, Shanghai World Expo to boost 
economy, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/video/2010-03/15/c_13211350.htm. (“Massive infrastructure 
construction and stimulated consumption are set to drive the local economy….  Some 70 million visitors from home 
and abroad, are expected to attend the event. Revenue generated by tickets, food and souvenirs is expected to reach 
11 billion yuan. Businesses related to travel and hotels are expected to pull in 80 billion yuan. (emphasis added)”)   
67 This international sports game is held in different cities.  The International Olympic Committee will make vote for 
the city during the IOC session.  See generally Official website of the Olympic Movement, 
http://www.olympic.org/en. 
68 The world cup is held by FIFA in different FIFA member countries for holding men’s international soccer 
tournaments.  See generally FIFA World Cup, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/index.html. 
69 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1B, 1999, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS], art. 3. (“For the 
purposes of this Agreement: 
(a) “measures by Members” means measures taken by: 
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3.  Mode III Examples 
In Mode III, an analogous example would be an export subsidy by any measure which provides a 
benefit to service suppliers of a Member to establish abroad or once the supplier is established to 
support its operation in another Member’s territory.70 
Subsidies under Modes III and IV rarely occur since no country has an incentive to 
support this type of activity in the services trade.  Instead, governments would encourage 
domestic corporations or people to provide services domestically.  Hence, Mode III and Mode IV 
examples will contradict the general practices.71  This is the conclusion found in a working paper 
published by The South Centre,72 which states that, 
Conceptualizing an export subsidy is not straightforward in the case of mode 3.  
There are not many situations where a government would give a subsidy, in the 
traditional sense, to a firm that was planning to establish itself in another country.  
It is more likely that countries wishing to attract foreign investment provide 
                                                                                                                                                             
(i) central, regional or local governments and authorities; and  
(ii) non-governmental bodies in the exercise of powers delegated by central, regional or local 
governments or authorities) 
70 Majluf, supra note 34. 
71 楊光華, 服務補貼規範展必要性之初探, 政大法學評論 translated in, Guang-hua Yang, Discussion on the 
Necessity to Have Service Subsidy Regulations in WTO, Chengchi Law Review, at 123, footnote 12 (2004).  Sauvé 
Pierre, Completing the GATS Framework:  Addressing Uruguay Round Leftover, Aussenwirtschaft, Vol. 57, No. 3, 
329-330 (2002), available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/Papers/Sauve/sauvegats.pdf.  Calvin Maduna, The 
WTO Services:  An Analysis Of The Gats And Issues Of Interest For Least Developed Countries, Trade-Related 
Agenda, Working Papers 23, South Centre December 2004 Development And Equity,  at 41, available at 
http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=224%3Athe-wto-services-
negotiations-an-analysis-of-the-gats-and-issues-of-interest-for-least-developed-countries&catid=52%3Atrade-in-
services&lang=en. 
72 See generally South Centre, www.southcentre.org.  (In August 1995, the South Centre was established as a 
permanent inter-Governmental organization of developing countries. In pursuing its objectives of promoting South 
solidarity, South-South cooperation, and coordinated participation by developing countries in international forums, 
the South Centre has full intellectual independence.  It prepares, publishes and distributes information, strategic 
analyses and recommendations on international economic, social and political matters of concern to the South.  The 
South Centre enjoys support and cooperation from the governments of the countries of the South and is in regular 
working contact with the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77.  The Centre’s studies and position papers are 
prepared by drawing on the technical and intellectual capacities existing within South governments and institutions 
and among individuals of the South.  Through working group sessions and wide consultations which involve experts 
from different parts of the South, and sometimes from the North, common problems of the South are studied and 
experience and knowledge are shared.) 
276 
incentives argued as a means of development assistance based on market 
failures.73 
 
It is true that a country rarely benefit from subsidizing its people and companies to 
provide services overseas.  But it is NOT impossible. 
Without considering reasons, countries do have laws that authorize subsidies to local 
companies to provide service overseas.  The Taiwanese government provides some regulations 
to help their local industries invest overseas, or to invest in countries that maintain diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan. 74   Another example would be the United States Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC).  OPIC facilitate long-term borrowing through U.S. 
Government-backed loan guarantees. 75   Moreover, OPIC provides direct loans, loan 
guarantees,76 and investment funds77 to U.S. businesses.  These provisions of support are based 
on the belief that it is appropriate to encourage overseas development through private 
industries.78 
The South Centre working paper further states that, 
                                                 
73 Calvin Manduna, The WTO Services Negotiations:  An Analysis of the GATS and Issues of Interest for Least 
Developed Countries, Trade-Related Agenda, Development and Equity (T.R.A.D.E.), Working Papers 23, at 41 
(December 2004), available at 
http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=224%3Athe-wto-services-
negotiations-an-analysis-of-the-gats-and-issues-of-interest-for-least-developed-countries&catid=52%3Atrade-in-
services&lang=en. 
74  Ministry of Economic Affairs, Department of Investment Services, Assistance for Foreign Investment and 
Technical Cooperation, http://www.dois.moea.gov.tw/asp/law1.asp and Assistance with Corporation to Invest in 
Country with Public Relation, http://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=J0040013. 
75  OPIC, Investment Funds, at1, available at 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=opic%20support%20market%20prices&source=web&cd=2&sqi=2&ved
=0CCkQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.opic.gov%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fdocs%2Fopic_investment_f
unds2009.pdf&ei=tL6wTuPCK8jt0gHxkdHjAQ&usg=AFQjCNHe8u8-_XYv6dvEKBB-pr8hfEQvYg. 
76 OPIC, Finance Eligibility Checklist, http://www.opic.gov/financing/eligibility-checklist. 
77 Overseas Private Investment Corporation, How Funds Work, http://www.opic.gov/investment-funds/how-funds-
work.  (“Typically, OPIC financing will be provided to the fund in the form of a loan in which certificates of 
participation guaranteed by OPIC (and backed by the full faith and credit of the U. S. Government) are sold to 
“eligible investors” as defined in OPIC’s governing statute.  In general, eligible investors include:  U.S. citizens; U.S. 
corporations, partnerships, or the like which are more than 50% beneficially owned by U.S. citizens; and foreign 
entities wholly owned by U.S. citizens. OPIC requires either (1) that the fund manager or general partner be eligible 
investors, or (2) a significant percentage of the limited partner capital of the fund (typically, an amount equal to 25% 
of the OPIC financing) be provided by eligible investors.”) 
78 OPIC, Overview, http://www.opic.gov/doing-business-us. 
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Export market development is another important category of subsidized services 
as governments provide assistance to cover the costs of various activities aimed at 
penetrating new markets abroad or for preparation of feasibility studies and 
project proposals.  These are all programmes primarily intended to lead to exports 
of services.  Many firms from LDCs and developing countries have complained 
about these subsidies, particularly, in engineering and consultancy services – as 
they find themselves unable to compete with subsidized foreign firms both abroad 
and in their own home markets.  Indeed, subsidized feasibility studies could lead 
to exports of major projects, which might also be subsidized by export credits tied 
to purchase of both goods and services from the country of origin.79 
 
The paper cites Canada’s Program for Export Market Development as an example.80  
This program is called Global Opportunities for Associations (GOA), formerly the Program for 
Export Market Development - Associations (PEMD-A).  The purpose of the GOA is “to provide 
contribution funding to support national associations undertaking new or expanded international 
business development activities, in strategic markets and sectors, for the benefit of an entire 
industry (member and non-member firms).”81 
The eligibility requirements include, for example, the obligation “to be a national 
association (or in some cases, a regional association with a national perspective) whose objective 
is to promote sector-specific international business development for its members and industry at 
large.”82  Eligible activities for this type of support include, 
Those activities may promote products or services, improve market access, or 
generate market intelligence.  Three types of international business promotion 
activities are eligible: 
 
(1) direct contacts (such as trade shows, outgoing missions and incoming 
visits) 
 
                                                 
79 Manduna, supra note 73, at 41. 
80 Id. 
81  Official website of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Agenda, Global Opportunities for Associations 
(formerly PEMD-A), http://www.tradecommissioner.gc.ca/eng/funding/global-opportunities-associations/home.jsp. 
82  Official website of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Agenda, Global Opportunities for Associations 
(formerly PEMD-A):  Program Eligibility, http://www.tradecommissioner.gc.ca/eng/funding/global-opportunities-
associations/eligibility.jsp. 
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(2) marketing tools (such as web site development targeting foreign 
customers, print materials and other materials that promote integrative trade 
opportunities of a Canadian industry 
 
(3) other marketing activities (such as research, awards programs, and 
indirect marketing that promotes relationship building, or improves access to 
foreign markets).83 
 
The benefits conferred by this program are, 
Annual non-repayable contributions range from a minimum of $20,000 to a 
maximum of $150,000 and the funding approvals are made for a one-year period 
for activities and related expenditures taking place between April 1 and March 31 
of the following year.  GOA provides matching funds of up to 50% of eligible 
expenses.84 
 
In certain fields of services, such as energy services, it is common to see companies 
receiving government support for situating R&D activities overseas.  Intensified global 
competition has forced companies to invent and develop commercially viable products and 
services faster.  At the same time, the requisite knowledge has become more multidisciplinary 
and more broadly located, making innovation more expensive and riskier than ever.  Hence, 
innovation strategies increasingly depend on global sourcing.  This has become a major motive 
for locating R&D outside the home country.85  So, it is also logical to say that, in the above 
situation, governments may subsidize local industries to establish subsidiaries overseas. 
In addition to the R&D example, government support programs mentioned in Mode I can 
also be applicable in Mode III.  The reason why these programs are applicable in both Mode I 
and Mode III is that these programs’ mission is to support their local industries ability to export 
goods and services offshore.  In order to export goods and services, companies can decide to 
establish subsidiaries or simply export through traditional channels. 
                                                 
83 Id. 
84 Official website of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Agenda, supra note 77. 
85 Radhika Perrot and Sergey Filippov, Localization Strategies of Firms in Wind Energy Technology Development, 
United Nations University – Maastricht Economic and social Research and training centre on Innovation and 
Technology, Sep. 2010, at. 8, available at http://www.merit.unu.edu/publications/wppdf/2010/wp2010-047.pdf. 
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Stories of success published on governments websites demonstrate that such subsidies are 
provided to businesses that are setting up a commercial presences offshore.  An illustrative 
example is Envirup.com, a Nottingham-based waste management service company that was 
seeking to build an Electrical Waste Recycling plant in Romania.86  With help from the British 
government, the company modified their original plan for approaching the Romanian market.87  
Guntert & Zimmerman Const. Div., Inc, a California-based construction company, also received 
support in its expansion into Eastern Europe.88  Because of the funds it received, Guntert & 
Zimmerman made a sale in early 2010 of $1.4 million in concrete paving equipment to a Czech 
Republic company looking to expand its fleet of road construction machinery.89 
4.  Mode IV Examples 
The Mode IV category would capture as an export subsidy any measure which provides a benefit 
to natural persons of a Member, who temporarily supplies a service in another Member’s 
territory.90 
At first glance, it also seems quite unlikely that a country would subsidize its nationals to 
work abroad.  Sending nationals to work offshore seems to mean giving away a country’s 
                                                 
86  British Chambers of Commerce, Case studies:  An Opportunity Too Good to Waste, 
http://www.britishchambers.org.uk/zones/export/case-studies_1/uniway-solutions-ltd.html. 
87 Id.  (“Romania is not yet ready for world class waste management.  The state-of-the-art services that we have here 
in the UK are simply not appropriate for that marketplace.  They need an intermediate level service.  For example, at 
the time of my visit, all municipal waste went straight to landfill.  However, the landfill sites were being closed 
down in preparation for accession to the EU.  They needed an immediate solution to the problem but were not in a 
position to introduce the best of what is available in the UK.  At present, the Romanian market for waste 
management is probably 20 or 30 years behind the UK”). 
88  Export-Import Bank of the United States, Small Business Success Stories, 
http://www.exim.gov/sbgport/SB_success.cfm. 
89 Id. 
90 Majluf, supra note 34. 
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resources to other countries.  Because countries generally wish to keep experts in their domestic 
markets, it is hard to conceive of the possibility of subsidizing nationals to work offshore. 
However, hypothetically, it is still possible for countries to subsidize their workers 
offshore.  Suppose a certain service sector within a country is full, and there are a lot of service 
providers unemployed.  Governments may take several methods in dealing with this situation.  
While attracting foreign companies to run business domestically is the most common strategy, an 
alternative is to provide support to citizens working abroad in the saturated sector.  This type of 
scenario has occurred in both the Philippines and in India. 
The Philippines government has long provided support to its nationals to work overseas, 
as its economy is incapable of creating jobs for all of its citizens domestically.  According to the 
Manila-based IBON Foundation, the Philippines faces historic joblessness, with an average 
annual unemployment rate of 11.3% from 2001 to 2007.91  Exporting labor has become the 
passport to safer and greener pastures for both jobless Filipinos and the government, which is 
already plagued by sporadic political unrest over legitimacy and corruption issues.92 
In response to these issues, the Philippines government established the Philippines 
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to help their people work overseas.93  Remittance 
is a key issue in this process, and the Philippine government has actively encouraged people to 
send money back home.94  Moreover, by migrating officially, migrants receive a number of 
subsidized benefits:  pre-migration training on social and work conditions abroad, life insurance 
                                                 
91  Carmela Cruz, Global Crisis Hits Overseas Workers Hard, ALTERNET, Dec. 27, 2008, 
http://www.alternet.org/immigration/115014/global_crisis_hits_overseas_workers_hard/. 
92 Id. 
93 See generally Official Website of the Philippine Oversea Employment Association, www.poea.gov.ph. 
94 Kevin O’Neil, Labor Export as Government Policy :  The Case of Philippines, MIGRATION INFORMATION SOURCE, 
Jan. 2004,  http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=191. 
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and pension plans, medical insurance and tuition assistance for the migrant and his or her family, 
and eligibility for pre-departure and emergency loans.95 
In Indonesia and Vietnam, governments are also supporting citizens that decide to work 
offshore, and governments seem to support the idea of exporting workers overseas to rake in 
badly needed foreign exchange.96  This results in new problems such as increasing crime rates, 
abuse of workers, and human rights violations. 
Some states in India face similar problems.  Kerala is a typical example, and its 
unemployment is a big issue, forcing citizens to find work in the Persian Gulf area.  An interview 
with a Kerala native reveals a proper description on the situation, “So many educated people are 
here, but we have no jobs.”97  Therefore, the government of Kerala provides some programs 
helping their nationals work abroad.98 
These are examples of Mode IV subsidies.  An interesting point is that these programs 
provided by governments may raise similar questions as those raised in Modes I and III.  
Because most of these programs are found in Southeast Asia, people may question the purpose of 
establishing programs that help nationals work overseas.  Due to bad economic markets, people 
are forced to work overseas.  Governments cannot stop them from working offshore.  Instead, 
they are taking actions to help them work offshore and to secure their people’s benefits.  
However, as mentioned previously, the original purpose does not matter, and what matters the 
most is the effect of providing incentives for service providers to work overseas. 
                                                 
95 Id. 
96  Tran Dinh Thanh Lam, Vietnam’s overseas workers get raw deal, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, July 2, 2003, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/EG02Ae05.html. 
97 Jason Deparle, Jobs Abroad Support “Model” State in India, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 7, 2007,  available at 
http://www.nd.edu/~jwarlick/documents/DeParle_JobsAbroadSupportModelStateinIndia.pdf. 
98  The Official Web of Government of Kerala, Service/Activities, 
http://www.kerala.gov.in/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&catid=85:non-resident-keralites-affairs-
department&id=2956:norka-dept-services&Itemid=2258. 
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C.  RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE PROBABILITY QUESTION 
From the above discussion, one can see that export subsidies may occur in all four service 
modes.  Some Members’ statements, providing no real world examples of service subsidies, 
question this conclusion.  On the other hand, apart from demonstrating that real world service 
subsidies exist, additional empirical evidence is necessary for further development.  This could 
affect Members’ motives to conduct future negotiations on service subsidies, and remind 
Members to fulfill their obligations under the GATS. 
Regarding the possible economic effects on export service subsidies, I have not 
conducted any empirical economic analysis.  Therefore, the monetary impact of trade-distorting 
effects caused by these possible export subsidies cannot be estimated or calculated.99  Moreover, 
more detailed information is necessary in order to examine some of the examples, and 
corroborate existing information on their impact upon markets.100  It is understood that some 
scholars opposed to regulating export service subsidies are on the side of developing countries.  I 
also recognize the truth that it is impossible to have a complete elimination of export subsidies at 
the present time.  This is why I have proposed a compromise structure for the current 
                                                 
99 Majluf, supra note 34, at 18.  (“Conceptually, these (SCM) conditions could apply to trade in services. However, 
the SCM assumes by definition that all export subsidies have adverse effects on trade, therefore they are prohibited.  
There is no need also to prove actual distortion of trade in order to prove export contingency.  In the case of services 
the possible effects of subsidies on trade are not as straightforward as in the case of goods; neither is the 
determination of those cases in which in fact, not by law, the subsidy is contingent upon export performance.”) 
100 Id. at 19.  (“Article XV recognizes that in “certain circumstance” subsidies have trade-distortive effects.  The 
outright probation of export subsidies, or their phasing-out, will require that a very convincing case be made 
demonstrating that in all circumstances exports subsidies distort trade.  Even in such a case treatment to be granted 
to developing countries should be carefully assessed.  Export-enhancing subsidies can play an important role in the 
development of service sectors in developing countries, and in pursuing national policy objectives.  Furthermore, the 
outright prohibition of this type of services can limit the possibilities open to these countries to benefit from the new 
market opportunities provided by trade liberalization in developed countries.  It might be the case that an initial push 
might be required to allow domestic services providers to venture in the international market.  From the point of 
view of developing countries interests it seems to be more favourable to rely on the trade-distorting effect, or injury 
test, rather that renouncing policy area altogether, in dealing with export subsidies.”) 
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negotiation.  This analysis provides further support for the concept of a hybrid regulation model 
for service subsidies and countervailing measures. 
What we can determine is that export subsidies do occur in all four modes of service 
supplies, even though their trade-distorting impacts are controversial.  This make a phasing-out 
process preferable to the outright and immediate elimination of all such subsidies.  Furthermore, 
the authorization of differential/preferential treatments is indispensible for the purpose of 
protecting developing countries and least-developed countries. 
I recognize that more empirical date is necessary to any final determination of the best 
regulatory system for service subsidies.  But enough information exists to conclude that 
Members should be motivated to act on their mandates, especially information exchange.  That 
process will help provide the information on which a better structure can be built. 
At the beginning of this chapter, I stated that if a hybrid regulatory structure is applied to 
service subsidies, a system for the imposition of countervailing measures may not be appropriate 
at this time.  With more information and empirical evidence (which can result from the required 
information exchange), however, Members might progress to a more advanced system regarding 
countervailing measures in the future. 
The fact that the appropriateness of countervailing measures is not an issue in applying 
the hybrid approach, does not mean that countervailing measures are inappropriate in services 
trade.  If we recall that the purpose of countervailing measures is to offset the trade-distorting 
effects resulted from subsidies, then it is reasonable to believe that having countervailing 
measures in the GATS might also create similar effects to offset service subsidies. 
I have concluded that it is probable that export subsidies exist in all four modes of 
services supply.  Suppose in the future negotiation rounds, Members agree to bring in the 
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concept of countervailing measures at the end of the peace clause period.  More issues will be 
left to handle, such as measuring the magnitude of subsidization, assessing the impact on 
domestic producers and in trade in general, and designing appropriate remedies.101  Without 
Members’ active participation in this matter, these technical issues will be hard to resolve.  
Nevertheless, it is important to consider such matters.  Therefore, in Chapter 9, I will follow up 
this discussion of the probability of subsidies in each mode of service supply by considering both 
the appropriateness of countervailing measures, and their administrability and feasibility within 
the GATS. 
                                                 
101 Id. at 20.  (He further mentions that, “Many of the provisions of the SCM would not be therefore easily 
transferable to trade in services….Therefore, a gradual approach might be advisable in developing rules and 
disciplines for subsidies on trade in services.  Some basic disciplines can be put into effect, and those reviewed and 
expanded over time.  The evolution of disciplines on subsidies on trade in goods shows the complexity involved in 
such as task.”) 
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IX.  THE POSSIBLE APPLICATION OF COUNTERVAILING MEASURES IN 
SERVICES TRADE 
In Chapter 8, I introduced the concept of countervailing measures in the goods trade and 
discussed its application to services trade.  Under the hybrid approach that I propose, a 
countervailing measures mechanism is not necessary at this time.  But, what about having 
countervailing measures in the future?  If, as was demonstrated in Chapter 8, one can find 
examples of service subsidies in each of the four modes of supply, is it feasible or administrable 
to have countervailing measures applicable to subsidies in trade in services?  In this Chapter, I 
will discuss the possible application of CVDs to services subsidies in general, and to export 
subsidies in particular. 
A.  CONDITIONS FOR THE IMPOSITION OF COUNTERVAILING DUTIES IN THE 
SCM AGREEMENT 
First, let us recall from Chapter 3 that there are three requirements for conducting CVD 
proceedings:  subsidy, material injury, and a causal relationship between the subsidy and the 
injury.1  In Chapter 7, I demonstrated that subsidies can exist as a practical matter in each of the 
four modes of delivery in services trades.  Thus, the first requirement for obtaining a CVD 
                                                 
1 See Chapter 4.II.B of this dissertation. 
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remedy can actually exist in each mode, but this does not yet satisfy the other two requirements – 
material injury and causation.  Demonstrating these two requirements with detailed, empirical 
evidence and adequate data is indispensible.  The limited availability of information regarding 
subsidies in the services trade is an obstacle in writing this dissertation.  It is expected that 
Members and international organizations will continue to make contributions to the information 
database.  Based upon the information available, however, I will propose relevant regulations for 
each requirement. 
1.  Recommendations on the Existence of a Service Subsidy 
The first requirement is that there is a subsidy taking place in a service trade.  Comparatively, 
this element is easier to prove than the other two.  As long as Members agree on the definition of 
subsidy and upon classification, we can identify the existence of a subsidy practice.  As shown in 
the examples in Chapter 8, export service subsidies can exist as a practical matter in every mode 
of supply.  Apart from export subsidies, many domestic service subsidies also exist.  In Rajeev 
Ahuja’s working paper, he observes that many (sector-specific) subsidies exist: 
(1) Telecommunication services:  The U.S. provides a number of direct mechanisms 
that target both service providers and subscribers.  Malaysia provides fiscal 
incentives to promote investments in telecommunication.  China provides low 
interest loans, offers discounted tax rates, and makes generous provisions of land 
in high-technology parks.  India provides preferential credit and guarantees and 
loans to service providers, like BSNL.  Singapore supports subsidized loans, 
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organizes training and human resource programs, reimburses trade promotion 
costs incurred by firms, and gives tax incentives to exporters.2 
(2) Social services:  Canada provides subsidies to promote public care in less 
prosperous provinces, for research and innovation in health information, for 
professional training, and for public health research for certain diseases such as 
cancer.  China funds a national disease prevention control centre and local disease 
prevention projects.  India provides funding for national disease control programs 
including HIV/AIDS, and for implementing family planning programs.  South 
Africa provides subsidies to facilitate primary health care, to enable lower income 
groups to use health care facilities, and to facilitate medical care in remote areas.3 
(3) Audio visual services:  France subsidizes their domestic industries to preserve 
their culture’s independence and diversity, unity and prestige.  The United 
Kingdom gives tax incentives to promote growth, employment, and investment 
and also to facilitate structural change to meet global competition.  Italy 
subsidizes activities that promote cinematographic projects, including film 
industry events, public institutions, professional associations, and a screenplay 
award.  Germany subsidizes movies that promote German culture and language.  
India provides subsidies for the construction of theatre/multiplexes and for the 
promotion and discovery of national talent.4  Canada has several film incentives 
programs, which no longer require Canadian content.5 
                                                 
2 Rajeev Ahuja, Towards Developing Subsidy Disciplines under GATS, Indian Council for Research on International 
Economic Relations, Working Paper No. 174, November 2005, at 29-30, available at 
http://www.icrier.org/pdf/WP174.pdf. 
3 Id. at 30. 
4 Id. at 32. 
5 See generally Claire Wright, Hollywood’s Disappearing Act:  International Trade Remedies to Bring Hollywood 
Home, 39 Akron L. Rev. 739 (2006).  (These feature film subsidies have caused material injures to the U.S. 
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One significant difference between the SCM Agreement and the proposed hybrid system 
is that:  in the current goods trade, only prohibited/actionable subsidies are subject to CVD.  In 
the proposed hybrid framework, at the end of the peace clause, semi-prohibited/semi-actionable 
subsidies would be subject to CVD disciplines. 
2.  Recommendations on the Material Injury Determination 
The purpose of having a CVD is to eliminate the effects of a subsidy from influencing the 
importing country’s markets.  What are the effects of subsidies?  Professor Sykes lists two 
possible effects: 
(1) Subsidies lower the producers’ cost of production, and this reduction can lead to 
two results: 
(a) Some subsidies depend directly on output.  In general, producers will 
respond to a reduction in short-run marginal costs by lowering the price.6 
(b) Even where the amount of the subsidy is not contingent on output and 
does not affect short-run marginal costs of production, it can affect long-
run marginal costs.7 
(2) Subsidies will have no impact on the output of recipients.8 
                                                                                                                                                             
Hollywood feature film industry.) 
6 Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, John M. Olin Law & 
Economics Working Paper No. 186, 10 (2003), available at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/186.aos_.subsidies.pdf.  (Prof. Sykes gives an example that, “the subsidy 
program may provide a producer with $1 for each widget that it produces, for example (or $1 for each widget that it 
exports, the classic “export subsidy” discussed below).  Subsidies that increase with output in this fashion are 
economically equivalent to a reduction in the short-run marginal costs of production for the producer that receives 
them.”) 
7Id. at 5.  (Prof. Sykes gives an example:  “imagine an unprofitable company that is unable to cover its operations 
under ordinary circumstances.  A subsidy to that company that is contingent on it remaining in business can avert a 
shut-down in operations – it must simply be enough to allow the company to cover its variable costs at some level of 
output.  Likewise, a subsidy can induce a company to build new capacity to enter a market when the expected 
returns to entry absent the subsidy would not be high enough to induce entry.”) 
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Even though it is possible to have export subsidies in the four different modes, the 
possible effects of subsidies are not as straightforward as they are in goods trade. 9   The 
assessment and calculation of a subsidy’s impact on domestic markets is fairly difficult.  World 
Trade expert, Luis Abugattas Majluf, raised this concern, saying, “As an example we can 
mention the presumption of serious prejudice when subsidies are above the benchmark of five 
percent of the price.  In many services it would be difficult even to determine the actual price due 
to the customized nature of many transactions.”10  In goods trade, it is relatively easy to calculate 
a subsidy’s impact upon an industry, since goods are tangible and the importation of goods can 
easily to be targeted.  On the other hand, it is quite difficult to assess a service subsidy’s impact 
due to the complexity of services trade since services are intangible and the importation of 
services through different modes can be targeted only with difficulty.  This difficulty also occurs 
in the injury test. 
According to the SCM Agreement, the applicable concept of injury is “material injury to 
a domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic industry or material retardation of 
the establishment of such an industry.”11  The concept of materiality is fairly abstract.12  Still, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
8Id.  (Prof. Sykes gives an example:  “that a government simply sends a company an unexpected check for $1 
million.  The money is in no way contingent on the company’s output, or on it remaining in business.  The owners of 
the company will be pleased to receive this subsidy, of course, but there is no reason for them to change their 
operations in any way – whatever level of output was most profitable without the subsidy will also be most 
profitable with the subsidy.”) 
9 Luis Abugattas Majluf, Towards Disciplines on Subsidies on Agreements to Liberalize Trade in Services, Report 
Prepared for the CRNM/IDB Project, Aug. 2002, at 18, available at 
http://www.crnm.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=166&Itemid=82.  Calvin 
Manduna, The WTO Services Negotiations:  An Analysis of the GATS and Issues of Interest for Least Developed 
Countries, Trade-Related Agenda, Development and Equity (T.R.A.D.E.), Working Papers 23, at 41 (December 
2004), available at http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=224%3Athe-wto-
services-negotiations-an-analysis-of-the-gats-and-issues-of-interest-for-least-developed-
countries&catid=52%3Atrade-in-services&lang=en. 
10 Majluf, supra note 9, at 20. 
11 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1999, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14. [hereinafter the SCM Agreement], art. 15, footnote 
45. 
12 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) for the definition of materiality is harm that is not inconsequential, immaterial, or 
unimportant. 
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SCM Agreement provides some factors for consideration. 13   The argument for material 
retardation of the establishment of a domestic industry is rarely successful in practice. 14  
However, measuring the degree of subsidies, such as calculating per unit subsidization rates, is 
challenging.15  Sauvé Pierre, however, proposes a possible method for calculating injuries: 
[T]he serious prejudice provision in the SCM Agreement does contain specific 
tests of total ad valorem subsidization that might be relevant in a service context.  
In particular, it is worth noting that the SCM Agreement states that serious 
prejudice is deemed to exist when the overall rate of subsidization exceeds 15% 
of the total funds invested in a new start-up operation.  In a sense, this resembles 
closely a plausible scenario under Mode 3, whereby the subsidization is given to 
entice the establishment of a commercial presence by a service provider.16 
 
Currently, due to the lack of data contributed by Members, there is not enough evidence 
available to make a determination on the appropriateness of CVDs.  Pierre suggests that 
calculating the injury is only plausible in mode 3 situations.  As for the other three modes, 
Members need to come up with more empirical analysis. 
Based on the definition of injury in the SCM Agreement, a determination of injury shall, 
                                                 
13 The SCM Agreement, supra note 11, art. 15.7.  (“A determination of a threat of material injury shall be based on 
facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture or remote possibility.  The change in circumstances which would 
create a situation in which the subsidy would cause injury must be clearly foreseen and imminent.  In making a 
determination regarding the existence of a threat of material injury, the investigating authorities should consider, 
inter alia, such factors as: 
(i) nature of the subsidy or subsidies in question and the trade effects likely to arise therefrom; 
(ii) a significant rate of increase of subsidized imports into the domestic market indicating the likelihood of 
substantially increased importation; 
(iii) sufficient freely disposable, or an imminent, substantial increase in, capacity of the exporter indicating the 
likelihood of substantially increased subsidized exports to the importing Member’s market, taking into account 
the availability of other export markets to absorb any additional exports; 
(iv) whether imports are entering at prices that will have a significant depressing or suppressing effect on domestic 
prices, and would likely increase demand for further imports; and 
(v) inventories of the product being investigated.”) 
14 RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:  INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE, 1113 (2007). 
15 Sauve Pierre, Completing the GATS Framework:  Addressing Uruguay Round Leftover, Aussenwirtschaft, Vol. 57, 
No. 3, 331 (2002), available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/Papers/Sauve/sauvegats.pdf.  (He further 
mentions in footnote 37 that, “It is also debatable whether it would be advisable to even contemplate a 
countervailing duty mechanism for services trade.  Countervailing implies that the use of an unilateral remedy to try 
to resolve what is inherently a bilateral or multilateral issue-at least two governments are involved, the one 
providing the subsidy and the complaining party.”) 
16 Id. 
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be based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) 
the volume of the subsidized imports and the effect of the subsidized imports on 
prices in the domestic market for like products and (b) the consequent impact of 
these imports on the domestic producers of such product.17 
 
If we utilize the same requirements in service subsidy situations, then the assessment of injury 
must be based on like services and service providers in a domestic market. 
If we apply the likeness criteria from the goods trade, then three factors can help us to 
assess whether services are alike:  physical characteristics, consumer habits and tastes, and end 
use.18  However, these criteria might raise questions in service trades.  Professor Bhala uses the 
end use criterion as an example:  “Consider tertiary education.  From the point of view of a 
teacher, face-to-face instruction and correspondence courses are not qualitatively like services.  
But, to a student who cares solely about obtaining a degree or qualification, the two pedagogies 
are like.”19  The concept of like services and service providers is also stipulated in the MFN and 
NT principle in the GATS, which can provide us with some guidance.20  Nevertheless, the 
current likeness criteria for services and service providers are not yet a major part of the subsidy 
discussions between Members. 
A Working Paper published by the WTO states that, 
One explanation may be the limited jurisprudence – only five disputes – existing 
so far under the GATS.  In two disputes, the panels and the Appellate Body made 
findings with respect to national treatment, but likeness was addressed in a very 
cursive manner.  Moreover, in WTO services bodies, Members have shown 
                                                 
17 The SCM Agreement, supra note 11, art. 15.1. 
18  Bhala, supra note 14, at 1589 (citing Appellate Body Report, Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (October 1996)). 
19 Id. at 1589. 
20 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1B, 1999, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS], art II, para. 1.  
(“With respect to any measure covered by this Agreement, each Member shall accord immediately and 
unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favourable than that it 
accords to like services and service suppliers of any other country.”)  Id. art. XVII, para.1.  (“In the sectors inscribed 
in its Schedule, and subject to any conditions and qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to 
services and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, 
treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers.”) 
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limited interest for discussing such issues in abstracto and have expressed a 
preference to leave it to case-law to determine likeness on a case-by-case basis, as 
has been done under the GATT.21 
 
Additionally, among WTO dispute settlement cases, different opinions arise.22  Also, 
among commentators, different opinions arise.23  It seems that no conclusion can be drawn on 
like services and service providers at this time.24  Such an undetermined result will definitely 
create problems in CVD proceedings for service subsidies. 
                                                 
21 Mireille Cossy, Determining “likeness” under the GATS:  Squaring the circle?, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:  
ECONOMIC RESEARCH AND STATISTICS DIVISION, Staff Working Paper ERSD-2006-08, Sept. 2006, at 2, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd200608_e.pdf. 
22Id. at 7-8.  Those cases are: 
Cases Comments on likeness 
EC – Bananas III the panel circumvented the difficulty of determining likeness of service suppliers by finding 
that “to the extent that entities provide these like services, they are like service suppliers” 
(Panel report in EC – Bananas III, para. 7.322) 
Canada – Autos The panel found that, contrary to what was claimed by Japan, there were no “like” Japanese 
and Canadian wholesaler service suppliers; hence, “in the absence of ‘like’ domestic service 
suppliers, a measure by a Member cannot be found to be inconsistent with the national 
treatment obligation in Article XVII of the GATS” (Panel report in Canada – Autos, paras. 
10.283-10-289) 
US – Gambling Different opinions on whether there was “always a need to assess likeness for both ‘services’ 
and ‘service suppliers’” (Panel report in US – Gambling, page C-44) 
Antigua argued, in essence, that a cumulative requirement would have the effect of limiting 
the scope of Article XVII since “less favourable treatment of like services would only be 
caught by Article XVII to the extent that the services are supplied by like service suppliers”.  
(Panel report in US - Gambling, p. C-44) 
the United States argued that likeness had to be established for both services and service 
suppliers.  (Panel report in US – Gambling, p. C-45) 
 
23 Id. at 8-9.  (These opinions include, “Abu-Akeel argues that the reference to services and service providers is of 
little practical significance because “any treatment of services is also, in effect, a treatment of the suppliers thereof 
and vice-versa”.  Hence, the reference to services and suppliers does not do any harm, “except for the confusion it 
may cause as it implies that the distinction has a practical significance”.  Nicolaïdis & Trachtman attach importance 
to the fact that Article XVII refers to both services and suppliers.  These authors argue in favour of a “disjunctive” 
test, whereby both services and service providers would have to be evaluated, but separately.19  This “disjunctive 
test” is supported by Krajewski who is concerned that a “cumulative” test would not allow Members to discriminate 
among like services because a measure “which treats service suppliers – for valid regulatory reasons – differently 
could be invalidated it if (also) affected the supply of like services”) 
24 Id. at 46.  (“The correlation between services and service suppliers has been dealt with in a cursory manner by 
panels, with the result that the concept of like suppliers remains largely empty.  This is not surprising since the 
traditional likeness test developed under the GATS is ill-suited to compare service suppliers…  There seems to be a 
shared feeling that the well-established GATT approach to determine likeness of goods cannot be mechanically 
transposed under the GATS.  The four criteria used in GATT jurisprudence offer a narrow base for determining 
likeness of services and service suppliers, and may have liberalizing effects exceeding what is necessary to protect 
conditions of competitions for foreign services and service suppliers.”) 
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With respect to the distinct modes of supply in service trades, I propose that the SCM 
Agreement factors might not be sufficient.  The SCM Agreement should include more factors to 
assess the materiality of injuries.  These additional factors may include:  unemployment 
rates/salary reduction of service providers (as in Mode 4), lost sales/lost business (as in Mode 3), 
and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of a country, among others.  The uncertainty of like services 
and service providers will hinder Members’ implementation of CVD mechanisms.25  However, 
the question of likeness of services and service providers arises not only in subsidy cases, but 
also in MFN and NT situations.  If more information and data are provided by Members, then 
these issues might be more clearly considered.  At the present stage, it is not possible to 
adequately judge the appropriateness of CVDs in service trades as a response to subsidies. 
Quite often, subsidies on services are likely not to cause injury to an industry in the 
country in which the services are consumed.  They may be more likely to cause injury to a 
competing service supplier in a third country.  As with subsidies on goods, this is a situation that 
cannot be remedied by the application of countervailing duties, precisely because the injured 
industry is not in the country of importation.  Thus, for both goods and services, this type of 
injury must be addressed at the multilateral level, in the Dispute Settlement Body, and not 
through unilateral national measures. 
                                                 
25 Pierre, supra note 15.  (He states that, “For mode 1, there would be several implementation problems, such 
as…the conceptual difficulty of defining ‘like services’ and ‘like domestic services providers.’”) 
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3.  Recommendations on the Question of Causation between the Subsidized Imports and 
the Injury 
The third requirement for the introduction of CVD relief is to determine the causal relationship 
between the subsidized service imports and the material injury suffered by domestic service 
industries.  In U.S. proceedings regarding subsidized goods, in a CVD investigation, “a private 
petitioner must show more than the existence of an illegal subsidy and material injury or threat.  
To be successful, the injury or threat must occur by reason of the unlawful subsidy.”26  The SCM 
Agreement provides some guidance in determining this casual relationship.27  The concept of 
causation in both the U.S. proceedings and WTO rules is less precise than the injury test 
discussed previously.  However, some U.S. and DSB decisions can provide guidance in 
assessing causal relationships, including those issued under the Anti-dumping or Safeguard 
Agreements. 
In dumping cases, “essentially, as long as injury occurs by reason of dumped 
merchandise, causation is assumed.”28  There are many other factors that could cause the injury 
                                                 
26 Bhala, supra note 14, at 1141.  (“In the Gerald Metals, Inc v. United States, United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, 132 F.3d 716, 720 (1997).  The court states that, “Substantial evidence is “‘such relevant evidence 
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”  Suramerica, 44 F.3d at 985 (quoting 
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 83 L. Ed. 126, 59 S. Ct. 206 (1938)).  However, the 
substantial evidence standard requires more than mere assertion of “‘evidence which in and of itself justified [the 
Commission’s determination], without taking into account contradictory evidence or evidence from which 
conflicting inferences could be drawn.’”  Id. (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487, 95 L. 
Ed. 456, 71 S. Ct. 456 (1951)).  Rather “‘the substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record 
fairly detracts from its weight.’”  Id. (quoting Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 488).”) 
27 The SCM Agreement, supra note 11, art. 15.5. (“It must be demonstrated that the subsidized imports are, through 
the effects of subsidies, causing injury within the meaning of this Agreement.  The demonstration of a causal 
relationship between the subsidized imports and the injury to the domestic industry shall be based on an examination 
of all relevant evidence before the authorities.  The authorities shall also examine any known factors other than the 
subsidized imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other 
factors must not be attributed to the subsidized imports.  Factors which may be relevant in this respect include, inter 
alia, the volumes and prices of non-subsidized imports of the product in question, contraction in demand or changes 
in the patterns of consumption, trade restrictive practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic 
producers, developments in technology and the export performance and productivity of the domestic industry”) 
28 Bhala, supra note 14, at 1112.  (He further mentions that, “…in practice, causation winds up being confused with 
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suffered by domestic industries.  The languages of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the SCM 
Agreement are similar,29 asking an investigating authority to differentiate other factors taking 
place at the same time.30  To determine whether a causal relationship exists between dumped 
products and injury is a crucial step for DSB panelists.31  Professor Bhala outlines five steps in 
this process: 
(1) “Identifying factors that could be causing injury to the petitioner; 
(2) Checking to see whether these factors are operating simultaneously; 
(3) Examining all of the factors to see if they do, in truth, have an injurious effects; 
(4) Differentiating injurious effects of subject merchandise from injurious effects of 
all other known factors; 
                                                                                                                                                             
correlation.  Cleaver choice of the period of investigation (POI) helps ensure the time during which merchandise is 
dumper corresponds to the time of woe as described by a petitioner.”) 
29 The SCM Agreement, supra note 27. 
30 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping 
Agreement), 1868 U.N.T.S. 201 [hereinafter AD Agreement], art. 3.5. (“It must be demonstrated that the dumped 
imports are, through the effects of dumping, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury within the meaning of 
this Agreement.  The demonstration of a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the injury to the 
domestic industry shall be based on an examination of all relevant evidence before the authorities.  The authorities 
shall also examine any known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the 
domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports.  
Factors which may be relevant in this respect include, inter alia, the volume and prices of imports not sold at 
dumping prices, contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption, trade restrictive practices of and 
competition between the foreign and domestic producers, developments in technology and the export performance 
and productivity of the domestic industry (emphasis added).”) 
31 Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, 
WT/DS184/AB/R, at para. 223 (July, 24, 2001).  (“Logically, such an assessment must involve separating and 
distinguishing the injurious effects of the other factors from the injurious effects of the dumped imports.  If the 
injurious effects of the dumped imports are not appropriately separated and distinguished from the injurious effects 
of the other factors, the authorities will be unable to conclude that the injury they ascribe to dumped imports is 
actually caused by those imports, rather than by the other factors.  Thus, in the absence of such separation and 
distinction of the different injurious effects, the investigating authorities would have no rational basis to conclude 
that the dumped imports are indeed causing the injury.”)  See also Appellate Body Report, European Communities – 
Anti Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fitting from Brazil, WT/DS219/AB/R, at paras. 191-192 
(July, 22, 2003).  (“We do not find that an examination of collective effects is necessarily required by the non-
attribution language of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.  In particular, we are of the view that Article 3.5 does not 
compel, in every case, an assessment of the collective effects of other causal factors, because such an assessment is 
not always necessary to conclude that injuries ascribed to dumped imports are actually caused by those imports and 
not by other factors…  We are therefore of the view that an investigating authority is not required to examine the 
collective impact of other causal factors, provided that, under the specific factual circumstances of the case, it fulfills 
its obligation not to attribute to dumped imports the injuries caused by other causal factors.”) 
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(5) Ensuring that injury caused by other factors is not erroneously attributed to 
subject merchandise.”32 
Moreover, The DSB clarified the issue of causal relationship in United States – Subsidies 
on Upland Cotton. 33   There it was determined that, in assessing causation, the DSB must 
consider other factors, such global demand, currency exchange rates, and other international 
issues.34 
With services subsidies, there may be other relevant factors causing injury to domestic 
service industries, in addition to subsidies.  As shown in the Mode II examples, many factors can 
affect a country’s tourism business.  Tourists might be more inclined to travel because their 
domestic currencies are strong, because of seasonal sceneries (e.g. cherry blossoms), or because 
of visa waiver programs.35  Conversely, a natural disaster may produce a negative impact on a 
country’s tourism business (e.g. Japan’s earthquake).36  The steps proposed by Professor Bhala 
can help to assess whether the imported service subsidies are the cause of the injury suffered by 
the domestic industry. 
From this discussion, we can presume that it is possible to apply CVD criteria from the 
goods trade in assessing service subsidy proceedings.  In fact, several concepts from the SCM 
Agreements are applicable by analogy.  But the connection will be stronger if more subsidy 
information on service sectors is produced by Members.  The hope here is that a reasonable 
understanding of the potential regulatory framework can serve to urge Members to provide 
relevant information on this matter. 
                                                 
32 Bhala, supra note 14, at 1162. 
33 Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R (March 21, 2005). 
34 Id. at para. 456-457. 
35 The Hawaii Korean Chamber of Commerce, Special Message from Lt. Governor Duke Aiona:  Promoting Hawai’i 
Tourism in Korea, http://www.hkccweb.org/en/tourism-in-korea.html. 
36 Tanya Mohn, Japan’s earthquake, radiation threats take toll on tourism:  Uncertainty of nuclear reactor, mixed 
messages have American visitors on edge, MSNBC.COM, Mar. 30, 2011, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42154541/ns/travel-news/t/japans-earthquake-radiation-threats-take-toll-tourism/. 
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B.  SUGGESTIONS ON THE COLLECTION OF COUNTERVAILING DUTIES 
Determining the appropriateness of authorizing CVDs in response to service subsidies is difficult 
with more empirical information and the type of data that could support findings of material 
injury and causation.  With more Member cooperation in future negotiations, however, this 
difficulty can be removed. 
I have proposed some useful concepts for applying substantive rules from the goods trade 
to the services trade in the previous paragraphs.  With respect to the administration of these rules, 
however, Members and scholars have been skeptical about just how to enforce or collect CVDs.  
Indeed, several obstacles arise due to the different modes of supply in service trades.  However, 
these problems are not entirely without solutions.  In fact, several existing rules can serve as 
guidance.  Therefore, regarding the collection of CVDs, I propose some possible approaches for 
Members in dealing with the four different modes of supply in service trades. 
1.  Some Ideas from the Value-Added Tax (VAT) System 
A value-added tax (VAT) or Goods and Services Tax (GST) is one form of tax that imposes a 
multi-stage tax on the consumption of goods and services,37 collected at every stage of the 
product development and distribution process, relative to the amount of value added during each 
stage.38  The EU Member States, Canada, Australia, and India have all enacted VAT/GST.  Since 
VAT/GST can be collected upon the consumption of services, it is useful to analyze 
                                                 
37 Christopher Deal, The GATT and VAT:  Whether VAT Exporters Enjoy a TAX Advantage under the GATT, Loyola 
of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Journal, 17 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 649, 651 (April 1995). 
38 GEORGE N. CARLSON, VALUE-ADDED TAX:  EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES, 2 
(1980).  Brandon A. Ketterman, VAT?  A Look Inside Canada’s Experience With the Goods and Services Tax, 8 San 
Diego Int’l L.J. 259, 273 (Fall 2006). 
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administrative procedures in the VAT/GST system and consider their applicability to the 
collection of CVDs. 
a.  Registration of Taxable Service Suppliers and Exemption  The first step is to identify the 
service suppliers who might be subject to CVD collection.  The method employed by the 
VAT/GST system to target taxpayers is registration, with some systems making it mandatory and 
others voluntary.39  I propose that this registration process is applicable in the services trades.  
Let us discuss Mode 3 and 4 examples that were previously discussed in Chapter 1.40  Suppose 
Country A provides a subsidy to its law firms/lawyers to work in Country B, and Country B’s 
domestic law firms/lawyers suffer material injury as a result of the subsidy.  Country B is 
entitled to collect CVDs from Country A’s law firms/lawyers located in its domestic market. 
The first step is that Country B’s authorities request Country A’s law firms/lawyers to 
register.  In this case, mandatory registration might be preferred.  As a result, Country B will 
have a better understanding about who the taxable companies/persons are and where they are 
located.  The next step comes when it comes time to file income tax reports, combined with the 
registration on the taxable Country A’s service suppliers, Country B’s authorities can collect 
CVDs from Country A’s service suppliers.  When creating the registration system, it is easier for 
Country B to monitor subsidized import transactions and collect CVDs. 
                                                 
39 Id. at 273. (“Canada uses a system of registration as its primary mechanism to administer the GST(Goods and 
Services Tax).”)  See also Graeme S Cooper & Richard J Vann, Implementing the Goods and Services Tax, 21 
Sydney L. Rev. 337, 344 (September 1999).  (“….Registration is a requirement for inclusion in the GST system, and 
so services to keep purchase and sales by private individuals out.”).  See generally WS Tibetan Chamber of 
Commerce, VAT registration, http://www.tibetancc.org/vat%20registration/vat%20registration.html (In India, it is 
also mandatory to register requiring that, “Every dealer who is registered under the Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975 (43 of 
1975) or the Delhi Sales Tax on Works Contract Act, 1999 (Delhi Act 9 of 1999) or the Delhi Sales Tax on Right to 
Use Goods Act, 2002 (Delhi Act 13 of 2002), at the time of commencement of this Act shall be deemed to be 
registered under this Act with effect from the first day of April, 2005, and he is not required to seek fresh registration 
under DVAT”). 
40 See Chapter I.B.3.a of this dissertation. 
 299 
However, this collection method – combining registration with income tax system – is 
only feasible in Mode 3 and 4 situations.  Since those service suppliers either have a commercial 
or physical presence in the importing country, they are subject to the jurisdiction of the importing 
country.  In Mode 1 and 2 situations, subsidized service suppliers are not located within the 
importing country.  Hence, they are not subject to the importing country’s jurisdiction.  
Requiring foreign service suppliers to register, without any incentives or punishment, would not 
be an easy system to enforce. 
Nevertheless, exemption from registration exists in the VAT/GST system.  Small 
businesses and retailers are exempt from registration.41  The main reason is that small businesses 
may bear high costs of compliance with the registration requirement.42  Taking this exemption 
and its rationale into consideration in the service subsidy situation, both injured states and 
foreign companies/persons bear burdens in complying with the registration process.  Perhaps 
Members can create a “privilege threshold”43 to exempt small businesses/low-income persons 
from the CVD collection.  Thus, it can relieve both the injured country’s and foreign service 
suppliers’ burdens in keeping up with the documentation and registration. 
                                                 
41 Barry M. Freiman, The Japanese Consumption Tax:  Value-Added Model or Administrative Nightmare?, 40 Am. 
U.L. Rev. 1265, 1282-1283 (Spring 1991).  (In the Japanese Consumption Tax (CT) system, “it relieves small and 
medium-sized business enterprises from paying all or part of their potential tax liability.  First, the law exempts 
those enterprises with taxable sales during the base period of less than thirty million yen ($231,000) from paying the 
tax…  Second, business enterprises with taxable sales between thirty and sixty million yen ($231,000 and $ 462,000) 
may claim a marginal or partial exemption from tax liability.”).  See also Graeme S Cooper & Richard J Vann, 
Implementing the Goods and Services Tax, 21 Sydney L. Rev. 337, 420 (September 1999).  (In Australia, “any firm 
that conducts an enterprise will be required to register if its total supplies exceed $50,000 per annum.  Non-profit 
societies, clubs and associations will only need to register if their total sales exceed $100,000 per annum.  Where the 
value of annual turnover is less than the threshold, the person is not required to register, but has the option of 
registration, provided they are carrying on, or propose to carry on, an enterprise.”).  Ketterman, supra note 40.  
(Canadian GST has a special scheme requiring that, “Businesses with total taxable sales of goods and services of 
less than C$30,000 per year may qualify for small supplier treatment, under which they need not collect nor pay any 
GST.  (citing Excise Tax Act, R.S.C., c E-15, §148(1985))”).  See generally Value-added and Non-Value-added 
Business Tax Act, amended June 25, 2003 Art. 13.  (Still, some countries don’t grant exemption to small business.  
Taiwan even taxes the smallest vendors.) 
42 ALAN SCHENK AND OLIVER OLDMAN, VALUE ADDED TAX:  A COMPARATIVE APPROACH, 78 (2007). 
43 See id. (However, it is up to Members to decide what the requirements can define the exemption.  In VAT/GST 
system, each country has its own threshold to exclude small businesses/persons from registration.) 
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b.  Reverse-Charging Rule  The reverse-charging rule concept is very unique in the VAT 
system.  The general rule of the European Union’s VAT system is that the intangible services in 
cross-border transactions are subject to the reverse-charging rule.44  This rule works by imposing 
VAT obligations on the recipient, rather than on the supplier.45  The objective is to prevent the 
situation where taxpayers order services from abroad to avoid paying domestic taxes.46  This 
concept can be brought into the collection of CVDs in the Mode 1 and 2 situations since, in these 
two examples, both are cross-border transactions on services.  Adopting this idea in collecting 
CVDs fits the purpose of having the reverse-charging rule in the VAT/GST system.  In sum, 
collecting CVDs from the consumer of the subsidized service is a plausible way to deal with the 
Mode 1 and 2 situations. 
Let us also consider the goods subsidy situation.  In collecting CVDs in conjunction with 
goods subsidies, who is the person who must pay CVDs at the point of the importing country’s 
customs control?  It is the person who brought in the subsidized goods that are subject to the 
CVD.  We can apply the same notion to service subsidy situations.  In the services scenario, the 
person who brought in the subsidized services could be subject to paying the CVD.  This concept 
may be applied to all four modes of service supply.  In the Mode 3 and 4 examples mentioned 
previously, the CVD is levied upon foreign service suppliers, either corporations or persons, who 
brought in the subsidized services.  In the Mode 1 and 2 examples, a CVD is levied upon the 
consumer of the service, who is also responsible for bringing in the subsidized services.  Such a 
unique concept does not happen in the goods trade since CVDs are mostly collected from 
                                                 
44 Stephen E. Shay, Victoria P. Summers, Selected International Aspects of Fundamental Tax Reform Proposals, 51 
U. Miami L. Rev. 1029, 1057 (July 1997) (citing Council Directive 77/338, art. 9(2)(e), 1977 O.J.(L 145) 77 (as 
amended by Council Directives 91/680,92/111,94/5)). 
45 Id. (citing Council Directive 77/338, art. 21(1)(b), 1977 O.J.(L 145) 77 (as amended by Council Directives 
91/680,92/111,94/5). 
46 Id. at 1058. 
 301 
suppliers, instead of consumers.  But because of the services trade’s distinctive modes of 
supplies, it is useful to introduce this reverse-charging rule when administrating the collection of 
CVDs. 
2.  Some Ideas from the U.S. Online-Shopping Tax Methods 
Another possible model we can examine for collection of duties on services is the taxation on e-
commerce.  This approach offers insight into Mode 1 supply situations.  Suppose Country A 
subsidizes online service suppliers from Country A who provide services into Country B through 
the internet.  Is it possible for Country B to apply CVDs to this type of services trade?  The 
government of Country B will have difficulties collecting CVD from a source that has no 
physical presence in Country B.  Internet shopping creates a similar situation and has been 
discussed regarding the collection of sales taxes, and can offer useful comparisons.47 
The modern notion of sales tax includes assessments on the purchase of goods and 
services, with sales taxes imposed on the transfer of tangible property as well as on some 
services.48  Sales taxes are typically collected at the point of sale by a seller; however, some 
states in the U.S. also have use taxes.49  Use taxes apply the same sales tax rate to out-of-state 
purchases made by state residents.  Enforcing the collection of use taxes is generally difficult.50  
The U.S. and its states employ different methods to collect taxes from states.  These include, 
                                                 
47  See Verne G. Kopytoff, Amazon Pressured on Sales Tax, THE NEW YORK TIMES, March 13, 201, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/14/technology/14amazon.html.  (discussing the matter that Amazon.com is facing 
the pressure from several states in collecting customers’ taxes). 
48 W. Ray Williams, Electronic Commerce in this 21st Century:  Article the Role of Caesar in the Next Millennium?  
Taxation of E-commerce:  An Overview and Analysis, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1703, 1709 (2001). 
49 Hal R. Varian, Debating the Prospect of E-Commerce Taxation:  Article & Policy Commentary:  Taxation of 
Electronic Commerce, 13 Harv. J. Law & Tec 639, 640 (2000). 
50 Id. (“…since states do not have tax jurisdiction over out-of-state companies and thus cannot require them to 
collect use taxes at the point of sale.”). 
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(1) collecting use taxes from consumers:  Michigan and Wisconsin have asked 
taxpayers to report their out-of-state purchases on their income tax forms, but 
very few have responded. 51   Individual compliance with this tax is virtually 
nonexistent for international or mail order category purchases.52  If a remote seller 
does not collect tax from a customer, it is up to that individual to report his 
purchase and self-assess the tax to the state.53 
(2) collecting use taxes from firms:  Businesses are subject to tax audits by state 
authorities, which is an easier way for states to collect a use tax from firms.54  
Compliance in this category is much higher than with collection from 
consumers.55 
While internet shopping is getting more and more popular these days, more states are 
eager to collect an online sales and use tax.56  Some proposed methods are applicable to CVD 
collections in Mode I. 
Registration processes should be combined in collecting CVDs in Mode I.  Let us take 
the example from Chapter 1.  Suppose Country A’s government provides subsidies to its local 
law firms, which support legal consultation over the Internet.  In other words, Country A’s law 
                                                 
51 Id. 
52 Pamela Swidler, The beginning of the End to A Tax-Free Internet:  Developing An E-Commerce Clause, 28 
Cardozo L. Rev. 541, 545 (2006).  (In footnote 29, she further mentions that, “Most people are probably not even 
aware of the use tax and self-reporting requirements.  (citing Gary C. Cornia, Sales and Use Tax Simplification and 
Voluntary Compliance, 24 Pub. Budeting Fin. 1, 5 (2004))”) 
53 Id. at 546-47.  (“Some States, such as New York, North Carolina, and Michigan, have added use tax reporting 
lines to income tax returns.  They give instructions on how to self-assess the amount of tax on out-of-state taxes.  
However, these efforts are only mildly successful.”) 
54 Varian, supra note 49, at 641. 
55 Id. 
56  The New York Times, Amazon v. the States, March 18, 2011 Friday, 
http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=f6361973d2bc5642887037730af08d50&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_
startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzB-zSkAb&_md5=927ea65c605a72fd8d145f8fa2fd1d27.  (“It’s ridiculous now when so 
many states are in deep fiscal trouble.  Illinois estimates that it is losing more than $150 million a year in uncollected 
taxes; California is losing an estimated $300 million a year.  That would cover more than half the planned cuts for 
the University of California system.”) 
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firms are “exporting” their legal services to other countries, including Country B.  As a result, 
Country B’s local law firms may suffer injury from Country A’s subsidies, since Country B’s 
nationals may seek legal services from Country A’s on-line legal service suppliers. 
In this example, how can Country B’s government collect CVDs after an investigating 
authority confirms a determination of subsidy, injury, and causation?  We can divide the 
solutions into two categories: 
(1) Collection from firms:  this category is comparatively easier than collection from 
consumers.  Applying the reverse-charging rule from the VAT/GST system, 
Country B’s authority has two options: 
(a) Voluntary compliance by foreign exporters:  Country B can ask Country 
A’s online legal service providers to register with Country B’s controlling 
authority.57  Then, Country B may ask Country A’s service providers to 
voluntarily submit their transaction details regarding Country B purchases 
from the Country A service providers.58  Country B’s authority in charge 
may collect a CVD based on each sale made to its domestic services 
markets.  However, the main concern is compliance since Country A’s 
                                                 
57 This voluntary registration idea is based on the European Commission (EC) proposed VAT amendments on e-
commerce.  See generally Thomas Fawkes, The Proposed E.U. VAT on Electronically Transmitted Services:  
Enforcement and Compliance Issues, 22 NW. J. INT’L. & BUS. 47, 50-57 (Fall, 2001), (explaining the European 
Union system to tax some forms of electronic commerce, and the discussions on the proposed amendments and 
discuss the possible disadvantages of the proposed amendments.) 
58 Id. (“The only exception to the registration rule is that, “if its annual level of sales within the E.U. is below 
100,000 Euro (approximately $70,000USD).  This exemption has been suggested in order to avoid placing undue 
burden on the development of global e-commerce as a whole, as well as protecting those businesses only making 
occasional sales to European parties.  (citing Proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive 77/388/EEC as 
regards the Valued Added Tax Arrangements Applicable to Certain Services Supplied by Electronic Mean, COM 
(2003) 349 final (hereinafter Explanatory Memorandum) at 14)”) 
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service providers are not subject to Country B’s jurisdiction.  If no 
sanctions can be enforced, compliance in this model is doubtful.59 
(b) Voluntary compliance from domestic firms: 60  Combined with the 
VAT/GST registration requirement, Country B’s government can ask local 
recipients of receive legal services from Country A providers, to register 
with the authorities in charge.  Later, these registered recipients could 
submit their financial statements to the authority in charge.  Based on the 
submitted transaction records, Country B’s government can collect CVD 
from Country B recipients of every subsidized service that has been 
purchased from a Country A provider.61 Compliance should be increased 
                                                 
59 Id. (In the EC VAT amendments situation, the same compliance issue occurs, but “EC fully believes that those 
non-E.U. vendors will comply with the new registration and collection requirements.  The EC concedes that, ‘the 
effectiveness of this approach to tax administrations can only be assured when it is underwritten by a reasonable and 
realistic expectation that non-compliance will be detected, remedied and that appropriate sanctions will be applied.  
The vendors’ reputations appear to be the VAT regime’s most effective deterrent to non-compliance by non-E.U., to 
risk exposure to significant and unresolved tax debts in the world’s largest marketplace cannot be considered 
prudent business practice.”) 
60 This idea is based on the OECD’s recommendations on cross-border business-to-business transactions.  See Centre 
for Tax Policy and Administration, International VAT/GST Guidelines, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Feb. 2006, at 13, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/36/36177871.pdf.  
(The rational is that, “it is recommended that in cases where the supplying business is not registered and is not 
required to be registered for consumption tax in the country of the recipient business, a self-assessment or reverse 
charge mechanism should be applied…  In the context of B2B cross-border transactions in services and intangible 
property the self-assessment/reverse charge mechanism has a number of key advantages.  Firstly, it can be made 
effective since the tax authority in the country of consumption can verify and enforce compliance.  Secondly, given 
that it applies to the customer, the compliance burden on the vendor or provider of the service or intangible product 
is minimal.  Finally, it reduces the revenue risks associated with the collection of tax by non-resident vendors 
whether or not that vendor’s customers are entitled to deduct the tax or recover it through input tax credits.”) 
61 This concept is based on Hawaii’s proposed tax collection on internet shopping.  See Mark Niesse, Hawaii 
deciding how to tax Internet shopping:  Hawaii lawmakers consider creative ways to collect taxes owed for online 
purchases, YAHOO FINANCE, Apr. 26, 2011, http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Hawaii-deciding-how-to-tax-apf-
3234488234.html?x=0&.v=1.  (“…either by requiring Internet sellers to hand over customer information to the 
government, or by enrolling in a multistate program in which websites voluntarily collect taxes… The tax collection 
method favored by House lawmakers would require out-of-state businesses to provide yearly statements to the 
government listing customer names and transaction amounts, which tax collectors could then use to seek the state’s 
general excise of 4 percent on neighbor islands and 4.5 percent on Oahu.’All we’re saying is, ‘Hey, we can’t force 
you to collect our taxes, but we can request information from you,’ said Rep. Isaac Choy, D-Manoa. ‘If you’re not 
going to collect our taxes, give us information and we’ll collect our own taxes…’”) 
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over the provider payment model because the recipients within Country B 
are subject to government audit. 
(2) Collection from consumers:  This one will cause more enforcement difficulties 
since individual transactions are hard to monitor.  As a result, individual 
transaction monitoring will be costly during the enforcement process.  Therefore, 
I propose that the best possible way is to ask consumers in Country B to self-
register with the authorities in charge, and report their transactions for CVD 
collection.62  Moreover, Country B can pursue educational campaigns and other 
methods63 to persuade Country B’s nationals to pay the CVD voluntarily or not to 
purchase subsidized service imports. 
From these proposed concepts, we can agree that it is not impossible to have CVD collection in 
services subsidies.  The problem might be the cost of administering any available method of 
CVD collection.  It is true that CVD collection may create burdens, such as registration and 
monitoring, on injured states, but it is up to injured states to decide whether to take such actions.  
Therefore, this dissertation tries to utilize the current rules or proposed amendments to design a 
feasible way for Members to decide. 
                                                 
62 The same difficulty took place in OECD’s recommendation on cross-border business-to-consumer transaction.  
See Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, supra note 60.  (“Member countries recognize that no single option… 
is without significant difficulties.  In the interim, where countries consider it necessary, a registration system should 
be considered to ensure the collection of tax on B2C transactions… it is recommended that a number of 
considerations be taken into account.  Firstly, consistent with the effective and efficient collection of tax, countries 
should ensure that the potential compliance burden is minimized.  For example, countries may wish to consider 
registration regimes that include simplified registration requirements for non-resident suppliers (including electronic 
registration and declaration procedures…  Secondly, countries should seek to apply registration thresholds in a non-
discriminatory manner.  Finally, Member countries should consider appropriate control and enforcement measures to 
ensure compliance, and recognize, in this context, the need for enhanced international administrative co-operation.”) 
63 See Varian, supra note 54.  (This idea is based on some U.S. states’ intention on how to make consumers report 
their out-of-state tax.) 
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C.  WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE ROAD FORWARD? 
In Chapters 8 and 9, I have discussed the purpose of countervailing measures and have proposed 
several recommendations for the application of countervailing procedures in service subsidies.  
Considering the purpose, the substantive rules, and the administrative aspects of countervailing 
procedures, Members should decide whether it is appropriate to apply countervailing procedures 
in service trades.64  This is the mandate stated in GATS Article XV.  At present, I believe there is 
the lack of real-world examples that justifies creating a set of rules for countervailing procedures.  
If more service subsidy examples through the required information exchange, then it might 
become appropriate to authorize countervailing procedures in service subsidies.  Until we have 
the empirical information on which to build such a system, the burden of proving the need for 
procedures seems not to have been met. 
I noted that Members are mandated to “address the appropriateness of countervailing 
procedures 65 ….(emphasis added)” instead of countervailing measures.  This observation 
implicitly confirms that applying the notion of countervailing measures in the services trades is 
acceptable, but the concern is how to apply them.  I have elaborated on some procedural aspects 
in this chapter for Members to consider in determining whether it is appropriate to have 
countervailing procedures. 
In Chapter 4 of this dissertation, I note that Members have two options when facing a 
subsidy granted by other Members.  In addition to unilaterally imposing countervailing 
measures, Members may challenge the subsidy within the multilateral system by following 
                                                 
64 GATS, supra note 20, art. XV.  (“…The negotiations shall also address the appropriateness of countervailing 
procedures….”) 
65 Id. 
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Article 4 or 7 of the SCM Agreement.66  When the peace clause stipulated in the hybrid approach 
ends, I propose that if domestic countervailing procedures are not applicable, then Members are 
left with the option to challenge the subsidy at the international level.  The procedure for such a 
challenge can follow the SCM Agreement model.67  Below is an illustration of the procedure: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  The SCM Agreement Dispute Settlement Procedure68 
The above illustration is based on Articles 4 and 7 of the SCM Agreement.  One thing in 
particular to note is the establishment of the Permanent Group of Experts (PGE).  It is stipulated 
                                                 
66 See Chapter 4.A of this dissertation. 
67 The SCM Agreement, supra note 11, art. 4 and 7 
68 羅昌發, 國際貿易法, translated in CHANG-FA LO, THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAWS, 840 (2002). 
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in the SCM Agreement that Members shall assemble a Committee on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures,69 which shall establish a PGE.70  The PGE’s function is to provide 
consultation services to the DSB and the Members.71  The Council for Trade in Services carries 
similar responsibilities to the committee in the SCM Agreement.72  Thus, the GATS Council 
could establish a group of experts who target subsidies in services.  Furthermore, the GATS 
experts group could consult with the PGE in the SCM Agreement since the hybrid approach 
adopts many notions from the SCM Agreement.  At the implementation stage, Members can 
apply measures regulated in GATS Article XXIII,73 which refers to the DSU Article 22. 
The absence of procedures for countervailing measures on service subsidies does not, in 
itself, prevent Members from challenging a disputed subsidy in the WTO framework.  The 
question is whether those procedures between governments at the international level currently 
                                                 
69 The SCM Agreement, supra note 11, art. 24.1.  (“There is hereby established a Committee on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures composed of representatives from each of the Members.  The Committee shall elect its 
own Chairman and shall meet not less than twice a year and otherwise as envisaged by relevant provisions of this 
Agreement at the request of any Member.  The Committee shall carry out responsibilities as assigned to it under this 
Agreement or by the Members and it shall afford Members the opportunity of consulting on any matter relating to 
the operation of the Agreement or the furtherance of its objectives.  The WTO Secretariat shall act as the secretariat 
to the Committee.”) 
70 Id. art. 24.3.  (“The Committee shall establish a Permanent Group of Experts composed of five independent 
persons, highly qualified persons??? in the fields of subsidies and trade relations.  The experts will be elected by the 
Committee and one of them will be replaced every year.  The PGE may be requested to assist a panel, as provided 
for in paragraph 5 of Article 4.  The Committee may also seek an advisory opinion on the existence and nature of 
any subsidy.”) 
71 Id. art. 24.4.  (“The PGE may be consulted by any Member and may give advisory opinions on the nature of any 
subsidy proposed to be introduced or currently maintained by that Member.  Such advisory opinions will be 
confidential and may not be invoked in proceedings under Article 7.”) 
72 GATS, supra note 20, art. XXIV para. 1.  (“The Council for Trade in Services shall carry out such functions as 
may be assigned to it to facilitate the operation of this Agreement and further its objectives.  The Council may 
establish such subsidiary bodies as it considers appropriate for the effective discharge of its functions.”) 
73 GATS, supra note 20, art. XXIII.  (“1... 2.  If the DSB considers that the circumstances are serious enough to 
justify such action, it may authorize a Member or Members to suspend the application to any other Member or 
Members of obligations and specific commitments in accordance with Article 22 of the DSU.  3.  If any Member 
considers that any benefit it could reasonably have expected to accrue to it under a specific commitment of another 
Member under Part III of this Agreement is being nullified or impaired as a result of the application of any measure 
which does not conflict with the provisions of this Agreement, it may have recourse to the DSU.  If the measure is 
determined by the DSB to have nullified or impaired such a benefit, the Member affected shall be entitled to a 
mutually satisfactory adjustment on the basis of paragraph 2 of Article XXI, which may include the modification or 
withdrawal of the measure.  In the event an agreement cannot be reached between the Members concerned, Article 
22 of the DSU shall apply.”) 
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also require the parallel authorization of national level procedures for authorizing countervailing 
measures.  Until further empirical information is provided to prove that need, I the WTO system 
should not authorize Members to establish domestic systems that would allow the imposition of 
countervailing measures in response to service subsidies.  The problems of administration of 
such a system simply are too great. 
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X.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The purpose of this dissertation has been to suggest direction for WTO Members on the future 
development of GATS Article XV, which only provides basic instructions on services subsidies.  
Due in part to the complexities of services trade, the development of rules addressing service 
subsidies under Article XV has been delayed and even ignored.  Nonetheless, Members have 
committed themselves to consideration of a regulatory mechanism for service subsidies, and 
should thus engage in an effort to negotiate a service subsidies framework. 
A.  CONCLUSIONS ON GATS ARTICLE XV 
Members and scholars have presented several submissions and papers on the definition of 
service subsidies.  In this dissertation, I have demonstrated the importance of regulating services 
subsidies, and pointed out Members’ inaction regarding their mandate under GATS Article XV.1  
My hope is that this discussion might reverse Members’ indifferent attitudes and provide 
incentive to re-open the discussion. 
                                                 
1 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1B, 1999, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS], art. XV.  (“…For the 
purpose of such negotiations, Members shall exchange information concerning all subsidies related to trade in 
services that they provide to their domestic service suppliers.”  At the time of this writing, only 5 Members have 
completed the information exchange mandate.) 
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1.  Subsidy Definition 
I propose application of the SCM Agreement definition of service subsidy as a starting point.  If 
Members are unable to identify an existing service subsidy that falls outside of the categorization 
found in the existing goods definition of subsidy, there is no need to have a new definition for 
purposes of services trade.  Nevertheless, Members may wish to provide for flexibility in 
language in order to cope with the unique characteristics of services trades and the possibility of 
future identification of subsidies that fall outside of the current framework for goods. 
The definition of “subsidy” for goods purposes, found in the SCM agreement Article 1, 
can simply be used for services purposes (with a single, minor addition, shown as underlined): 
(1) For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if: 
 
(a) there is a financial contribution by a government or any 
public body within the territory of a Member2 (referred to 
in this Agreement as “government”), i.e. where, but not 
limited to: 
 
(i) a government practice involves a direct 
transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and 
equity infusion), potential direct transfers of 
funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees); 
 
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is 
foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal 
incentives such as tax credits); 
 
(iii) a government provides goods or services 
other than general infrastructure, or 
purchases goods; 
 
(iv) a government makes payments to a funding 
mechanism, or entrusts or directs a private 
body to carry out one or more of the type of 
functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) above 
                                                 
2 A more flexible interpretation is required to assess the relationship between the financial contribution and the 
subsidizing Member. 
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which would normally be vested in the 
government and the practice, in no real 
sense, differs from practices normally 
followed by governments; 
or 
 
(i) there is any form of income or price support 
in the sense of Article XVI of GATT 1994; 
 
and 
 
(b) a benefit is thereby conferred. 
 
(2) A subsidy as defined in paragraph 1 shall be subject to the provisions of 
this agreement only if such a subsidy is specific in accordance with the 
provisions of specificity. 
 
One distinctive requirement of the SCM Agreement’s definition is specificity, a concept 
designed to eliminate trade-distortive subsidies.  I propose that this criterion is applicable in 
service subsidies and should thus carry over from goods to services.  Furthermore, the specificity 
requirement should be included in the definitional stage instead of the countervailing measure 
stage.  The definition of “specificity” for goods purposes, found in the SCM agreement Article 2, 
can simply be used for services purposes (with a single, minor addition, shown as underlined): 
(1) In order to determine whether a subsidy is specific to an enterprise or 
industry or group of enterprises or industries (referred to in this 
Agreement as “certain enterprises”) within the jurisdiction of the granting 
authority, the following principles shall apply: 
 
(a) Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to 
which the granting authority operates, explicitly limits 
access to a subsidy to certain enterprises, such subsidy shall 
be specific. 
 
(b) Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to 
which the granting authority operates, establishes objective 
criteria or conditions governing the eligibility for, and the 
amount of, a subsidy, specificity shall not exist, provided 
that the eligibility is automatic and that such criteria and 
conditions are strictly adhered to.  The criteria or conditions 
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must be clearly spelled out in law, regulation, or other 
official document, so as to be capable of verification. 
 
(c) If, notwithstanding any appearance of non-specificity 
resulting from the application of the principles laid down in 
subparagraphs (a) and (b), there are reasons to believe that 
the subsidy may in fact be specific, other factors may be 
considered.  Such factors are:  use of a subsidy programme 
by a limited number of certain enterprises, predominant use 
by certain enterprises, the granting of disproportionately 
large amounts of subsidy to certain enterprises, and the 
manner in which discretion has been exercised by the 
granting authority in the decision to grant a subsidy.  In 
applying this subparagraph, account shall be taken of the 
extent of diversification of economic activities within the 
jurisdiction of the granting authority, as well as of the 
length of time during which the subsidy programme has 
been in operation. 
 
(2) A subsidy which is limited to certain enterprises located within a 
designated geographical region within the jurisdiction of the granting 
authority shall be specific.  It is understood that the setting or change of 
generally applicable tax rates by all levels of government entitled to do so 
shall not be deemed to be a specific subsidy for the purposes of this 
Agreement. 
 
(3) A subsidy which is limited to a certain mode of service supply or a certain 
sector of service trades inscribed in the Schedule of this Agreement, such 
subsidy shall be specific. 
 
(4) Any subsidy falling under the provisions of prohibited subsidies shall be 
deemed to be specific. 
 
(5) Any determination of specificity under the provisions of this Article shall 
be clearly substantiated on the basis of positive evidence. 
 
Taken together, these two articles will serve to define what a subsidy is for purposes of a 
legal response in the context of services trade.  Unlike Members’ submissions, which only ask 
questions without answering them, my purpose here has been to respond with the best available 
information at hand, and to offer specific proposals that might move the process forward.  As the 
process moves forward, Members should also continue with the information exchange mandated 
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in GATS Article XV.  With more available information, the definition of service subsidy can be 
more complete. 
On the topic of the classification system, 3  I offer a third proposal for Members to 
consider.  Both the SCM Agreement and the AoA have their advantages and disadvantages.  
Members, certainly, can choose between these two classification methods.  But I propose a 
hybrid system, combining the SCM Agreement and AoA models.  The following table illustrates 
my proposed classification system in detail: 
Table 20.  Proposed Hybrid Classification System for GATS 
Semi-prohibited 
Subsidy 
Two categories of subsidies should be identified:  (1) export subsidy; (2) domestic 
substitution subsidy. 
Members should specify in their commitments what export and domestic service 
subsidies are in effect.  Members should set a time period during which to gradually 
decrease the subsidies according to schedules. 
Semi-Actionable 
Subsidy 
This type of subsidy should be actionable only if it causes: 
(4) injury to the domestic industry of another Member; 
(5) nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or indirectly to other 
Members under GATT 1994, in particular the benefits of concessions bound under 
Article II of GATT 1994; or 
(6) serious prejudice to the interests of another Member. 
If it can be confirmed that adverse effects have been caused by this type of subsidy, it 
should then be subject to reduction.  The amount of reduction would be determined by 
the DSB or the Working Party, whoever obtains the best available information. 
Non-actionable 
Subsidy 
This class of subsidy includes: 
(1) Assistance in services necessary to achieve certain public policy.  This may 
include, but is not limited to, assistance not involving direct payments to producers or 
processors, such as research, pest and disease control, extension and advisory services, 
marketing and infrastructural services, water, energy, transport, and education; 
(2) Disadvantaged regions not limited to specific enterprises or industries within a 
region, which is given as part of a general framework of regional development, and the 
region can be shown to be disadvantaged in terms of economic development (e.g. 
income per capital or household income per capita, or GDP) than the Member country 
as a whole; 
(3) Disaster Relief. 
(4) Research & Development:  Assistance for research activities conducted by firms or 
by higher education or research establishments on a contract basis with firms, up to a 
maximum of 75% of the costs of industrial research or 50% of the costs of pre-
competitive development activity, subject to a number of conditions on the scope of the 
assistance; 
(5) Environmental protection:  assistance to adapt existing facilities to new 
environmental requirements, provided that the help is given on a one-time basis, is 
limited to 20% of total costs, and is generally available to all eligible firms 
                                                 
3 Previously, Members were either opposed to the SCM Agreement classification system or to the AoA classification 
system. 
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Together with this hybrid system, I also propose to incorporate a temporary peace clause 
and temporary special and differential (S&D) treatment for developing and least developed 
countries.  These changes can be accomplished by adding the following language (adapted from 
AoA Article 13) to a new service subsidies instrument: 
(1) Until [such time as the information exchange mandate has been 
satisfactorily fulfilled], all categories of subsidies (semi-prohibited, semi-
actionable, and non-actionable) shall be: 
 
(i) exempt from the imposition of countervailing duties;4 
 
(ii) exempt from actions based on Article XVI of GATT 1994 
and Part III of the Subsidies Agreement; and 
 
(iii) exempt from actions based on non-violation nullification or 
impairment of the benefits of tariff concessions accruing to 
another Member under Article II of GATT 1994, in the 
sense of paragraph 1(b) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994 
 
(2) After [such time as the information exchange mandate has been 
satisfactorily fulfilled, and the peace clause of paragraph (1) expires], 
developing and least developed countries shall enjoy 
 
(i) permission to grant subsidies in Mode I for research and 
development activities and permission to maintain free 
trade zones in services; 
 
(ii) exemption from countervailing for least developed 
countries in all instances, and for developing countries 
whose gross domestic product (GDP) is blow an 
appropriate threshold established through negotiation; 
 
(iii) the maintenance of export subsidies on services for an 
additional period [to be determined], subject to their 
gradual removal; 
 
(iv) the exemption from countervailing duties for subsidies 
promoting the development of domestic services. 
 
                                                 
4 “Countervailing duties” where referred to in this Article are those covered by Article VI of GATT 1994 and Part V 
of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
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The incorporation of the peace clause should help encourage compliance with the 
information exchange mandate (which is the real current problem) by reducing Member fears of 
action by other members targeted at the existing subsidies they would disclose.  The 
incorporation of the S&D treatment provision insures that the interests of developing and least 
developed countries interests are taken into consideration. 
2.  Countervailing Measures 
In addition to the need to define service subsidy, there is another mandate.  As stated in GATS 
Article XV, Members are to “address the appropriateness of countervailing procedures.”  By 
using the term “countervailing procedures,” instead of the term “countervailing measures,” this 
provision appears to imply that the authors have already concluded that countervailing measures 
are appropriate, and the only remaining question is what procedures should lead to their 
application.  If this is correct, then Members should participate more actively in discussing the 
appropriate procedures for the implementation of a system that allows countervailing measures. 
So far, there has not been the Member cooperation necessary to produce workable 
countervailing duty procedures for service subsidies.  With my proposed hybrid approach, 
however, two important provisions would reduce Member concerns at this stage.  These are the 
peace clause and special and differential treatment for developing countries, discussed in Chapter 
7. 
I do not underestimate the significance of countervailing measures in service subsidies.  
Therefore, with the information available to date, I propose a basic structure for the application 
of countervailing measures in service subsidies.  In order to apply countervailing measures, an 
authority must find the existence of the three traditional elements:  the existence of a service 
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subsidy, material injury suffered by domestic service suppliers, and the causal relationship 
between the subsidy and the injury.  The second (injury) and third (causation) determinations are 
the difficult ones in the services context.  Nonetheless, an appropriate framework for 
countervailing procedures (and measures) can be negotiated. 
Quite often, subsidies on services are likely not to cause injury to an industry in the 
country in which the services are consumed.  They may be more likely to cause injury to a 
competing service supplier in a third country.  As with subsidies on goods, this is a situation that 
cannot be remedied by the application of countervailing duties, precisely because the injured 
industry is not in the country of importation.  Thus, for both goods and services, this type of 
injury must be addressed at the multilateral level, in the Dispute Settlement Body, and not 
through unilateral national measures. 
The collection of countervailing duties will be more complicated because of the different 
modes of service supply.  While the collection of countervailing duties on service subsidies may 
be difficult, however, is not an impossible task.  Similar processes used in e-commerce tax 
collection and the Value-added Tax/Goods and Services Tax (VAT/GST) system, provide 
workable possible examples.  Using these examples, I propose the inclusion of a registration 
system 5  and a reverse-charging rule in the countervailing procedure. 6   I provide different 
applications for these elements based on the different modes: 
a.  Mode 1 and Mode 2  The main concern for these two modes is that service suppliers are not 
located in the country of injury.  Therefore, they are not subject to the country of injury’s 
                                                 
5 The purpose is to identify the service suppliers subject to CVD collection.  The method is based on VAT/GST 
system’s registration, either mandatory or voluntary. 
6 This concept is based on the EU VAT system.  The rule is imposing VAT obligation on the recipient, rather than on 
the suppliers when trading cross-border intangible services. 
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jurisdiction for purposes of collection of countervailing duties.  This causes procedural 
difficulties in collecting CVDs.  Still, I offer a series of procedural regulations that may allow a 
workable system.  These include: 
(1) Collection from firms:  this category is comparatively easier than collection from 
consumers.  Applying the reverse-charging rule, the country of injury has two 
options: 
(a) Voluntary compliance by foreign exporters:  the service providers in 
country of injury can ask the importing country’s service providers to 
register with the country of injury. 7   It can then ask the importing 
country’s service providers to voluntarily submit their transaction details 
in regard to the country of injury’s corporations/consumers.  The country 
of injury’s authority in charge may collect a CVD based on every 
importing country’s transaction made to its domestic services markets.  
The main issue is that of compliance, since the importing country’s 
corporations are not subject to the country of injury’s jurisdiction.  If no 
sanctions can be enforced, compliance under this rule may be doubtful. 
(b) Voluntary compliance by domestic firms:8 Combined  with the registration 
requirement, the country of injury’s government can ask local 
corporations, which receive services from the importing country, to 
register with the authorities in charge.  Later, these registered companies 
need to submit their financial statements to the authority in charge.  Based 
on those submitted transaction records, the country of injury’s government 
                                                 
7  This voluntary registration idea is based on European Commission (EC) proposed VAT amendments on e-
commerce. 
8 This idea is based on OECD’s recommendations on cross-border Business-to-Business transaction. 
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can collect CVDs on every service that has been purchased from the 
importing country.9  Moreover; compliance with this regulation should not 
be difficult since corporations are subject to government audits. 
(2) Collection from consumers:  This will cause more enforcement difficulties since 
individual transactions are hard to monitor.  As a result, individual transaction 
monitoring will be costly during the enforcement process.  Therefore, I propose 
asking consumers in the country of injury to self-register with the authorities in 
charge, and report their transactions for CVD collection.  Moreover, the country 
of injury can pursue educational campaigns and other methods10 to persuade their 
nationals either to pay the CVD voluntarily or not to purchase subsidized service 
imports. 
b.  Mode 3 and Mode 4  In these two situations, compliance is relatively easier to monitor.  
Because the service suppliers either have a commercial presence or are physically located in the 
country of injury, they are subject to the country of injury’s jurisdiction. 
With the registration system11 and income tax system in place, the country of injury can 
have a better understanding about who and where the taxable corporations and people are.  The 
country of injury’s authority in charge can collect CVDs from the importing country’s service 
suppliers by looking into income tax records. 
I also suggest one possible exemption from the CVD.  In order to alleviate burdens in 
countervailing procedures, Members can contemplate an exemption threshold,12 which exempts 
                                                 
9 This concept is based on Hawaii’s proposed tax collection on internet shopping. 
10 This idea is based on some U.S. states’ intention on how to make consumers report their out-of-state tax. 
11 Mandatory registration is better. 
12 This idea is based on the VAT/GST system. Members shall decide what exemption requirements are. 
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small businesses/low-income persons from CVD collection.  This relief mechanism can ease 
both the country of injury’s and the service suppliers’ obligations to register or document 
transactions. 
These proposals are merely groundwork.  It would not be appropriate to have 
countervailing procedures at present given the minimal Member participation in information 
exchange and the resulting lack of relevant information.  However, having countervailing 
procedures in service subsidies is still plausible in the future. 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
Several conclusions can be drawn from my analysis.  First, the lack of real-world examples of 
service subsidies is a major obstacle.  One can see from Members’ submissions in Chapter 6 that 
they are clearly aware of this “chicken and egg” dilemma.  Despite this understanding, however, 
not much progress has been made.  Without real examples of existing subsidies, no empirical 
data can demonstrate the distortive effects of such subsidies.  This insufficiency in data is a result 
of Members’ lack of interest and participation.  In response to the information exchange mandate 
in GATS Article XV, only 5 out of 153 Members have submitted their information.  This is a 
sign that the political will necessary to make progress currently exists on the service subsidy 
issue.  They need more incentives in order to actively address service subsidies.  Otherwise, 
Sauvé’s observation will hold to be true:  the potential of trade distortion is only for 
economists.13 
                                                 
13 Sauvé Pierre, Completing the GATS Framework:  Addressing Uruguay Round Leftover, Aussenwirtschaft, Vol. 57, 
No. 3, 332 (2002), available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/Papers/Sauve/sauvegats.pdf. 
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Second, there is no need to completely re-invent the subsidies wheel.  Any new service 
subsidies instrument can begin with language found in the SCM Agreement and the AoA. 
Third, concerning the definition of both service subsidy and specificity, Members should 
stop pointing at problems and instead comply with their information exchange mandates.  My 
proposal regarding a definition is based primarily on the SCM Agreement mechanism.  There are 
doubts, however, about its application to services trades.  The financial contribution examples 
need to be completed.  Maybe more types of financial contributions exist in service trades.  The 
notion of territoriality needs to be flexible enough to capture the four modes of supply. 
Fourth, regarding countervailing measures, problems occur at two stages:  the 
determination of injury suffered by domestic industries, and the proof of causation between 
subsidy and injury.  Calculation of the value of injury is a huge challenge since prices in services 
differ.  Although there have been suggestions on how to calculate injuries under Mode 3, other 
Modes still have not been the subject of useful discussions on injury determination.  
Furthermore, the determination of causation is also difficult.  In the Mode 2 situation, clarifying 
consumers’ preferences, considering local scenic spots, and hosting world events are all 
important to a country’s tourism sector.  An authority needs to consider these factors while 
reaching the decision that the injury suffered by a Member’s domestic industry is caused by 
another Member’s subsidy.  In order to build this causal relationship, an authority needs to 
examine factors beyond those that have already been discussed in goods subsidies. 
Finally, regarding countervailing procedures, my proposal is that countervailing measures 
are not appropriate until further information on existing service subsidies is provided by the 
Members.  Even with better information and the framework for effective countervailing 
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procedures, the implementation, enforcement, and effective monitoring of countervailing 
measures will be time-consuming and costly. 
Based on these conclusions, the following are my recommendations for future work: 
1) Members must fulfill their Article XV obligation and provide information on 
existing service subsidies; 
2) Future negotiations should focus on the language of the SCM Agreement and the 
AoA; 
3) The definition of subsidy and specificity for services purpose should be based 
upon the existing definition of subsidy for goods purposes found in the SCM 
Agreement; 
4) The determination of both injury and causation in any service sector 
countervailing duty procedures must take account of the difficulties of making 
such determinations caused in each of the four modes of supply; and 
5) The first four recommendations require further work before a workable system for 
countervailing procedures and measures in the services sector can be properly 
established. 
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